Copyright Statement

The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand).

This thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the Act and the following conditions of use:

- Any use you make of these documents or images must be for research or private study purposes only, and you may not make them available to any other person.
- Authors control the copyright of their thesis. You will recognise the author's right to be identified as the author of this thesis, and due acknowledgement will be made to the author where appropriate.
- You will obtain the author's permission before publishing any material from their thesis.

To request permissions please use the Feedback form on our webpage.
http://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/feedback

General copyright and disclaimer

In addition to the above conditions, authors give their consent for the digital copy of their work to be used subject to the conditions specified on the Library Thesis Consent Form and Deposit Licence.
Queer Lives in Fiji

Tulia Thompson

Abstract

The thesis gives a postcolonial and queer analysis of queer lives in Fiji. It asks how queer Fijians negotiate the requirements of racialised and sexualised subjectivity in a context of ongoing social marginalisation. Drawing on Ahmed’s (2006) *Queer Phenomenology*, I undertake a phenomenological close reading to explore the effects of the family, church, and nation on queer bodies in Fiji.

The thesis is based on in-depth qualitative interviews with 13 Fijian people (10 Indigenous Fijian and 3 Indo-Fijian) from sexual minority communities in Suva during 2003 to 2004. The hybrid methodology directs attention to the way ethnonationalism, colonialism, and heterogender impacts on queer subjects. Drawing on the work of Gopinath (2005) and Ahmed (2006), I map out the relationships between queer Fijian bodies and the social sites they participate in.

Drawing on my close reading of these interviews, I argue that following the 2000 putsch family, church, and nation were powerfully aligned with heterogender as sites of racialised meaning making. As a result of this alignment, queer Fijians were subjected to continual ‘stopping’ where their motility within significant social sites was limited by their lack of heterosexual privilege.

Heterogender acts as a condition of Indigenous Fijian subjectivity, so that queer bodies risk either being coerced back to the ‘straight line’ or expelled from it through ‘straightening mechanisms’ (Ahmed 2006). In the family, closeness acts disciplinarily so that family members maintain silences and sexuality is relegated to the ‘background’. Violent acts against queer bodies are ‘disgust mechanisms’ that produce shared hyper-masculine subjectivities for
perpetrators and shamed subjectivities for queer victims. In this context, I argue that queer bodies are required to ‘swivel’ between ‘straight lines’, and queer ‘lines of sight’.
for

Charles Ormond Eyre Thompson
Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful to my supervisors, Dr. Vivienne Elizabeth and Dr. Yvonne Underhill-Sem. Dr. Yvonne Underhill-Sem brought optimism, clarity, and helped me see my project as part of Pasifika feminism. I hope we continue this talanoa. Dr. Vivienne Elizabeth has been my primary supervisor, and given incredible commitment to my research and my development as a scholar. Her caring, analytical insight and broader wisdom have led to the completion of this project. Dr. Tim McCreanor and Dr. Tamasailau Sua’ali’i have been supervisors and offered insight and support. Vinaka vaka levu.

I am grateful for the contribution of the Sociology Department at the University of Auckland, especially Dr. Bruce Curtis, Dr. Tracey McIntosh, Professor Maureen Baker, Vivienne Kent, Johanna Schmidt and Catharina Muhamad-Brandner. Catharina kindly swapped marking commitments with me during my submission period. Fiona Scott-Melton professionally proofread and formatted my thesis with much attention to detail. I am grateful also to Jackie Ede and Louise Pentney.

Dr. Tupeni Baba, Dr. Unaisi Nobobo-Baba, Dr Teresia Teaiwa, Larry Thomas, and Dr Theresa Koroi have provided useful talanoa about Fiji. I am especially grateful to Dr. Theresa Koroi for her perceptive translations of the participant information sheets into Bauan. Vinaka vaka levu.

I am grateful to the University of Auckland for a University of Auckland Doctoral Scholarship, and to the Graduate Research Fund of the Faculty of Arts, for partially funding fieldwork in Fiji in 2003. I am grateful for a Pacific Career Development Award from the Pacific Health Research Council during 2004-2005.
I am deeply grateful to the Sexual Minorities Project (SMP) from Women’s Action for Change (WAC), Suva. I am unable to name the people who generously participated in my research, but your stories within my thesis are testament to your courage. I am deeply grateful to the Auckland and Suva-based activist communities, especially Marlene Dutta, Peni Moore, Sangeeta Singh, Luisa Tora, and Gina Cole for their insight, laughter, talanoa, and shared vision for a peaceful Fiji. Vinaka vaka levu.

I am grateful for the loloma of Shannon MacCourt, Jakob Mehlhoff, George Parker, Mitch Cranch, Victoria Cockle, John Fenaughty, Elizabeth Thom, Bridget McKechnie, Rashmi Pilapitiya, Bart Langton, Nelson So, Lucy Husbands, Tracey Thompson, Tamadea Martin, Karishma Kripalani, Charlotte Craw and especially Rachel Bullen. Jaimie Veale proofread, edited, encouraged and remained steadfastly convinced of the project’s merit. I am also grateful to Karishma Kripalani for her editing of Chapter Eight and Charlotte Craw for her editing of the methodology chapter and ongoing conversations. I look forward to our continued dialogue.

I am deeply grateful to my family in Aotearoa and Fiji, especially Leilani and Deimos. Aunty Toa and Uncle Pate were kind and generous during research in Fiji. Madeleine and Miles have provided much love and homeopathic remedies. My father was deeply committed to me achieving my doctorate and helped fund fieldwork in Suva. I am deeply grateful and saddened that he is not here to see it completed.
Contents

Abstract .................................................................................................................. ii
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................. v

Chapter One: Introducing Queer Lives in Fiji ...................................................... 1
Violent Masculinities, Christianity and Ethno-nationalism in Fiji......................... 2
Queer Fijians ........................................................................................................... 7
Queer Phenomenology ......................................................................................... 15
Queer Bodies? ....................................................................................................... 20
Chapter Overview ................................................................................................. 32

Chapter Two: Theory ............................................................................................. 36
Orientation ........................................................................................................... 38
Lines ....................................................................................................................... 39
Straightening Devices .......................................................................................... 42
Compulsory Heterosexuality and the ‘Promise of Return’ ................................... 44
Stopping ................................................................................................................ 45
Disgust Mechanisms ............................................................................................. 46
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 47

Chapter Three: A Methodology of Dis/orientation ............................................. 49
Pasifika Criticism of Research from the West ....................................................... 54
Are Straight Lines also White? ......................................................................... 57
Queering Pasifika Methodological Frameworks .................................................. 60
Locating Myself as Insider/ Outsider ............................................................... 67
Data Collection .................................................................................................... 70
Analysis ................................................................................................................ 76
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 79

Chapter Four: Sexual Subjectivities: Queer Selves and the Promise of Return ......................................................................................................................... 80
Compulsory Heterogender and Cultural Lines ..................................................... 81
When Indigenous Fijian Fathers Give Pink Teddy Bears .................................... 86
Lesbian Subjectivity and Making Sense of Queer Moments ................................ 90
Points of Rupture: When the Queer Body Disrupts Lines of Inheritance ............ 95
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 98

Chapter Five: Femininity as an Orientation Device: The Recognition of the Queer Body in Fiji ............................................................................................................. 100
Always Already the ‘Other’: Visibility, Femininity and the Under-class .............. 102
Queer Subjects and Masculinity ......................................................................... 110
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 116

Chapter Six: The Ties that Bind: Family, Closeness, and the ‘Unspeakable’ ................................................................................................................................. 118
How Closeness acts as a Straightening Device .................................................. 120
Queer Experiences of Family in Fiji...............................................................125
Queer Experiences of Samoan ‘aiga in Aotearoa/ New Zealand......................128
Conclusion: The Conditions of Closeness and the Agency of the Queer Subject ......141

Chapter Seven: Christianity, ‘Unsaved’ Others, and the ‘Swivelling’ Queer Body .................................................................144
Fiji: Alignment of Church and Nation and Resistance Within........................148
Swivelling Bodies.........................................................................................158
Conclusion................................................................................................169

Chapter Eight: ‘Shame on You’: Violence, Powerful Masculinity and Mechanisms of Disgust in Fiji ......................................................174
Shamed Bodies: Understanding Queer Bodies as Bodies Subjected to Shame.......178
Disgust Mechanisms: The Enactment of Shame on Queer Bodies...............184
Violence as a Disgust Mechanism...............................................................188
Violent Masculinity as a Requirement of the Shared Direction of the Nation........196
Conclusion................................................................................................200

Conclusion: Stopping, ‘Straightening’ and Swivelling: A Phenomenology of the Queer Body in Fiji ...............................................................206
Straight Lines...............................................................................................208
Straightening Devices....................................................................................210
Disgust Mechanisms....................................................................................213
Stopping........................................................................................................214
Stopping and Straightening Mechanisms as Technologies of Power.............217
Interpellation and the Queer Subject............................................................218
The Swivelling Body: ‘Queer Survival’ and the Agency of the Queer Subject.....221
‘Shared Directions’ without ‘Straight Lines’: Conditions of Possibility for a New Fiji through Inheritance’s Queer Effects..............................................223
Conclusion................................................................................................225

References ................................................................................................226
Chapter One: Introducing Queer Lives in Fiji

This thesis gives an account of the lives of queer people in Fiji in relation to ‘lines’ of culture and ethno-nationalism (Ahmed 2006). I offer an empirically-based working through of Ahmed’s *Queer Phenomenology* to investigate the impact of both heterogender and culture on particular bodies that are constrained by them. Being Indigenous ‘Fijian’ often requires the ‘take up’ of heterogender as a condition of belonging within the family, church and nation. Queer lives are marginalised through heterogender and nationalism in site-specific ways. I focus on deeply personal processes of marginalisation intricately embedded in everyday language, emotions and understandings of the self. This thesis draws on queer and post-colonial theories to produce a close-reading of the stories people tell about themselves and others.

I chose Fiji because it is my Pacific ‘homeland’. Fiji is the place that I grew up with in my belly as a second generation Pacific migrant. As a New Zealand-born ‘Pacific Islander’ it was a place I belonged to but had never seen until I was a young adult. This version of Fiji was given to me by my Fijian-Tongan father and Kailoma Fijian family. Using my personal and family history as a touchstone for this project has allowed me to address the role of family relationships as a central site for the transmission of cultural ‘lines’ (Ahmed 2006), as well as self and culture making. It has given me first-hand insight to the ways that the relationships between culture and power are experienced bodily and psychically by queer people.

Fijian queer lives are rendered marginal through the force and salience of normative ‘lines’ of heterogender and ethno-nationalism. These lines are powerful, and entrenched through social institutions like family, religion and the military. These ‘straight lines’ work to orient bodies in particular directions – supporting the motility of some and exposing others to ‘stopping’
(Ahmed 2006) where they experience marginalisation from privilege. I argue that Fijian queer bodies are subjected to continual ‘stopping’, and ask what impact this continual ‘stopping’ has on their lives.

I argue that closeness and silence are intrinsically linked within the site of the family. This is because ‘closeness’ requires family cohesion where sexuality is relegated to the background. Silence acts as a requirement that reinforces heterogender; it acts as a disciplinary mechanism for closeness within the family. The everyday requirements for belonging to a church or family act as ‘straightening devices’ (Ahmed 2006). Bodies that deviate from heterogender are at risk of being coerced back in-line or expelled through acts of violence that act as disgust mechanisms which augment the heterogender system. Non-straight bodies are subjected to ongoing ‘stopping’ (Ahmed 2006); they do not experience the same ‘reach’ as other bodies. I rework Ahmed’s (2004) interrogation of disgust and ‘straightening mechanisms’ to argue that disgust mechanisms work to create shame for queer people, a particularly difficult emotion to bear. These pervasive ‘straightening mechanisms’ (Ahmed 2006) obscure but do not obliterate the agency of queer bodies. Queer bodies can and do ‘swivel’ between the direction of church or family, and their own lines of sight and desire.

**Violent Masculinities, Christianity and Ethno-nationalism in Fiji**

This section provides some political and socio-cultural background to Fiji prior to my research in 2003 and 2004. Most notably, I give an account of the 2000 putsch in Suva because of the relationship between this event and ongoing enactments of violent masculinity as a corollary of ethno-nationalism (George 2008).

In Fiji, histories of colonialism, structural violence and political turmoil (see Lal 2001) have created a context where masculinist ethno-nationalism augments the heterogender system.
This political backdrop forms a potent cultural requirement for Fijian identity-making. To be ‘in-line’ with the dominant direction of Fijian identity-making is to be taukei (Indigenous Fijian) and Christian. Ethno-nationalism acts as a ‘straightening device’ (Ahmed 2006) – a forceful mechanism for directing bodies. This cultural line is inherently heterogendered through the requirements of family and church, which I explore in Chapters Six and Seven. While my study does not focus explicitly on Fiji’s political processes or history or the Indo-Fijian community, Indigenous Fijian ethno-nationalism has played a powerful role in constituting a ‘shared direction’ (Ahmed 2006) for the Indigenous Fijian national imaginary that is both raced and heterogendered.

Christianity has been integrated into Indigenous Fijian everyday practice, belief, and social institutions to the extent that it can be seen as a significant means of constituting Indigenous Fijian subjectivity (See Newland 2013; Ryle 2005; Baleiwaqa 2003; Halapua 2003; Ratuva1999, 1994). That is, Christian belief and associated practices act as powerful aspects of what it means to be Indigenous Fijian. The most significant intertwining of Christianity and Indigenous Fijian life has been through the colonial history of the Methodist Church in Fiji from 1835 onwards (Newland 2013; Baleiwaqa 2003; Halapua 2003; Tuwere 2002), particularly through integrated concepts of vanua (land and people), lotu (church) and matanitu (governance) of the Bauan chiefly system (Halapua 2003; Baleiwaqa 2003, Duratalo 1986). Methodist missionaries incorporated Indigenous Fijian origin narratives into theology; ‘the notion of Degei as head of the Fijian pantheon of gods, and the establishment of the Wesleyan Fiji District were successfully woven together’ (Newland 2013, 229). The integration of Wesleyan Christianity into Indigenous Fijian world-views was dependent upon colonial relationships with existing chiefly hierarchy, particularly the highly political conversion of Cakobau (Ryle 2005), and influenced by the impact of Colonial Administration on the concept of ‘vanua’ (Tuwere 2002).
Colonisation has had pervasive consequences in Fiji for racial and national meaning-making. The British colonial administration brought near to 61,000 Indians to Fiji as indentured labourers for the plantation system (Newland 2013; Lal 1984). Many remained in Fiji, and the current Indo-Fijian population are the descendants of these labourers. While relationships between Indigenous and Indo-Fijian communities are not monolithic, there has been ongoing racial tensions that have contributed to the ethno-nationalist coups of 1987 and 2000 (Newland 2013).

The system of land tenure produced by the British colonial administration has connected particular named Taukei (owners) with particular vanua (representing ancestral lands as a narrowly geographically defined and sometimes contested region) that while in Indigenous ownership is often difficult to use: ‘iTaukei living on Native Land cannot sell, exchange, assign, or sublet their land, and especially that regarded as reserve or village land’ (Newland, 2013, 237, see also Boydell and Shah 2003, Kaplan 2005). Newland (2013) argues that this system has had a ‘rigidifying’ effect on Fijian identity (229).

Trnka (2008) has explored how political violence has become ‘embodied and disembodied’ by the Indo-Fijian community in Fiji. Discussing the violence that followed the 2000 putsch, Trnka asserts:

[j]t was fuelled by a racialized, anti-Indian rhetoric that promoted images of Indo-Fijians as vulagi, or foreigners, who had usurped the rights of the taukei, or Indigenous Fijians, to govern Fiji. Hand-in-hand with taukei assertions of ‘indigenous rights’ were condemnations of non-Christians and calls for Fiji to restore its status as a Christian state (3).
Christianity has been mobilised through rhetoric to garner Indigenous Fijian support for the coups of 1987 and 2000 (Newland 2013). Newland explains that during the first coup, Rambuka considered his role ‘as a calling to lead the Fijians as a chosen people and to promote Christianity as the religion of Fiji (231, see also Ratuva 1999). Interestingly, Newland (2013) points out that Christian nationalist rhetoric relies on a desire to preserve hierarchical order through patriarchal family form, as reproduced through the interweaving of Old Testament scripture and Indigenous Fijian kinship systems (232).

The constitutional recognition given to Fiji’s sexual minorities as part of the 1997 constitutional review gave way to strong public backlash by Indigenous Fijian ethno-nationalists and churches (George 2008). This ‘heightened level of controversy’ led to ‘increasingly powerful condemnation’ of public displays of gay identity. As George (2008, 165) asserts:

[r]epresentatives from many of Fiji’s Christian churches continue to voice strong opposition to tolerance of homosexuality, their position of authority constraining the political space available to local activists pressing their claims for tolerance and state recognition of their rights.

There has been a strong link between conservative Christianity and ethno-nationalism in Fiji (Ryle 2010; 2005; George 2008). George asserts that representatives of conservative churches and Indigenous elite both had a role in undermining the Indo-Fijian Prime Minister Chaudhry prior to the 2000 putsch.

In May 2000, ethno-nationalist insurgents entered the parliamentary complex by force and took government members hostage (George 2008; Kaplan 2005; Robertson and Sutherland 2001). These ethno-nationalist insurgents created a Fijian-led regime that lasted for 56 days
before they were charged, and an interim pro-nationalist government established. During these 56 days, the insurgents created an aura of fear and menace throughout the city by targeting public infrastructure; particularly through controlling hydroelectric supply by seizing the Monasavu Dam, and attacking police stations and telecommunications infrastructure.

George (2008, 169) discusses the outbreak of looting that accompanied the putsch as young Fijian men took up the broader anti-Indian rhetoric: ‘in the first day of the coup alone, incidents of looting, arson, rape, vandalism, and occupation saw f$30 million of damage in Suva’s central business district’. Like other commentators, George asserts that these criminal and violent acts were a complex mix of impulsive acts by young Fijian men within chaotic conditions, and strategic acts by ethno-nationalists aimed at producing fear and compliance (George 2008; Robertson and Sutherland 2001; Emde 2005; Cretton 2005; Kaplan 2005).

George emphasizes the way these acts were almost exclusively connected to violent masculinity, arguing ‘the level of civil chaos created by such hypermasculine activity served the interests of Fiji’s indigenous ruling classes and their ambitions to retain power’ (172). George astutely observes the sharp contrast between subsequent efforts by Fijian religious leaders and elite to justify the actions of the Fijian looters, compared to their sweeping condemnation of homosexuality that is posed as a ‘threat’ to Fijian society. The contrast in conservative Fijian leaders responses is an effect of the naturalising and legitimising of violent Indigenous Fijian masculinities while casting homosexuality as a social ill:

…in its most vitriolic form, their homophobic rhetoric has described physical threats such as tsunamis or spiritual punishments as curses that will be visited on Fiji if homosexuality is tolerated (173).

Privileged iterations of Indigenous Fijian masculinity have been continuously reproduced through acts of force and violence that in turn reinforce the significance of physical strength (see Teaiwa 2005). Teaiwa (2005, 2011) has explored the pervasiveness of militarism socially,
culturally and politically throughout Fiji. While Halapua (2003) has investigated the promotion of militarism through the relationship between lotu (church), chieftainship ‘turagaism’, and the state, Teaiwa (2005) focuses on the extensive spread of militarism into everyday life. The inherent masculinist and ethnicised delineation of socially pervasive militarism has occurred through a complex colonial and political history. In particular, Teaiwa explores complex cultural articulations of bati (warrior) ideology that are expressed at a more mundane level in Fijian rugby, but which were also drawn on by Rabuka to valorise the 1989 coup. These articulations of militarism are both gendered and racialised, and fuel a pervasive image of idealised Indigenous Fijian masculinity as physically robust and forceful. McCabe, Mavoa, Ricciadelli et al (2011) have shown that Indigenous Fijian boys experience a high bodily dissatisfaction wanting to achieve more musculature and to be bigger in order to have more physical strength. Many in the study had undertaken weight training. In comparison, Indo-Fijian boys were mostly satisfied with their bodies, and emphasising the importance of health rather than size and shape. Indigenous Fijian masculinity, then, is aligned with physicality as embodied efficacy to enact force.

**Queer Fijians**

Research on same-sex desire or transgressions of normative gender amongst people in Fiji has been very limited. McIntosh (1999) asserts that colonial accounts of Fiji mention ‘ritualised homosexuality’ but are flawed and inconclusive (Seemann 1862, Waterhouse 1866, Layard 1942 cited in McIntosh 1999). She asserts that the term vakasalewalewa is used for ‘transgenderal homosexuality’ in Fiji (11), conferring with Besnier (1994) that this identity is primarily about gender and the use of gendered behaviour. McIntosh explains that while transgendered people were once accepted in the Pacific, ‘it is now a more tenuous marginalised position’ (12). McIntosh argues that while vakasalewalewa are visible in both
urban and rural Fiji, ‘instead of being seen as a part of Fijian society it is seen as a “foreign body”’(12).

During the 2003-2004 time period of my data collection in Suva, the Fijian language term that I heard most commonly used for biological males who enact femininity was ‘viavialewa’ which translates as ‘wanting to be a woman’, and was a derogatory term. This sense of ‘viavia’ connotes wanting to be something you are not is connected to the way ‘viavia’ is used as an insult for someone who thinks to highly of themselves (Baba 2003). Fiji gay rights activists from the Sexual Minorities Project were interested in ‘reclaiming’ the term Vakasalewalewa – literally ‘in the way of a woman’ – which was a term they had heard was traditionally used. They had engaged with gender and sexuality activists from throughout the Pacific region; and were excited by dialogue with Samoan Fa’a fafine and Tongan ‘Leiti’ about using Fijian language. Over the last six years, I have seen the term vakasalewalewa used increasingly in a Pan-Pacific context. Unsurprisingly, when told about my project, Fijians often responded with polite bewilderment that I was mistakenly thinking of Polynesia, and that it did not happen ‘here’.

Bavinton, Singh, Naiker et al (2011) have conducted a community-based study into male-to-male sex, gender identity and HIV transmission risk in Fiji. Of 212 total respondents, 32.4% were straight identified, 14.8% were bisexual, 19.5% were gay, and 33.3 % were ‘transgenders’ or vakasalewalewa. Perhaps unexpectedly, questions on stigma and discrimination identified that most respondents (65.7%) felt ‘unsafe’ expressing their sexuality. The project recognised that gender and sexual identity was used in ‘complex and inconsistent ways’ (7) by the participants, and commented on emergent differences between ‘localised’ feminine gay and transgender identified people, and ‘globalised’ ‘masculine gay’ people. One difficulty with this project in terms of making sense of the data is the collapsing
of people who identify as vakasalewalewa, ‘TG’, and ‘transgenders’ into one category. Because the categories were pre-determined and then read out by research assistants, it is difficult to know how many people would self-identify as transgender or TG rather than gay or vakasalewalewa if not prompted.

Bavinton, Singh, Naiker et al (2011) assert that gender and sexuality are not understood as distinct categories in Fiji, stating:

‘…for many people in Fiji, the concept of a “gay man” is impossible, because if one is “gay” then one cannot be “male”. In the case of transgenders, the category of “transgender” is sometimes seen as encompassing both sexuality and gender together…For the most part, it seems that the “transgender” label, at least for male-to-female transgenders, implies attraction to straight men; however, many TGs appear not to use the sexual identity label “heterosexual”, perhaps because they are not biologically female…a number of people in our study identified themselves as both “gay” and as “transgender”’ (23).

The interconnectedness of gender and sexuality resonated with my own project and observations of gender in Fiji. The difference between localised and globalised identities is an interesting thread, and while it is beyond the scope of this project, this is a worthwhile area of future research. Although further consideration of HIV risk in Fiji is beyond the scope of my project, interested readers are directed towards the following regional reports by Pacific Island AIDS Foundation (2011, 2010), and UNDP Pacific Centre and UNAIDS (2005).

Brison’s (1999) ethnographic project on Indigenous Fijian children in a village in Rakiraki mentions the use of the term ‘qauri’ (derogatory slang for homosexual) by children as a means of teasing male children. Interestingly, the use of the term ‘quari’ seems to be subtle ‘gender
'policing' (Tomsen and Mason 2001) to effect tough or non-vulnerable behaviour of boys. Brison (1999) argues that age rank is a more significant hierarchy than gender for children and points out that both genders are expected to learn to be tough and withstand teasing. However I would argue that the use of different terms to tease boys and girls reflects a subtle hierarchialisation of masculinity and femininity, whereby femininity is devalued (see for instance, Braidotti 1999). Brison (1999) asserts children ‘called the boys quari (homosexual) if they cried and girls babies for similar behaviour’ (111). The insult seems a way of denoting a loss of status related to the child’s gender. This name-calling occurs in a context where older children are expected to be responsible for younger children, and where age rank acts as a means for children to practise authority over younger children.

White’s (2005) article on transgender Indigenous Fijian males in a Fiji secondary school makes deeply problematic assumptions about ethnicity and transgenderism in Fiji. Both are worth unpacking because of the similarity of our topics. White draws on her observations of and interviews with two 12-13 year old males while conducting fieldwork for a study on Fijian education in 2002. She optimistically argues that ‘there is the potential for transgendered identity to open spaces for engagement with non Fijian ethnic markers… the case study shows the individualized ways that two transgendered males negotiate and challenge notions of Fijian male authenticity’ (313). Her claim that transgender males ‘open spaces’ for cross-ethnic engagement is based on her observations of one of the boys. This young person wears shorts as well as the traditional sulu, enjoys English as a subject and chooses to converse in it, is friends with Indo-Fijian boys, is academically high-achieving, and wants to be a chartered accountant. She concludes:
Kevin’s desire to become an accountant – highly refereed in Fiji as an Indian occupation – and his inclusion of a pair of shorts in his school uniform, are both markers of Indian maleness (332, my emphasis).

White’s (2005) interpretation that this cluster of behaviours indicate an engagement with ‘Indian maleness’ ignores the situatedness of these actions in Fiji, and of Fiji more generally in a global context. Most of these actions could more accurately be assessed in relation to displays of social class. Wearing shorts and speaking English could be read as an engagement with the West – which is privileged – instead of an engagement with Indo-Fijian culture per se.

White (2005) points out that ethnic subjectivities in Fiji are constructed oppositionally, asserting that ‘many Indians conceive of their “disciplined,” “individualistic” way of life in contradistinction to the “laziness” and “carefree” ways of Fijians’ (321). Her interpretation that Kevin’s career goal to be an accountant and his high achievement is a marker of engagement with Indian ethnicity is problematic because it seems to inadvertently reify this social binary and therefore naturalise or essentialise a lack of achievement as ‘Fijianness’. I would argue that White’s perception of the similarities between Kevin and the Indo-Fijian boys he is friends with marks their shared orientation towards markers of the West and socio-economic privilege in a context where they are both systematically marginalised and othered. As Trnka (2008) has explained, Indo-Fijian masculinity has been depicted as weak and feminised.

White’s (2005) assertion that Kevin’s gender performance ‘opens spaces’ for engagement across ethnic lines does not take sufficient consideration of the power relations between Kevin and his Indigenous Fijian peers. Even though she provides a rich description of the way that
Kevin is teased and physically bullied by Indigenous Fijian boys, she doesn’t make meaning of these actions in relation to the operation of heterogender or Fijian subjectivity. As White describes:

Fijian male classmates taunted him with ‘poofter’ and ‘point five’. As Kevin emphasized, harassment often went beyond mere teasing, as verbal taunts were increasingly punctuated with punches and slaps… Relentless teasing engendered strong feelings of alienation from the Fijian peer culture and general disaffection for the school (328).

The situation described suggests that Kevin experiences increasingly violent ‘gender policing’ (Tomsen and Mason 2001) by Indigenous Fijian boys because of his transgression of heterogendered norms associated with Indigenous Fijian masculinity. Rather than gendered transgressions innately leading to ‘open spaces’ for non-essentialised ethnic identity, my reading would be that Kevin strategically engages with other markers of success in the face of violent exclusions from the indigenous community. The taunts and physical violence are instances of Othering where his racialised and heterogendered subjectivity is held to account. The inextricable connection between the heterogendered line and social worth within Indigenous Fijian terms means that Kevin’s engagement with ‘non-Fijian ethnic markers’ (speaking English and performing well academically) could be read as an alternate claims-making to ‘what it means to live a life worth living’ (Ahmed 2006, 25).

White’s (2005) analysis falters because of her a priori investment in representing Fiji as less rigid than the West in both gendered and racialised terms. She asserts:

…even if Fijian notions of race entail more explicit boundary maintaining mechanisms relative to the rest of the Pacific, these boundaries remain more fluid and negotiable than Western constructs. The question is whether, for Fijians, sex and gender
constructs are, or have been, relatively fluid and negotiable and in what ways these
interface with ethnicity (316).

This approach reifies and reproduces a binary between the West and the ‘rest’; even though it
seeks to represent Fijian culture favourably. It erases the history of colonial interventions that
has had profound impact on the production of racialised and gendered subjectivities in Fiji. It
also undermines the significance of local operations of power within Fiji that have
marginalising effects on sexual minorities.

George (2008) situates the fraught but emergent political activism of the Fijian gay
community within the context of recent political history, particularly the legitimation of
violent Fijian masculinity that occurred following the 2000 putsch. The June 2001 murders of
John Scott and his partner Gregory Scrivener showed the marginalisation of gay males in Fiji,
and further traumatised the gay community through the homophobic stance of media and
police (see also Goldson 2008; Scott 2004).

George (2008) describes how during 2002 some gay activists within the Suva-based NGO
Sexual Minority Project (SMP) started consciously subverting the practice of wearing sulu as
a means of challenging privileged masculinist and ethno-nationalist discourses of Indigenous
Fijian identity by ‘reclaiming the sulu’ (178). Sulu are a traditional item of Fijian clothing.
They are worn by Fijian boys, and by indigenous police officers and military. George points to
the symbolic value of the sulu as it is worn by the ‘indigenous establishment’; Methodist
ministers, politicians and representatives of Fiji’s Great Council of Chiefs. Gay activists from
SMP adopted a practice of wearing sulu alongside items of clothing that contested the
authority of the sulu as a marker of Indigenous Fijian masculinity. One indigenous gay activist
wore a sulu with a Che Guevara tee-shirt, and a shell necklace; while others wore sulu paired with retro 1970’s shirts from Suva opportunity shops. George concludes:

[d]einstitutionalising the sulu… can be read as a symbolic challenge to the hegemonic sites of indigenous institutional authority, and a simultaneous demand that indigenous diversity be afforded a more significant degree of mainstream recognition (179).

George’s (2008) analysis of Fiji’s political events in the early 2000s alongside the continued legitimization of violence as a marker of Indigenous Fijian masculinity sets the scene for my phenomenological close-reading queer lives in Fiji. My research takes a more micro-analytical approach by looking at the lived experiences of queer Fijians.

My work on queer lives in Fiji is important because it speaks to the intersections of politicised subjectivities and gives a nuanced analysis of the workings of power. The collusion of structural inequalities and direct violence shapes many local sites where intersecting margins of heterogender and ethno-nationalism are at work. I refine Ahmed’s queer phenomenology by exposing it to the complexities of empirical work – how orientation is experienced through a particular Fijian and queer lens.

My analysis takes the form of an in-depth close reading which works on both a political and methodological level to readdress the erasure of power relations in the personal stories of queer Fijians. For Ahmed (2006), bodies and objects are ‘fetishised’ when they are positioned in ways that erase their social and political history. I do not attempt to veer too widely into the broader socio-political structures which inform my analysis. There are significant bodies of literature on Pacific identity, colonization and imperialism in the Pacific, and sexuality which are beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, I offer a close-reading of site-specific instances where these structures inform the lives of queer Fijians. My thesis also offers voice – albeit
constrained – to what it means to live a life that is multiply discounted. As Ahmed (2004) asserts, emotions are politically and culturally produced. Chapter Eight of my thesis discusses feelings of shame experienced by queer Fijians by making the underlying history of shamed bodies and power relations visible.

While the historical analysis of Pacific sexuality is a prominent and valuable line of academic enquiry; it is only marginal to my analysis here. What I am most interested in is the contemporary and complex relations of power that produce the lived experiences of queer Fijians. Although my work touches on the relationship between global ‘gay’ identity and ‘local’ Fijian sexualities; the relationship between global and local identities is not my focus, nor is the history of these differences. My focus is on how the lived experience of being queer orients or disorients bodies, and how sites of cultural self-making are experienced by those who lack social privilege.

Since my fieldwork during 2003 and 2004, political events in Fiji have shifted the context considerably, making my research a near-history. I would like to note that while it is beyond the scope of my thesis, the political direction in Fiji since the 2006 coup is likely to exacerbate the existing collusions of hyper-masculinity, heterogender and poverty so that the lives of queer Fijians will in all likelihood be more constrained (see George 2008). Queer bodies – as bodies that go ‘offline’ – are subjected to ongoing violence. The ever-presence of extreme poverty plays a forceful role in limiting the possibilities for queer bodies to trouble heterogender.

**Queer Phenomenology**

My thesis is heavily indebted to Sara Ahmed’s (2006) articulation of queer phenomenology. Ahmed’s work, while offering some textual analyses, is primarily theoretical – drawing from
divergent bodies of work including post-colonialism, queer theory, and phenomenology. Her self-conscious interweaving of personal anecdote and theorisation alongside the exposure of phenomenology proper to queer and postcolonial literature is variously seen as an intentionally ‘disorienting’ writing practice linked to the political ethos of her work (Howard 2007; Shildrick 2009; McDowell 2009). Boellstorff (2008) and Haritaworn (2008) have both argued that while textually-based theorisation is the predominant mode of inquiry for queer studies, empirically-based research offers insights into positionality and social context not available through stand-alone theorisation. In particular, Haritaworn (2008) asserts that empirical research is better placed than textual research to navigate the complex positionalities of researcher and subject for projects on marginalised queer lives.

My own contribution to the broader development of queer phenomenology as a mode of inquiry is to offer an empirically-based working through of Ahmed’s (2006) concepts in relation to queer and racialised bodies. In this way, I explore what is ‘workable’ in a site-specific context. In some ways it is a working through the intersections of gender, sexuality and ‘race’ that Ahmed’s work precipitates, but does not fully explore. In the following section I introduce the languaging of Ahmed’s work.

The value of Ahmed’s (2006) queer phenomenological account for my research into queer Fijian lives is that it provides an analytical framework for accounting for the lived experiences of those who are othered. Ahmed’s use of phenomenology is a shift from the primarily discursive and epistemological approach that queer theory has taken (see Jagose 1996; Seidman 1997); but simultaneously she brings a ‘queer’ consideration of perception as sexualised and raced to phenomenology. Within my work, considering how the sexualisation and racialisation of social sites accounts for the orientations of bodies has been valuable for my analysis. Berlant (2011) asserts that queer phenomenology drives inquiry into the relational
and subjective experience of the oriented body alongside ‘the modes of circulation through
which subjects enter into contemporary wordliness, identity and belonging’ (197). For Ahmed
(2006), the directions we face or turn towards are inherently shaped through social and
political processes. This concept of orientation speaks to the relationship between bodies and
power, and our means of making sense of social norms. She claims:

…orientations shape not only how we inhabit space, but how we apprehend this world
of shared inhabitance, as well as ‘who’ or ‘what’ we direct our energy and attention
toward (3).

Using orientation as a starting point allows Ahmed to investigate the ways in which particular
objects act as ‘orientation devices’ (3). That is, they become means of directing our thoughts
or actions, a means of making sense of the world. Ahmed introduces this concept by discussing
the role that tables – writing tables in particular – play in philosophy. She points out that
while the proximity of the table to the body of the philosopher reveals the orientation of
philosophy, the table itself often ‘disappears from view’ (4). The table is ‘behind’ the writer
because it recedes from view, as an effect of its familiarity, even though it directs the writer
towards writing. We are thus directed to observe the relationship between our perception,
and the social norms and processes that make some objects – and not others – apparent to us.
The social objects which ‘direct’ us might similarly recede from view as an effect of their
familiarity. Drawing on Marxism, Ahmed argues that the ‘arrival’ of the object into our field of
vision is an ‘effect of history’ (40). The history of the object is obscured by its spatiality; ‘a
history that involves multiple forms of contact between others’ (41). Objects extend the
‘reach’ of the body (51). But objects are not equally available. As Ahmed asserts ‘objects, as
well as spaces, are made for some kinds of bodies more than others’.
The value of Ahmed’s (2006) *Queer Phenomenology* for my account of the role of heterogender, racism and colonisation in Fijian queer lives in its articulation of ‘lines’ as a means of describing the accrued force and continuity of social processes, that have both productive and oppressive effects. This concept has allowed me to consider how heterogender is reproduced as a normative condition of Indigenous Fijian subjectivity. This provided insight into the complex experiences of those who are marginalised along both heterogendered and racialised lines.

I describe ‘lines’ more extensively in the following theory chapter, but I want to signal here that Ahmed (2006) uses ‘lines’ to phenomenologically describe the effect of a shared direction over time. She builds on Butler’s (1997) account of performativity to explain the role that repeated actions play in augmenting the force of particular directions (See Howard 2007).

Ahmed (2006, 15) argues:

> [w]e are ‘in line’ when we face the direction that is already faced by others. Being ‘in line’ allows bodies to extend into spaces that, as it were, have already taken their shape.

Thus, Ahmed (2006) provides a valuable analysis of the ways in which heterosex and racism cohere as lines which privilege certain bodies by extending the motility of the body in certain directions, but which ‘stops’ bodies of others. She develops her argument through advancing the role of social investment in these lines, which I will explore further in the following chapter.

Ahmed’s (2006) *Queer Phenomenology* includes chapters on sexual orientation, and then the orientation of bodies through racism, but does not substantially investigate the collusions of these lines. Ironically, as I read *Queer Phenomenology* for the first time, I imagined that she was leading us towards the intersection of heterosexed and racialised lines to such an extent I was
disoriented by the conclusion on disorientation. That is, I pre-empted an analysis of the effects of lines of heterogender and racism on the queer non-white body. Instead, Ahmed’s conclusion on ‘disorientation’ opens up political or strategic possibilities for fleeting moments when institutionalised social norms of sexuality or race cannot be made to run. Howard (2007) points out that while Ahmed considers the prospect of queer connections through disorientation from prevalent social norms, ‘she does not prescribe disorientation as the necessary path to political redemption’ (375). However, Ahmed opens a ‘line of flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980) for thinking through sexuality and ‘race’.

As a mixed-race queer the choice is not either to become white and straight or to disappear. This is a choice between two different kinds of death. The task is to trace the lines for a different genealogy, one that would embrace the failure to inherit the family line as the condition of possibility for another way of dwelling in the world (Ahmed 2006, 178).

For Ahmed (2006), moments of ‘disorientation’ from the conditions of normative heterosexuality or race offer ethical possibilities for positioning ourselves differently. That is, for queer subjects to consciously not take up the conditions of the ‘straight line’. Queer subjects are shaped by heterogender, but do not receive the rewards or pleasures of this ‘shared direction’. My thesis starts with bodies that are both queer and non-white as my point of arrival. And yet, I found Ahmed’s remark about taking up the ‘failure to inherit’ deeply unsettling. Because while my project explores ‘ways of dwelling’ as both queer and non-white, the inability to inherit ‘family lines’ of heterogender or ‘race’ does not open up the ‘choice’ to ‘not’ inherit them. This is in part because lines of heterogender and race are interwined so that the ‘rewards’ of each become indistinguishable; and in part because these powerful lines have ‘always already’ shaped the subjectivity of the subject (Butler 1997), such that ‘failure to

Queer Bodies?

I STRATEGICALLY USE THE TERM ‘QUEER’ THROUGHOUT THIS THESIS IN A WAY THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH AHMED’S (2006) ASSERTION OF QUEER. IN THIS CONTEXT, ‘QUEER’ INDICATES BODIES THAT DO NOT FOLLOW LINES OF HETEROGENDER. THIS Follows A POSSIBLE USE OF ‘QUEER’ FROM WITHIN QUEER THEORY, WHERE ‘QUEER’ INDICATES THE TRANSGRESSION OF SOCIAL NORMS RELATED TO GENDER AND SEXUALITY (WARNER
2012; Seidman 1997; Jagose 1996) In particular, it can signal the deconstruction of binary gender, and of heterosexuality/homosexuality (see Seidman 1997; Kosofsky Sedgwick 1991; Jagose 1996). It is worth pointing out that within queer bodies of work there is slippage between how ‘queer’ is used as both an analytical concept and as a descriptive one. Queer is also sometimes used as an umbrella noun for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender etceteras within the West. This is not the way that I use ‘queer’ throughout this thesis, because to use it descriptively rather than analytically would be to impose particular trajectory of Western identity politics to a Fijian context. This thesis is not concerned with sexual ‘identity’ in the sense of a politics of naming. Using ‘queer’ as an identity marker is intrinsically linked to particular Western histories where the term ‘queer’ has been reclaimed. ‘Queer’ as a descriptive or ‘reclaimed’ term does not make political sense in Fiji, where it has neither been used as an identity term or a derogatory term. ‘Queer’ can be used as a rejection of the normative, and institutionalising aspects of the gay rights movement in the West (see Warner 2012; 1999; 1993); and more recently to challenge its racialised and nation-building effects (see Warner 2012; Puar 2007; 2002). While this is a worthwhile line of inquiry because it allows for an interrogation of globalised gay, or ‘homonormative’ discourses on other bodies and spaces (Warner 2012; Puar 2007), I do not extend this analysis in-depth here because my focus has been limited to analysing the local conditions and power relations that act on Fijian queer bodies.

Most of the male participants within my study described themselves as ‘gay’ – but not by drawing on the tropes of ‘gay’ these critics challenge, nor by accessing the (white) privilege mobilised by the term ‘gay’ in a Western context. There is a difference between how Fijian people use ‘gay’ – to indicate feminised males and same-sex attraction – and how it is currently used in the West to predominantly indicate men who are same-sex attracted but
normatively gendered (see Valentine 2007; Valentine 2000; see also Altman 2002; see Jackson 2002). Valentine (2007) gives an excellent ethnography of how the emergence of a gender normative understanding of ‘gay’ through the gay rights movement in the West has led to the production of ‘transgenderism’ as a distinct category; where ‘gay’ denotes sexual orientation and ‘transgender’ denotes gender identity. In contrast, the term ‘gay’ used widely in Fiji denotes both males with a sexual attraction towards men and a feminine appearance. People who were ‘gay’ exhibited a range of feminine attributes or behaviours. There were gay males who were same-sex attracted but normatively gendered as masculine. There were gays who dressed and lived exclusively as women and were attracted to men. But there were also a lot of gay people who were same-sex attracted and expressed a fluid degree of femininity that marked them as gay; this might be through wearing eyeliner, having long hair, or some subtle element of dress or expression. Schmidt (2010) gives a comparable analysis of the range of feminine attributes displayed amongst Fa’afafine in Samoa.

The term ‘transgender’ is not widely used by the sexual minority community in Fiji. During the time period of my research, many of the community and participants in my study had not heard of the term ‘transgender’. The exception to this was activists who worked for the Sexual Minority Project who used the term ‘transgender’ because of their exposure to it through global Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender (LGBT) human rights collateral and HIV/ AIDS prevention material, mostly from Australia and New Zealand. Even so, this term usage was made local through the use of the term ‘transgender gays’, where transgender was used as an adjective to describe people who lived exclusively as women. The term ‘transgender’ is difficult to employ ethnographically because it is underpinned by a Western trajectory that presumes a binary gender logic and the ability to transition from one gendered body to the other. As Valentine (2000) argues:
[i]f… ‘transgender’ has a specific history and a set of meanings which implicitly mark it in terms of its difference from US American understandings of ‘gay,’ then labelling bantut [Philippines] or travesti [Brazil] as ‘transgender’ is just as problematic… the use of ‘transgender’ in these ethnographic texts actually relies on the same ontologies of gender and sexuality presupposed by the category ‘gay’ which these authors… so assiduously avoid (cited in Towle and Morgan 2002, 474).

The term ‘transgender’ used ethnographically problematically imposes a western inscription of gender and sexuality, and presupposes a binary gender logic. Nevertheless – with this caveat – I do use the term ‘transgender’ in some places throughout my thesis, particularly in Chapter Eight, which deals with gender-related violence. This is because readers of earlier drafts of this material drew my attention to their difficulty in following whether the acts of violence discussed were related to gender, sexuality or both. On review, I felt that more in-depth descriptions of their clothing or physical attributes of the participants posed too great a risk to their privacy or personal safety. So where there is a need to distinguish ‘transgender gay’ Fijians from other gay Fijians, I used the term transgender woman, or gay man or boy.

There is a dense body of literature on Pacific sexualities and ‘third genders’ (see Schmidt 2010; 2005; Jolly 2008; Besnier 2004; 2002; Manderson and Jolly 1997; Herdt 1994). Towle and Morgan (2002) assert that Herdt’s (1994) use of the term ‘third gender’ emerged as a strategy for troubling binary gender within the West. The term ‘third gender’ was a means to contest gender essentialism by drawing on gendered differences across cultures, rather than provide an accurate description within the indigenous culture (Towle and Morgan, 2002). This reflects a broader ethnographic discursive tradition of drawing on ‘friendly’ ‘exotic’ depictions of indigenous cultures to critique regimes of gender and knowledge within the West. Bhabha’s (2004) account of the Other emphasises that the ambivalence of Western
representations is logocentric; the desire for the ‘friendly native’ is inextricably linked to the converse aggression towards the ‘savage’. As Said’s (1994) *Orientalism* has shown, representations of the Other legitimise Western interventions that may be economic, political or military. Towle and Morgan (2002) assert:

[r]ather than accept uncritically the need for a ‘third’ gender category, though, we should ask how ‘our’ narratives about ‘them’ (cultural Others) reflect our own society’s contradictory agendas concerning sexuality, gender, and power (476).

My research deviates from – or queers – ethnography proper, because it is critical of the role of ethnography in legitimising Western interventions into the Pacific region. An aspect of ethnography that I have tried to self-reflectively refuse as a Fijian woman is the tendency for ethnography to create rich descriptions of otherness for the pleasure of (Western) academia. That is, it is not my aim to create a description of what Fijian sexualities or genders are like for Western consumption (see Bell Hooks 1992). Instead, my project has always been inherently political on Fijian terms. That is provide an analysis of the marginalisation of queer lives in Fiji that draws attention to local operations of power. The participants in my study are positioned between local and global discourses of queer identity. In most cases, they identified as ‘gay’ but in the context of Fiji gay could designate a gendered subjectivity as well as a sexual orientation. I use the term ‘queer’ throughout this thesis to explore how bodies transgress and threaten normative heterogender within a Fijian context. That is, particular Fijian bodies are made ‘queer’ as a consequence of the delineation of culturally-specific, heterogendered ‘straight lines’. As the subsequent empirical chapters will show, ‘queer’ bodies – as bodies which are designated as Other, or ‘out-of-place’ because of their transgression of heterogendered norms – become subjected to instances of ‘stopping’.
Ahmed’s (2006) use of the terms ‘bodies’ and ‘objects’ requires some explanation for readers unfamiliar with her work. Her focus on bodies stems from phenomenological literature that focuses on the ‘lived experience’ of the body via perception; as a body that is oriented in space. Ahmed draws on Husserl’s (1969 cited in Ahmed 2006) concept of the ‘living body’ and Merleau-Ponty’s (2002 cited in Ahmed 2006) exploration of perception. Her use of the term ‘object’ describes things that come into proximity with bodies and through this relationship shapes the actions of bodies. Objects may be material objects, socio-cultural processes, or affects (like familial closeness as I argue in Chapter Five). Howard (2007) astutely observes that Ahmed brings “the body” of literature on queer and race studies into proximity with phenomenology as a philosophical ‘object’ (373). Physical objects and socio-cultural processes both exert force on the body which is shaped by them and shapes them in turn. The clearest distinction made between bodies and objects in *Queer Phenomenology* is through Ahmed’s (2006) analysis of the body becoming an object in Fanon’s (1986) phenomenological account of the black man’s experience of normative and privileged whiteness. Ahmed says, ‘[t]he black man in becoming an object no longer acts or extends himself; instead, he is amputated and loses his body’ (2006, 139). I would argue that for Ahmed, the body has perception and agency, while the object does not. Ahmed draws on Merleau-Ponty’s use of motility to describe the body’s ability to move freely, ‘expressed in the hopefulness of the utterance, “I can”…’ (139). My interpretation of Ahmed’s use of the term ‘body’ is that she uses the ‘body’ as ‘body-as-subject’. After all, to draw on Butler’s (1997) interrogation of subjection, the ‘I can’ of motility depends on a pre-existing ‘I’: ‘The “I” is not simply one who thinks about him or herself; it is defined by this capacity for reflective self-relation or reflexivity’ (22). In contrast to my interpretation, Eckert (2009) has argued that Ahmed does not sufficiently address the agency of the body (138). However, I would argue
that Ahmed’s (2006) use of ‘motility’ can be understood as agency that extends from the body, in that in Ahmed’s (2006) work the ability to move extends to multiple forms of social ‘reach’. It is confluent with Ahern’s (2001) definition of agency as the ‘socioculturally mediated capacity to act’ (112). Ahmed’s (2006) use of the terms ‘body’ and ‘object’ open up some inevitable slippage between them – such as when as the body is objectified – as her analysis of Fanon’s account suggests. However, in general Ahmed’s use of the body is as the ‘body-as-subject’, and my use of the term ‘body’ throughout my thesis reflects this.

One point of difference between my ‘take up’ of Ahmed’s *Queer Phenomenology* and her account of it is my use of the term ‘heterogender’. Throughout *Queer Phenomenology* Ahmed critiques ‘straight lines’ of heterosexuality. The difference here is mostly linguistic. It is clear that Ahmed’s analysis does suggest the intrinsic connection between heterosexuality and gender; firstly because it draws on Butler’s (1990,1997b) accounts of ‘performativity,’ and secondly because she argues that the naturalisation of desire for the ‘other sex’ is a component of dominant representations of lesbianism. However, I draw on Mason’s (1997) account of ‘heterogender’ instead because I like the emphasis on heterosexuality as a mechanism of normative gender as well as sexuality that the term ‘heterogender’ makes visible. In the Fijian context, I want to emphasize the intrinsic intermeshing of gender and sexuality as one line, the slippage between these concepts, and that the heterogender system affects both gendered subjectivity and the construction of desire.

What contribution does a micro-level analysis of Fijian queer lives offer to the body of work on gender, sexuality and culture? My intention here is to look at everyday language in ‘close up’ to reveal the delicate nuanced processes of marginalisation on our selves. My thesis offers a working through of *Queer Phenomenology* (Ahmed 2006) as a theoretically-based lens for interpreting empirical data, which in turn hones some of Ahmed’s (2006) conceptualisation.
Giving a queer phenomenological account of queer Fijians’ accounts of their lives allows for constant tacking between what is experienced on a deeply personal level and the augmentation of these mechanisms through broader social processes. It is deeply significant that we experience marginalisation through emotions like disgust and shame, in everyday conversations, turns of phrase, the ways we express love or experience family life. It reveals the pervasive effects of social mechanisms; the inner life of power relations. Ahmed (2006) asserts: …for bodies to arrive in spaces where they are not already at home, where they are not ‘in place,’ involves hard work: indeed, it involves painstaking labor for bodies to inhabit spaces that do not extend their shape (62).

So what orientation devices act to direct queer Fijian bodies as bodies which are simultaneously ‘at home’ and not ‘at home’? What objects shape the contours of immediate space? Which directions can Fijian queer bodies take, and how is this direction shaped by processes of heterogender and ethno-nationalism? This thesis is an account of the specific ways in which lines of heterogender and ethno-nationalism confine and sometimes enable Fijian queer bodies; the work that queer bodies do to resist multiple forms of ‘stopping’ and extend into limited spaces, and a voicing of possibilities for queer lines of sight. For queer Fijians, turning away from the expectations of heterogender towards queer desire is both necessary and dangerous. It offers the pleasure of being close to bodies or objects marked out as ‘out of reach’. Simultaneously, queer bodies are subject to the threat of straightening mechanisms – in the form of physical and psychic violence – aimed at bodies that have strayed ‘off-line’.

**Nation, Family and Church**

This section establishes how I have used the concepts of ‘nation’, ‘family’ and ‘church’ as analytic and symbolic devices within this thesis. I explore the sites of the family, church and
nation through the lens of the queer body. This approach will be more familiar with readers from the disciplines of Cultural studies and Sociology, and thus arguably situates the work as a piece of queer cultural sociology. Here I outline the parameters of these terms and the literature that has informed my use, as well as signalling some of the complexities with using these concepts thus. My attention to their symbolic weight within local conditions may at times elide the way that these sites are also constituted geographically and politically through social histories that are perhaps more complex than my analysis can capture. It is difficult in any analysis to balance attention between broader patterns and fine detail. However, what I have sought to do in this thesis, particularly across chapters six to eight and in the conclusion is to provide an analysis of the ways in which salient social sites act as ‘straightening devices’ that reproduce heterogender, and to argue that it is the ‘alignment’ of these sites that produces forceful disgust mechanisms against queer bodies, via violence or expulsion. The ‘alignment’ of these sites as a ‘straight line’ is not “natural” or even inevitable; it is the result of particular socio-political histories, that at particular moments may be made more or less salient. It is useful to make sense of how these sites act symbolically and intersect with each other because it provides a deeper understanding of how queer bodies are subjected to continual ‘stopping’, or stopping across these sites, and reveals the relationship between these sites and processes of subjectification.

By drawing on Ahmed’s theoretical discussion of ‘shared direction’, I argue that during the early to mid-2000s the ‘shared direction’ of the Indigenous nation privileged strong masculine indigenous Fijian bodies and excluded queer bodies. This forceful discursive construction of the nation relies on an alignment with the missionary project of colonial Christianity; a designation which rests on a delineation of the ‘saved’ from the ‘unsaved’, and which promotes the symbolic construction of a Christian, Ethno-nationalist and heterogendered nation. I argue that this ‘shared direction’ was powerfully aligned with family and church.
These claims are inherently political, and are theoretical designations that rest on postcolonial and queer theorising. However, these insights provide useful localized conceptual devices for considering power relations in Fiji, and the impact of heterogender on queer bodies.

Thus, I explore intersections between family, church and nation. Whilst other understandings of the nation are salient, my focus on the ongoing experience of marginalisation across these sites speaks to the complicity between them. This dynamic relationship between family, church and nation allows me to expand on Ahmed’s understanding of ‘straight lines’ to theorise about the impact of institutional alignment and force.

My use of the term ‘nation’ stems from cultural studies’ literature that discusses the nation as symbolic or imaginary (Anderson 1983, Hobsbawm 1992). Notably, Mann (1999) has argued that there is a structural relationship between nationalism and genocidal violence. Kaldor (1999) asserts that ‘new nationalisms’ via smaller, political units seeking particular racialised visions of the nation have eroded the nation-state’s monopoly on violence. In queer studies, Gayatri Gopinath (2005) addresses the national imaginary as a site of discontent for the queer insurgent body. Similarly, Munt (2008) has argued that the nation is a ‘phallic imaginary’, a unified and cohesive vision of the nation always fed by internal anxieties and rupture. She argues that the heterosexist imagining of the Irish nation depicted through St Patrick’s Day parades in the U.S. reflects the anxieties of migrant Irish community to be ‘authentic’ in diasporas, and are at odds with the inclusion of queer Irish in Ireland.

In this thesis, I am interested in how an imagined ‘shared direction’ of the iTaukei ethnonationalist nation – which comes to speak to indigenous Fijian subjectivity and collective experience – is implicated in the exclusion and marginalisation of indigenous Fijian queers, and in acts of public violence. This ‘shared direction’ is an inherently political project: it is powerful, but fraught rather than absolute, and reflects contested relations of power.
Newland (2013) argues ‘an influential faction of iTaukei Methodists have imagined Fiji as a Christian community connected to ‘place’ through kinship and narratives of historical belonging’ (227). This rhetoric is connected to ongoing calls for Fiji to be made a Christian state, which in turn has been mobilised to represent Indo-Fijians as a ‘heathen’ threat to the nation in the 1987 and 2000 coups (Newland 2013, Ryle 2005).

While I explore the ways that Christianity in Fiji is mobilised as an ‘orientation device’ that reproduces heterogender, different denominations and churches have had varied responses to the calls by ethno-nationalist actors (See Newland 2013, Ryle 2005). Newland (2013) points out that while the Methodist church showed at least partial approval for the 2000 coup:

‘[i]t took several days for the Methodist Church to clarify its official position in a full-page advertisement in The Fiji Times: that the church supported the interim government because, while disagreeing with Speight’s terrorist activities, all his objectives had been met’ (233; see also Newland 2006).

Thus to suggest that the church informs the ‘shared direction’ of Indigenous Fijian nation-building, is not to imagine a monolithic Christian community, but to explore the lines of sight that Christianity makes possible, and ask what is obscured through this direction.

Finally, my thesis also considers the role of the ‘family’ in relation to Queer Indigenous Fijian’s experiences of ‘stopping’ and argues that family reproduces heterogender through ‘closeness’ mechanisms.

I consider family as a conceptual and symbolic designation as well as a social site which is reproduced through socio-cultural norms. My analysis of family considers the family as a site of everyday ‘straightening mechanisms’ (Ahmed 2006), which is informed by a feminist and queer conceptualisation of the family as a complex site of power relations, myth-making and
hierarchy, rather than, say, as a more neutral site for the cultural reproduction of kinship or culture that does not attend to power. My analysis is particularly influenced by Liu and Ding’s (2001) consideration of silences within families in Chinese speaking worlds, which draws nuanced attention to the disciplinary effects of seemingly ‘benign’ silences on queer bodies. My use of the family as a site which reproduces normative heterogender requires shifting between my analysis of queer experiences of family within Fiji, and a more theoretically driven consideration of the relationship between these experiences of family, and the symbolic significance family is able to wield as a site which intersects with religious, nationalist and racial meaning-making. I do this strategically with an understanding that experiences of family are more varied than a univocal narrative can account for, in this regard my analytical retelling of the family offers a deliberately narrow lens: it is a consideration of how through the experience of queer family members, attributes of the family both reproduce the family, the queer subject within the family, and normative heterogender.

It is clear that hierarchical relationships between men and women in Fiji inform the reproduction of gender and sexual norms. Ravuvu (1983) has argued that the socialisation of Indigenous Fijian girls requires girls to act obediently, and show deference to males. Likewise, Toren (1990) has argued that dominant Indigenous Fijian ideology supports the hierarchisation of men and women. Broader consideration of the historic changes within Indigenous Fijian kinship systems is not possible within my thesis, but those interested in Indigenous Fijian kinship patterns should consult research by Nayacakalou (1987), Turner (1983), Walter (1975) and Capell (1946). Interestingly, Toren (1990) has argued that many girls perceived men and women to be of equal status, even when surrounding adults support the dominant hierarchical view. Toren suggests that girls are both less exposed to adult gender hierarchy by occupying more egalitarian spaces, but also that the girl’s views showed ‘submerged’ themes of egalitarianism exist alongside gender hierarchy. In turn, Brison (1999)
argues that while adults in an Indigenous Fijian village emphasised the significance of gender hierarchy, children experimented with exercising authority via age-ranking, and also participated in egalitarian play when possible. Brison (1999) concludes like Toren (1990) that the different, egalitarian experiences of Fijian children show that while men dominate social life, there is a ‘submerged egalitarianism’ at play.

**Chapter Overview**

Chapter Two ‘Theory’ addresses how Ahmed’s (2006) queering of phenomenology provides the basis for my analysis of queer lives in Fiji. This chapter gives an overview of the conceptual terms I use throughout my analysis including ‘stopping’, ‘straightening mechanisms’ and the ‘gift of inheritance’. The ‘gift of inheritance’ offers an account of how heterosexuality is made compulsory through the requirement that children ‘inherit’ their parent’s lives. I use this theoretical concept throughout my thesis to assert that heterogender is made compulsory to Indigenous Fijian subjectivity. I use Ahmed’s (2006) concept of ‘stopping’ to show how queer Fijians are constrained through both ethno-nationalism and heterogender.

Chapter Three ‘Methodology’ explores how the post-positivist qualitative research approach is underpinned by an understanding of contestable and partial knowledge, inextricably produced through relations of power (see Denzin and Lincoln 2003, Tuhiwai-Smith 1999). Methodological tensions arose between indigenous Pasifika and queer approaches to research that signals competing world-views. I bridge these tensions by employing a ‘hybrid’ methodology that drew on some of the strengths of both approaches. These tensions are not easily resolvable, and will require ongoing consideration for researchers investigating sexuality in the Pacific region. However, I argue the contentious use of queer theorising within a study of Fiji was an invaluable means of critiquing gender and power in a Fijian context. This signals the limitations of some indigenous Pasifika methodologies, that do not sufficiently challenge
cultural-hierarchies of power by naturalising the authority vested in ‘traditional’
power structures. In particular, I suggest that some Pasifika research paradigms fail to take
account of ‘internal Others’ (Munt 2008).

Chapter Four ‘Sexual Subjectivities: Queer Selves and the Promise of Return’ uses Ahmed’s
(2006) account of the ‘gift of inheritance’ alongside four participants’ stories to discuss how
subjectivity is concurrently sexualised and raced. Heterogender is reproduced as a requirement
of Indigenous Fijian subjectivity. The inability of a transgender woman to take up a mata-ni-
vana role that would have been her birthright acts as an instance of ‘stopping’ (Ahmed 2006)
where the queer body is unable to experience the ‘ease’ of cultural privilege. However, while
queer lives are constrained through ‘compulsory heterosexuality’, my analysis of the ‘family
line’ shows that there is also scope for queer possibilities when the reproduction of the family
line gives way to difference.

Chapter Five ‘Femininity as an Orientation Device: the Recognition of the Queer Body in
Fiji’ discusses how feminised attributes on male bodies becomes a marker of visibility for queer
bodies in Suva. Femininity is ‘stopping’ or stigmatising. This chapter looks at the relationship
between femininity and class; whereby ‘straight-acting’ middle-class gays distance themselves
from feminine gays because of the risk of being ‘outed’. I then turn to an analysis of two gay
men’s adoption of masculinity as a strategic means of accessing gender privilege and
Indigenous Fijian subjectivity.

Chapter Six ‘The Ties that Bind: Family, Closeness, and the ‘Unspeakable’ differs from my
other empirical chapters, in that it offers a comparative analysis between queer Fijians’
experiences of family in Suva and queer Samoan’s experiences of family in Auckland. For both
Pasifika cultures, ‘closeness’ acts as a ‘straightening mechanism’ within the family through the
requirements of cohesion and similarity. Thus, ‘closeness’ becomes intrinsically linked to silence as sexuality is relegated to the ‘background’. This points to the impact of colonial Christianity throughout the Pacific region. Significantly though, the silences within Samoan ‘aiga in Auckland were more able to be troubled or transversed by queer participants; which I suggest is linked to the different ‘shared directions’ of Samoan identity in New Zealand compared to Indigenous Fijian identity in Fiji.

Chapter Seven ‘Christianity, “Unsaved” Others and the “Swivelling” Queer Body’ argues that the Christian church is aligned with the family and the nation in Fiji such that it ‘lines up’ with Indigenous Fijian subjectivity. The role of the colonial mission has produced a ‘shared direction’ (Ahmed 2006) towards the ‘unsaved’ Other. I argue that this ‘shared direction’ indicates an underlying anxiety about the status of Indigenous Fijian bodies because of their prior designation as ‘unsaved’ or ‘savage’ bodies through the colonial gaze. Queer bodies are required to negotiate the church as a condition of belonging in the nation (see Ryle 2005). Drawing on Fijian participants’ accounts of churchgoing, I argue that queer bodies are required to ‘swivel’ between the straight line and queer lines of sight.

In Chapter Eight “Shame on You”: Violence, Powerful Masculinity and Mechanisms of Disgust in Fiji’ I bring Ahmed’s (2004) accounts of disgust and shame together to argue that feelings of shame expressed by queer Fijians are produced through acts of Othering that work as ‘disgust mechanisms’. I turn to an exploration of direct violence as a ‘disgust mechanism’ against gay and ‘transgender gay’ bodies. I argue that physical and sexual violence aimed at the transgression of heterogendered boundaries acts to produce queer bodies as shamed Others and produce privileged violent masculine subjectivities for the perpetrators (see Tomsen and Mason 2001; George 2008).
In the Conclusion, ‘Stopping, “Straightening” and Swivelling: A Phenomenology of the Queer Body in Fiji’ I argue that an empirical working through of Ahmed’s (2006) concepts in relation to the queer body in Fiji highlights the significance of the ‘straight line’ for the construction of Indigenous Fijian subjectivity. The ‘shared direction’ of the Indigenous Fijian nation towards the ‘unsaved’ Other is underpinned by ethno-nationalism and militarised masculinity. In this context, queer bodies are subjected to instances of ‘stopping’ and ‘straightening mechanisms’ as a condition of being ‘internal Others’ (Munt 2008) that threaten the status of indigenous subjectivity. I argue that the ‘swivelling’ body is a means of conceptualising queer agency in relation to the requirements of ‘straight lines’.
Chapter Two: Theory

In this chapter I explore the theoretical underpinnings used to analyse the lives of Fijian queers throughout this thesis. My central concern has been to examine the ways that the lives of Fijian queers are marginalised through heterogender and ethno-nationalism in site-specific ways. Processes of colonisation inform the trajectories that heterogender and ethno-nationalism have taken in Fiji. My research focuses on the subversive possibilities for living queer lives and whether these possibilities involve challenging the status quo, or more subtly making different meanings of and within their lives. Ahmed’s (2006) queering of phenomenology provides the basis for my analysis of queer Fijian subjects. I take up her analysis as a means of unpacking how the lives of queer Fijian subjects are constrained and produced through particular institutionalised norms of gender, race, and sexuality. As discussed in my introduction, Ahmed’s phenomenological approach considers how institutionalised norms of heterosexuality and ‘race’ cohere as ‘lines’ that work to direct bodies in particular directions.

Ahmed’s (2006) phenomenological approach is useful for making sense of the relationship between queer subjects and the institutionalised ‘lines’ of heterogender, ethnicity, and nationalism that they are subjected to. Queer phenomenology makes it possible to attend to people’s lived experiences of the power relations that produce and restrain them. Various scholars are using Ahmed’s (2006) theorisation to produce rich, analytical work on how intersecting axes of difference orient bodies. Crowley and Rasmussen (2010) use Ahmed’s conceptual work methodologically as a means of analysing the sexual and racial orientations of the narrative of an Australian television drama. Berggren (2013) uses the concept of orientation to consider classed and racialised discourses in hiphop. Goldberg, Ryan and Sawchyn (2009) suggest a queer phenomenological practice within perinatal nursing to
explore the lived experiences of lesbian mothers within the heterosexist and homophobic health system. Horncastle (2009) uses ‘disorientation’ from Ahmed (2006) to retheorise an interstitial poetics of the queer self.

*Queer Phenomenology* (Ahmed 2006) attends to the relationship between the body and pervasive social mechanisms of heterosexuality and race by explaining that lines are directional, and that the body is ‘oriented’ by the lines that it follows. Ahmed says:

> [t]he concept of ‘orientations’ allows us to expose how life gets directed *in some ways rather than others*, through the very requirement we follow what is already given to us (21, my emphasis).

The value of this approach for my work is that through attending to the relationship between bodies, objects, and space, we are able to build up a complex theoretical picture of the impact that these institutionalised lines of heterosexuality and culture have on bodies that do *not* follow them. Ahmed’s concept of the ‘stopping’ of bodies that do not conform to the demands of particular spaces illuminates how Fijian queer subjects are restricted through heterogender as a cultural imperative that is reproduced as a requirement of Indigenous Fijian subjectivity.
Orientation

Ahmed (2006) deals with queer and non-white marginality through explicating the ways in which subjects are oriented towards certain objects, both within and through space. This section explores the relationship between orientation, bodies, and objects.

According to Ahmed (2006), orientation describes the direction that we face towards in space. Our orientation determines our relationship to objects; some are close to us or make up the background based on the direction we face. The orientation of the body means that other possibilities of seeing and doing are negated by the direction that the body faces. She suggests that these orientations are ways of making sense of the body, which is shaped by the limitations and possibilities of direction it takes: ‘some spaces extend certain bodies and simply do not leave room for others’ (11). The body shapes and is shaped by social space, so particular spaces will ‘extend’ particular bodies more readily. This allows us to consider how the social spaces that queer Fijian bodies negotiate are geared towards bodies other than our own. Ahmed’s work directs us to analyse the lived experiences of those whose presence within privileged social spaces is uncomfortable, liminal, or subject to hostility.

Heterogendered bodies have increased reach – in the form of privilege – through the continuity between their bodies and the social spaces that support them. The repeated reaching and facing of bodies along particular directions, in turn creates lines that easily extend the body. These lines are created through the continuity of direction faced by collectives or social groups. Ahmed says, ‘[t]he work of repetition is not neutral work, it orients the body in some ways rather than others’ (57, emphasis in original). The interrogation of ‘straight lines’ allows us to consider the social meanings and costs involved with going ‘offline’, or taking a ‘queer’ perspective.
Lines

For Ahmed (2006), the orientation of bodies raises the concept of directional lines. The directions we face give way to particular perceptions, and create a particular relationship between ourselves and objects: ‘[t]he lines that allow us to find our way, that are “in front” of us, also make certain things, and not others available’ (14). By following a particular direction, other possibilities are excluded from our line of sight. The directions we follow are intrinsically connected to existing power relations through the way we take on the direction of others through institutionalised lines. As Ahmed states:

[ t]he lines we follow might also function as forms of ‘alignment’, or as ways of being in line with others. We might say that we are orientated when we are in line. We are ‘in line’ when we face the direction that is already faced by others (15).

The requirements of being ‘in line’ with others is central to Ahmed’s (2006) argument. It is through particular political and social imperatives that we are directed towards particular views at the expense of other possible directions. This is inherently connected to our agency as subjects and our relationships to particular communities. Ahmed explains:

…what if direction, as the way we face as well as move, is organized rather than casual? We might speak then of collective direction: of ways in which nations or other imagined communities might be ‘going in a certain direction’, or facing the same way… Becoming a member of such a community, then, might also mean following this direction, which could be described as the political requirement that we turn some ways and not others (15, my emphasis).

Ahmed draws on Butler’s (1990, 1997b) account of performativity to suggest that lines are performative in that they are constituted through a repeated direction. She argues:
lines are both created by being followed and are followed by being created. The
lines that direct us... are in this way performative; they depend on the repetition of
norms and conventions, of routes and paths taken, but they are also created as an
effect of this repetition (16).

Ahmed (2006) contends that lines constitute ‘social investments’ in that they involve the
‘promise’ of a return. We follow a direction believing it will lead us to a particular destination
or reward. She explains, ‘[t]hrough such investments in the promise of return, subjects
reproduce the lines that they follow’ (17, emphasis in original). This forms the basis of her
discussion of compulsory heterosexuality through inheritance and reproduction, discussed
later in the chapter.

Ahmed’s (2006) concept of ‘straight lines’ draws together the institutionalisation of social
lines with the heteronormative. ‘Straight lines’ are both the lines that draw out in front of us
as an effect of social norms, and those that reinforce the sexual and gender order. Ahmed
suggests that it is the repetition of particular directions that construct subjectivity in
particular ways:

[w]e could say that history ‘happens’ in the very repetition of gestures, which is
what gives bodies their tendencies (56).

In particular, Ahmed (2006) addresses how ‘straight lines’ are perpetuated through the form
of the heterosexual couple, an aspect I will pick up later in this chapter. This notion of
‘straight lines’ becomes central to my analysis, in that it provides a conceptual tool for
understanding how heteronormative mechanisms reinstate the status quo, or limit queer
bodies, across different sites. My thesis examines the ‘straight lines’ perpetuated through
family, religion and nation. The requirements of belonging to a nation, religion or family inherently involve sharing a particular orientation, and following a ‘straight line’.

I draw on Ahmed’s (2006) account of how collective identity – such as nationalism – can be an effect of the ‘shared direction’ of bodies. The body is aligned to the cultural and political orientations of a group through the direction it faces. Ahmed argues that phenomenologically, Orientalism (Said 1979, cited in Ahmed 2006) involves the ‘shared direction’ of the West towards the East; where the process of Othering acts as an ‘extension’ by legitimising the economic, militaristic and discursive ‘reach’ of the West into the East. In turn, the ‘shared direction’ towards the East produces the cohesive identity of the West. I use this concept of the ‘shared direction’ of the nation to discuss the relationship between ethno-nationalism and heterogender in Fiji. In Chapter Eight, I argue that the ‘shared direction’ of the Indigenous Fijian nation, that has inherited the colonial direction towards the ‘unsaved’, requires that bodies ‘line-up’ with heterogender.

Ahmed (2006) argues that under particular conditions ‘straight lines’ give way to ‘oblique angles’, or ‘queer moments’ where the subject is ‘disoriented’. Possibilities open up even from within the very mechanisms that reproduce the social order. Ahmed draws on the epistemology of ‘queer’ which connects it linguistically with ‘bent’, to suggest that queerness acts as a change in direction. She explains:

> [t]he spatiality of this term is not incidental. Sexuality itself can be considered a spatial formation not only in the sense that bodies inhabit spaces, but also in the sense that bodies are sexualized through how they inhabit space (67).

Ahmed emphasises the way that queer moments – which form ‘oblique angles’ to the direction of the straight line – are temporal or fleeting. In her analysis, they do not open up their own
‘queer lines’, because to do so would suggest a form of institutionalisation. The social conditions of creating a line involve repetition and motility, which would render the ‘queer line’ straight after all. Its very potentiality is in its ‘disorienting’ effects and its temporary nature (for an account of queer temporality, see Halberstam 2005). In conceptualising queer moments in this way, Ahmed follows other queer scholars who have focused on the transgressive or subversive potential of queer (see for instance, Berlant and Warner 2005, 1998; Jagose 1996; Butler 1990). My own argument critiques Ahmed’s on this issue, where I suggest that her theorisation of queer moments does not take enough consideration of the ongoing work that queer bodies do to negotiate straight lines, either while sustaining the ‘straight line’ or from points which are experienced as ‘off-line’. While I agree that queer moments can be fleeting, I argue that because these queer moments might be experienced as an ongoing fixture of queer lives they require the queer body to ‘swivel’ towards and away from the straight line.

**Straightening Devices**

For Ahmed (2006), ‘straightening devices’ are mechanisms which work to bring queer or ‘oblique’ moments back ‘in-line’ with the heteronormative, and which maintain straight lines. Ahmed expounds the way in which queer bodies or acts are read or described as if following the straight line. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s (2002) discussion of perception, she observes that perception is intrinsically linked to the horizons of the body: ‘his phenomenology instead embraces a model of bodily space in which spatial lines “line up” only as effects of bodily actions on and in the world’ (66). Thus the straight (normative) body appears ‘in-line’ only because it effectively ‘lines up’ with pre-existing lines. Bodies or objects that do not line up with the straight body appear oblique because of their disalignment with pervasive social
order. The continuity of the straight line depends on ‘straightening devices’ that allow lines to adhere to other lines and hence maintain their straightness. Ahmed asserts:

[i]f lines are traces of other lines, then this alignment depends on straightening devices that keep things in line, in part by ‘holding’ things in place. Lines disappear through such processes of alignment, so that when even one thing comes ‘out of line’ with another thing, the ‘general effect’, is ‘wonky’ or even ‘queer’ (66).

Straightening devices – such as institutional practices or privileged discourses – realign queer or oblique moments by providing ‘horizon lines’ that reorient the body to the ‘straight line’. For example, Ahmed gives an analysis of the concept of ‘sexual inversion’ (Ellis 1940, cited in Ahmed 2006) as a straightening device that imposes a heterosexual ‘line of desire’ on lesbian bodies through privileging and naturalising erotic desire for difference. In Chapter Six, I argue that silence about sexuality acts as a ‘straightening device’ that maintains the coherence of the family as a ‘straight line’. The requirement of belonging in the family acts as a straightening mechanism for Fijian bodies because of the alignment of family, church, and nation.

I depart from Ahmed (2006) by arguing that ‘straightening devices’ are not exclusively ‘perceptual’ – through the realignment of the body with ‘horizon lines’ – but occur through the labour of bodies and institutions when bodies appear ‘off-line’. Ahmed’s formulation conceives of ‘queer moments’ as when the world that appeared ‘straight’ suddenly appears disoriented. The work of ‘straightening devices’ as horizon lines allows the subject to right herself. The subject on the ‘straight line’ is already straight, because her perspective is able to be righted by aligning herself with a heterogendered horizon point. Ahmed writes:

[s]paces become straight, which allow straight bodies to extend into them, such that the vertical [normative] axis appears in line with the line of the body (92).
If we shift from occupying the position of the straight subject that perceives the world as ‘straight’ and is then ‘disoriented’, and look at the ‘straight line’ from map view instead of as a line that is drawn out in front of us, then ‘queer moments’ or ‘oblique angles’ can also be when bodies turn or are turned away from the ‘straight line’ as a change in direction, say a pivot of 45 degrees. In turn, ‘straightening mechanisms’ are then required to return the body to the ‘straight line’ through the work of bodies and institutions. In Ahmed’s (2006) account, lines are already accumulations of action, so the straight body’s perception of the horizon line is already an effect of the work done to make it ‘line up’. This allows me to give an analysis of violent acts against queer Fijian bodies as ‘straightening mechanisms’ that restore the ‘shared direction’ of the nation, which I explore in Chapter Eight.

**Compulsory Heterosexuality and the ‘Promise of Return’**

Ahmed draws on Rich’s (1993, cited in Ahmed 2006) account of compulsory heterosexuality to assert that heterosexuality can be seen as a ‘compulsory orientation’ (84); the subject is required to take up this social direction towards certain bodies and objects – and not others – as a condition of living a socially meaningful life. Ahmed asserts, ‘to become a subject under the law one is made subject to the law that decides what forms lives must take in order to count as lives “worth living”’(84). She examines compulsory heterosexuality by asking what we are obligated to orient towards as a requirement of the ‘straight line’. The concept of ‘inheritance’ explains how heterosexuality is socially instituted between generations. She says, ‘it is the presumption that the child must inherit the life of the parent that requires the child to follow the heterosexual line’ (85). Ahmed draws on Mauss’s (1969, cited in Ahmed 2006) theorisation of ‘gift’ as a means of accounting for how this inherited heterosexual line acquires the social force that it wields. While appearing voluntary, the gift requires an obligatory
return. The value of the gift creates a bind; as an unpayable debt it compels the child to be ‘like’ the parents in the form of heterosexuality. Ahmed explains:

[s]o the gift… produces the one who has received the gift as indebted and demands its endless return. Heterosexuality is imagined as the future of the child insofar as heterosexuality is idealized as a social gift and even as the gift of life itself (86).

I draw on Ahmed’s account of the reproduction of compulsory heterosexuality through familial ‘inheritance’ in Chapters Four and Six. Firstly, I utilise the ‘promise of return’ as a means of exploring the conditions of Indigenous Fijian subjectivity in relation to heterogender. Secondly, I explore the heterogendered conditions of ‘closeness’ as a requirement of belonging within the family.

**Stopping**

Bodies whose reach is not extended by a particular ‘shared direction’ might experience ‘stopping’ (Ahmed 2006). ‘Stopping devices’ could include a range of practices through which the body experiences pressure or barriers rather than an experience of ease and complicity within a particular space. Ahmed (2006, 139) explains:

[f]or bodies that are not extended by the skin of the social, bodily movement is not so easy. Such bodies are stopped, where the stopping is an action that creates its own impressions.

‘Stopping’ occurs along racial and sexual lines. This concept is particularly relevant to the lived experiences of queer Fijians in describing how their living situations fail to support their bodies through the maintenance of both heterogendered and racialised lines. The notion of ‘stopping’ conjures the image of obstacles or barriers that impede bodies from progressing along particular pathways. I explore this throughout my thesis by evaluating how queer bodies
are ‘stopped’ within the family, church and nation. Ahmed argues that bodies that appear
‘out-of-place’ (139) are interpellated by acts of ‘stopping’: ‘…the “unrecruitable” body must
still be “recruited” into this place, in part through the very repetition of the action of being stopped
as a mode of address’ (140, my emphasis). My thesis suggests that queer bodies in Fiji are
subjected to ongoing ‘stopping’ across different sites. As Ahmed explains:

[s]topping is… a political economy that is distributed unevenly between others,

and it is also an affective economy that leaves its impressions, affecting the bodies

that are subject to its address (140).

**Disgust Mechanisms**

In Chapter Eight, I assert that the disgust projected towards queer bodies in Fiji acts as a
‘straightening mechanism’ that restores the straight line by expelling the queer body. In order
to give an account of how ‘straightening mechanisms’ produce both subjects and affects, I
describe these ‘straightening mechanisms’ as ‘disgust mechanisms’. This analysis is informed by
Ahmed’s (2004) two distinct accounts of disgust and shame that I bring more closely into
conversation to suggest that what I call ‘disgust mechanisms’ produce the relationship
between ‘self’ and ‘Other’ both discursively and corporeally. While I discuss this in significant
depth in Chapter Eight, I introduce her analysis of shame and disgust here.

For Ahmed (2004, 101), shame involves ‘the de-forming and re-forming of bodily and social
spaces’. She explains that in feeling shame, the subject ‘turns’ away from both others and
itself. Shame involves the subject’s self-opinion as well as the opinion of others: ‘…shame fills
up the self – becomes what the self is about’ (105). This self-opinion is informed through the
imagined view of the other. Ahmed asserts that this dependence on the perspective of the
Other is intrinsically connected to pre-existing love or desire. She draws on a psychoanalytic
framework to suggest that this internalisation of the perspective of the Other is constituted as the ‘ideal self’: ‘an ideal self is produced as an approximation of the other’s being’ (106).

Brought to bear on the lives of Fijian queer subjects, I was interested in how the participants in my study came to feel shamed through the homophobic or transphobic violent acts or words used against them.

To address this concern, I turn to Ahmed’s (2004) account of disgust as performative. Ahmed explains that disgust ‘generates the object that it names’ (93). Disgust is a mechanism of positioning the self in relation to the disgusting object. I argue that phenomenologically the movement of the disgusted subject away from the Other/‘object of disgust’ that Ahmed describes, acts as an interpellation that projects shame onto the Other body. In other words, disgust acts as a mechanism that orients the shamed subject so that it ‘faces the direction’ of the disgusted. While it is not inevitable that being the object of disgust produces a shamed self; the alignment of the disgusted with the ‘straight line’ of the family or nation produces force.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have outlined how I make use of Ahmed’s (2006) *Queer Phenomenology* to account for the lived experiences of Fijian people who have same sex relationships. Ahmed’s account of the relationship between bodies, objects, and space allows us to attend closely to the effects social processes have on and within the body. The body is oriented by the objects around it. For Indigenous Fijian people, the ‘shared direction’ towards the ‘unsaved’ that has been ‘inherited’ through colonial processes does not offer the motility that is gifted to ‘white’ bodies. I argue that the ‘straight line’ of heterogender is aligned with the ‘shared direction’ of ethno-nationalism so that Fijian queers experience ongoing ‘stopping’ as the reach of their
bodies is not extended through social and political space. Furthermore, I have addressed Ahmed’s description of how heterosexuality is compulsory because the child is required to return the ‘gift’ of her parents by reproducing heterosexuality as a straight line. I utilise the ‘promise of return’ to analyse how heterogender is reproduced as a condition of Fijian subjectivity.
Chapter Three: A Methodology of Dis/orientation

The development of my post-positivist methodology has been driven by a critical focus on subjectivity and marginalisation. I am interested in how my participants are multiply constituted as Pasifika and queer subjects. This focus on how marginalisation shapes subjectivity has led to a ‘hybrid’ methodology, drawing on both the anti-colonialist insights of Pasifika methodologies and postcolonial studies, and queer theory’s interrogation of gender and sexual norms. My research approach was underpinned by an understanding of how knowledge is produced through power relations (Foucault 1980), and that research knowledge is subjective, partial and political (Denzin and Lincoln 2003, Tuhiwai-Smith 1999). The data collection was informed by Pasifika, postcolonial and narrative research methods. My analysis is informed by queer methodologies, particularly the nuanced deconstructive work made possible through textual analyses (see Gopinath 2005). I use Ahmed’s (2006) *Queer Phenomenology* as a methodological tool for mapping out and conceptualising the relationships between bodies, objects, ‘straightening mechanisms’, and shared directions.

Research knowledge has perpetuated a colonial gaze that as constructed indigenous peoples as ‘Other’ (Tuhiwai-Smith 1999). Equally, queer methodologies point to the erasure of queer lives from “what counts” as meaningful. Rather than reproducing research knowledge as usual, my project has been intended as partial and reflexive inquiry where I am explicit about my relationship to the research project and the peoples it involves. In this chapter I self-reflectively deconstruct queer phenomenology and then trouble the knowledge claims of Pasifika research. In the section, ‘Locating Myself as Insider/ Outsider’, I situate myself in relation to the production of salient, subjective knowledges that informed my research practice.
There are critical tensions between Pasifika methodologies and queer methodologies. Pasifika researchers have responded to the historical and ongoing marginalisation of the Pacific region and peoples and the silencing of Pasifika voices through the exotic ‘Othering’ of the West (see Huffer and Qalo 2004; Diaz and Kauanui 2001). Many assert that the decolonisation of Pasifika research requires us to turn to Pasifika epistemologies and conceptual devices to make sense of Pasifika peoples and places. Queer theory draws on post-structural theorising to interrogate the development of sexual and gender binaries (Seidman 1997; Jagose 1997). It is heavily indebted to the Western philosophy that Pasifika scholars justly critique as Eurocentric (see Diaz and Kauanui 2001). This critical tension is negotiated within my thesis. My research is part of a growing body of work by post-colonial queer scholars, who fit between the specificity of local, ethnicised or non-white meaning-making and experience, and the conceptual tools of post-colonial and queer theory to analyse the complexities of culture, place, gender and sexuality (see Ahmed 2006; Gopinath 2005; Boellstorff 2006; Oswin 2007; Nagel; Omise’eke 2008; Herbst 2009; for indigenous see Qwo-Li Driskill 2010; Smith 2010).

What occurs when a non-white queer woman takes up Western philosophy to interrogate sexuality in a post-colonial context? My analysis of heterogender in Fiji is strengthened through the critical attention to operation of normative gender and sexuality that queer theory offers. In this chapter, I deconstruct Indigenous Fijian conceptual tools to argue that these frameworks unconsciously perpetuate the marginalisation of sexual and gender minorities, paying attention to when ‘culture’ or ‘tradition’ is reified to naturalise regimes of power. Some Pasifika conceptual tools underplay the role of existing Pasifika cultural hierarchies. The effect of this blind spot is that research practices can validate already privileged Indigenous Fijian voices rather than those that are marginalised within systems of
indigenous meaning-making. Examples of this reaffirmation of privilege include focusing on church leaders and Indigenous Fijian chiefly elite. Such practices give rise to an important methodological tension within Pasifika research: how can we address the need for research which draws on Pasifika knowledge systems and simultaneously attend to the voices of our own ‘internal Others’ (Munt 2008)? Pasifika research needs to make sense of Pasifika systems of meaning, and to critically analyse the operation of power within and through these systems.

My use of queer theory largely reflects the use of the tools I had to hand; I reflect on my tenuous position as an insider/outsider researcher who is Kailoma (of mixed Indigenous Fijian and European descent), queer, New Zealand-born, and descended from commoner instead of chiefly families. I argue that Western philosophical tools can be taken up differently and strategically by postcolonial queer scholars to analyse local gender regimes. Ahmed (2006) and Gopinath (2005) are examples where non-white queer lives are brought to the centre – not the margins – of research. My thesis uses queer methods for Pasifika concerns in a way that still centres my analysis in the Pacific through a critical analysis of local power relations. I use Ahmed’s queer phenomenology to guide the analysis of my data via attention to the operation of heterogender as a ‘straight line’. This approach is relevant for conceptualising how heterogender operates in Fiji and within Pacific communities in New Zealand in site-specific ways. It is intrinsically linked to the operation of culture. Ahmed’s explication of ‘disorientation’ suggests that in moments where we are disoriented, that which appears ‘natural’ is rendered askew. In this project, critically exploring or ‘queering’ the family, religion, and violence in Fiji ‘disorients’ the operation of culture and nation. I analyse how these sites propagate sexual subjectivities, and constrain particular bodies.

I operationalise Ahmed’s (2006) queer phenomenology to give re/oriented accounts of my participants’ stories. I interrogate how ‘straight lines’ shape my participants’ lives and their
proximity to objects that cohere around them. I explore my participants’ experiences of being ‘queer’ through experiences of ‘stopping’ in social sites that do not support them. My analysis has examined how and when queer bodies experience ‘stopping’, and how and when queer bodies experience ‘motility’ within social spaces.

In what follows, I discuss the significance of queer theorising on producing post-positivist empirical research on gender and sexuality (see Boellstorff 2006; Oswin 2007). I explore some of the important methodological concerns raised by Pasifika and other postcolonial scholars about the implicit eurocentrism of Western research methodologies and the impact of this work for Pasifika peoples. I deconstruct my engagement with Ahmed’s (2006) queer phenomenology from this viewpoint, but suggest that attending to local conditions of power offers a means of mitigating interpretive errors that may arise. I then turn to queering Pasifika methodologies, suggesting that what is at stake is that heteronormative and masculinist systems of power can be authenticated as ‘traditional’, and speak for the experience of Pasifika peoples instead of a privileged few. I draw on Gopinath (2005) to argue for a critical interpretation of moments when Indigenous Fijian culture re/produces gender norms with harmful effects. Furthermore, I suggest that a queer reading offers possibilities for making sense of instances of alignment between indigenous cultures and colonising forces, in which, rather than the radical possibilities suggested by postcolonial hybridity (Bhabha 2004), the ‘shared direction’ of the colonial force becomes a ‘gift of inheritance’ (Ahmed 2006) that compels the indigenous culture to reproduce the ‘straight line’. I then situate my methodology in relation to my own insider/outsider position, and suggest that as a Kailoma queer woman I am uniquely positioned to interrogate the relationship between gender and power in Fiji because of the ambivalences of being a ‘borderlander’ that occupies an in-between space.
(Anzaldúa 1987). Finally, I discuss the situated Pasifika/postcolonial queer approach I took to collect and analyse my data.

**Queering Ethnography**

My post-positivist qualitative methodology fits within the emergent canon of queer ethnographies (See Boellstorff 2006; Oswin 2007; Nagel; Omise’eke 2008; Herbst 2009; for indigenous see Qwo-Li Driskill 2010; Smith 2010). The intention of my queer methodology was to understand the operation of the regime of gender and sexuality via the standpoint of people who are marginalised by it. Thus, aspects of the local gender and sexual order are brought into view that would not otherwise be visible.

My methodology is underpinned by some central tenets of the queer theory canon that oriented my post-positivist approach and my critical focus on the operation of heterogender via the family, church and nation. Firstly, Foucault’s (1980) assertion that knowledge is produced through relations of power and that therefore rather than being innate, sexuality and sexual identity are produced through particular socio-political and historic contexts.

Secondly, as Sedgwick (1991) famously argued, the framing of ‘gay’ as a sexual minority reproduces the relationship between the dominant heterosexual group and renders gay lives marginal. Instead, Sedgwick argues that sexual orientation is an effective social structure for regulating heterosexual as well as homosexual bodies. While ‘queer’ is often harnessed as a site of transgression within the queer canon (see Warner 2005), my empirical approach has been to situate the marginalisation of queer bodies at the centre of an analysis of contemporary or fairly recent indigenous Fijian culture. I explore the exclusions of queer lives and bodies as an operating logic for understanding indigenous Fijian identity. That is, I have taken an inherently social constructionist approach to gender relations, whereby instead of creating
truth-claims to describe queer Fijians as research objects, my project has been to situate queer Fijian lives in relation to the construction of salient knowledges about gender and sexuality.

Queer methodologies might arguably entail situating the queer subject at the centre of the analysis as a means of explicating the operation of heterogender. Rather than queer lives being implicitly marginal, the exclusion of queerness from significant social sites allows these sites to take particular heteronormative forms (Sedgwick 1991). Thus the approach I have taken explores sites like the family, church and nation through the lens of the queer body. While the participants in my study represent a small, marginalised group within Fiji, their experiences speak to the construction of the family, church and nation as heterogendered because of their implicit exclusions from these sites. I use my close reading of qualitative interviews to theorize the intersections between family, church and nation. This critical approach to theorizing about racial and national tensions via the tensions played out interpersonally between queer bodies is similarly reflected in Lambevski’s (1999) work exploring the sexual and racial tensions in cruising scenes as a site of racial and national meaning-making between gay Macedonians and gay Albanians. The interpersonal interactions of marginalised people are deeply embedded in cultural and political processes. Pervasive experiences of marginalization across these sites speaks to the complicity between them, and this has allowed me to expand on Ahmed’s (2006) understanding of ‘straight lines’ to theorise about the impact of institutional alignment and force.

**Pasifika Criticism of Research from the West**

Pasifika research about sexuality faces a complex and traumatic history because the Pacific has been a site of eroticised exploitation. Pacific people have been represented as hypersexual, while the Pacific region has acted as the erotic ‘Other’ of the West (Sua‘ali’i 2001) and as a
site of ‘pleasure and danger’ (Jolly 1997). As Taouma (2004) asserts, racialised discourses of evolutionary progress produced colour-coded depictions of bodies; the ‘fairer’ skinned women of Polynesia were depicted as ‘dusky maidens’, whereas dark-skinned Melanesian men were depicted as cannibalistic savages. The initial eroticised and exotificated cartographies of the Pacific that legitimised colonial interventions has been pervasively reproduced through Western art and popular culture (see Taouma 2004), tourism, militarism, and trade (Sua’ali’i 2001; Jolly 1997; Manderson and Jolly 1997).

This exotic Other discursive designation of the Pacific culminated in the early ethnographic projects of Malinowski and Mead, which reproduced the Pacific as a site of unrestricted sexual access (see Jolly 1997, 2008). Through such research practices, the ‘Pacific’ has been inscribed within Western research methodologies as a sexually and racially charged site (Jolly 2007, 2008; Teaiwa 2006). Academic practices in the Pacific sit within the broader context of research’s embeddedness in global colonial processes. As Denzin and Lincoln (2003, 1-2) reflect:

> [i]n the colonial context, research becomes an objective way of representing the dark-skinned Other to the white world… From the very beginning, qualitative research was implicated in a racist project.

Contemporary research practices continue to be shadowed by this colonial legacy. The trajectory of imperialist representations of the Pacific as exotic other produces an unsettling inherited ‘shared direction’ (Ahmed 2006) for more recent ethnographic work in the region. As Besnier (1994) claims about research on third gender in the Pacific:

> ‘…a common and more or less clearly articulated motivation in this corpus of work is to demonstrate that preindustrial societies are more ‘tolerant’, ‘accepting’,
‘approving’, or ‘accommodating’ of erotic diversity and gender variation than ‘the West.’

As Besnier suggests, some scholars uncritically reify the binary between the West and the Pacific and perpetuate the exotification of Pasifika cultures as a site of unrestrained eros (see Wallace 2003; Besnier 1994; see Towle and Morgan’s discussion of Herdt 2002). Recent work drawing on post structural paradigms makes assertions about ‘fluidity’ within Pacific sites. This ‘fluidity’ is inevitably relational to sex/gender regimes in the West, and reinforces the Pacific as the exotic Other. As discussed in the introduction, an example of this is White’s (2008) recent claim that transgender embodiment in Fiji acts as a site for the transgression of ethnic boundaries. White reports an incident of bullying against a transgender student, reading the student’s adoption of ‘cross-ethnic markers’ as an example of fluid identity performance. White’s analysis, however, does not offer a critical analysis of the racialised effects of relations between gender and power in Fiji. In contrast, I would argue that acts of bullying by other Indigenous Fijian boys and teachers signal that the student was violently excluded because of his transgression of gender norms, showing the significance of embodied masculinity as a practice of Indigenous Fijian identity. His use of what White sees as ‘cross-ethnic markers’ in response to such institutionalised marginalisation is a resistive claim for social worth and recognition through an alignment with the West. Such adaptation is not a ‘fluid’ engagement with ethnic boundaries that flows directly from his transgression of gender norms, but a situated response to a regime of racialised gender. As this example illustrates, analysing practices of sexuality and gender in the Pacific requires an understanding of racialised identity and its relationship to local power structures.

A significant outcome of the discursive binary between the West and the Pacific is research that critiques the sex/gender system of the West in relation to the Pacific, but does not
adequately critique sex and gender in the Pacific. Wallace (2003) argues that designations of Pasifika genders as naturalised and not comparable to sex/gender in the West reproduces the discourse of the Pacific as ‘Other’. Claims of Pacific ‘fluidity’ made in this way are empty and depoliticised; as a conceptual designation, ‘fluidity’ would only be an act of transgression or resistive agency in a set of cultural, political and economic conditions where rigidity was produced as the dominant social order. Towle and Morgan (2002) address work that identifies so-called ‘third gender’ bodies in different global contexts and compares this to the limited terrain of Western sexualities and genders. They claim:

[d]istinguishing ‘the West’ from ‘the rest’ does not advance our understandings of the historical and political contexts in which gender ideologies are negotiated. Does gender variability flourish under conditions of victimization, for example, or resistance? […] To what extent does it result from the exercise of state power or technological capacity? How is it affected by the interpretations of biology or the requirements of kinship (489)?

Towle and Morgan’s assertion of the need to attend to how gender operates politically and materially within its geographical location resonates with my own approach. A critical analysis of local power regimes is needed to interpret the reproduction of gender within the Pacific. My project explores the relationship between Fijian experiences of sexuality and gender and the local reproduction of heterogender alongside the operation of ethnonationalism.

**Are Straight Lines also White?**

Postcolonial and Pasifika scholarship highlights the need to critically attend to the use of Western epistemologies within a Pacific context. Teiwa (2006) asserts a critical ambivalence about the role of cross-cultural analogies between the Pacific and the West. While she
concludes that comparative work can be fruitful, she stresses the need for caution over theorising across different geopolitical sites that are embedded with very different worldviews and material conditions. Likewise, Jolly (2007) points out the interpretative errors that arise when Pasifika and Western concepts are brought clumsily into contact. Huffer and Qalo’s (2004) calls for the (re)framing of Pasifika concepts as broader conceptual frameworks within the context of the marginalisation of Pasifika knowledges via colonial and neo-colonial processes. They call for the use of Pacific philosophy and ethics as ‘a body of applicable concepts and values to guide interaction within the region and beyond’ (87). These Pasifika criticisms of Eurocentric conceptual modes are challenging for my project because the conceptual apparatus that has arisen out of queer theory and queer studies is inherently indebted to a Western philosophical tradition. To address this, I deconstruct my own use of Ahmed’s (2006) ‘straight lines’ in relation to Fiji as a means of exploring the complexity of postcolonial and queer engagements, and also as a means of explicating a situational and limited account of how Western conceptual terms might be best understood and utilised in a Pasifika, or other non-Western, context.

Ahmed (2006) is a British Pakistani theorist whose account of ‘straight lines’ draws on both Western philosophical precepts, particularly Merleau-Ponty’s (2002) interrogation of perception, and the work of post/anti-colonial scholars such as Linda Martin Alcoff and Franz Fanon (1986). Ahmed’s concept of ‘straight lines’ makes a connection between bodily perception and the social conditions for the reproduction of heterosexuality. This concept effectively captures how dominant social norms are produced through the repetition of bodily action. Most significantly, lines signal particular directions that the body might take, making some objects visible at the exclusion of others that disappear from view.
The crucial question for my analysis is whether Ahmed’s (2006) theoretical framework for understanding institutionalised heterosexuality and racialised privilege remains valid in Pacific contexts. Ahmed’s theorisation relies on an individualised human body as the vehicle for perception. This approach contrasts with Pasifika ontologies that are communally oriented and who situate their being in relation to the primordiality of place. For example, if the vehicle of perception for Indigenous Fijian people is the vanua (people/land) instead of an individual human body, then perception might always be multidimensional (see Ravuvu 1983). Do lines extend from the perception of the body or from an a priori culturally oriented body that is always already directed towards linearity?

It is possible that embodied Pasifika perceptions would not relate to the experience of the singular body in the world, nor would perception be understood through what is visible or tactile in front of the body. In this context, motility, or the socially shaped ability of the body to move freely, might be less synonymous with a person’s agency in social sites. For Pacific nations facing global warming as a pressing concern, motility might be connected to movement of fish or tides instead of the movement of the human body; and agency might be linked to the capacity to stay still rather than to move.

However, Ahmed’s (2006, 111) theoretical approach does speak to the racialised marginalisation of Pasifika peoples because it addresses the way in which bodily schema are racialised. Her engagement with racialised bodies and her emphasis on the orientation of bodies in relation to social structures (family, nation, race) provides a productive basis for analysing the relationship between queer Pasifika people and the social sites that shape their bodies. It would certainly be interesting to examine further the incommensurability between postcolonial theories and indigenous Pasifika ontologies but this is outside the scope of my thesis. As my analysis demonstrates, the tensions that exist at a conceptual level between the
singular body and Pasifika bodies were not encountered, because Ahmed’s conceptualisation inherently suggests very different site-specific relationships between bodies and objects. Her theoretical framework is useful in interpreting the mechanisms of heterogender in Fiji because it offered a means of analysing the experiences of the body in sexualised and ethnicised terms and accounting for the pervasiveness of heterogendered norms through ongoing iterations. ‘Straight lines’ are relevant in an Indigenous Fijian context because they offer an effective means of theorising how site-specific heterogendered actions cohere into institutionalised and privileged accumulations that produce force. What becomes more significant is asking how ‘straight lines’ can be utilised as part of an analytical framework that makes sense of culturally specific material and local conditions. In the following section, I explore the need to queer Pasifika methodologies.

**Queering Pasifika Methodological Frameworks**

In this section, I propose a queering of Pasifika methodological frameworks as a critical analysis of the role of gender and sexuality within Pasifika paradigms. I argue that Pasifika conceptual knowledge can reproduce social hierarchy as if it is an essentialised aspect of Pasifika culture rather than a system that privileges some Pasifika knowledges at the expense of others. My approach here is influenced by Gopinath’s (2005) methodological framing of the South Asian queer diaspora as a site of intervention into ethnicised and nationalist imaginaries. Gopinath’s theorisation is based on the South Asian diaspora, but her methodological insights offers a useful way of approaching queer subjectivities in an indigenous context that is similarly inflected by postcolonial nationalism. In my work, I adopt her positioning of a queer female diasporic subjectivity, not as an adjunct to ethnicised and national belongings, but as a subjectivity which has already been displaced by them and therefore offers a critical perspective on their operations.
Following Gopinath, I mobilise queer non-white subjectivity to explore the intersections of gender, sexuality, and racialised nationalism. Gopinath (2005, 10) argues that ‘the critical framework of a specifically queer diaspora [...] may begin to unsettle the ways in which the diaspora shores up the gender and sexual ideologies of dominant nationalisms on the one hand, and processes of globalisation on the other’. She states further, ‘[t]his [queer diasporic] framework “queers” the concept of diaspora by unmasking and undercutting its dependence on a genealogical, implicitly heteronormative reproductive logic’ (10). My approach throughout this thesis is to queer sites of Indigenous Fijian meaning making and interrogate how and when they reproduce Fijian subjectivities through the exclusion of queer bodies. I argue that queer bodies are not ‘new’ (i.e. Western interventions) but have been elided by dominant Indigenous Fijian cultural norms. ‘Queer’ is a somewhat uncomfortable and compromised Western term, but my use of it here is not a descriptive claim for Westernised sexual identities. Instead, I adopt the term as a critical and political claim that when heterosexuality and normative gender is reproduced as an aspect of ‘culture’ it is also always a function of power which renders invisible other alternatives for cultural belonging. My intent is not to suggest that indigenous and Pasifika concepts are not fruitful for furthering studies within the Pacific or elsewhere. I hope that Pasifika methodologies flourish, but I also advocate that they do so in ways that pay attention to local operations of gender and power in the Pacific. The following examples show the necessity of ‘queering’ Indigenous Fijian conceptual frameworks in order to critically examine the exclusion of queer bodies.

The underlying power relations underpinning processes of talanoa is a useful example of the necessity of queering Pasifika research paradigms. Talanoa is a pan-Pacific term for the conversational sharing of ideas, a familiar aspect of everyday life throughout the Pacific region. In Pasifika research, the term has been used to describe a culturally appropriate means of
talking together to collect data which involves shared meanings on the part of researcher and participant (Thompson 2012; Fletcher, Parkhill, Fa’afoi and Morton 2006; Huffer and Qalo 2004). As a research practice, talanoa makes the significance of spoken words within Pasifika culture central to the research project. Fletcher and colleagues (2006, 40) explain:

[t]alanoa is a qualitative, ecological, oral interactive approach to research that allows for continuity, authenticity and cultural integrity. Tala means ‘to inform, tell, talk about’ and noa means ‘nothing or void’. The methodology involves providing a culturally appropriate setting for the researcher and those researched to talk about whatever arises.

Fletcher et al. (2006) suggest that using talanoa as open-ended interviewing practices without fixed questions or structure maintains the dignity and autonomy of the researched through the sharing of power. They argue that this shift ‘assists to diminish the distance between the researched and researchers’ (2). Indeed, within my data collection, the conversational process of collecting data was informed by the participants’ and my own shared understandings of talanoa in a Fijian (and broader Pasifika) context.

However, what these accounts of talanoa-as-research-practice fail to take account of is that talanoa, in Fiji at least, has never been an egalitarian process of sharing knowledge. It is almost always mediated by implicit cultural hierarchies about who can speak to whom, in what tone and about what subjects, and in what spaces. The gendered and hierarchical arrangement of social spaces means that men are likely to speak together and women are likely to speak together (see White 2005; Ravuvu 1983). The authority invested in turaga (chiefs) and elders produce a one-directional process of talking whereby some talk and others listen.
Likewise, it disturbs me that Pasifika researchers conceive of processes of talanoa during research as ‘power sharing’. While a cultural process might be shared it does not follow that the privilege that flows from the process is shared in the form of equal gain. What talanoa imagines is that when culture is shared between researcher and researched, our stake and authority in the project is the same. It is not. Talanoa is reimagined as an open process of dialogue instead of a culturally mediated site for the exchange of information which is always partial and conditional on the basis of multiply constituted hierarchies.

My concern about how talanoa is used as a research practice is that it risks reproducing talanoa as formal and masculinist through its lack of critical attention to the power dynamics within talanoa. Within these spaces queer talanoa is likely to be further marginalised.

Certainly, from my own experience, I can think of spaces in Fiji where talanoa between or about queers might emerge. A space for queer talanoa might be out back of the house amongst women sharing yaqona (*piper methysticum*) out of a bucket; whilst men share yaqona from carved tanoa in the front of the house. Queer talanoa might emerge through liminal spaces like the informal, teasing talanoa amongst women (see Toren 2005 for an account of the micropolitical dimensions of joking in Fiji). However, when these forms of talanoa emerge they are resistive practices that are produced through the informal terms they operate on, and the overriding hierarchialisation of gender and space.

Huffer and Qalo (2004, 88) argue for research that promotes ‘Pacific epistemologies and ways of doing and being’. They offer an account of how ‘matanivanua’ as ‘a mediator of society’, can operate conceptually as a mechanism for problem solving. Huffer and Qalo argue that, ‘as a concept, it can be transformed, enhanced, and reapplied to a context that has also evolved, bringing new tensions and conflicts in its wake (96). While Huffer and Qalo recognise matanivanua are linked to particular vanua (land, in this case region) rather than the nation,
they do not offer any analysis of how this role is mediated by power relations. The role of matanivanua is more traditionally understood as an orator. It is passed on to sons via birthright and it operates to accord its bearers a particular status. In my research, a transgender participant was ‘matanivanua’ by birthright in her village. Transgressing normative masculinity meant that she was ‘stopped’ from either staying in her village or inheriting this powerful role. She moved to Suva where she was unemployed, and had previously been engaged in survival sex work.

From a queer perspective, the reproduction of matanivanua has acted as a means of reproducing particular forms of knowledge within the vanua as privileged knowledge that is intrinsically linked to masculinity and heterogender. Koroi’s (2010) work on ceremony interestingly challenges the masculinist assumptions of this site by observing that in situations where men were unable to complete the retelling of oral tradition, this knowledge could be reproduced perfectly by women who were otherwise relegated to listening roles.

Finally, I want to critically attend to the conceptual overlay between ‘being straight’ or ‘being queer’ and the Indigenous Fijian concepts of ‘davo donu’ (to lie straight) and ‘davo cala’ (to lie in a crooked way) (Huffer and Qalo, 2004). Huffer and Qalo argue for the broader conceptual use of ‘lying straight’ (davo donu) that informs vakavanua (the way of the land/people). They assert that the concept of ‘lying straight’ is an Indigenous Fijian concept that might be useful for governance. Huffer and Qalo draw on Tuwere’s (2002) explanation, ‘the way of the vanua is davo donu (lit, to lie straight) — that is, if all live justly and peacefully with one another, with the ancestors, with God and with nature — the land would be filled with sautu (well-being)’ (130, quoted in Huffer and Qalo 2004, italics original). Certainly, this is a lovely aspiration. However, what the cross-cultural juxtaposition of ‘lying straight’ and Ahmed’s ‘straight lines’ alerts me to is that the concept of ‘lying straight’ operates within
a particular discursive terrain where social good is linked to Christianity and the reproduction of heterogender. Whose bodies are imagined as ‘lying straight’? Huffer and Qalo explain, ‘in contrast, davo cala (to lie in a crooked way) would bring disaster to the land and to the people’ (96). George (2008) has pointed out there have been public claims by church leaders in Fiji that homosexuality would lead to natural disasters. I suggest that these claims by church leaders depend on the alignment of ‘davo cala’ with homosexuality, whereby queerness is construed as a moral wrongdoing. An uncritical approach to the distinction between davo donu and davo cala risks perpetuating the way these concepts legitimise particular heterosexist and masculinist privileges in Fiji, especially the authority of chiefly classes and religious leaders. This distinction can also reproduce the Othering of the Indo-Fijian community as different values are perceived as a social threat.

In a methodological context, this queer deconstruction of Indigenous Fijian concepts signals the need to attend to multiple marginalisations: both the colonial and imperialist processes that have haunted the production of knowledge about the Pacific and the subtle silencing of queers via the mechanisms of reproducing the culture or nation. There are no easy answers to the complexity of these issues, but what I want to draw out here is that my analysis – while drawing on Western research methods – is analytically poised to address the processes of imperialism and racism that marginalise queer Pacific subjects. As Towle and Morgan (2002, 471) assert:

…‘member’ knowledge is based on the conviction that members have a right to represent themselves, both to inspire others and to resist hostile and repressive political forces. But the politics of membership are complex. Do transgender natives, speaking for themselves, merit a place in the literature?
As a queer Pasifika researcher, I ask what counts as a Pasifika methodology. As the examples explored above suggest, the voices of queer Pasifika people might be obscured within some Pasifika research paradigms because of their position as ‘internal Others’ (Munt 2008). Pasifika research methodologies, as I argue, do not, to date, pay sufficient attention to the embeddedness of indigenous practices in local relations of power and the marginalisation of queer subjectivities within indigenous conceptions of gender and sexuality. Furthermore, such methodologies often overlook their own adoption of ideas from the West, including significantly, Christianity.

What is necessary for my project, then, is a research methodology that pays attention to the interlocked nature of racialised identities, sexuality and gender, and their embeddedness within local relations of power. In order to develop such a methodology, I have drawn on the work of post-colonial queer theorists Sara Ahmed (2006) and Gayatri Gopinath (2005). Their scholarship extends the scope of queer theory, bringing its Western philosophical roots into conversation with the analysis of race, ethnicity and national identity. As I demonstrate, the analysis of the intersections of race, gender and sexuality that they propose is a useful tool for the unpacking of the complex lives of queer Pasifika people. The following section situates myself as a queer Pasifika researcher.
Locating Myself as Insider/Outsider

As a queer and Kailoma (mixed race) woman of Indigenous Fijian, Tongan, and Pakeha descent I am uniquely positioned to research and analyse queer lives in Fiji. Situating myself within my research project as queer and Pasifika orients me to making sense of multiple forms of domination. These include colonial and neo-colonial processes within the Pacific, and the structural elision of queer people in Fiji through the intersection of ethnonationalism and heterogender. This approach extends from Gopinath’s (2005) mode of situating queer diasporic female subjectivity as a positionality that offers a critical challenge to the patriarchal gendering of both Indian nationalisms and diasporic imaginaries. Likewise, Ahmed’s (2006) own queer non-white body is the body she attends to throughout *Queer Phenomenology*, by theorising her concept of ‘stopping’ in relation to her experience of being stopped through technologies that are racialised, and the elision of her queerness within the family home as a site of the family line.

However, while my queer Kailoma subjectivity oriented me towards wanting to make sense of situated marginalisations and the need to attend to both sexuality and racism my experiences as a Pasifika diasporic Kailoma subject do not map onto the experiences of my participants; and in fact trouble ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ distinctions. As Dwyer and Buckle (2009, 60) asserts:

> Insider and outsider are understood as a binary of two separate preexisting entities, which can be bridged or brought together to conjoin with a hyphen. This hyphen can be viewed not as a path but as a dwelling place for people. This hyphen acts as a third space, a space between, a space of paradox, ambiguity, and ambivalence, as well as conjunction and disjunction.
My positionality as an insider/outsider researcher was confounded in multiple ways by points of connection and disjuncture that I describe below.

Being queer and of Indigenous Fijian descent enabled my participation in queer Fijian communities in a way that would not otherwise have been possible. I was able to talanoa and laugh with the participants in my research about my own experiences with my family in Fiji, and had shared some of the painful experiences they described. Queer belonging both enabled connections but these connections were also complicated by the possibility of misrecognition. While I participated in moments of affinity with queer Fijians through recognition of shared experiences of marginalisation, I am conscious of the need to recognise the situated nature of these different experiences. My empathy for participants (and theirs for me) was not an easy or straightforward identification because I am both Kailoma (mixed race) and a diasporic Fijian. I could identify with some aspects of local culture but was displaced from others.

In terms of the researcher-subject relationship, I occupied the privileged space of coming from more affluent New Zealand, which has more power in the Pacific region.

As Denzin and Lincoln (2003, 29) assert ‘[t]here are no objective observations, only observations socially situated in the worlds of- and between- the observer and the observed’.

One of the significant differences between my experience and theirs was my motility to be able to move between Fiji and Auckland, and the different worlds they provide. In our informal talanoa the ‘shared direction’ of queer lives in Fiji sometimes generated a sense of hopelessness about Fiji as an effect of continually being stopped; that as a second-generation migrant I could at least partially turn away from. This speaks to the body of work on diaspora; as members of diaspora are again both privileged and excluded from experiences of belonging (see Gopinath 2005; Ahmed et al 2003; Fortier 2001). In particular, my methodology was shaped
by my realisation that I was unable to do the form of Pasifika epistemological research that Huffer and Qalo (2004) described because I do not speak Fijian or have enough knowledge of Fijian language to create an in-depth analysis through these methods.

Being ‘Kailoma’ (mixed race) has site-specific meanings in Fiji that shifted how I understood myself between Fiji and Auckland. In Auckland, the white New Zealander designation of my father as a ‘Pacific Islander’ because of being brown skinned, and the varied negative representations that term has conveyed shaped my experience of understanding myself as a Pacific Islander (see Teaiwa and Mallon 2005). My understanding of myself as Indigenous Fijian through genealogical lines back to our vanua was socially influenced by living in New Zealand, whereby Maori identify themselves as Maori and by particular Iwi based on these genealogical lines rather than blood quantum. This created a mis/recognition for me when I started my research in Fiji: I had not understood that the Fiji colonial processes had led to Kailoma (classified as “Part Europeans” on the electoral role) being understood as a separate group distinct from Indigenous Fijians.

In Fiji, colonialist projections led to rigid designations of bodies within the colonial state that Lal (1987, 1) has referred to as ‘benevolent apartheid’. During the colonial period, Kailoma or ‘Part Europeans’ were privileged over ‘full’ Indigenous Fijians and often given roles within the colonial administration. DeBruce (2007) explains that Kailoma were seen as a site of contamination and potential threat, and devalued by the British. Since independence, and with the shifts in racialised discourse that have emerged through Fiji’s recent history, the position of Kailoma in present day Fiji is still fraught. For Indigenous Fijians (i Taukei) ‘Kailoma’ has been associated with being dirty or shameful, as people without either culture. I am a Kailoma woman whose father was from Lautoka, and grandfather was Tongan from Nuku’alofa. My understanding and knowledge of the distinction between being Kailoma and
Indigenous Fijian only emerged through my doctoral studies, and was in many ways deeply painful.

Equally, though participants in my study recognised me differently as both a cultural insider and a cultural outsider. I had outsider moments when people questioned whether I knew what ‘Kailoma’ meant because they were so surprised I would use ‘that word’ when I could pass as a white New Zealander. I had insider moments when participants explained where they were from in relation to my own vanua, or asked me if I didn’t burn because the people from Beqa Island, the island I descend from, were firewalkers. I also had some insider moments when participants cautiously admitted to me that they were also genealogically Kailoma, even though they were recognised as being Indigenous Fijian. For example, one participant explained that his mother had actually been Kailoma, ‘like you’; another explained that he actually had Tongan heritage. There is not space in this thesis to explore the ambivalent attachments of being Kailoma more fully (see deBruce 2007; see Ahmed 2006 and Haritaworn 2010 for discussions of being mixed race in other cultural contexts).

**Data Collection**

I conducted research in Suva, Fiji and in Auckland, New Zealand. As I initially conceived of this project, I intended to investigate subjectivity amongst queer Pasifika peoples based in Aotearoa. Tim McCreanor suggested that I do a case study within Fiji, to look comparatively between the experiences of queer Pasifika diaspora and the queer experiences of ‘homeland’. However, the data that emerged was so rich and complex across both sites that it became apparent that my doctoral project would be more cohesive as a study of Fiji. Chapter Five, on families, has retained data from my Auckland-based data collection because it provides a useful site of comparison.
There are simultaneous material, historical, and metaphorical connections between these two research sites. Fiji and New Zealand have a long-standing relationship: firstly as islands explored and settled by Pasifika voyagers, then as lands colonised by the British in the nineteenth century, and since then as nations who have significant political and cultural ties, including the migration of Fijians to New Zealand. Both of these sites also have personal resonance for me. Being New Zealand-born of Fijian, Tongan, and Pakeha (New Zealand European) descent, Fiji operated for me as an ‘imagined homeland’ (Gopinath 2005, see also Fortier 2001). It was psychically familiar through its relationship to my family and my own sense of belonging. Auckland was the city I was raised in as a second-generation Pacific migrant.

My interviewing in Suva was done between 2003 and 2004. I sought and gained ethics approval from the University of Auckland Ethics Committee. I found participants through the intermediary bodies of non-government organisations: the AIDS taskforce and the Sexual Minorities Project that was part of Women’s Action for Change. I provided participants with information and consent forms written in both English and Fijian. I also offered participants the choice of being interviewed in English, Fijian or Hindi, through the use of a translator. Interestingly, all participants chose to be interviewed in English.

I interviewed thirteen participants in Suva, including five women, six men, and two women who were biologically male. The participants were predominantly Indigenous Fijian, two were Indo-Fijian, and one was Samoan. I used in-depth qualitative interviews to draw out participants’ experiences of having same-sex attractions, desires or relationships and their interactions with a range of social sites. My approach mobilised talanoa, as discussed. I asked a series of identical open questions designed to encourage participants to tell their own stories. This approach also drew on narrative interviewing used by other Pacific academics.
(Tiatia 2003; Anae 2001). The interviews took between one and a half to two and a half hours each. My research intentionally used a non-ethnic definition of Fijian as part of my own political and ethical stance. I also conducted five additional interviews with ‘cultural informants’, who were spokespeople from different non-government and community organisations. These interviews provided further background information on the cultural, social and political aspects of queer life in Suva.

Engaging with grass-roots community via community-based organisations in Suva was an integral aspect of the research process. I participated in a screen-printing and sexuality workshop that was being run through the Sexual Minorities Project (SMP), which gave me the opportunity to engage with people about my research. This workshop itself reflects the political and economic realities of queer lives in Fiji, where the impetus was simultaneously discussing sexuality and developing work skills to appeal to those unable to gain employment. This workshop provided a wonderful opportunity for me to build relationships with people connected to SMP. It was significant for me to be able to talanoa and laugh alongside the queer community, and for them to get to know me and where I was from. I openly talked about my own intimate relationship and my family from Lautoka and New Zealand. The outcome was that most of my interviews stemmed from participating in the workshop, and the level of mutual trust and friendship that we developed.

My interviewing in Auckland was conducted in 2005. In Auckland I canvassed for participants through personal networks as well as through Pacific and gay community organisations including the New Zealand AIDS Foundation, Rainbow Youth, and the ‘Love Life Fono’ (a national hui for Pacific sexual minorities). The interview process was far more fraught then in Fiji because of the small number of potential participants. The small size of the community meant that privacy was a concern for potential participants. Canvassing through Auckland gay
organisations was largely ineffective, because of the lack of Pacific people who accessed these organisations. I eventually interviewed seven participants consisting of five women and two men. Four participants were Samoan, two were Cook Island Maori and one was Indigenous Fijian. Six were New Zealand-born, and one was born in Samoa but New Zealand-raised. Two participants were men, and five were women.

I asked the following questions at all interviews:

1) Where are you from?
2) Tell me about your family.
3) Tell me about your sexual identity and different ways of identifying.
4) Tell me about your experiences with the communities that you belong to.
5) Tell me about the relationships or sexual encounters that you have had.
6) Tell me about any unsafe or risky situations that you have been in that you feel was related to your sexuality.
7) Tell me about any health issues, problems or concerns that you have, or have had, and that you feel relate to your sexuality.
8) Tell me about your experiences with religion or spirituality.
9) How do you see your future?
10) Are there any other issues you feel are important for my topic?

The first question, ‘Where are you from?’, was chosen because of the significance of vanua (ancestral land) to Indigenous Fijian understandings of self, and also Indo-Fijian understanding of place. On the level of protocol, asking where someone is from is generally the first question asked colloquially when people meet in Fiji. This question was a means of orienting myself to my participants’ lives, and enabling them to be forthcoming about their experiences. Asking about place was about developing a relationship between them and myself, because I would
inevitably respond by explaining where I was from in Fiji. That is, that my father grew up in Lautoka, but that we descended from Beqa Island, Ba, and the Nailaga region. In some cases this meant that we already had a pre-existing relationship because of historical ties between my people and theirs.

The questions ‘tell me about your sexual identity and different ways of identifying?’ and ‘tell me about the relationships or sexual encounters that you have had?’ were consciously open because it was an operating assumption that having same-sex sexual or intimate relationships did not lead to a particular sexual identity, e.g. being gay, vakasalewalewa or straight, and that ways of identifying might be contextual. I also was cogniscent of the complex relationships between indigenous language and globalised ‘gay’ identity (see Altman 1996, 2001), and wanted to see how participants constructed sexual subjectivities in local terms. On reflection, this question does still presume that sexual desires or behaviours has a bearing on identity, which is a feature of Western gay identity. This choice of wording also came about through engaging in the local context, where the Sexual Minorities Project was arguably organised around human rights claims for the gay and lesbian community.

These questions would lead to follow up questions, and sometimes into extended periods of conversation. In a lot of instances I would reflect on my own experience, openly empathise, or share their laughter. I felt that my own sexuality and cultural background contributed largely to the level of openness and sense of shared experience throughout the interviews. Connection and trust were significant aspects of the interview process.

I transcribed the interviews verbatim. Transcripts were given back to the participants, who were able to remove or amend their transcripts within a two month timeframe of receiving
them. As several participants in Suva did not have addresses, transcripts were given back to them in person or via the Sexual Minorities Project.
Analysis

My use of queer phenomenology as a means of interpreting and analysing the experiences of my participants has been driven by a concern to put an in-depth analysis of heterogender in Pacific contexts at the centre of my research. As Denzin and Lincoln (2003, 33) claim, ‘cultural studies and queer theory paradigms use methods strategically – that is, as resources for understanding and for producing resistances to local structures of domination’. My project is concerned with how heterosexuality and gender acts structurally and symbolically, and are intrinsically connected to the operation of culture and nation. Analysing sites of family and religion – via the alignment of straight lines – reveals the way culture and nation constitute sexual subjectivities. My project seeks to understand how this process both constitutes queer Pacific subjects, and shapes their lived experiences. This is to say, that my project puts gender and sexuality at the centre rather than the margins of analysis.

My analysis of interview data is related to the practices of textual analysis that have emerged from queer studies more generally. It is connected to Gopinath’s (2005) description of postcolonial ‘queer reading,’ a process that requires reading for the ‘insurgent queer’ figure. Gopinath’s close reading evokes textual possibilities for queerness within postcolonial media, recasting migrant nostalgic memory that might otherwise signify the maintenance of heteronorms. Likewise, my analysis of interview data looks critically at moments when heterogendered norms are transgressed.

My analysis has involved a complex restorying of the lives of Pacific queers via critically analysing transcript data in relation to broader power relations. I rearticulate these stories in relation to their ‘embeddedness’ within particular sites and institutions, and their relationships to privileged lines. Ahmed’s (2006) account of ‘fetishisation’ suggests that
objects and others are fetishised when they are presented as having ‘arrived’ untied from the social, political and historical mechanisms that have produced them. Thus, the retelling of these stories is a retelling that reinscribes the underlying relations of power into the story itself. Unpacking the ‘embeddedness’ of queer stories within social relations poses a challenge to the ‘fetishisation’ of marginalised subjects. My thesis is a site-specific engagement with the mechanisms of power, both local and global, that produces particular kinds of subjects and experiences.

My decisions about how to analyse the data that I used was based on the significance of unpacking the way in which Pacific queers were simultaneously subject to culture and sexuality. Within this context, I deconstructed participants’ stories via Ahmed’s queer phenomenology. That is, I was interested in how participants were oriented, and when or if they were oriented by ‘straight lines’. I approached transcript data by critically unpacking a complex picture of how particular objects cohered around particular bodies, relationships of proximity and distance, and what is ‘in front’ of the body as well as what is ‘behind’ it. Focusing on these measures of perception allowed me to analyse the significance of social sites of family, religion, and the nation in mediating the experience of same-sex desire.

For Ahmed (2006), movements away from straight lines are experienced as ‘queer moments’. She describes these moments as temporal and fleeting. What has emerged from my engagement with empirical data is the way in which in this context, queer subjects negotiate ‘straight lines’ in sustained ways. Close attention to the ‘orientation’ of the subject and the orientation of social sites around them has allowed me to uncover the site-specific ways in which ‘straight lines’ emerge in the Pacific context, built out of the alignment of heterogender with key institutions. My analysis explores the direction that subjects face in relation to ‘straight lines’ that are socially and historically constituted. I consider the moments in which
subjects either reproduce the ‘straight line’, or turn away from the ‘straight line’, as analytically significant to how queer subjects are constituted and how their lives are shaped. That is, my analysis is interested in unpacking what aspects create ‘motility’ in the lives of my subjects. What allows them to experience ‘ease’ or ‘reach’ within particular social contexts? Furthermore, what creates ‘stopping’ or limitation?

Analysing the relationship between the body and the way in which heterogender coheres as a ‘straight line’ allows for a nuanced analysis of how subjectivity is formed through interpellations in the form of ‘stopping’ or ‘ease’. Drawing on Ahmed in this way means that my approach to subjectivity is performative; the subject is constituted through the repetition of the social line. I chose data to analyse from the transcripts on three related bases. Firstly, I chose data that spoke to how participants were constituted as non-heterosexual and cultural subjects, and more specifically how they were subject to culture and sexuality simultaneously. I investigate what is at stake when queer bodies are positioned in particular ways. Secondly, I investigate the ‘stopping’ of queer participants. These two aspects of my analysis are intrinsically linked, because as Ahmed (2006) discusses ‘stopping’ is an interpellation that constitutes the subject in particular ways. By exploring moments when my participants experience ‘stopping’, I make sense of how ‘stopping’ works in site-specific ways to construct queer Pasifika subjectivities. Thirdly, I chose data that spoke to the transgression of heterogendered norms – or the coherence of straight lines. This question again, is linked to ‘stopping’, because it is a way of asking what happens when bodies do not respond in ways that are expected of them, when bodies fail to cohere. These moments might act to ‘disorientate’, and are powerful because they simultaneously disrupt straight lines and draw attention to their construction. Drawing on a methodological tradition within queer theory,
close analysis of moments of transgression reveals the 'straightening mechanisms' that work to make heterogender cohere as natural or authentic.

**Conclusion**

How do Pasifika subjects resist ‘straight lines’? (Ahmed 2006). That is, I consider how participants secure subjectivity along particular lines, or alternatively reveal instances when their lives are taken ‘off-line’. This line of analysis is in itself a decolonising strategy in that Pacific stories, and queer Pacific stories in particular, are often under threat of erasure. In this thesis, ‘queer’ works to unsettle both sexual and colonial meaning-making. I have drawn on queer theory as well as Pasifika methodologies as a means of analysing the complexity of Fiji’s social context, and nuanced relationships of power. My theoretical engagement with Ahmed is informed by my empirical research. Exploring the lived experiences of my participants has allowed me to retheorise the relationship between straight lines and those whose lives are discounted by them. In my thesis, the use of queer theory has been as a strategy for attending to queer Pacific people as internal ‘Others’. Pasifika research needs to attend to structural heterogender within Pasifika institutions as systems of meaning.
Chapter Four: Sexual Subjectivities:

Queer Selves and the Promise of Return

Queer Fijians in Suva are oriented as both sexual and ethnic subjects simultaneously. This chapter explores subjectification as a mutually constitutive process through which subjects are (re)produced as both ethnicised and sexualised. I draw on Ahmed’s (2006) account of the ‘gift of inheritance’ – through which the child takes up the social line of compulsory heterosexuality – as a means of exploring the complex relationship between what Ahmed calls ‘straight lines’ and queer subjectivities. For Ahmed, the notion of the ‘straight line’ articulates how heterosexuality is naturalised and institutionalised through repetition. Ahmed asserts that we follow lines because of our social investment in them. She says, ‘[t]hrough such investments in the promise of return, subjects produce the lines that they follow’ (17, emphasis original). This concept is useful for my exploration of Fijian (queer) subjectivity because ‘straight lines’ indicate an investment in the ‘shared direction’ of culture. In this chapter I extend Ahmed’s theorisation of the gift of inheritance to sites of cultural re/production asking what gets taken up as a condition of Indigenous Fijian subjectivity. That is, I interrogate instances of interpellation – or moments where subjectivity is formed or at stake – to ask how culture produces straight lines as ‘cultural lines’ where heterogender becomes a condition of culture or ‘being’ Indigenous Fijian. Ahmed’s account of ‘the gift of inheritance’ is especially relevant here because as my analysis shows heterogender is often inherently aligned with culture through ‘family lines’, so that the reproduction of heterosexuality becomes a condition of familial and cultural belonging. Heterogender becomes socially invested in what it means to be Indigenous Fijian to the extent that ‘queer’ desires displace or trouble racialised and cultural ‘inheritance’ or ‘lines’.
This chapter contains a close reading of four stories from my fieldwork in Suva. These stories describe moments of interpellation or (mis)recognition where the subjects are positioned to ‘inherit’ ‘straight lines’ - that are simultaneously family and racialised cultural lines – as a condition of their subjectivity. That is, they are moments when the subjects are constituted as Indigenous Fijian. Firstly, I analyse a story of a young Indigenous Fijian gay man who is given a pink teddy bear by his father. I suggest that – instead of reproducing straight lines of heterogender - the ‘uptake’ of the family line sometimes has queer outcomes. Secondly, I explore two accounts by lesbian women whose lesbian desires are rendered difficult to recognise in a context where performative ethnicised and gendered agency connotes a ‘straight line’ of desire. Finally, I explore the story of Nina, a transgender woman who is unable to take up the gendered role of mata-ni-vanua that would have been her birthright. Ahmed (2006, 90) says, ‘at certain points we can refuse the inheritance – at points that are often lived as breaking points’. I explore how Nina’s inability to take up her birthright is a moment of ‘stopping’ (Ahmed 2006) whereby her ‘refusal’ of heterogender inhibits her ability to take up the family line. What these different stories raise is the question of when and how does non-heterosexuality become ‘turning points’ or ‘breaking points’ for the ‘shared direction’ of the subject, or the constitution of the subject as Indigenous Fijian. Simultaneously, when does the subject’s ‘shared direction’ as Indigenous Fijian prevent the subject from being ‘read’ or interpellated as queer.

**Compulsory Heterogender and Cultural Lines**

Ahmed (2006) gives an account of compulsory heterosexuality that offers a means of understanding how heterosexuality is reproduced as a dominant social form. She says, ‘[h]eterosexuality is compulsory precisely insofar as it is not prescribed by nature: the heterosexual couple is “instituted” as the form of sociality through force’ (84). The
institutionalisation of heterosexuality allows it to appear natural precisely because of the ‘ease’ that heterosexuality gathers as a shared direction. Heterosexuality as a line has amassed ‘ease’ through its history. This spatial conception of the relationship between subjectivities, histories and meanings provides the framework for understanding how heterosexuality orients the body. Thus, (compulsory) heterosexuality is an effect of continual reinvestment in a particular ‘straight’ line, the line of family inheritance and the related role of the heterosexual couple. To be queer is to turn away from this habitual path as it extends through personal and political history. Ahmed states:

…subjects are required to ‘tend toward’ some objects and not others as a condition of familial as well as social love. For the boy to follow the family line he ‘must’ orientate himself toward women as loved objects… It is the presumption that the child must inherit the life of the parent that requires the child to follow the heterosexual line (85).

Ahmed (2006) asserts that notions of family propel compulsory heterosexuality through the taking up of the ‘family line’, through which the form of the heterosexual couple is privileged. Ahmed explains, ‘[i]t is the presumption that the child must inherit the life of the parent that requires the child to follow the heterosexual line’ (85). She suggests that the concept of family inheritance involves a ‘gift’ that automatically requires a ‘return’, through the reproduction of the family line: ‘[h]eterosexuality is imagined as the future of the child insofar as heterosexuality is idealised as a social gift and even as the gift of life itself’ (86). The force of the gift to compel heterogender is premised on its conceptual weight as an ‘irrepayable debt’, and the history of repetitions through generations amassed behind it. Heterogender is produced and reproduced through the repeated actions of bodies that enact the continuation
of family and social lines. Ahmed states, ‘subjects are required to “tend toward” some objects and not others as a condition of familial as well as social love’ (85).

This chapter draws on Butler’s (1997) exploration of the relationship between subjectivity and subjection. Butler asserts that through a productive conception of power, the agency of the subject is inherently ambivalent. This is because the production of the subject through power relations necessitates a ‘passionate attachment’ to the conditions of its arrival. The agency of the subject is still an effect of power; even though the subject may experience agency in ways that challenges or transmutes the operation of power in the process. As Butler astutely argues:

> power acts on the subject in at least two ways: first, as what makes the subject possible, the condition of its possibility and its formative occasion, and second, as what is taken up and reiterated in the subject’s ‘own’ acting (14).

Thus, Ahmed’s (2006) description of the ‘gift of inheritance’ offers a means of exploring the relationship between subjectivity and power: the ‘return’ that is compelled by the ‘gift of inheritance’ signals our social bargain with existing heteronormative conditions as the conditions of our existence as a subject.

This chapter draws on Ahmed’s (2006) theorisation of how racialised privilege is reproduced through social lines that act as points of arrival for some bodies at the exclusion of others. Ahmed provides a phenomenological account of how whiteness operates as social privilege; asserting that whiteness as an orientation: ‘[c]olonialism makes the world “white,” which is of course a world “ready” for certain kinds of bodies, as a world that puts certain objects within their reach’ (111). She discusses the means by which whiteness is reproduced through the ‘straight line’ of the family, where discourses of inheritance and familiarity act as processes of
racialisation whereby subjects get recognised as ‘alike’ on the basis of shared habits. Whiteness acts as an orientation that allows certain bodies to be extended into space and towards others, whereas other bodies are stopped. Whiteness is ‘habitual’ through the movements that bodies are enabled to take. That is, whiteness involves the repetition of particular bodily movements that in turn are supported by their surroundings. Whiteness is marked by the privilege of feeling comfort because it extends the reach of the white body easily into the space that supports it. The orientation ‘around’ whiteness becomes ‘background’ which then obscures the relationship between this orientation and power. Ahmed says:

[w]hen I refer to whiteness, I am talking precisely about the production of whiteness as a straight line rather than whiteness as a characteristic of bodies. Indeed, we can talk of how whiteness is ‘attributed’ to bodies as if it were a property of bodies; one way of describing this process is to describe whiteness as a straightening device. We can ask how whiteness gets reproduced through acts of alignment, which are forgotten when we receive its line (121).

Ahmed (2006) describes the reproduction of whiteness as a form of social inheritance: ‘[t]o inherit whiteness is to become invested in the line of whiteness: it is both to participate in it and to transform the body into a “part” of it’ (125). For Ahmed, similarities that are consequences of proximity are interpreted as being hereditary. Ahmed says, ‘in receiving whiteness as a gift, white bodies – or those bodies which can be recognised as white bodies – come to “possess” whiteness as if it were a shared attribute’ (125).

Ahmed (2006) is clear that despite the social force of the ‘gifts’ of whiteness and heterosexuality, subjects do not always ‘take up’ this family line. She says:
there is pressure to inherit this line... [a]nd yet, these places where we are under pressure don’t always mean we stay on line; at certain points we can refuse the inheritance – at points that are often lived as breaking points (90).

In analysing the stories of my participants, I am interested in when and how these breaking points constitute them as particular kinds of subjects. In particular, the participants’ stories reveal the way lines of heterosexuality are often inherently aligned with lines of culture through the notion of family lines, so that the reproduction of heterosexuality (almost) becomes a condition of ‘being’ Fijian via familial and cultural belonging. I am interested in how concepts of femininity or masculinity become socially invested in what it means to be Indigenous Fijian to the extent that queer desires displace or trouble cultural inheritance.

Ahmed’s account of ‘whiteness’ is an account of the reproduction of a form of social privileging rather than ethnicity. Likewise, my conception of an Indigenous Fijian ‘cultural line’ here is conceptualised as an axis of privilege and marginalisation. My intention here is to consider what I am calling ‘cultural lines’ as social processes that forcefully constitute particular subjectivities through shared directions (that have both pleasures and limitations), rather than essential notions of ‘culture’.

Nevertheless, some participant stories grated uncomfortably with Ahmed’s account of compulsory heterosexuality, because they revealed instances where – instead of reproducing the straight lines of heterogender - the ‘uptake’ of the family line could have queer outcomes. I suggest that in this instance, the maintenance of cultural lines becomes a means of resisting the ‘Othering’ or instances of stopping that might otherwise occur. It reveals that ‘belonging’ is inherently complex. While straight lines orient our bodies in directions that make some (love) objects more accessible than others (Ahmed 2006), these lines are themselves susceptible to ruptures that may or may not support the shared directions of culture.
**When Indigenous Fijian Fathers Give Pink Teddy Bears**

Luke’s story highlights the way that the ‘return’ of the family line can have queer outcomes. For Ahmed (2006), the return of the family line is involved in the uptake of heterosexuality and acts as a means of re/producing heterosexuality. In the following account, I trouble this assertion by revealing how the ‘return’ of family lines can have queer results. Instead of disorienting the ‘straight line’, Luke is legitimised as a queer subject through the reproduction of Indigenous Fijian cultural lines. Luke, an Indigenous Fijian in his early twenties, told this story about his father:

> the person who I thought would never accept my being gay was my dad. And he actually accepted it. Like he’d buy me girlish things like a big teddy bear. I still have this big pink teddy bear from him. He was [...] in the military, so his first trip to the Middle East, he went to Cyprus and he bought me a big teddy bear for my birthday.

In this story the phrase ‘my being gay’ doesn’t refer to a point of coming out as gay (i.e. as an adult) but instead a way of being. He constitutes his subjectivity as being inherently feminine. The father’s buying of an object which is coded as feminine through its historical and social proximity to girls signifies to Luke that his father accepts and recognises the way Luke is without any discussion about this between them. In the story then, concepts of gender and sexuality are interwoven. When I asked Luke about whether he had told his father that he was gay, he explained:

> [w]ell the thing with my dad was I didn’t come out to him, but he kind of accepted the fact that I was different, and he reached out and made an effort. So he bought me stuff like that, and he even called me ‘my little girl’ sometimes. ‘My little girl’. He actually told me later that he actually wanted a girl for the family. And he thought that maybe it was because of that urge - that urge that he had that I was born this way- such a typical Fijian thing that we have

Tulia: oh, tell me more about that?

Luke: oh yeah um, it is a native kind of thing. They say that for a young couple the first time a woman conceives, it comes from the [man]. If they say ‘it’s a boy, it’s a
boy, it’s a boy,’ it’s a boy. If they say ‘I want a girl, it’s a girl, it’s a girl,’ it’s a girl. So my dad had that perception you know, and because I was the last child he definitely wanted a girl not a boy. So he thought it was his fault, and also he took the blame for it because that was the way he felt when I was in my mother’s tummy. It’s a Fijian thing. They always do it. And then my mother thought I was gay you know. I guess the sex change in the process of the womb did not actually complete itself. The homework did change, but not the physical part!

[laughter]

In this story Luke explains how he is brought into being through his father’s story of his gestation. Being ‘gay’ in this context means to be feminine or female within a male body. In Luke’s story, his feminine self exists within a physical body, rather than being enacted through his physicality. Interconnected to this, is an understanding of the feasibility and likelihood for ideas to act productively, such that the word or thought reshapes the material world. Luke’s joke that ‘the homework did change but not the physical part!’ is connected to Indigenous Fijian understandings of the self more generally, which involves a notion of a spirit self inside the physical body (Ravuvu 1983). The notion of changing form is prevalent within traditional Fijian belief with significant storytelling about shape-changing spirits and gods that take the forms of animals. Inherent in this conception is a notion of ‘being’ beyond the physical body, which can be different from the form that the physical body takes. So for instance, a god may take the form of an eel.

This story illuminates alternate ways of thinking about inheritance, and its relationship to heterogender. As outlined in the theory chapter, Ahmed’s (2006) account of familial inheritance reveals the way in which the imagined (foregrounded) return of the ‘gift of inheritance’ through the reproduction of the family line precipitates compulsory heterosexuality. Here I suggest inheritance can be maintained in queer ways. Rather than replicating the form of the heterosexual couple, the ‘gift of inheritance’ is taken up by Luke as ‘queer’ subjectivity. Rather than signalling a point of going ‘off-line’, this uptake of queer
subjectivity still offers the perpetuation of the ‘family line’, which reproduces a cultural line of ‘Fijianess’ or subjectivity-as-Fijian. That is, this family line projects both a familial and ethnicised way of being which is also queer.

Luke’s story opens up tensions in Ahmed’s (2006) account of compulsory heterosexuality. In my reading of Ahmed, queer subjectivity is marked by a lack – it comes about when the hetero-subjectivity of the child fails. That is, when the child is unable to be recognised as a subject because they are unable to ‘return’ the gift of inheritance via heterosexuality (see Butler 1992, 1997). What is interesting here is the relationship between cultural lines and the reproduction of heterogender, and what happens when heterogendered cultural lines produce queer subjects, or the reproduction of the ‘straight line’ fails. Ahmed says ‘at certain points we can refuse the inheritance – at points that are often lived as “breaking points’” (90). What conditions would give way to this ability to refuse? Particularly when, the agency to refuse is already mitigated by the way that the ‘gift of inheritance’ configures the conditions of the child’s subjectivity? Instead, in my analysis below, I argue that Luke’s queerness does not constitute a refusal but a continuation of the family line.

Certainly, on one hand, the way Luke’s father ‘took the blame for it’ suggests some sense of a wrong having been done that is very much tied to the story of the family. Luke is neither the desired girl child nor a heterogendered boy child, both of whom could have reproduced the family line through heteronormative practices. So when heterogender is not reproduced via inheritance and the cultural line, we could say that although the cultural line is maintained the child is reproduced as/recognised as the ‘Other’.

But already there are complexities that relate to the way inheritance as metonym comes up against practices of inheritance. Firstly, Luke is the youngest child with older brothers. The
father ‘choosing’ to have a girl suggests that the father already has sons and therefore (future) lines of inheritance. In fact, his intention for Luke could well be ‘not’ to inherit, or in other words to generate an alternative line which ‘supports’ the pre-existing lines of inheritance by not challenging their privilege. This reveals the way that lines of inheritance are always already conditional; the inheritance of family lines is already gendered in that they privilege the masculine. Secondly, Luke’s father desires a daughter. The unborn male child takes up this demand by becoming feminine: ‘the homework did change’. Luke takes up the gift of subjectivity that the father offers and returns it through the translation of his father’s (Indigenous Fijian, gendered) world-view onto his body. The story itself then becomes a form of reproduction, where the belief is validated and augmented as part of the family and racialised social line: ‘It’s a Fijian thing, they always do it’. Luke is constituted as both an Indigenous Fijian subject and a queer subject. By ‘taking up’ the demand to be feminine, Luke is simultaneously constituted as the good or obedient child.

It is possible that this version of queer subjectivity that takes up the gift of inheritance is only available in an Indigenous Fijian context and that this way of being constituted as a subject would not cross into the West. There is a need for further research in this area. My supposition would be that queer children could take up the gift of inheritance in ways that troubles compulsory heterosexuality (albeit differently) in other cultural contexts, because what is at stake is whether powerful heterogendered repetitions of culture simply reproduce existing power relations, or also create difference (See Butler 1990, 1997; Derrida 1980). While it is culturally-specific to the story that the father determines the sex of the child prenatally, what is given to the child alongside the gift of inheritance is an indeterminacy of the form that the ‘return’ might take.
Lesbian Subjectivity and Making Sense of Queer Moments

This section discusses the constitution of lesbian subjects by discussing the *proximity* of particular bodies as a consequence of a racialised and heterogendered ‘shared’ direction, as marker of (hetero)sexuality, and as a conduit to lesbian desire. The ‘gift of inheritance’ (Ahmed 2006) takes a less literal form as a conceptual tool for the following analysis. Through these stories, I consider the ‘gift of inheritance’ through the habitual, performative iterations of heterogender that constitute an Indigenous Fijian ‘shared direction.’ These normative gender practices represent a ‘return’ to the parents; they reproduce the ‘straight line’ as both gendered and racialised. The following stories reveal the relationship between such ‘returns’, and recognisability.

The subject’s ‘return’ of the ‘gift of inheritance’ is their point of arrival into the ‘straight line’ (Ahmed 2006); this conceptual moment equally signifies their subjectification within a ‘field of power’ through which they are performatively produced (Butler 1997). In the following stories, these women’s proximity to other women can be read as the reproduction of the straight line through their adherence to cultural norms. Yet the reproduction of the ‘straight line’ leads to what Ahmed describes as ‘contingent’ lesbian desires based on their proximity to other women. These stories suggest that the ‘return’ of the straight line has ambivalent effects. However, the reproduction of cultural norms associated with heterogender also means that these women’s experiences and subjectivities are rendered unintelligible, or unrecognisable as queer. Similarly, Gopinath (2005) describes the way nationalist discourses about South Asian women have rendered the female body as a site of purity and national identity that disavows queer female desire (16).
Ana is an Indigenous Fijian woman who identifies herself as lesbian. Her sexual orientation has not been discussed with her family members. Ana explained:

[t]ill today I haven’t told my family about it. But they just know I’m like that, because everyone I bring home is nobody else but girls.

The significance of what is left unspoken came through in Ana’s narrative, which I discuss in more depth in the following chapter. Suffice to say, Ana assumes that her family are aware of her sexual orientation because she only brings women home. I am interested in the work that the negative construction of ‘nobody else but girls’ does in this sentence. Ana bringing women home does not in-and-of itself signal her sexual orientation to her family, but most significantly the lack of men. Or rather, it is the combination of women without men that becomes a marker of non-heterosexuality that potentially signals Ana is queer: ‘they just know I’m like that’. Ahmed’s (2006) analysis of the contingent lesbian is useful here because Ana’s story gives such a poignant account of the orientation of sexual orientation, which underlies Ahmed’s analysis. Ana presumes her family know about her sexuality because she is only oriented towards women to the extent that they are the only people she brings home. Ahmed asserts:

[I]esbian desires enact the ‘coming out’ story as a story of ‘coming to,’ of arriving near other bodies, as a contact that makes a story and opens up other ways of facing the world (105, my emphasis).

The proximity of Ana’s body to the bodies of women – and not men – is what constitutes her sexuality in terms of a particular line of sight, and a story of ‘how she is in the world’. But what is particularly complex here is that gender in Fiji is already marked out by the proximity of the gendered body to bodies that are similarly gendered. To be a woman in Fiji is to constantly be in social proximity to other women usually without men present. This speaks to culturally habituated performative gender, the gendered work that bodies do, and the spaces
that gendered bodies occupy. White describes the gendered and hierarchical division of space in Fijian villages:

[...]he i cake position on the floor mat where meals are received is a place of honour reserved for male household heads and special guests, while women and children occupy the lower i ra quadrant, reflective of patriarchal household relations (2005, 318; see Toren 1986).

While Ana lives in urban Suva rather than within a village, the gendered designations of spaces and bodies remain an aspect of Indigenous Fijian life. Women sit together in the kitchen or outside the back step. Men sit together on front porches. Gender orients the body close to same gendered bodies. As White asserts:

…a gender division is established by the prepubescent age, as young girls are oriented towards the home setting… Males are expected to pursue adventures beyond the home setting with male cousins and age-mates (318; see Toren 1986).

In this context, Ana’s proximity to female bodies keeps her, albeit ambivalently, ‘in-line’ with the ‘straight line’. The extent to which the lack of men she brings home signals she is ‘like that’ relates to the way the lack of boyfriends indicates a threat to her imagined heterosexual future through marriage.

Talei, an Indigenous Fijian woman in her early thirties, talked about being in love with another woman from her neighbourhood, Rachieli, who was a close friend:

[w]e are always being together. She comes over – she comes and sees me… She calls me in the middle of the night. That’s why I’m thinking ‘maybe she is?’ She wakes me up after two in the morning. She calls and asks me what I’m doing. She says, ‘We’re drinking. I come and pick you up?’ I say, ‘Okay it’s up to you’. She comes; I think ‘Why is she like this’… We live in the same neighbourhood. We grew up together. We grew up really close friends. Really close. I’m solid for her. I told her all this. She knows.
This narrative shows the collision of intimate love (between women) and the proximity between women in Fiji. That is to say, the proximity between women in Fiji - that is a routine and habitual performance of gender - creates a possibility for multiple misrecognitions. Talei’s romantic feelings could ‘pass’ as friendship in a context where she is read as a straight close friend and not as a lesbian. Rachieli’s closeness to Talei may or may not indicate romantic love or vice versa because her feelings are indeterminable. Either way, it is possible for women’s romantic love to ‘pass’ as friendship because to be gendered in Fiji is to be close to bodies of the same gender. We could say that the operation of heterogender in Fiji relies on particular gendered behaviour; where women are in proximity to other women, and men are in proximity to other men.

The orientation towards heterogender within a Fijian context means that gender is constituted through the operation of fairly separate social spaces. Recall that Ahmed (2006) suggests that we pay attention to the proximity of particular objects and bodies as a condition of the direction we face. We could say that this example shows how gender difference is produced through the habitual reiteration of distance between bodies: women perform gender through proximity to other women and distance from men and masculinity. Talei expressed uncertainty about whether or not Rachieli was also lesbian. Confounding proximities come into play here. Firstly, there is the proximity between herself and Rachieli, and her knowledge of the proximity between women. Then, perplexingly for her, there is the proximity between their actions and the actions associated with love relationships that makes Talei question whether romantic feelings are involved. Talei begins her relationship with Rachieli by being ‘in-line’ with the ‘straight line’; by re/producing a gendered ‘shared direction’ that in turn reproduces her as an Indigenous Fijian woman. This is interesting because it suggests that when following a particular social direction that extends your reach, and where the body can
feel at ease, the action that might take you ‘off line’ can be very subtle. In this example, Talei’s actions are indeed heading in the same direction as the heteronormative. We could imagine her love for Rachieli as being a consequence of being ‘in-line’ with the straight line until she steps ‘too far’ by moving ‘so close’. The notion of ‘stepping too far’ might be an action that has simply not been repeated enough to constitute the habitual. This indicates the significance of repetition for producing normative heterogender.

Talei’s story shows the relationship between gendered and racialised performance, the straight line and the re/production of affect. Talei and Rachieli’s longstanding close friendship – ‘[w]e grew up really close friends’ - re/produces love through proximity as both a consequence and as a performative constituent of normative gendered subjectivity. We can think of Talei’s love for Rachieli in terms of gender-mediated agency; that is the ‘straight line’ initially directs and shapes her capacity to feel. Yet, Talei’s feelings for Rachieli extend beyond the heteronormative conditions of being an Indigenous Fijian woman as a form of affective agency; a line of desire that, following Ahmed (2006), brings her close to another body as an affective iteration of lesbian subjectivity. As Butler (1997) says:

…agency is the assumption of a purpose unintended by power… that operates in a relation of contingency and reversal to the power that makes it possible, to which it nevertheless belongs (15).

Interestingly, Gopinath’s (2005) queer diasporic analysis of Mehta’s film Fire similarly suggests that within the context of urban India, female homosociality acts as a conduit for female same-sex desire. She argues prevalent characterisations of same-sex desire as a trajectory from home to urban geographies of queer identification are underpinned by dominant Western and masculinist narratives. Gopinath asserts, ‘the slide from female homosociality to female
homoeroticism serves to locate female same-sex desire and pleasure firmly within the confines of the home and “the domestic,” rather than a safe “elsewhere”’ (153).

However Talei’s story suggests that within the Indigenous Fijian context, pleasure is less obtainable. Gendered household spaces cohere with the direction of the ‘straight line’ - while gender and ethnicity orients Talei’s body close to Rachieli’s she experiences a lack of social motility to move even closer either through unambiguously declaring her feelings, or being able to definitively interpret Rachieli’s feelings for her. Certainly, lesbian couples in Fiji can and do overcome these barriers. But Talei’s predicament alerts us to what Ahmed (2006, 12) describes when she says, “the family home” seems so full of traces of heterosexual intimacy that it is hard to take my place without feeling those traces as points of pressure’. The presence of ‘points of pressure’ that effectively ‘straighten’ the home are experienced differently in Talei’s situation. The pressure points that shape Talei’s tenuous orientation on the straight line might be the threat of shame if her feelings for Rachieli are discovered but not reciprocated. Rachieli’s body is only recognisable through the ‘straight line’ of enacting Indigenous Fijian heterogender; it poses the threat of the ‘shared direction’ of homophobic intolerance.

**Points of Rupture: When the Queer Body Disrupts Lines of Inheritance**

The final story I want to address juxtaposes the literal inheritance of birthright against Ahmed’s (2006) theoretical ‘gift of inheritance’ through which the subject is compelled to take up the ‘straight line’. As with the other stories, it reiterates that the ‘straight line’ of heterogender is simultaneously ethnicised: being Indigenous Fijian is constituted as sharing the direction of the indigenous nation. In the following story, Nina an Indigenous Fijian transgender women is ‘stopped’ from taking up her customary role because her enactment of
gender acts as a ‘rejection’ of the straight line and the conditions of occupying a valued subjectivity. Simultaneously, Nina’s comments draw our attention to pre-existing points of rupture along the ‘straight line’ of the indigenous nation. Nina would by birthright be the mata-ni-vanua in her village. The mata-ni-vanua is the highly valued role of orator, or speaker for the chief, literally translated as the ‘the eyes of the land/people’. Nina was living in an impoverished part of Suva. She was unemployed and has previously worked as a sex worker. She spoke with a mixture of frustration and resignation about Indigenous Fijian reactions to her:

[here in Fiji most of us ['transgender gays'] don’t feel safe when we walk through the town because of the Natives. The Fijians. Here in Fiji we try to move ahead but then we always go back, because of the attitudes... That’s why we never move forward. We’re always trapped like this. We cannot leave the church. We keep saying, '[o]h we’re the landowners!’ What land do we own now? Half the place has been bought!

The significance of social status in Fiji shows the complex alignment between global capitalism and traditional Indigenous Fijian chiefly hierarchy. Indigenous Fijian lines of inheritance have are subject to strict hierarchy, with ‘chiefly classes’ inhabiting privilege, in part through the effects of British colonial administration that produced colonial constructions of Indigenous Fijian culture (see France 1969; Kaplan 1989). Privilege is passed on by birthright. Within this system, how you must and must not act are quite rigidly defined depending on the status of your family. The enmeshment of chiefly hierarchy with class reflects the collusion of the hierarchical line of chiefly status with the trajectories of global capitalism and the fraught inheritance of a Western political system that has reinstitutionalised the authority of Indigenous Fijian elite. Within these interacting axes of difference, birthright does not uniformly command privilege but intersects with heterogender. In Nina’s story, the role of mata-ni-vanua is the privileged ‘gift of inheritance’ she is required to take up. However, Nina’s non-conformity along heterogendered lines acts as a point of rupture. She is unable to
‘return’ the gift by taking up heterogender. Recall that Ahmed’s (2006) account of the gift of inheritance points out that the child is required to be ‘like’ the parent. Here we could say that because Nina’s does not take up the (hetero)gendered iterations of her father’s body as masculine; her body cannot be recognised as ‘alike’. Nina’s refusal of heterogender acts as if it is a refusal of the role of mata-ni-vanua. The structuring of heterogender acts as a ‘stopping device’; she cannot extend her body into the role or ‘shared direction’ laid out before her through her birthright.

This story could of course draw our attention to the way this ‘family line’ is already (hetero)gendered and masculinist. If Nina had been birth-assigned female, she also would not have been able to inherit this line; the foreclosure of this inheritance based on the sexed orientation of her body would have cohered as the ordinary conditions of being an indigenous woman such that it would not even appear as a loss. Ahmed (2006) suggests that what is ‘behind us’ is amassed through personal and social histories which allow us to take the shape of line we are taking up, hence driving us toward. This story draws our attention to the way that the rupture of heterogender enacts a loss of social worth: the ‘shared direction’ of the line is towards a valued life. That is, it produces a rupture with a privileged way of being Indigenous Fijian. Nina’s experience of a lack of personal safety as she walks through town exemplifies her loss of status.

Nina’s account of the intolerance of Indigenous Fijian attitudes towards her traces the relationship between ethnonationalism and heterogender. Her comment, ‘[w]e keep saying we’re the land-owners!’ seems to reflect her frustration at Indigenous Fijian entitlement on the basis of land ownership, which is set up in opposition to the Indo-Fijian community. In her explanation, the sense of entitlement mobilised by the Indigenous Fijian nation extends beyond the right to land or self-determination to a far broader sense of social motility. That is,
being the ‘land-owners’ acts as a ‘shared direction’ towards a ‘life-worth living’ (Ahmed 2006): a privileged subjectivity as Indigenous Fijian that excludes those who do not take up heterogender as a condition of this line. Simultaneously though, Nina’s remark, ‘[w]hat land do we own now?’ points to a point of tension or rupture with this privileged shared direction. This loss of Indigenous Fijian motility points to the ‘stopping’ of Indigenous Fijian bodies via trajectories of colonisation, Western imperialism and global capitalism. However, it also highlights that the anxious repetitions of this line are at least in part mobilised by the fear of a lack of social motility; a fear that orients the ‘shared direction’ of masculinist ethnonationalism and ‘stops’ queer bodies.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have explored how subjectivity is multiply constituted for queer Fijians via culture, gender and sexual orientation. I have argued here that subjectivity is constituted in relation to the ‘straight line,’ which both racialises and sexualises the subject. I use Ahmed’s (2006) account of the reproduction of the family line to ask what is the subject required to take up in order for their subjectivity to stay ‘in line’. While Ahmed describes the perpetuation of ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ via the requirements of the gift of inheritance, I argue that inheritance simultaneously enacts the reproduction of culture. The child’s ability to ‘take up’ likeness becomes a requirement of recognition.

However the requirement to inherit via the ‘straight line’ does not always require the straight body; inheritance can have queer effects. Luke enacts his father’s wish for a girl child and his story of how the gender of the child is given. Taking up this story gives way to a queer body – one that is not ‘like’ his father – but which nevertheless takes up the requirements of the cultural line and maintains a ‘shared direction’. This version is different from Ahmed’s (2006)
assertion that the subject might refuse to inherit – it is not that the line breaks – but that heterosexuality is not required to carry the line forward, because the subject meets the requirements of the cultural line without heterogender.

The stories of the two lesbian women highlighted the intrinsic relationship between the reproduction of heterogender and ethnicity. Their stories showed the way the ‘straight line’ was enacted through the performative actions of their bodies in relationship to gendered space. Through these stories we could see that the ‘gift of inheritance’ has ambivalent effects. On one hand, the uptake of gendered ways of being opened the possibility for lesbian desires via the proximity of female bodies. On the other, there were pervasive ‘points of pressure’ that aligned Talei’s body with the ‘straight line’, and challenged her motility to reach towards her desired love object. In these stories, the ‘return’ of the ‘straight line’ via ordinary gendered and ethnicised practises made lesbian bodies difficult to recognise.

In other instances though, the inheritance of cultural lines was entirely conditional on the inheritance of heterogender. We need to ask what conditions make heterogender compulsory in order for the subject to be able to take up the cultural line. For Nina, being transgender gay means she is unable to take up ‘likeness’ to her father via the cultural line of mata-ni-vanua. What is at stake here is the relationship between masculinity and privilege in underpinning the ‘shared direction’ of the Indigenous Fijian nation.
Chapter Five: Femininity as an Orientation Device:

The Recognition of the Queer Body in Fiji

This chapter deals with enactments of femininity and masculinity by queer male-bodied Fijians. I argue that femininity on male bodies acts as a complex site of recognition: for ‘transgender gay’ or vakasalewalewa Fijians it produces motility within social sites that might ‘stop’ their bodies. Ahmed (2006) draws on Butler’s (1990) performative account of gender to explain how gender acts an orientation. Ahmed says:

\[
\text{gender becomes naturalized as a property of bodies, objects, and spaces partly through the 'loop' of... repetition, which leads bodies in some directions more than others as if that direction came from within the body and explains the way it turns (58).}
\]

In this chapter I explore the enactment of masculinity and femininity on male bodies; where the direction of masculinity is the valued direction of the nation, and the direction of ‘femininity’ acts as a turn that takes the body off-line. In Fiji, masculinity is reproduced as if it were a natural attribute that comes from within male bodies. When male bodies display femininity it acts as a marker of ‘queerness’ and is interpreted by other Indigenous Fijians as a threat or disregard for the ethnicised ‘shared direction’ of the nation. Butler (2012 cited in Willig 2012, 3) has argued, ‘there are schemes of recognition that determine in a relative sense who will be regarded as a subject worthy of recognition. We can call this the differential distribution of recognizability’. While femininity acts as a site of visibility such that the body is able to be recognised as a queer subject, masculinity acts as a site of social recognition and value. I draw on Ahmed’s (2006) discussion of proximity to suggest that femininity becomes ‘sticky’: it is marked as a disgusting object that threatens contagion (Ahmed 2004).
Femininity, as a set of attributes and practices that are socially reproduced as ‘close to’ women or female bodies and distant from male bodies, is always already socially devalued (see Braidotri 2006). There is a relationship between enactments and bodily displays of femininity and being ‘under-class’. I suggest that this relationship signals the extent to which ‘femininity’ signals bodies that are able to be visible as queer (albeit ambivalently); and that being ‘under-class’ acts as a site of already lacking social motility. Researchers on sexuality and globalisation have argued that ‘local gay’ identities in diverse geographic locations are giving way to a ‘global gay’ identity that shows the ideological hegemony of the West (Altman 1996, 2001; see Boellstorff 2006; see Jackson 2001). One of the effects of this discursive dominance is the elision of sexual cultures where gender and sexuality are understood as coterminous in favour of a Western understanding of ‘gay’ as same-sex desire amongst gender normals, and ‘transgender’ as a distinct category signalling cross-gender identification (see Altman 1996, 2001; see Jackson 2001; see Valentine 2007 for an equivocal argument in the West). Rather than suggesting local subjectivities are usurped by global gay identity, I suggest that the production of masculinity on queer male bodies acts as a site where the ‘straight line’ of the local masculinist trajectory is aligned with the habituated corporeal embodiment of global gay identity. Between these lines, some queer Fijians might orient their bodies towards masculinity as a means of achieving social recognition in a site where they are routinely devalued.

This chapter is in two sections. In the first section, I explore enactments of femininity on male bodies in relationship to the under-class. I argue that the juxtaposition of femininity with a lack of social and economic motility shows the way in which the production of femininity on male bodies renders the body both visible and devalued. This is revealed through participants’ discussions of their lack of acknowledgment by ‘middle-class gays’ who were ‘straight-acting’
and not out. I suggest that the queer visibility of feminine bodies produces a fear of contagion for ‘middle-class gays’ who risk losing their social motility. In the second section, I turn to an analysis of the uptake of masculinity by two Indigenous Fijian men, suggesting that enacting masculinity offers them motility within social sites where they might otherwise face ‘stopping’. In this way, masculinity produces a form of social ‘reach’ to (ambivalently) ‘belong’ to the nation.

**Always Already the ‘Other’: Visibility, Femininity and the Under-class**

In this section I explore femininity as a visible marker of both queerness and class. In Fiji, feminine ‘local gay’ identity is marked by its relationship to the under-class, while emergent ‘global gay’ (Altman 1996, 2001) identities are less visible. Overall the interlocking of feminine male bodies and low class status shows the ‘stopping’ or stigmatising effect of femininity in a context where ethno-nationalist masculinity is aligned with the ‘shared direction’ of the nation-state. Various participants explained to me that the ‘middle-class’ wasn’t ‘out’ in Fiji. In Suva, there appeared to be marked reluctance amongst professional gay people to be interviewed for my project. The following analysis sheds some light on the relationship between visibility and femininity.

This section explores the relationship between feminine gays and middle-class gays through their uncomfortable contact in a Suva nightclub. For Luke, an Indigenous Fijian (with some Tongan heritage) in his early twenties, the lived experience of being working class and the prejudice he felt from more privileged classes was potent and self-defining:

Luke: In Fiji they have a thing about class, social status kind of thing. It’s more like where I work this is a different class from some other people. Some gay people hold positions in the Government, and one person in a shareholding company. So those kind of people don’t actually talk to people like us, it’s more like I’m up here and you’re down there so go [away] from me, you know, don’t come near me.
Tulia: What happens when, tell me about when you go out to the clubs or whatever, and do those men that are like white collar do they go out or?

Luke: Oh yeah they go out, they go to posh clubs. We have a nightclub called O’Reilly’s. They normally go there, and you can see them, they look at you and they ignore you. And they don’t talk to you or smile at you… But another way I see it is like they are a bit scared. I don’t know why. They’re scared or something. They don’t want to talk to us. They don’t want to even socialise. We hold a function [for gay people] and they don’t come, because it’s not on their ladder.

In Luke’s description, O’Reilly’s acts as a social site where feminine gay bodies are brought directly into contact with middle-class bodies. Luke identifies O’Reilly’s as a ‘posh club’, as a place that middle-class gay people would go. O’Reilly’s is a bar in central Suva. It is not a gay bar, nor would your presence there mark you out as ‘gay’. Nevertheless, it was one of three nightspots mentioned to me by other gay people as places where they congregated with gay friends. This is partially because of its location away from nightclubs considered ‘rough’ or ‘dangerous’. O’Reilly’s is seen as a ‘safer’ place, so it brings gay middle-class bodies into contact with bodies which are visibly gay through their enactment of femininity and feminine clothing.

In Luke’s story, the middle-class gays brought into proximity with visibly feminine gays show an overt disregard for feminine gay bodies. Luke says, ‘you see them they look at you and they ignore you, and they don’t talk to you or smile at you’. Drawing on Butler’s (1997) interrogation of the role of interpellation in producing subjectivity, we could say that the act of ignoring enacts a refused interpellation. It is salient that interpellation is conceived of as naming by a more powerful other that is taken up because of the subject’s attachment to underlying power relations. The middle-class gays ignore the feminine and ‘transgender gays’ because there is no compulsion to recognise a less powerful other, but also because the act of recognition could signal a taking up of subjectivity associated with a lack of status. Luke’s depiction of middle-class people and working/under-class people is of two distinct categories,
which are clearly demarcated and hierarchical: ‘I’m up here and you’re down there’. The lack
of acknowledgement by middle-class gays could act as a refusal to be ‘recognised’ as queer, or
constituted as ‘gay’ through proximity to gay bodies.

Secondly, I was interested in Luke’s musing that ‘it is like they are a bit scared’. I want to
explore this idea for what it could offer conceptually to an understanding of the
interconnection between overt sexuality and class in Fiji. Let’s return to Ahmed’s (2006) idea
that social spaces extend particular bodies. She says:

[首付]uch histories of action or ‘take up’ shape the bodily horizons of bodies. Spaces
are not only inhabited by bodies that ‘do things’, but what bodies ‘do’ leads them
to inhabit some spaces more than others. If spaces extend bodies, we could say that
spaces also extend the shape of the bodies that ‘tend’ to inhabit them (58).

So let’s say that the structural mechanisms of class function in such a way that the middle-
class is organised as a social space that extends particular privileged bodies. The ‘work’ done
by these bodies both economically and socially (i.e. inheriting a particular name, accruing
capital, being in contact with other privileged bodies) allows them to ‘take up’ this space in
this way. Ahmed (2006, 135) argues that ‘whiteness may function as a form of public comfort
by allowing bodies to extend into spaces that have already taken their shape’. Class privilege
functions in the same way; class is already organised around the shape of the bodies that
cohere within it. Ahmed draws on Black feminist notions of intersectionality to suggest:

[t]here are ‘points’ in such intersections, as the points where lines meet. A body is
such a meeting point. To follow one line (say whiteness) will not get you too many
points if one does not or cannot follow others. How one moves along institutional
lines is affected by the other lines that one follows (136).
In Fiji, ‘overt’ displays of sexuality, such that one’s sexual desire for someone of the same-sex is ‘known/spoken about’ or shown through bodily markers of sexuality disorients the body from this line of privilege. The queer body is stopped within middle-class space; the shape of the queer body is not able to extend. As Ahmed (2006, 139) explains about ‘stopping’: ‘[f]or bodies that are not extended by the skin of social, bodily movement is not so easy. Such bodies are stopped, where the stopping is an action that creates its own impressions’.

The fear that Luke recognises in middle-class gays signals the threat posed by proximity; that they could be stopped or disoriented from class privilege. We could say that it is not the desire per se for someone of the same-sex that threatens to ‘stop’ the middle-class body, or knock it off course, because their bodies are still able to extend in the place of the ‘unspoken’. It is the public recognition of the person as inhabiting a queer body, either through proximity to feminine objects or proximity to other queer bodies, that threatens to become queer or disorient them (Ahmed 2006). This means that we must keep in mind Ahmed’s assertion about the directionality of bodies; that some bodies are able to reach towards certain objects and others in front of them. We could say that the ‘unmarked’ or unstigmatised bodies of middle-class subjects are fearful that when they are near the marked bodies of the queer under-class, they are then at risk of being ‘recognised’ or ‘stopped’ through their proximity to queer bodies.

Femininity, then, acts as a particular marker of queerness on male bodies that poses the threat of contagion. Ahmed’s (2004) analysis of disgust suggests that disgust is sticky; it threatens to contaminate the self, which creates an urge to expel or distance oneself from the disgusting object. Femininity in this context acts as a sticky object; it becomes an overt marker of devaluation that threatens to taint masculinity. Femininity acts as an orientation device: it threatens to take bodies ‘off-line’, and ‘stop’ their motility. The ‘stickiness’ of femininity on
male bodies signals the way that femininity on males symbolically evokes sex relationships with straight men. Besnier (2004) suggests that humour about the (im)possibility of Leiti (transgender Tongans) having love relationships harnesses broader Tongan fears that the sexual relationships Leiti have with straight men may threaten marriage. He argues:

[t]he elimination of the abject is a disavowal of external objects that one finds repulsive, as well as aspects of the self that engender revulsion. The abject represents a threat to order, structure and limits that must be constantly harnessed because it is never completely eliminated (305).

In Fiji, femininity enacted on male bodies could be ‘sticky’ or abject because it signals sexual relationships with straight men that threaten the straight line.

The bodies of the queer under-class are already subjected to constant ‘stopping’ through their socio-economic position: their bodies are already devalued. While being ‘read’ as queer is likely to subject them to further ‘stopping’ in everyday life, such as in instances of violence, they are not at risk of losing something which has already been denied to them, such as the extension or movement of their bodies. As Ahmed (2006, 139) concludes, ‘[a] phenomenology of “being stopped” might take us in a different direction than one that begins with motility, with a body that “can do” by flowing into space’.

Another interaction between a middle-class gay and a ‘transgender gay’ reinforces the relationship between enacting femininity, visible queerness, and the lack of social worth.

Nacanieli, an Indigenous Fijian man, told a story about an interaction between a ‘white collar gay’ and a transgender woman:

[j]ust yesterday when we did the workshop, one of the white collar gays walked past and Isabella was calling him, and he didn’t respond at all. Even though they knew each other. So Isabella went right down to the footpath, and he was walking on the other side, and there were this group of Indian men on the opposite side and
they were looking, and Isabella was calling him, and they were looking. And Isabella ended up throwing a shoe.

The tone of the story was light and humorous. It was intended to be jokey and gossipy. Clearly positioned, ‘just yesterday,’ it called my attention to the familiarity of events like this and that the story is set in the middle of the day on an ordinary inner city Suva street. Nacanieli’s repetition of the statement ‘and they were looking’, draws focus to the way this event drew attention. The humorous aspect of the story is the way that others witnessed what happened. This signals that the story is about the crossing of a social boundary, how an interaction between a middle-class gay and a transgender gay becomes a visible spectacle of queerness that threatens to disorient heterogendered public space.

Isabella’s act of throwing her shoe reveals the complex relationship between visibility, social recognition and motility. The ‘white-collar gay’ enacts a particular social hierarchy between them through the act of ignoring her. His body is oriented away from hers. The actions of the white collar gay are an attempt to not lose status/motility; he doesn’t want to be ‘disoriented’ or pulled off line by Isabella’s proximity. This act of ignoring is an interpellation that simultaneously designates her as queer and devalued because of her feminised male body. This designation then, threatens to stop the motility of Isabella’s body in the social site. She is signalled as being ‘not worth knowing’.

However, the story reveals the complexity of femininity enacted on male bodies. For onlookers femininity signals a site of stickiness and devaluation because of its relationship to visibility. But for Fijian gays it produces motility through visibility; it makes queer desires and pleasures apparent and disorients the ‘straight line’ of social spaces. Isabella refuses the interpellation of the ‘straight acting’ gay, but instead of rejecting femininity she rejects the devaluation it presumes. Isabella responds to the rejection by getting the ‘white collar gay’s’
attention very publicly. Isabella makes a scene such that his rejection of her becomes an excessive and visible performance of rejection. Her enactment of femininity gives her motility to transgress heteronormative space because she is already visible. The scene acts as naming. When Isabella throws her shoe at him she both refuses his public designation of her, and takes him off-line: he is ‘disoriented’ as his body becomes part of a non-hetero spectacle. Femininity is a resistive enactment which then produces further agency; it enables a limited form of motility through its ability to threaten the ‘shared direction’ of masculinity.

Isabella’s preparedness to be recognised through (socially devalued) femininity - and the motility she accrues through it - signals the different meaning-making between feminine gays in Fiji and other Indigenous Fijians. Skeggs’ (2001) analysis of how working class British women use femininity is instructive here. She argues that while working class women draw on aesthetic enactments of femininity to counter negative representations of their class status, these performances are negatively consigned by middle-class women who read them as confirmation of their lack of value. Skeggs argues:

femininity is used by working-class women as a means of deflecting associations of pathology, poverty, and pollution. Ironically, it is read often as just that. The mis-recognition of their use of feminine artefacts and clothing shows how different interpretative systems come into play. The aesthetic production of themselves can be seen as a way of generating a prosthetic identity in which they attach and detach things, such as clothing and attributes, to themselves to deflect attention away from potentially negative readings (4).

Similarly, Isabella’s enactment of femininity harnesses a different ‘line of sight’ from the more broadly construed ‘shared direction’ of the indigenous masculinist nation. For her, femininity
can be seen as a means of recasting her worth; as making a claim for recognition via the aesthetics of femininity despite the loss of value she faces as a queer subject.

Nacanieli’s story deals with two interlocked axes of difference; class and the hierarchical designations of masculinity and femininity. The characters are defined by the ‘white collar gay’s’ unwillingness to be recognised as queer, and Isabella’s willingness to be recognised. Nacanieli doesn’t need to spell out that the man is masculine because that is already assumed by the term ‘white collar’. Similarly, Nacanieli does not need to explain what class Isabella belongs to; her relationship to femininity designates her as part of the under-class.

The relationship between class status and visible queerness shows the motility that both class and heterogender affords. Isabella’s obvious non-conformity through gender already positions her as being ‘under-class’. Fiji’s under- and working-classes are already denied the social privilege and motility that class could provide. In clichéd terms, they have nothing more to lose. For Fiji’s ‘white collar’ class: cultural, social and economic capital is at stake. White-collar gays cannot risk ‘acting’ gay or being visible through femininity because they have further to fall. Their bodies could be read as ‘off-line’ and they would lose the social motility that class status returns to them. The threat posed by the loss of social motility (which is linked to the loss of economic capital) is exacerbated in Suva (like many third world urban centres) because contrasting realities of what it means to be rich or poor are directly juxtaposed against each other. The middle-class are already in troubling proximity to the bodies of others. Similarly to the discomfort generated by the proximity of feminine gay bodies to middle-class queers: the possibility of being stopped or knocked off-line could feel like a tangible presence, perhaps the preconditions of disgust (Ahmed 2004). The bodies of the middle-class in Fiji are shaped along very constricted lines by the conditions of both the
‘shared direction’ and the uncomfortable presence of other bodies that act like the presence of air to a tightrope walker.

**Queer Subjects and Masculinity**

This section deals with participants’ stories of masculinity and their desire to position themselves as masculine and same-sex attracted. This positioning is complex; sometimes these masculine bodies experience ‘stopping’, while simultaneously masculinity operates as a straight line that extends the reach of these bodies. Like Aizura (2010), I do not want to detract from the value of this sense of self for these participants, but instead critically acknowledge how the performance of masculinity operates a survival strategy. My analysis here highlights the way that sexual desire comes to be seen ‘as if’ it is an effect of gender through the heterosexualisation of lines of desire. Ahmed (2006, 71) explains:

> [t]he naturalization of heterosexuality involves the presumption that there is a straight line that leads each sex towards the other sex, and that ‘this line of desire’ is ‘in line’ with one’s sex (emphasis in original).

Luke told the following story of experiencing the gay nightclub scene in Australia. Luke’s account describes a moment of disorientation where the gendered embodiment of two Australian gay men challenges Luke’s perception of same-sex desire. He explained:

Luke: I reached Canberra and the first night we went out we went to a gay nightclub. I saw these two butch, really muscular guys smooching in the corner, and I’m standing there with my jaw open saying, ‘Am I seeing the right thing?’ ‘Duh’ ‘I thought one was supposed to be feminine and the other was supposed to be masculine or something.’ ‘No! Look at those two guys kissing over there.’ ‘Oh okay.’ Yeah, that’s the perception I had. In order to be gay you have to be feminine, act like a girl. Dress like a girl. Walk like a girl.

Tulia: How do you normally dress?
Luke: On the girlish side… I think no, I’m not going to display myself like that. I think if I’m gonna be gay I have to be myself. Be normal. Wear something I’m comfortable in.

Tulia: And so now you feel like?

Luke: I feel like I should just be myself. Yeah, and it actually affirms myself… I’d be perfectly comfortable in that kind of outfit [a t-shirt and jeans].

This conversation is quite complex. I’m reluctant to sweep Luke’s experience under the rug of an indigenous cultural belief usurped by Westernised, capitalist global gay identity. Certainly on one hand, Luke might have experienced ‘stopping’ in the Canberra nightclub as a place that is inhabited by white bodies that follow particular sexual trajectories. However, Luke’s story shows an alignment between dominant Western discourses about sexual identity and the Indigenous Fijian ‘straight line’. In the comment, ‘I think you don’t have to dress like that in order to tell people that you’re gay’, he is recognising the role that dressing femininely plays in being recognised by others as being gay: recognising the extent to which subjectivity is constructed in relation to others, from the outside in, so to speak. There is an overt relationship between being feminine and being recognised: being feminine indicates your desire towards men.

The binary concept Luke refers to, of thinking one partner has to be masculine and the other to be feminine, also has a long history in the West. While Ahmed (2006) refers to the way in which butch/femme relationships can signal queer possibilities rather than reinscribe heterosexism, she also addresses the way that the presumption of the necessity of masculine/feminine pairings acts as a ‘straightening device’, where queer desires are accounted for through their proximity to heterogendered lines. In this way, queer bodies are brought back ‘in line’. So, Luke’s admission that he thought there had to be a masculine and a feminine partner could also be evaluated in relation to the mechanisms of heterogender in Fiji.
whereby the pairing of masculine and feminine partner reproduces the straight line. The straight line shapes Luke’s body; in order to be desirable to (masculine) men he believed he needed to be feminine – probably in part because femininity confers queer desires. Masculinity, then, is an object out of reach.

Luke takes up a more masculine appearance through an engagement with global gay bodies, but arguably this is related to the motility it provides him in the local Fijian context. The story relates a moment of disorientation where the sight of Australian men kissing means that the gendered order of Luke’s world appears askew: ‘[l]ines disappear through… moments of alignment so when even one thing comes “out of line” with another thing, the “general effect” is “wonky” or even “queer”’ (Ahmed 2006, 66) The self-recognition that occurs for Luke through seeing the Australian gay men is negatively rather than positively conferred. That is, he realises that ‘he doesn’t have to be like this to be gay’, rather than, ‘to be gay I have to be like this’. Luke’s repetition in the phrases ‘I think if I’m gonna be gay, I have to be myself’ and ‘I feel like I should just be myself’ plays a concluding role in the way the story is organised. Luke feels he has become more himself rather than less himself. Luke mobilises global gay identity to access different ontological subjectivity: he gains access to a different ‘way of being’ through orienting himself to a different ‘shared direction’.

However, what I returned to as I reflected on my analysis of this story was the question of what factor in the story made Luke take up masculinity, rather than returning to his habitual femininity. The (hetero)masculinity which Luke evokes is a particularly privileged form of doing gender in Fiji. We need to think about what else is ‘behind’ Luke in terms of the cultural and historical repetitions that enable his arrival as a subject. There is an interesting proximity in Luke’s statement between ‘being himself’ and ‘being normal’. Luke is able to position himself as being an Indigenous Fijian man in a context where Indigenous Fijian
masculinity offers both gendered and racialised motility. Masculinity confers social worth. We could say that taking up masculinity enables Luke to simultaneously take up ‘Fijianess’ in a context where feminine male bodies are ‘stopped’ from reaching or taking up cultural lines. Overall though, this identification remains complex. While Luke evokes a privileged gendered embodiment through masculinity, this embodiment also disrupts lines of heterogender by refuting the conception that masculine bodies need to be paired with feminine ones.

To draw out some of the complexities of Fijian masculinities for queer subjects I want to turn to Michael’s story of his relationship with his brothers. Describing his brothers who were considered tough, he says:

[t]hey couldn’t stand the sight of transgender gays, wearing make-up. And when I was young I loved putting on those things – girls’ dresses and make-up. But as I grew [up] hanging around with them I started becoming a man again. But still being gay. And so, I always hang out with them, but I dress as a guy. And I liked it, like I stopped putting on those dresses and girly stuff. But being who I was, a guy, but gay.

The shift from femininity to masculinity that Michael takes on when he starts ‘hanging out’ with his brothers signals the privileging of hypermasculinity and its relationship to an Indigenous Fijian ‘shared direction’, particularly amongst men. Deconstructively speaking, the way the latter masculinity is ‘learnt’ throws both femininity and masculinity into a state of flux, where neither seem essential or ‘given’ (see Butler 1990). The statement ‘a guy, but gay’ seems to shift the meaning of ‘gay’ within the passage from presuming male displays of femininity and same-sex attraction, to only presuming same-sex attraction. The statement, ‘being who I was, a guy’, could be drawing on prevalent constructions of heterogender which pair biological maleness with masculinity. Concurrently, ‘but gay’ undercuts the association between masculinity and (hetero)sexual orientation; Michael is making a claim for masculinity without heterosexuality. Furthermore, it reveals the way pervasive conceptions of masculinity
- ‘being a guy’ - are entrenched in conceptions of heterosexuality: to be a man is to follow a heterosexual line of desire.

However what I wanted to draw out here is the role that Michael’s ‘tough’ brothers play as a trope of Indigenous Fijian masculinity. Ahmed (2006, 118) explains that:

…collectives such as the family as well as the nation involve shared orientations towards and around objects. The collective would be an effect of this repetition over time that coheres ‘around’ certain bodies and that creates the very effect of bodily coherence (my emphasis).

This notion of a collective where bodies cohere through the repetition of their shared direction is useful for thinking about masculinity. Teaiwa’s (2005) discussion of the militarisation of indigenous masculinity in Fiji is instructive here. We could say that the ‘shared direction’ of indigeneity in Fiji, which creates the appearance of bodily coherence, coheres ‘around’ masculinised male bodies. Ahmed (2006, 118-119) explains that:

Freud argues…that the bond within a group relies on the transference of love to the leader, whereby the transference becomes the ‘common quality’ of the group… it is the fact that transference is directed toward ‘the same object’ (real or imagined) that produces the effect of the group.

In Michael’s account, the brothers represent the trope of the ‘leader’. Michael’s idealisation of ‘tough’ masculinity through his brothers acts as the transference that binds Michael to the shared direction by enacting masculinity as a form of attachment. This analytical formulation connects idealised ‘hegemonic masculinity’ (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005) to the ‘passionate attachment’ (Butler 1997) the subject feels towards the ‘straight line’ as the operant conditions for its social existence. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) assert that
while most men do not enact hegemonic or idealised masculinity, they enact ‘complicit’ masculinity that shores up the privileging of hegemonic masculinity and its hierarchical relationship to other masculinities, as well as dominance over femininities. Phenomenologically, this compliance with masculinity could be seen as a means of orienting the body near to privileged masculinity and thus creating the effect of coherence. The effect of shared masculinity amongst Indigenous Fijian men can be seen as having been produced through their shared idealisation of ‘tough’ masculinity as a condition of their subjectivity as Indigenous Fijian. While Michael cannot take up idealised masculinity through heterosexuality, it is enough to take up the shared direction of gender and culture by positioning himself in proximity to their bodies.
Conclusion

Femininity on male bodies is multiply invested in being recogniseable. I have argued in this chapter that femininity enacted on male bodies acts as a site of visible queerness by rupturing the ‘straight line’ of heterogender. Femininity acts as a site of ‘stickiness’ (Ahmed 2004) that threatens to contaminate masculinity. This chapter explored instances where middle-class gay bodies were threatened by their proximity to feminine and under-class gays. The intersection of these axes of difference reveals the relationship between masculinity and social worth in Fiji. Drawing on Butler (2012, cited in Willig 2012) the relationship between masculinised and feminised male bodies signals an underlying schema of ‘recognisability’; where while feminine male bodies are rendered visible and intelligible, the shared direction of Indigenous Fijian masculinity is towards recognition and value. Indigenous Fijian masculinity has been reproduced through embodied accumulations of physical force through the alignment of masculinity and militarism (Teaiwa 2005, 2011). Furthermore, as George (2008) has signalled through her discussion of the rioting following the 2000 putsch, forceful masculinity has been rewarded through the reproduction of ethnonationalism (I discuss this more in Chapter Eight). Stopping mechanisms associated with devaluation prevent feminine male bodies from taking up the privileges of the ‘straight line’.

However, my discussion has also signalled that while femininity signals a site of degradation for onlookers, it offers different possibilities for queer bodies. It offers a site of visible queerness where your subjectivity may otherwise be elided: it could signal an ambivalent mode of queer survival. Firstly, it signals the presence of queer desires by aligning the body with a hetero direction of desire, i.e. the pairing of a feminine body with a masculine one. Secondly, as a visible site of queerness it can give bodies the motility needed to disrupt straight spaces. Isabella is able to reject the middle-class gays shaming designation of her and the elision of
their relationship through mobilising her ability to make a scene, or act in a way not usually associated with heterosexual space.

Queer male bodies also took up masculinity. The ‘shared direction’ of Indigenous Fijian masculinity intersects with the ‘shared direction’ of global gay identities. These two forceful directions are obviously not leading the same way, but a gay masculine Indigenous Fijian subject is produced at their origin point. For Luke, seeing two Australian gay men together could offer him the possibility of increased motility within a distinctively Indigenous Fijian context, where he might otherwise experience ‘stopping’. In this way, enacting masculinity could also signal an ambivalent mode of queer survival: where agency is understood as increasing the reach of your body in a site where you risk being devalued.
Chapter Six: The Ties that Bind:

Family, Closeness, and the ‘Unspeakable’

This is a comparative chapter that explores family relationships amongst queer Fijians in Suva and queer Samoans in Auckland. Across both of these locations, the Pasifika queer people that I interviewed spoke almost unanimously about their closeness to their families and the significance of family relationships. The significance of family for Pacific cultures is well documented, with family operating as a significant site of identity-making (Anae 2001; Sua’ali’i 2001; Ravuvu 1983; Tiatia 2003). However, most participants in both Fiji and Auckland explained that their sexuality was not discussed with their family. Many were not ‘out’ to their families. In this chapter I argue that ‘closeness’ acts disciplinarily on the body; it produces a requirement to be ‘alike’ and cohere within the family (Ahmed 2006). This is not to say that queer subjects do not resist these disciplinary mechanisms, which I explore more in the following chapter on religion. Instead, what I am interested in exploring here is how ‘closeness’ acts to simultaneously reward and constrain the queer subject within the family. As Ahmed says, ‘bodies are… shaped by contact with objects and with others, with “what” is near enough to be reached’ (54). While ‘closeness’ offers the pleasures and rewards of belonging, it also prevents talanoa (talk) about sexuality. The family requires silence about sexuality as a ‘straightening mechanism’ for maintaining closeness. The family line is a ‘straight line’ for the reproduction of heterogender. The queer body might be subjected to continual ‘stopping’ that manifests as ‘slowing’; her motility is limited in the family because she is a ‘shadow being’ (Liu and Ding 2005) unable to be recognised (Butler 1997).

The value of using comparative data here – in what is more broadly a project about the effects of heterogender on queer bodies in Fiji – is that it situates Fiji within what Hau’ofa (1993)
has called ‘our sea of islands’, emphasising the interconnectedness of Pacific peoples and nations. This comparison draws attention to the different conditions attached to closeness and silence across Fijian families in Fiji and Samoan ‘aiga. The significance of silence about sexuality as a disciplinary mechanism for belonging in the family across both Fijian and Samoan cultures shows the pan-Pacific impact of colonial Christianity. This chapter also discusses how amongst the Auckland-based Samoan participants; more participants were able to challenge these silences to negotiate – albeit ambivalent – family belonging. This speaks to some complex differences between these sites. I argue that the ‘straight line’ is more coercive in Fiji because of the alignment between the family, church and nation. Simultaneously, as second-generation Pacific migrants in Auckland, the Samoan participants experienced greater motility to turn towards alternate ‘shared directions’ because of the tangible presence of the Auckland gay community as an object within reach.

In this chapter I consider how closeness – which we experience as a feeling – can be considered phenomenologically as proximity and coherence with other family members (Ahmed 2006). As a straightening device, closeness then requires the delineation of the speakable from the unspeakable to maintain the ‘shared direction’ of the family. As Ahmed explains:

…we need to ask what gets put aside, or put to one side, in the telling of the family story. What gets put aside, or put to one side, does not come after the event but rather shapes the line, allowing it to acquire its force (90).

To be ‘close’ to the family is also to be ‘close’ to the speakable. This requirement not to speak acts as a straightening device that keeps the queer subject in-line with the family. It is a straightening device because it allows the family to line up with heterogender, and thus appear straight. Using Ahmed’s phenomenological conception of direction and the relationship
between objects, we could say that the family reaches towards the speakable, and this adheres into a social line through the repetition of these practices. This privileges some family stories and events over others, and these privileged stories are then told and retold as the reproduction of the family line.

**How Closeness acts as a Straightening Device**

Phenomenologically, family ‘closeness’ acts as a form of proximity; people that are ‘close’ are near to other bodies, psychically if not physically. Closeness offers a form of coherence in the same way that pointillist dots on a painting can be perceived as a single shape. In fact, closeness is a requirement of maintaining this cohesion; bodies in the family must be ‘close’ in order to be read as an entity. As Ahmed (2006, 86) explains:

…insofar as we inherit that which is near enough to be available at home, we also inherit orientations, that is, we inherit the nearness of certain objects more than others, which means we inherit ways of inhabiting and extending into space.

Alongside the requirement to cohere, or be read as ‘within’ or ‘part of’ the family, is a requirement to share the same *direction*. Ahmed (2006) asserts that being alike is produced through the proximity of bodies. This likeness or resemblance is then interpreted as an effect of family inheritance.

However, I would argue that as well as being an effect of proximity, being ‘alike’ is also a required condition of cohesion or closeness. It is not just that the proximity of other bodies shapes us so that we are alike; it is also that we are *required to be alike* in order for our bodies to come close, or to inhabit the ‘shared direction of the family’.

Liu and Ding’s (2005) analysis of familial reticence in China and Chinese speaking worlds is instructive here. They suggest that the rhetoric of reticence needs to be understood as a
discursive disciplinary mechanism for the maintenance of ongoing heteronormative power relations. Liu and Ding question:

…in what ways might the residual and reconfigured ideology of reticent tolerance actually enable or facilitate the workings of an unfamiliar ‘gentle’ homophobia, or constitute homophobia as effect? (32).

Liu and Ding (2005) are thus challenging other queer scholars who have seen Chinese customary reticence as a non-Western site of queer possibility because of the absence of verbalised homophobia. Liu and Ding’s explanation of the disciplinary nature of reticence is useful for conceptualising the relationship between closeness and silence in a Pacific context. I argue that closeness acts disciplinarily through the requirement to be like; closeness is thus a familial obligation that is instituted through silences.

Interweaving Ahmed’s (2006) concept of the ‘gift of return’ with Liu and Ding’s (2005) account of reticence offers a means of conceptualising how silence is disciplinary. The return of silence acts as, or stands in for, the return of the family line. Recall that the ‘gift of inheritance’ acts disciplinarily in as much it demands a ‘return’ via the reproduction of the family line. Ahmed says:

…the heterosexual couple becomes a ‘point’ along this [family] line, which is given to the child as its inheritance or background. The background then is not simply behind the child: it is what the child is asked to aspire toward (90).

Interestingly, Liu and Ding (2005) suggest that reticence also demands ‘a return in kind’ where the silence of the family is returned through the silence of the queer child (42). Silence is thus a condition of being in the family. Liu and Ding explain that ‘reticence judges and holds responsible, silently demanding a return in kind only by way of indirect speech, with
actions and not words’ (42, my emphasis). Bringing these analyses together, we could say that silence acts as a mechanism for the return of the family line. The ‘gift of inheritance’ obliges the child to take up silence as a means of belonging to the family.

In the context of Fiji - and Pacific communities - we could say silence is intrinsically linked to the ‘return’ of the family line. Silence allows the family line to maintain its straightness. Most obviously, silence about sexuality is perpetuated by family members, and reproduced by the child. However, silence can also stand in for the return of the family line. I am reminded of times when I stayed with my elderly Fijian aunt and uncle. My aunty would ask, ‘when are you going to get married?’ and I would reply, ‘I’m still finishing my studies’. The question, ‘when are you going to get married?’ acts as a gendered and ethnicised interpellation to take up the family line via heterosexual marriage. It is an interpellation because it involves recognising me as her niece, but also generates a future maternal subjectivity by calling to mind that my children would continue our family line. My habitual response, ‘I’m still finishing my studies’ does not answer the question asked of me. It is a means of maintaining silence whenever the topics of marriage or babies are raised. I am called upon to ‘return’ the gift of inheritance through being heterosexual. I ‘return’ the gift through being silent. Ahmed (2006) points out that the ‘gift of inheritance’ is seen as ‘the gift of life’. Silence is not an equivalent ‘return’, but it is the only response I can give that reproduces the ‘straight line’. To answer the question directly by replying ‘I’m lesbian’ would risk shaming her or myself. Queer Fijians might resist the ‘return’ of silence if it was not so implicitly linked to the maintenance of family closeness, thus risking being ‘Other’ to the family. That is, being ‘in line’ with the family requires the ‘return’ of silence.

Thus, closeness is a ‘straightening mechanism’; it makes the family appear heterogendered through the requirements of similarity and proximity. Proximity to the ‘spoken’ mark out
what is valued; the repetition of a heterogendered line through the form of the heterosexual couple and the social reproduction of the family. As Liu and Ding (2005, 32) conclude about queer subjects:

…although they cannot be made to disappear for good, they can be made to cooperate in their own invisibility and quiescence.

Here, queer subjects collude with their ‘invisibility’ precisely because of the ‘return’ demanded of them through discursive reticence. The requirement of the family to face towards what is ‘speakable’ is linked to the ‘shared direction’ of the family; and to what counts as ‘a life worth living’ (Ahmed 2006). In the case of Fiji, the family is required to share the same direction as the church and the nation.

The silence that works to maintain the ‘straight line’ simultaneously positions queer lives as ‘background’, or renders them ‘out-of-sight’. The ‘unspeakable’ acts as ‘background’ that supports the orientation of bodies towards the speakable. However, a queer phenomenological analysis draws our attention to the ever-presence of the unspeakable. As Ahmed (2006, 31) says:

[w]e can think…of the background not simply in terms of what is around what we face, as the ‘dimly perceived’, but as produced by acts of relegations: some things are relegated to the background in order to sustain a certain direction: in other words, in order to keep attention on what is faced.

The delineation of the ‘unspeakable’ as background acts structurally and corporeally. Liu and Ding (2005) assert that ‘poetic reticence’ positions queer subjects within the ‘shadows’ of social and family life. The demands of reticence mark out the ‘unspeakable/unspoken/unrecognisable/unrecognised’ (33). They ask:
[w]hat keeps these persons in the shadowy ghostly spaces of the socio-familial continuum? This ghostly position demands of shadow beings the responsibility (at their expense) for the upkeep of the wholeness and harmony of the very continuum wherein they do not have a place (32).

The concept of ‘shadows’ seems incredibly useful and evocative here, because it suggests that subjectivity is simultaneously marked out and erased. It may be that at particular points, we are present as subjects that are unrecognisable or not fully recognised (Butler 1997). Silence is manufactured both around and within queer bodies, bodies that cannot or do not fully adhere to the ‘straight line’.

Closeness then, can have a ‘stopping’ effect on queer bodies because it makes the daily minutiae of their lives unspeakable. Stopping is both an interpellation – a moment of subjectification that names the queer subject - and a moment of slowing or halting the queer body. Here the queer body experiences a lack of agency - not because it is recognisable as the Other – but because her lived experience is not recognisable. Her motility through the social site of the family is inhibited; her body does not experience the same ease (Ahmed 2006).

Addressing the family of the queer subject allows us to further refine Ahmed’s explanation of the familiar. Ahmed (2006, 124) says:

…‘the familial’ is, after all, about ‘the familiar’: this is a world we implicitly know as a world that is organised in specific ways… objects are familiar, for sure, but familiarity is also about our capacity to use objects and how they are within reach as objects we do things with.

This chapter highlights the difference between ease and familiarity, whereby ‘ease’ indicates comfort, but familiarity can be uncomfortable. It could be like sitting in a single position on a
long car ride where you might feel cramped, but are still not able to change position. The cramped position you sit in is familiar, but this familiarity does not generate ease. Thinking about ‘ease’ and ‘familiarity’ separately takes us to different places. Rather than attending to the direction we are oriented to, it is to ask how we are corporeally or psychically oriented to the direction we are facing. That is, within the social site of the family, the queer subject may be silent as a means of maintaining ‘closeness’, and thus shares the direction of the family. But while the familiarity of the family sustains the habitual actions of the queer body, the queer body does not experience ‘ease’.

Queer Experiences of Family in Fiji

Ana’s Story

The significance of the unspeakable came through in Ana’s narrative about her family that was discussed in the last chapter:

[til] all today I haven’t told my family about it. But they just know I’m like that, because everyone I bring home is nobody else but girls.

It is clear here that within Ana’s family the unspoken is conceptually distinct from the known or unknown. Here Ana’s family know she is ‘like that’ because of her proximity to other women, as discussed in Chapter Four. The act of bringing people home also grounds the narrative in the familiar. The family holds particular meanings about bringing someone home that become momentarily queered when Ana only brings girls home. Ana becomes a queer subject by moving off-line; she does something that is unfamiliar. But ‘knowing’ is not what is at stake here. Instead, we need to ask what is invested in the delineation of the speakable from the unspeakable so that even though her family knows she is lesbian there hasn’t been any conversation about it. We could also ask why knowing that she is ‘like that’ is innocuous – it doesn’t generate action in the form of harm - unless it becomes spoken. The phrase ‘like that’
is also a placeholder that evades naming. Yet the pervasiveness of what has not been said even ‘till today’ still says something; the force of the unsaid is such that is pervades her relationship with her family even though her family knows – at least on some level – that she is lesbian.

I would argue that Ana’s continued lack of conversation with her family shows that closeness acts disciplinarily as a straightening device. Ana’s silence about her sexuality is a condition of closeness that orients the family towards heterogender and stops outspoken bodies. The unspoken still shapes the ground even though Ana believes her family knows she is ‘like that’, she stays oriented away from speaking about sexuality.

**Tulia’s story**

A strong example of spoken and unspoken worlds comes from my own story. I was in Suva quite a few years ago with my then-partner who was also Kailoma Fijian, and who came from a respected and traditional Fijian family. We stayed at her grandmother’s house where our relationship was described as ‘friends’ and also ‘tauvu’, because our ancestral villages share a common relationship of reciprocity based on the actions of our ancestors\(^1\). This was shown by the way my partner’s grandmother who does not speak much English referred to me as ‘yalewa ni Beqa’, which translates as ‘the girl from Beqa’, rather than using my name. The staying arrangement was augmented by my father visiting her grandmother by way of introduction, during which he teased her that the reason why she needed a new bed was that her old bed was worn out from too much ‘dancing’. Our intimate relationship, beyond being tauvu, was never mentioned. During that time the televising of the parliamentary sittings had shown members of the house calling out ‘sea wall, sea wall’ to a parliamentarian who had been

\(^1\) Tauvu relationships allow for teasing and informal behaviour between different villages, where relationships might otherwise require formal language and behaviour. There are different variations on the understanding of tauvu.
supposedly carrying out an extramarital relationship along the sea wall of Suva. One day my partner and I decided to go for a walk, and we mentioned to her cousin that we were going to the sea wall. Her cousin quickly replied ‘are you going to the sea wall to ki-’, but she quickly caught herself and said, ‘to watch the kissing’.

The episode made me realise that we were not so much ‘in the closet’ as that the family members around us were themselves ‘closeted’ from drawing attention to our relationship. While the family ‘knew’ we were romantically involved, and we knew that they knew, there was no mention of our involvement. The ‘unspoken’ is different from being ‘in the closet’ in the West. The Western concept of ‘the closet’ involves a gay subject who comes out as gay, and who then constitutes their sexual identity as a defining characteristic of their identity. As Foucault (1976) has asserted, the discursive construction of the homosexual subject came about through confessional and scientific discourses. Various writers have addressed the emergence of gay identity, and its subsequent expansion globally (see Altman 1996, 2001; see Jackson 2001). The ‘closet’ relies on the binary between ‘public’ and ‘private’, where ‘private’ designates what is behind or internal to the subject. The family in the West has a long association with the private sphere, as the sphere of domesticity. In the Fijian context, the ‘closet’ and the delineation of private and public cannot be made to run. Instead, what structured our inability to talk about our intimate relationship, even though it was known, was the delineation of the spoken from the unspeakable; this oriented us away from being able to mention our romantic and sexual relationship. Instead, describing our relationship as ‘tauvu’ was a means of describing who we were to each other that was within ‘reach’.

However, the delineation of the ‘spoken’ from the ‘unspoken’ also operated to render our relationship unseen in ways that felt deeply painful and uncomfortable. Liu and Ding’s (2005) description of ‘shadow beings’ seems relevant here. The disciplinary significance of silence as a
mechanism for maintaining family closeness needs to be considered in relation to other broader ‘straightening mechanisms’. Naming or discussing our intimate relationship could have been profoundly shaming for both families.

**Queer Experiences of Samoan ‘aiga in Aotearoa/ New Zealand**

Sua’ali’i (2001) argues that within a Samoan cultural context, self-identity is intrinsically linked to family. She asserts that ‘aiga acts as an organising principle. In Samoan cosmology, children’s conduct reflects on the status of the ‘aiga. She quotes the saying ‘o amio o tamaiti, e ta’u ai le lelei o le ‘aiga’ (the conduct of one’s children reflects the status of one’s family unit) (172). Sua’ali’i describes how this understanding is enacted through teaching techniques that instruct children how to behave respectfully and deferentially. Sua’ali’i explains:

…within every command issued by an elder demanding conformity, and within every rationale offered by a matai (chief) demanding the act of giving, lay the unspoken desire for the maintenance of communal and family wellbeing. The embodied message was overwhelmingly that family is all-important and all-encompassing (172).

What is significant to my analysis here is the relationship between ‘appropriate behaviour’ and the centrality of the ‘aiga. We could say that within the ‘aiga belonging is given in exchange for maintaining particular conduct, and that this conduct is compelled by indebtedness because the family is already coded as all-important. In this way, the family acts phenomenologically both through proximity between family members that shapes the body, and as a (sacred) object that the subject reaches towards. The subject reaches towards the family because the family-as-object is important and simultaneously the act of reaching towards reinscribes the family’s importance. The significance of conduct to family status is
instructive here: the family has a public face, the family faces onlookers who look back, the family is directed towards emotions of evaluation, including the spectre of judgment and loss of face.

Sua’ali’i (2001) argues that ‘aiga-based identity is more significant than gendered identity in the Samoan cultural context, where gendered identity flows on from ‘aiga-based identity. Gender roles reflect the importance of the continuation and upholding of the ‘aiga. Sua’ali’i explains, ‘reproductive sexuality was highly privileged amongst Samoan understandings of gender, and that privilege informed and defined both male and female roles and responsibilities’ (167). The complexity here is that ‘aiga-based identity directs the body towards heterosex and privileged gender as the best way to take up ‘aiga-based identity. Gender and opposite-sex desire act as if they are requirements of taking up ‘aiga-based identity, because of the relationship between the ‘family line’ and heterosex.

Sarah’s Story

Sarah’s narrative about her family offers insight into the way that the family faces a particular direction, and how what is unspeakable is obscured. Her story reveals the complexity of closeness; closeness shapes her, but she also experiences ‘stopping’ which limits her closeness.

When asked to speak about her family, Sarah explains:

> I am third oldest in a family of seven children, two brothers five girls, um I think I’m the only one that’s gay, [laughs] - um I’m very very close to my brothers and sisters.

Sarah’s description of herself as ‘very very close’ to her siblings not only signals the dimensions of their relationship, but the value she places on closeness. Closeness is offered as a valuable attribute. Sarah constitutes herself in relation to her family as the ‘third oldest’. Phenomenologically, we could say that Sarah gathers with her family as bodies that are near. Her joke that ‘I think I’m the only one that’s gay’ marks out gayness as a point of difference.
Sex was not discussed in Sarah’s family to the extent that when she left school at seventeen, she had to be told about sex by some friends.

Sarah: ah growing up, had no idea about sex or um, or what – homosexuality meant because it wasn’t spoken –

Tulia: was that your upbringing?

Sarah: it was just not –

Tulia: talked about?

Sarah: talked about, at all. I don’t even remember a – time or place where my parents even spoke anything about relationships or sex. It was just the family, and what was more important was the family. And, you know, the normal dos and don’ts of the house. You know, make sure you behave yourself and go to school, basic stuff.

This lack of talk is structured through its relationship to the family, which provides a framework of what is appropriate and voiced; that is the importance of family and following rules. There was no overt prohibition about talking about sexual matters, it just did not happen. Sexual matters remain unspeakable because Sarah is directed towards the family, and this direction is also familiar. Sexuality as the ‘unspeakable’ constitutes the ‘behind’; it is out of Sarah’s line of sight. Instead, the family coheres as an object within reach. Sarah’s explanation connects the disciplinary aspects of family life with the value imbued on the family. What is ‘unspeakable’ is intrinsically linked to the importance of the family, and the disciplinary mechanisms required to maintain this direction. Her sentence, ‘what was more important was the family’ marks out the parameters of what is ‘public’ or spoken, and constitutes the family line. Through this discursive structuring, sex and sexuality are marginal; they move to the shadows (Liu and Ding 2005). The uptake of the message that family is ‘all-important’ (Sua’ali’i 2001) acts constitutively to construct the subject as within the family. Constituted as a family member, Sarah is positioned to take up the family line. This uptake
reproduces both the centrality of the family, and heterogendered hierarchy inherent to it. Thus not speaking about sexuality becomes part of the conditions of being in the family. It is from within this family context that Sarah tells her family that she is gay. We could ask what motivates her to tell them; or what moves her to deviate from the family line. Instead, what I want to focus on here is the trajectory of closeness. Sarah says:

[m]y sisters didn’t take it very well, except for my oldest sister she just didn’t care. My two youngest sisters, because I was also very close to them um they were unsure, um so for about just under a year - it wasn’t that they didn’t love me - they were unsure to hug me or anything like that and didn’t know what that meant. Um so it took them a little bit longer. They were never nasty to me or anything, but I could sense that things were a bit different, but after they realised ‘oh it’s just Sarah [laughter] there’s nothing to it’ (my emphasis).

Sarah has challenged the heterogendered direction of the family line that delineates the spoken world of the family from the unspoken by telling her sisters that she is gay. The effect of this is that the ‘shadow’ of sexuality that is behind the family is brought forward into collision with the family. It is not just Sarah but the family that is queered, they are now at an oblique angle not facing the direction they thought they faced. Interestingly, this disruption of the usual discursive relationship between spoken and unspoken doesn’t lead into a permanent shift of the relationship between what can be said and what is left unsaid. That is, Sarah ‘senses’ that things are different, but there is no overt discussion of her sexuality. The opinion of her sisters is conveyed covertly though their actions: ‘they were unsure to hug me’.

Closeness as proximity acts as that which marks Sarah as different when she no longer coheres, ‘…because I was also very close to them um they were unsure’; and eventually accounts for her return to the family line ‘oh it’s just Sarah’. That is, we could suggest that it is her original proximity to them which produces their anxiety, and then the ability to recognise the way she still coheres that resolves this anxiety. Her statement, ‘they were never nasty to me or anything’ conveys the disciplinary maintenance of the unspoken. Here this discursive
mechanism both produces and restrains homophobia. On one hand, institutionalised heterogender is reinforced through the site of the family. On the other, the significance of the unspoken as a mechanism for reinforcing this social order simultaneously means any homophobia is not overtly voiced.

Sarah’s story gives a poignant example of the complexity of closeness. On one hand, what I have drawn out in the analysis above is the extent to which closeness acts as a mechanism that demands coherence. What I want to expand upon is that simultaneously ‘closeness’ becomes the object through which Sarah experiences ‘stopping’. Stopping is experienced by bodies that do not fit within a social site. Particular bodies do not experience the motility of other bodies; their movement is slowed or halted. When Sarah says her sisters were ‘unsure whether to hug me or anything like that’ we could think about these acts of uncertainty as ones which ‘stops’ Sarah from reaching her sisters, or closeness, in the same way as the heterosexual subject.

Marked out as lesbian, Sarah does not have the same access to physical proximity, and she is not as able to proximate closeness within the family. Ahmed (2006, 140) says, ‘[b]eing stopped is not only stressful, but makes the “body” itself the “site” of social stress’. Here, we could say that the ‘stopping’ Sarah experiences acts to reinscribe the queer family as in-line by locating her as the site of dis-ease; the queer subject. I want to emphasise that there is nothing intrinsic about the straightening of the family; under different social conditions the family that is shifted from the ‘straight line’ could stay queer. Likewise, we need to be able to account for why closeness leads to the disciplining of the queer body, rather than the queering of the family. In this instance, the technologies that propel the family to straighten include ‘stopping’ as a device that creates distance between the strange body and the ordinary bodies. It is performative in that the anxiety of the sisters stops Sarah from reaching physical proximity, and this in turn marks her as queer. She is stopped because she is different and different
because she is stopped. The act of stopping Sarah – at least momentarily - returns the family to the ‘straight line’. But her sisters’ realisation, ‘oh it’s just Sarah’ does different work here – it could be read as an interpellation that reproduces her familiarity without the requirement of likeness in the form of heterosexuality.

**Paul’s story**

Paul’s story about his relationship with his father can be analysed in relation to Ahmed’s (2006) account of similarity and the family line. Here, closeness and the associated mechanisms of silence work to reorient Paul to the ‘straight line’; at least through his father’s eyes. His father’s desire to read Paul as ‘like’ him acts as an imperative to be ‘in-line’. However, Paul also resists this narrative. Paul gave the following account of telling his father he is gay:

> [m]y father is a conservative Samoan male. He also told me about his past … and prayed, ‘and then I found God’, and blah blah blah. And I’m like, ‘yeah but I’m not you dad, I’m me. That’s really unfair, there’s no comparison’. So that, that was really hard. We never talked about it ever again. My dad used to ask my mother all the time, ‘[h]as Paul got a girlfriend?’

Paul’s father’s story of telling Paul an account of his own life acts as an interpellation to be ‘like’. As Ahmed (2006, 123) says, ‘likeness is an effect of proximity or contact, which is then “taken up” as a sign of inheritance’. The salvation story that Paul’s father uses as a framework to interpret his son’s sexuality is a narrative about God’s ability to create change where heterosexuality is aligned with good. The temporal shift imagined though the father’s story is a change in direction from being the ‘shamed’ subject to the trope of the ‘good’ Christian. This narrative is prevalent in evangelical Christianity. The salvation narrative is privileged in this context, where other interconnected power relations are at play, including the privileging of age and status through the father-son relationship. The privileging of this dominant salvation narrative subsumes other possible ways of making meaning. However, what I argue here is
that it is the requirement to be ‘like’ that augments the authority of the salvation story that prevents Paul’s father from making sense of his son’s sexuality in other ways. The father’s expectation that his son’s life will follow the same trajectory positions same-sex desire as a temporal queer moment, where Paul needs to be brought back ‘in-line’. Thus, the salvation narrative acts as a ‘straightening device’ (Ahmed 2006), where that which might be seen as a ‘queer moment’ is aligned with the heterogendered line because it is reinscribed as insignificant. It recedes to the ‘background’. It is not that the queer moment does not exist, but that it only exists as something to be superseded: the ‘behind’ to eventual salvation. The family line is perpetuated as a ‘straight line’ because of the requirement that Paul take up heterosexuality as a condition of being the good son; to be the good son is to be ‘like’ the father.

Paul’s statement, ‘I’m not you dad, I’m me’, reaches to the crux of the issue by recognising that his father’s story is premised on the notion that his son will have the same life. Paul’s statement, ‘there’s no comparison’, is a call to resist reading/interpreting his story along heterogendered lines; he is saying his life will not cohere to the path his father has taken. Alongside his father’s privileged story, Paul’s counter-narrative acts as a queer moment that takes him ‘off-line’ from both the family line and the religious line with which his family is aligned. We could ask what is ‘behind’ Paul that enables him to resist his father’s narrative in this way. In the Aotearoa context, it could be that the social history of the gay subject that is linked to concepts of individualism and liberal humanism acts to propel him. In part, I think we need to return to Ahmed’s (2006) account of the gift of the child and consider the dynamic that propels the child to be ‘not like’ the parent while simultaneously being required to inherit their line. As Ahmed argues later in *Queer Phenomenology*:
the gift of life is often a gift of parts... otherwise, the family would become a cloning device: the clone is a social pathology insofar as it inherits too much; it inherits everything such that it ceases to be a new thing... there is a connection between the demand for individuality and the concept of generation not only in the sense that the individual is generated as something new, but also in the sense that the generation becomes perceived as 'like' an individual, as the sum of its parts (123).

That is, the child is not simply required to return the gift of inheritance by taking up the requirement of being 'like', but that the conceptual nature of the family line is also what propels us forward to be different from our parents. We can think about Paul’s claim, ‘I’m not you dad’, as a device that extends his reach within the social site of the family by exploring this exchange as an interpellation. The father’s narrative operates as a means of hailing Paul as his son and therefore as inheriting straightness. Paul’s response is in fact an acceptance, rather than a rejection, of the hail in that it takes up the line of inheritance through the assertion of difference: Paul is his son because he is different.

I want to draw out the roles that silence and closeness play in this story in augmenting the significance of similarity; that Paul is required to be ‘like’ his father and thus inherit the line of heterogender. The privileging of salvation – as the direction the father is oriented towards – limits the possible outcomes of this dialogue. The effectiveness of this line is sustained by both mechanisms of closeness and silence. Paul says, ‘We never spoke about it again’. The silence acts disciplinarily in that it marks out what the father has designated as a ‘non-issue’ because it is ‘fleeting’ in such a way as to speak about it would be to challenge this demarcation. For the father, not speaking about it relegates same-sex desire to the background, it is both in the past and out of sight. Not speaking acts as a straightening device that maintains the
expectation that Paul will get a girlfriend, and follow the family line. But what conditions cause Paul to not speak about it? Why is this silence so compelling? I believe this question brings us back to the disciplinary nature of closeness. Paul spoke highly of his father, with considerable admiration and love. Yet to speak about his sexuality was to raise the spectre of conflict and invite overt condemnation. To maintain ‘closeness’ is to stay ‘in-line’ by appearing similar. Interestingly, although silence acts disciplinarily as a disincentive to being outspoken about sexuality (and therefore as a ‘stopping’ mechanism), silence also affords Paul the motility to enact being the ‘good son’ without actually being straight. Social bonds of familial closeness are both identity-sustaining and disciplinary mechanisms for maintaining the status quo.

Paul’s explanation of his relationship with his extended family and how he does not want to talk about it further reveals the ambivalence of silence – as a mechanism that both ‘stops’ and extends the queer body. His story also allows us to unpack the difference between familiarity and ease. Paul says:

I feel that my mother’s inroads with my extended family has actually propelled um acceptance of me in the family a lot more. And while it’s nice for me it’s not really a necessity. I mean if we talked about the whole gay issue I feel I could actually start hanging out with my family. Because I’ve actually disassociated myself from my family. I sort of cut myself off a lot because I just didn’t want the issue to come up. It wasn’t that I was hiding, I just didn’t really want to talk about it. I don’t think it’s anyone’s business. I don’t want the whole religious didactic argument coming back and forth. I just want to live my life. And not have people paw over it in detail and tell me how to live it.

When Paul says, ‘if we talked about the whole gay issue… I could actually start hanging out with my family’, he alludes to the way that silence acts as a stopping device, disabling him from reaching closeness with his family. Almost paradoxically he explains, ‘I’ve actually disassociated myself… I just didn’t want to talk about it’. These concurrent ideas signal the contradictory effects of the unspeakable, which is intrinsically linked with overt homophobia.
in sustaining heterogender. On one hand, the delineation of the unspeakable limits ‘stops’ or slows the queer body from accessing closeness, or speaking openly. On the other, silence offers motility within the family that overt homophobia does not afford. That is, Paul ‘didn’t want the issue to come up’ because he does not want to have to actively defend his sexuality against the privileged religious narratives. The threat of overt homophobia forecloses the possibilities for resisting the silence. Paul’s imagined ability to ‘start hanging out’ with his family imagines a set of conditions where same-sex desire is voiced within the space of the family, so that Paul is equally a family member rather than a ‘shadow’ (Liu and Ding 2005). Paul’s disassociation from the family signals the extent to which being ‘in’ the family requires Paul to take up a space which is uncomfortable. It is familiar, but his body is cramped by the direction this familiarity takes. Paul’s statement, ‘I just didn’t want to talk about it’, is intrinsically linked to the ‘religious didactic argument’. To imagine this situation differently is to imagine same-sex relations operating in the foreground of the family in the same way as heterosexual relations operate as ‘normal’, rather than as a site of conflict.

**Maria’s story**

Maria’s story about her changing relationship with her family shows how family is invoked as a point of binding when there are children involved, but also how having a child offers Maria motility within the family she did not experience previously. Having a child stands in for similarity, and returns Maria to the family line. Maria, a Samoan woman in her thirties, had experienced a lot of rejection by her Catholic family, and had recently perceived that their relationship was changing because of the birth of her daughter. She explained:

> [u]m, well it has taken many many many years for them to accept me for who I am. Um and I seem to have come up on the hierarchy now that I have a baby. Not without a lot of hard work and many years of struggling.
Maria used the terms ‘come up on the hierarchy’, a phrase she repeated again at another point in the interview when talking about her family. Her ability to recognise the hierarchy within her family could stem from the liminal, marginal or ‘outsider’ position she occupies within the family. This position is physical as well as symbolic, for several years she had little contact with them. This ‘outsider’ position gives her particular insight into the way her family operates. As a queer subject she is ‘stopped’ from experiencing the closeness she might otherwise have felt. It is interesting to compare this insight with the stories of other Pacific people who have, for a variety of reasons, not experienced marginalisation within their families. This position of liminality offers Maria, and other marginalised subjects, a different point of view.

Talking about her mother’s reaction to her having a child with a same-sex partner, Maria said:

> [m]y mother is so ecstatic that she now has another grandchild. And I’ve kind of fulfilled my whole role except I didn’t do the whole marry the guy thing.

Maria’s insight into how having a baby has meant she has, in her mother’s eyes, fulfilled her role reveals something important about the resilience of privileged narratives to act as orientation devices. That is, having a baby acts as a partial straightening device, which returns Maria to the family line. Even though Maria disrupts the ‘straight line’, 'I didn’t do the whole marry the guy thing', having a baby acts as a means of taking up the family line as a line of inheritance. Maternity acts as an investment into what it means to be a Samoan woman. The family ‘role’ that Maria takes up through becoming a mother reproduces the family line. Maria is fulfilling her mother’s imagined future for her. This makes obvious that being a daughter involves a relationship of obligation. The act of having a child becomes an act of subject making that reinscribes the family line; the daughter is transformed into a mother which also makes her a ‘good daughter’, and the mother is reinscribed as a ‘good mother’ for having a ‘good daughter’. The direction invoked in the imagined future of the daughter
substantiates the role of the mother, by emphasising the importance of mothering. The perpetuation of mothering, and the way in which Maria’s mother ‘is so ecstatic that she has another grandchild’, reasserts that Maria’s mother herself has fulfilled her role as a mother by being a ‘good’ mother.

Another way in which the experience of having a child creates closeness as a binding device within families involves narratives of common experiences around having children. Maria’s experience of having a daughter stands in for similarities between her life and the lives of her brothers. Maria explained:

[b]ecause we have a daughter and we’re not just the dinkies, you know double income no kids scenario, because we have gone down this path… my brothers have become more accepting as well. Because again it’s not just about having a nice house and all that sort of stuff. It’s actually we’ve got a family too, so we understand the struggles that you’ve been through. So that’s been a wonderful aspect as well.

Maria is perceived as more closely aligned with her heterosexual siblings, because they now share common experiences of parenting. This common experience has led to her siblings being more accepting of Maria. Her statement, ‘it’s actually we’ve got a family too’, shows the crucial role that having children plays in understandings of family. This narrative of ‘common experience’ stands in for closeness as both proximity and similarity. This closeness is powerful; the semblance of a shared direction is able to obscure very different experiences of childrearing and family. Maria’s brothers’ non-acceptance of her sexuality in relation to being ‘dinkies’ seems to revolve around a mis/perception of privilege: that gay and childless couples are financially privileged. Maria’s perception that her brothers have become ‘more accepting’ is at least partially related to the ways in which her maternity constructs her as ‘the same’ as them; more ‘in-line’ with a heterogendered construction of family. Nevertheless, I want to honour Maria’s perception that this has been a ‘wonderful experience’. As a queer subject, Maria is not completely recruitable to the family line but she does experience greater motility – in the
form of ease and the ability to ‘reach’ other bodies - through having a child. Even if Maria is an adjunct to the ‘straight line’ of the family, the proximity imagined through the narrative of shared experience of having a child produces a line of sight even while she maintains her queer position, such that Maria is positioned within the context of the family. Maria’s story involves an imagined future for her daughter that reveals the importance of being part of the ‘aiga.

Maria said:

[a]nd all of Bella’s cousins are just in love with this new baby, you know, and they’ll be playing together and teasing each other and all of that in the future.

This imagined future signals the significance of family and closeness as a pleasure, which also binds us to the shared direction of the family. For Maria, the family line is a source of pleasure through the imagined future of her child’s belonging within the family.

Maria told a lovely story about her aunties visiting the baby that revealed how cultural frames of reference are at play in determining who is constituted as ‘near’. Maria said:

[w]ell my aunties actually came to visit because they wanted to see the baby, and they couldn’t believe I’d had a baby, which is hardly surprising, but they found it very hard the whole concept. They said, ‘where’s the father?’ and I said, ‘the father lives in Australia’, and they said ‘oh okay’. I explained that Jane was here and they asked me whether Jane loved Bella and I said, ‘oh yes she does’ [emphatically] and I explained to them that Jane’s brother was the father. And they seemed to be able to understand that concept. But to get their head around me being gay, they wouldn’t quite understand, even though I think at their ages, and they’re seventy, they probably would but would still find it difficult.

What is significant here is that Maria is able to mobilise familial objects so that two (queer) women can remain at the centre of the story – at the privileged points on the family line reserved for the heterosexual couple – as women who are co-parenting a child. The relegation of their intimate relationship to the ‘unspeakable’ risks obscuring the relationship between Jane and the baby. Instead, Maria’s explanation that ‘Jane’s brother was the father’ provides her aunties with an alternate family line for understanding the relationship between Jane and
the baby in a way that is meaningful. It draws on the cultural inheritance of Pacific families, where aunties have always raised children.

What I am arguing is that rather than considering this story as one where a queer family is reconstituted along biological lines, we need to remember that the family is always already queer: it only appears straight through acts of alignment that allow certain objects to be relegated to the background. The historical significance of aunties to childrearing brings to the forefront the queer potential of the unspeakable as a line of inheritance of women without men. Explaining Jane’s brother was the father acts as an orientation device that allows for pleasurable recognition as within the family; it draws Jane close to the baby and the wider family and extends and shapes her body as one that loves the baby ‘very much’. We could say that queer lives/the lives of queer subjects are constituted both through moments of continuity with and difference from (as turning away) heterogendered life stories and the family line.

**Conclusion: The Conditions of Closeness and the Agency of the Queer Subject**

These stories reveal how closeness acts as a straightening device that maintains the family line as a line of heterogender. This is in part related to the coherence of particular objects to closeness; closeness acts disciplinarily through its relationship with silence and the unspeakable. The delineation of the unspeakable from the speakable propels family members towards the ‘family’ as a sacred object. The case studies I have discussed here all examine how closeness acts as a requirement to be ‘like’, which included the requirement not to speak about certain things, especially sexual orientation. The case studies showed that even when queer subjects trouble the family line, silence acts as a mechanism – a straightening device –
that ‘returns’ the family to the ‘straight line’ by maintaining the perception that the family is
going off-line. In Sarah’s story, the ‘stopping’ that manifests as physical distance between herself and
her sisters acts as a distancing device; it is as if she is propelled ‘off-line’ to maintain the
apparent integrity of the family. In Paul’s story, the silence between himself and his father
maintained their closeness while simultaneously maintaining a narrative of ‘likeness’: that Paul
would inherit the life of his father.

What I want to turn to here are some final remarks about what the relationship between
closeness and silence tells us about the agency of the queer subject. Ahmed’s (2006)
conception of ‘motility’ – the ability of the subject/object to move freely – a term she draws
from Husserl (1969), allows us to reflect on the agency of the subject. In *Queer
Phenomenology* Ahmed doesn’t use the term ‘agency’, which I presume is because she is
interested in emphasising the ability, or not, of the subject to move within social space, and
the requirements of particular directions. In the case studies discussed here, we saw how queer
subjects act in relation to the requirement to be silent as a means of maintaining closeness
with family. In this context, the queer subject experienced ‘stopping’ within the site of the
family, as an experience where the queer subject is stopped or slowed from experiencing the
same ‘ease’ within this social site as heterogendered subjects. Sarah experienced ‘stopping’ as
the physical distance that manifested between herself and her sisters, as they were unsure
whether to hug her.

These experiences highlight two different ways of envisaging the queer subject; as a subject
which goes off-line by transgressing the family line’s requirement for heterogender or by
refuting the requirement to be silent or close; or alternatively as a subject which actively stays
‘on-line’ despite the impact of ‘stopping’ mechanisms which might block it. These experiences
translate into two different forms of queer agency. Firstly – and this formulation is common in
queer literature – the queer subject experiences agency by transgressing heterogendered norms. In this instance, we could say that this envisages a queer subject that is prepared to cohere to that which is marked as unspeakable. Given the relationship between the unspeakable and shame, this subject is queer through its relationship to shame/disgust.

Secondly though, what these case studies reveal is the cohesion of the queer subject to the family line even when the queer subject experiences ‘stopping’. For this queer subject, agency is experienced as any actions that allow them to experience motility within the family as a social site. Maria and her partner Jane are able to mobilise familiar objects – the significance of aunties in childrearing – to cohere as ‘close’ bodies. For Paul, not speaking about his sexuality allowed him to maintain his proximity to his father.

Finally, the significance of closeness as a ‘straightening mechanism’ that reproduces poignant silences shifts across different contexts within the Pacific. For both Fijian and Samoan families, the relegation of queer sexuality to the ‘background’ produces the family as a site of reproductive sexuality or heterogender. The delineation of the ‘speakable’ from the ‘unspeakable’ follows the trajectory of colonial Christianity for both Fijian and Samoan families (see Puloto-Endemann 2001). Within Fiji, the requirement to take up the ‘gift of inheritance’ requires the child to line up with family, church and nation. In Auckland however, Samoan participants were more able to challenge silences within their ‘aiga. While further research is needed, these differences point to the differences between diaspora and homeland as well as differences between Samoan and Fijian identity. I would suggest that the proximity of the Auckland gay scene enables participants to draw on different ‘backgrounds’ to trouble the authority of silence. Simultaneously, the New Zealand-based Samoan community has a different ‘shared direction’. While heterogender is privileged; it is not the only route to belonging in the ‘aiga.
Chapter Seven: Christianity, ‘Unsaved’ Others, and the ‘Swivelling’ Queer Body

This chapter considers the positioning of queer Indigenous Fijian people in relation to Christianity in Fiji. I suggest that the Indigenous Fijian church is situated as a site of alignment that ‘lines up’ with the family and the nation, such that the queer subject is often multiply invested in the church for recognition. I explore the impact of this alignment on queer bodies who are required to ‘line up’ with the church as a condition of both belonging within communities and of being Indigenous Fijian. This chapter asks what shape the queer body takes within the church, and what actions are made possible within the church’s conditions of ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ (Ahmed 2006). Addressing religion provides a means of exploring broader questions about the agency of the queer subject. Ahmed argues, ‘the “unrecruitable” body must still be recruited… in part through the very repetition of the action of “being stopped” as a mode of address’ (140).

Thus, in this chapter I consider the queer subject as a subject who is still required to orient towards the straight line even though the queer subject might not be able to inherit the rewards or pleasures of this shared direction. Furthermore, the requirement of the queer subject to share the direction of the church acts performatively through naming; the subject is both inhibited bodily through this requirement and positioned as ‘Other’. In a context where church is central to cultural and national identity, I explore the extent to which queer subjects are able to transgress the heterogendered requirements of the church, or alternatively experience motility within a social site that does not support them. I argue that queer bodies are required to ‘swivel’ between the heterogendered lines of family, church, and nation and
queer lines of sight. I use the term ‘swivelling’ to describe the motion of the queer body turning between the shared direction of the church and queer desires. The swivelling movement of the queer body is shaped by both the requirement to ‘line-up’ and be positioned as ‘Other’, and also through the agency of the subject to resist erasure or being made ‘Other’. The requirement to swivel towards and away from the heterogendered line is shaped by social space such that we can ask how ‘swivelling’ becomes an attribute of queer bodies, and signals a mode of ‘queer survival’.

Ahmed (2006) offers a persuasive account of the pervasive nature of ‘straight lines’ and how they require bodily acts of alignment. What is less apparent in her work is the form of ongoing relationship between the queer body and the straight line, after the queer body has been marked as queer. Ahmed does not discuss the queer body as a queer body, because for her ‘queer’ constitutes moments of transgression where the subject is disoriented from the ‘straight line’, which is followed by realignment through the work of perception that restores the hegemonic heterogendered viewpoint. For Ahmed, this perceptual shift back to the straight line is made possible through ‘straightening mechanisms’, which are dominant discursive constructions that are aligned with compulsory heterogender. While the subject that cannot cohere to the straight line is mentioned, she does not expand on what the ongoing relationship between the subject and the straight line might be when the subject does not stay ‘on-line’. What tells us more about the relationship between the queer subject to the lines they cannot follow is Ahmed’s (2006, 139-142) discussion of ‘stopping’ within particular social sites in her discussion of racism. I depart from Ahmed by arguing that the queer body maintains an ongoing relationship with what is off-line, such that the queer body is required to swivel.
Paralleling Ahmed’s (2006) argument that compulsory heterosexuality acts like repetitive strain injury (RSI), I argue that this ‘requirement’ to swivel acts both as resistance or agency, and is habitual inasmuch as this repeated movement of turning towards and away from the straight line reshapes the queer body. If, as Ahmed argues, compulsory heterosexuality is like RSI – repeated movement that restricts the capacity of the body, then I argue queerness is like yoga – repeated movement that increases the body’s capacity to stretch or flex. This mobility is in itself restrained as the movement of turning towards and away from the requirements of the ‘straight line’. To be aligned is to be ‘recognisable’ (Ahmed 2006, see Butler 1997) as either a body that coheres or as a body that is marked as ‘Other’. Of course, there is nothing inherently flexible about the queer body, but rather flexibility could be considered as an effect of continued ‘stopping’ that requires the body to turn through acts of reorientation. This repeated swivelling occurs in a context where the subject maintains an investment with a queer ‘line of sight’. These queer lines of sight would include the direction of desire for a person of the same gender, or a sense of self that is aligned with femininity despite having male body. At the same time, the queer subject is required to ‘return’ to the straight line as the line that carries the body forward in the ‘shared direction’ of the nation.

This analysis involves thinking about queer moments differently from how Ahmed (2006) envisions them. For Ahmed, the queer moment is perceptual; the queer moment happens when what you see is ‘awry’, or ‘wonky’ (66). In Ahmed’s formulation, straightening devices work to realign your perception with the ‘straight line’ by providing ‘horizon lines’, which allow you to reorient yourself. These ‘straightening devices’ already exist prior to the queer moment, they are largely taken-for-granted social norms. In my analytical reworking of Ahmed’s concept, I argue that the queer moment acts as a shift in direction – even if your feet are in the same place you have a different line of sight. Phenomenologically, this is possible
because we are able to turn our heads, bend, or twist from the waist so that the direction of our sight is not the same as the straight line we are standing on. In my reworking, straightening devices still work as social mechanisms to ‘return’ you to the straight line, but straightening requires more work than the perceptual horizon lines that Ahmed describes. I argue that straightening devices entail the labour of other bodies or institutions to realign you with heterogender. Thus, straightening is less immediate, and it is not effective every time. My thesis describes what compels queer bodies to take up the ‘straight line’ even when their bodies are not supported by it, and what enables queer bodies to turn away from the ‘straight line’ despite the compulsion to cohere.

Following Ahmed’s (2006) analysis of the orientation of the West towards the Other, I argue that the church is directed towards queer bodies as a powerful ‘Other’. The church is aligned with the Indigenous Fijian nation to the extent that queer stands in for the fantasy of the ‘excesses’ of Western liberalism, which constitute a threat to Pacific nationalism and identity. Drawing on Gopinath’s (2005) account of nationalism, I argue that the constitution of the queer body as a threat to Indigenous Fijian nationalism means that the Indigenous Fijian queer body occupies an ‘impossible’ site as the threat within. The Indigenous Fijian church is aligned with notions of culture such that to be ‘in’ the church stands in as cultural and national identity. I argue that the alignment between the body, the family, the church and the nation effects a ‘straight line’.

The structural and orienting aspects of the church are accrued through ‘shared direction’ and repetition. The church is aligned with the family and the nation such that the church acts as a site for the family and the nation to be reproduced. It is difficult for the subject to resist or ‘turn away’ from the church because of the subject’s complex investments in this straight line. That is, to not be heterogendered is to not be Indigenous Fijian, to not be saved/ to not be
one body with Christ, to not be a daughter or a son, and therefore not to be recognisable as a subject. In other words, ‘taking up’ the church becomes a condition of family inheritance that reproduces compulsory heterosexuality. Likewise, the ‘shared direction’ of the nation is underpinned by alignment with the ‘straight line’ of the church.

The direction of the church towards queer bodies is also uneasy. As discussed in relation to the family in Chapter Five, silence acts as a ‘background’ object that allows the church to maintain its direction. I argue that ‘behind’ the imposing direction the church takes towards queer bodies is in fact an irreducible anxiety about its own body and bodies of the congregation because of colonial history. The historical force of the church was directed at non-white bodies. In this context, the Othering of queers acts as a projection for the Othering of ‘natives’. Ahmed’s (2006) phenomenological revisioning of Said provides a useful account of how the West is oriented towards the Other in such a way as to draw the Other close. My analysis here extends this account by arguing that this orientation does not only draw on (a fantasy of) the closeness of the Other but relies on the entitlement/‘ease’ to which its imagined, political and corporeal reach extends inside the body of the ‘Other’. I argue that this ‘ease’ is imagined as an entitlement to reach inside the body of the queer ‘Other’ both politically and interpersonally. This parallels the way violent acts can be read as an extension of entitlement into the body of the Other, which I explore in Chapter Eight.

**Fiji: Alignment of Church and Nation and Resistance Within**

In this section, I draw on Ahmed’s (2006) analysis of Othering to draw out some of the phenomenological aspects of the colonial church, which allows us to think critically about the church in relation to space, and the types of bodies that are able to inhabit particular spaces. As Ahmed says, ‘bodies are shaped by histories of colonialism…[s]uch histories, we might say,
surface on the body, or even shape how bodies surface’ (111). Colonial processes are heavily implicated in the direction that the church in Fiji and other colonised countries have taken (Tomlinson 2007, 2009; Ryle 2005). The concept of the ‘mission’ has structured the movement of the church body and the subsequent relationship between church and state in Fiji (see Ryle 2005). My argument here is not that Fiji was a passive recipient of colonial Christianity, nor that Indigenous Fijian Christianity took the same form as Christianity in the Anglo-West. There is significant research on Fiji’s strategic engagement with colonial Christianity, and the ‘Fijianisation’ of Christian concepts (see Tomlinson 2007, 2009; Ryle 2005). However, I argue that within the hybridised Christianity that emerged we need to be able to interrogate what aspects were institutionalised or structured in ways that augmented particular relationships to power and authority. That is, we need to ask what was inherited from the colonial project that steered the direction of the church, how this inherited direction became institutionalised, and what effect this inheritance has had on bodies inside and outside of the church. I argue that the colonial church ‘inherited’ a ‘shared direction’ (Ahmed 2006) towards the body of the ‘unsaved’ Other.

The ‘shared direction’ of Indigenous Fijian Christianity has been sustained through historical intersections between Christianity and chiefly hierarchy. The triumvirate of vanua (land and people), lotu (church), and matanitu (governance) has been immensely significant for Indigenous Fijians both structurally² and psychically³ (Ryle 2005). The relationship between church, vanua and state arose from the powerful intersection of colonial and indigenous

² A structural example of this is the historic political allegiance between the senate (made up of indigenous chiefs) and the Methodist church. This situation has shifted since the 2006 Coup, with growing discord between illegal government and the Methodist Church.
³ My use of ‘psychically’ here is intended to signal the relationship between what is psychic or ‘internal’ and conditions of power as per Butler (1997). That is, the relationship between vanua, church and state shapes Indigenous Fijian subjectivity (see Ryle 2005).
hierarchies in the fusing of Methodism and chiefly rule through the colonial period (Garrett 2005; Ryle 2005; Tuwere 2002). We could say that the work of aligning these concepts was not coincidental or natural but occurred through the work of ‘straightening devices’ (Ahmed 2006) that operated to bring these concepts into line, and as such form the historical ‘behind’ to this straight line. Missionaries were heavily reliant on the relationships they forged with chiefs, and chiefs took up Christianity strategically as a means of consolidating power. As Ryle explains:

[the Wesleyan mission did not make any significant headway until paramount chief Cakobau converted in 1854… Cakobau’s conversion came only as a ‘tactic of despair’, to save his position of power in a twelve-year feud with the chiefdom of Rewa and secure Taufa’ahau’s allegiance. In the years that followed Cakobau’s adopting of the lotu, so many Fijians converted that the mission was almost unable to keep pace (64).

Drawing on Ahmed (2006), we could argue that that the privileging of this lotu line, and the alignment forged between this line and earlier Indigenous Fijian conceptions of vanua, relied on points of intersection between the concurrent structural lines of British empire-building, and lines of chiefly hierarchy in Fiji. Both British empire-building and indigenous Chiefly hierarchy were structured through relationships between power, inheritance (as claiming those who were the same) and Othering (as naming those who were different). The effect of this collusion of powerful structural lines was the reinscribing of vanua so that it stayed in-line and was able to augment a powerful ‘shared direction’, by being invested with both chief and church authority. As Ryle (2005, 63) claims:

[Christianisation entailed the redefinition of vanua, adding the Christian God as supreme power among the Fijian cosmology of deities, yet retaining most other
elements and understandings of vanua as an ancestral shadow-land of place, kinship relations and spiritual power that exists alongside Christian belief and practice (lotu).

Significantly, pre-Christian Indigenous Fijian spiritual beliefs were held alongside the uptake of Christianity such that missionary John Hunt claimed that Fijians were ‘not so much convinced that their gods were false as ours is true’ (Hunt to General Secretaries, 1847 cited in Ryle 2005, 63), but were relegated to the background through silence. I am interested in the overlay between this act of relegation and the discursive relegation of sexuality to the background through silence. Ryle quotes Thornley who claimed that prior to church independence in Western Fiji, ‘the effect of sustained mission endeavour to shame Methodist followers into a rejection of all links with the past produced a profound silence on spiritual matters not considered in conformity with the orthodox’ (Ryle 2005, 63). Shaming or silencing as a modus operandi (or straightening device) for taking up a particular line works to produce silences as poignant relegations of objects to the background so that they are out of sight.

Another trace that makes the ‘shared direction’ of Indigenous Fiji as a Christian nation so potent is the alignment of colonial history and narratives of ‘the mission’ with the arrival of more recent Pentecostal churches in Fiji. The Pentecostal churches fervently direct themselves towards converting non-Christians to Christianity, and Christians to Pentecostalism. As Ryle (2005, 61) asserts:

[t]he coming of Christianity in people’s minds belongs to a not very distant past and is an essential part of their cultural and historical sense of identity. To carry forth the Light to others through missionisation is part of the responsibility that especially Pentecostalists feel.
Ahmed’s (2006) account of the work of repetition via the work that bodies do is instructive here. In a sense, the alignment of Pentecostal churches with a ‘shared direction’ towards the ‘unsaved’ Other is not coincidental, but an effect of the habitual work of bodies, where a particular position accrues ease. Likewise, the ‘alignment’ of Pentecostal churches with the ‘shared direction’ of the Indigenous Fijian nation towards the ‘unsaved’ Other powerfully entrenches the force of this ‘shared direction’ and makes it harder to resist. The ease of this direction for the Indigenous Fijian nation is also an effect of poignant silences, including the relegation of the harm done by colonisation to the background.

Thus, the silence of Indigenous Fijians maintains cohesion with the ‘shared direction’ of the church while not giving up an attachment to other objects or desires. The silence could signal aspects of indigenous belief that challenge Christianity, the violence of colonial processes, and sexual desires. Silence does not signify capitulation, nor abandonment of non-dominant beliefs or acts. Nevertheless, these silences sustain a straight line that directs the Indigenous Fijian body as both Christian and Indigenous Fijian. However, silence is an unstable straightening device because background objects threaten to come to the fore. The background objects of desire and indigenous history threaten the binary of the ‘saved’ from ‘unsaved’. Sexual desires and alternative Gods threaten to stick to bodies, and mark you as the various Others of the ‘saved’: as ‘savage’, ‘heathen’, or ‘queer’.
Uneasy Bodies

In this section, I argue that unresolvable anxiety underpins the ‘shared direction’ that Fiji has taken through the alignment of religious and ethno-nationalist identity. This ‘shared direction’ coheres as straight/heterogendered. The queer body operates as an ‘internal other’ (Munt 2007) that threatens to queer or displace the ‘straight line’. Munt claims that despite nationalist imaginaries of the unified nation, ‘the nation space is ruptured, it is mutable, temporal, limited, and precarious, haunted by its own division’ (60). The history of colonisation and Christianity reveals the complexity of alignments between Western and indigenous trajectories: the ‘shared direction’ of Fiji as a Christian nation accrued force through the work of ‘lotu’ and chiefly hierarchy being brought together. Through this work of alignment, particular objects were relegated to the background to be shadow objects that exist on the periphery. Thus, Indigenous Fijian bodies – as the colonial Other, or bodies made queer (see Ahmed 2006, 111) by the ‘shared direction’ of the white gaze, were already required to swivel between colonial Christianity and indigenous spirits (see Tomlinson 2007, 2009).

What does the relationship between Christianity and the State tell us about the shared direction of indigenous nationalism? We could consider the way in which the church has always been a site of unease for Indigenous Fijian bodies, an alignment that is inherently ambivalent and unstable. The anxiety of this alignment – where indigenous bodies must disavow their own Othering - is ‘behind’ the church’s orientation towards queer bodies. Queer bodies need to stand in for the ‘Other’ in order to maintain the shared direction of the church line. The queer body takes the shape of the sexual Other as a projection of the sexualised shame of the colonial project.
The work of the alignment between church and ethno-nationalist nation has culminated in a ‘shared direction’ that has powerfully constructed the Indo-Fijian community as ‘Other’. As described in the introduction, anti-Indian sentiment and violence has broken out in three consecutive coups. As Tomlinson (2007) has claimed, ‘[t]he 1987 coups brought together symbols of Christianity, warriorhood, and chieftliness, making them resonate with an aura of menace for Fiji’s non-indigenous citizens’ (535). As Ryle (2005) describes, repeated calls for Fiji to be recognised as a Christian nation are embedded with rhetoric that describes Indo-Fijian citizens as ‘heathen’, and excludes them from the Indigenous Fijian nation. This ‘shared direction’ demarcates the Indo-Fijian body as ‘unsaved’.

Ahmed’s (2006) phenomenological account of postcolonial relations is instructive for interrogating the shared direction of the church in Fiji. Ahmed draws on Said to argue that Orientalism works as an orientation. The Western subject is oriented around the West and towards the East. This orientation allows the West to draw the East closer, effectively putting the East within grasp, while maintaining and reifying the difference between ‘West’ and ‘East’. This delineation between orientation ‘around’ and orientation ‘towards’ is useful for understanding the mechanisms of both colonial and contemporary Christianity in Fiji, and the structural and cultural effects of these orientations. As Ahmed says, ‘[p]erhaps to be oriented around something is what allows us to “hold the center,” or even constitute ourselves as at the center of other things’ (116). Let’s say that the trope of Christ is at the centre of the church.

Within the colonial missionary churches the trope of the Christ-figure stands in for imagined shared attributes with the colonial mission, and the West writ large: masculine, white, and

---

4 Ahmed explains that this distinction is not always present (115). My intention is not to suggest that this difference is inherent, but that it is useful in understanding the context of the colonial church.
heterosexual. Orientation around the trope of Christ, and specifically the trope of Christ-as-saviour, acts a means of laying claim to discourses of righteousness, purity, truth and so forth. It extends a particular idealised means of living and inhabiting space. The history of colonialism has meant that these discourses have been intrinsically linked to notions of ‘whiteness’. Ahmed explains that ‘a “we” emerges as an effect of a shared direction toward an object’ (117). The direction faced by the colonial church has been towards the body of the ‘unsaved’, the trope of the ‘heathen’ that stands in for the Pacific as a whole. The body of the heathen was codified in racialised terms, and is linked to notions of Pacific people as savages, cannibals or hyper-sexual erotic Others (see Sua’ali’i 2001). Ahmed explains:

[i]t is the fact that what I am oriented toward is ‘not me’ that allows me to do this or that. The otherness of things is what allows me to do things ‘with’ them. What is other than me is also what allows me to extend the reach of my body. Rather than Othering simply being a form of negation, it can also be described as a form of extension (115, emphasis original).

The orientation of the Church towards the ‘unsaved’ is what has legitimised its reach across the globe and into Fiji, via both the colonial and missionary projects. The missionary project extended Western reach into the body of the Other. The missionary project legitimised an entitlement to reaching into Fiji and ‘unsaved’ bodies that has consolidated into a shared direction. This theme emerges in Chapter Eight, where I address direct violence against queer bodies.

This colonial orientation has had a pervasive effect on contemporary Indigenous Fijian churches, such that the shared direction of the church still requires the cohesion of the church as a ‘body’ around the trope of Christ-the-saviour and those ‘saved’ who are deemed moral and right, and towards bodies that are marked as ‘unsaved’ and deemed immoral and wrong.
There is also an anxiety inherently created by the translation of this direction - and what it means to share this direction - from white bodies to Indigenous Fijian bodies previously cast as Other. If we return to Ahmed’s (2006) account of inheritance, this is an uneasy inheritance because it requires Indigenous Fijians to ‘take up’ the ‘gift’ of the mission through the requirement to be ‘like’ the missionaries even though they have simultaneously been cast as the ‘Other’. If Indigenous Fijian bodies cohere around the body of Christ, what attributes are they required to share as a condition of this direction? Whose bodies stand in for the ‘Other’ that they are required to reach towards? A significant example of Indigenous Fijian bodies’ coherence around the body of Christ is revealed through ongoing calls from multiple denominations to have Fiji declared a Christian state (See Ryle 2005). This discourse clearly aligns the nation with the church, so that the trope of Christ is not just the imagined centre of the church, but simultaneously the centre of the nation.

In Fiji, Indo-Fijians stand in for the ‘unsaved’ or ‘heathen’, occupying the ground previously occupied by Indigenous Fijian bodies in general. But this alignment, where Indo-Fijians are marked as the ‘unsaved’ and Indigenous Fijians occupy the ground of the ‘saved’, is a nationalist fantasy susceptible to ‘rupture’ (Munt 2007). The indigenous queer body threatens to queer/disrupt the ‘straight line’ of the indigenous nation with bodies that do not ‘line up’. The effect of the indigenous Christian nation’s ‘shared direction’ towards the ‘unsaved’ is that queer bodies need to be expelled as sexual unsaved ‘Others’. The reach of the indigenous Christian nation towards the ‘unsaved’ Other is slippery, or susceptible to deconstruction in that the distinction between the ‘saved’ and the ‘unsaved’ may not hold. This could explain the work of disgust mechanisms as mechanisms that work to maintain a shared direction. These will be discussed further in the next chapter. As Ahmed (2006) explains, ‘[t]he reachability of the other… does not mean that they become “like me/us”. Rather they are
brought closer to home, but the action of “bringing” is what sustains the difference’ (117).

One of the participants, Lana, spoke about the response of Indigenous Fijian churches condemning homosexuality:

[t]hey say, ‘you live in sin. You’re gonna burn in Hell. You have to repent now and leave that lifestyle behind you and come and face, you know, the Lord.

In Lana’s comment we can see how the condemnation ‘you’re going to burn in hell’ is expressed as a ‘casting out’ but simultaneously draws the queer body closer – into relation with the church: ‘[y]ou have to… come and face the Lord’. Here, as Ahmed points out, the moment of ‘stopping’ is also an interpellation. In a phenomenological sense, the church holds the centre – maintained in part through discourses of righteousness such as these – that sustains the entitlement of its encroachment into the lives of those deemed Other. This lotu line is intrinsically linked to the ‘straight line’ of which it bears an indelible trace: to be Christian is to be ‘straight’ while to be queer is to be off-line as an ‘unsaved’ Other. Queer bodies have to endure the forced proximity of the church body. Thus, it is the extended reach of the church towards bodies that are marked as ‘unsaved’ that constructs the delineation of the ‘saved’. What is especially significant here is the inherent anxiety of the ‘saved’ Christian bodies, because they are always already at risk of being marked as ‘heathen’ because of the ‘background’ objects of indigenous belief and an inherited trajectory of shame. Queer bodies threaten to disrupt the ‘shared direction’ of the indigenous Christian nation ‘towards’ the ‘heathen’ Indo-Fijian body; by presenting an alternate Fijian body and raising the spectre of sexual shame. It is the presence of queer bodies and other bodies that do not conform and are rendered Other that legitimises the authority vested in church discourses and structures within Fiji.
Swivelling Bodies

The following stories show the way queer voices might negotiate space geared around the trope of Christ, where they risk bodily stopping as ‘unsaved’ Others. While unable to experience the motility of heterosexual Christian bodies within spaces demarcated by the relationship to the church, they are still subjected to the demands of the lotu line through interpellations that ‘stop’ them (see Ahmed 2006). While the three people whose stories appear below are clearly engaging with the straight line offered by their respective churches, they also engage in strategies of resistance where they are able to ‘swivel’ away from the ‘shared direction’ offered by the church. The shift in direction doesn’t indicate a permanent change in direction or a new line, but I argue that it still produces bodily flexibility for the subject. The possibility of occupying different subjectivities than those produced via the ‘shared direction’ of the church show us the extent to which people are able to engage tactically and creatively from within institutionalised lines to experience ‘queer moments’.

Lana is of mixed Samoan, Chinese and Indo-Fijian descent; she describes herself as ‘a Fiji local’. She explains, ‘I guess most of us born here have mixed Polynesian and Asian blood, born and raised here’. She was raised in a Catholic family:

[m]y parents are very staunch Catholics and that was my upbringing… I had a very sheltered upbringing… lesbianism didn’t even cross my mind, it just was something that never came up… it was just something I never even thought about’ (my emphasis).

Lana’s ‘sheltered’ upbringing, Catholicism, and the way lesbianism was something not spoken about are interconnected. The context of Catholicism, and of being ‘staunch Catholics’, delineates what is said and what is relegated out of sight. Lana’s statement that ‘lesbianism didn’t even cross my mind, it just was something that never came up’ shows the extent to which lesbianism was out of Lana’s line of sight. She was oriented along the ‘straight line’
in such a way that the possibility of having a same-sex relationship, or assuming a lesbian identity was foreclosed (see Butler 1997). Religion and family inheritance are powerfully aligned here. As I have previously described, Ahmed identifies the role of the imagined ‘return’ of the ‘gift of inheritance’ through the continuation of the family line via the heterosexual couple. In Lana’s sentence, ‘[m]y parents are very staunch Catholics and that was my upbringing’, Catholicism, and the worldview it entails, is part of the ‘gift’ of family inheritance that demands endless return. The religion of the parents is given as the ‘upbringing’ of the child. To be raised Catholic is to simultaneously reproduce the family, and the religion, and to be expected to continue both these lines as a condition of familial love. The consequence of the reproduction of this line is that lesbianism is an object out of sight.

Lana maintains a relationship with Catholicism, albeit shifting. She says:

[s]ometimes I feel a really strong connection with my religion. And I will make an attempt to go to church every Sunday, and then I’d like, go off for a couple of months or something. And then I’d go back and then go off, it’s like that.

We can think about these actions in relation to space; Lana lines up with the direction of the church that is simultaneously the straight line. This direction requires her to inhabit the uninhabitable space of the church. Within the church, she might be exposed to ongoing ‘stopping’, because to take up this ‘straight line’ the church requires her to either be heterosexual or to be positioned as the ‘Other’. In this context, Lana’s movement towards and away from the church – ‘I’d go off for a couple of months or something’ – is very significant. Her ability to turn towards and away from this line is what makes her life liveable as a queer subject. Ahmed’s (2006) analysis describes queer moments as momentary and temporal. She argues:

[i]t is important that we do not idealise queer worlds or simply locate them in an alternative space. After all, if the spaces we occupy are fleeting, if they follow us
when we come and go, then this is as much a sign of how heterosexuality shapes the contours of inhabitable or liveable space as it is about the promise of queer. *It is given that the straight world is already in place and that queer moments, where things come out of line, are fleeting* (106, my emphasis).

Lana’s ability to go ‘off-line’ from the heterogendered line of the church is indeed transitory and shaped by powerful alignments of heterosexuality, family and church. However, Ahmed’s (2006) account of ‘queer moments’ gives insufficient focus to the sustained ways in which subjects live lives that appear queer, while simultaneously maintaining a relationship with straight lines. As Ahmed points out, even when ‘queer moments’ are subjected to straightening devices which realigns them with powerful straight lines, bodies can create oblique angles. Bodies at oblique angles are required to swivel, or rotate. Here, Lana turns towards and away from the church. To recognise her ability to turn away is to recognise that the church is no longer her orientation device. To turn towards or face something else means that she has accumulated different objects ‘behind’ her that allow her to face that direction. After all, cultural histories of queer displacement could connect to her personal histories of cultural displacement. As ‘mixed’ Indo-Fijian/Samoan she is already at risk of being Othered or stopped. Arguably, the axis that enables Lana to swivel both towards the church and thus intersect with or ‘take up’ the line of the family, and away to a different (unimagined) horizon of queer is the embodied multiplicity of her subjectivity: she is always simultaneously a queer activist, a daughter, and a Suva local to name but a few. Lana’s ability to swivel towards and away from the church/straight line increases the motility of her body, and provides a different line of sight than she would have from the church/straight line alone. The swivelling of Lana’s body back towards the straight line (e.g. ‘I will make an attempt to go the church every Sunday’) is to take up an alignment with the church, which allows her to inherit particular
things: to be a daughter, to be an insider within Fiji, and to operate socially and culturally with (albeit limited) ease while still maintaining the ability to look away from the church.

An example of this alternate line of sight is Lana’s insight into the difference between church and congregation beliefs. Lana says:

> [t]he blanket statement is the church is against homosexuality in this country. That is the blanket statement. There are people, clergy and laypeople within the church that don’t quite believe that, or are a bit more open to it, but that’s the blanket statement and the church sticks to it.… So we… get a lot of backlash from the church.

Here the blanket statement of the church acts as a straightening device that keeps the church ‘in line’ despite divergent bodies within the space of the church. The more accepting perspectives of these bodies become relegated to what is out of sight through the work of the ‘blanket statement’. Yet Lana’s ability to turn towards what is out of sight, or draw closer to these shadow objects, offers her a means of survival within this space. Despite the requirement to share the direction of the church line, she is able to reach towards objects that are peripheral. A crucial aspect of Lana’s story seemed to be the affirming experience she has had from particular church leaders/elders. She says:

> I’ve had really interesting discussions with, um, some priests, in our parish about my sexuality… well one of them he’s pretty much a human rights activist himself… he actually told me, ‘[y]ou have to leave the guilt, you can’t feel guilty about it your whole life’ type thing, so he’s quite positive to talk to.

The priest plays an authorising role in Lana’s story such that she is able to stay ‘in’ the church while simultaneously being a queer subject. There is an uneasy yet vital distance between the priest and the church that is both reified and collapsed by this exchange. The priest’s words offer Lana increased motility within the space of the church such that she is able to be queer and not be propelled into guilt. They extend her reach, and draw her near to the priest in the sense that she feels close to him. Exemption from shame makes her relationship with the religion she was brought up with workable as a queer woman.
However, although the priest is affirming, his statement also raises the spectre of shame. To say ‘[y]ou have to leave the guilt’ tells us that there is guilt to leave. It is ambiguous whether ‘the guilt’ is a personal sense of guilt that the priest has knowledge of, or whether – and I lean towards this interpretation – ‘the guilt’ is guilt instilled within queer Others by the church. The priest’s need to name ‘the guilt’ (that he signals doesn’t need to be felt) reveals the tangible ever-presence of ‘guilt’ as a condition of queer subjectivity in relation to the church.

Lana is constructed as a shamed subject. Ahmed (2004) has argued that guilt and shame are different: ‘guilt’ is about a perceived wrong whereas ‘shame’ involves a shift where the perceived wrong act shapes the subjectivity of the perpetrator, i.e. from ‘I have acted badly’ to ‘I am bad’. Nevertheless, there is pervasive slippage within Christian doctrine and dogma between the concept that homosexual acts are ‘sinful’, and that homosexuals are ‘sinners’. The pervasiveness of the interpellation of the queer subject as a shamed subject is such that the shame is a habitual characteristic of queer bodies; the priest assumes that Lana feels guilty because she is lesbian. Thus, the priest’s statement acts as an interpellation to a shamed subjectivity. Shaming acts as a form of stopping. The priest’s interpellation is a moment of ‘stopping’ where Lana is halted from taking up the shared direction of the church and named as the queer Other.

The authority the priest has to release her from shame is a consequence of the structure that manufactures the shame in the first place via the reproduction of the ‘straight line’. The ritualised movement of the priest to exempt subjects from shame through the work of redemption is the habitual work of both his body and the body of the church to reach towards the unsaved/shamed Other. This in turn reinscribes the privileging of the church line. In discussing the churches that are most anti-gay, Lana concludes:

> I can get very anti, I’m more anti-religion rather than anti-chur [corrects herself] God, type thing, I get anti-structure of the religion, I don’t believe in
the man-made laws they say God told them.

This delineation between the structure of the church and God enables Lana to maintain both her spiritual beliefs and sexuality; it acts as a means of refusing the direction of the church while simultaneously remaining within the church body. She is able to partially inherit the church line, and therefore the family line, by taking up certain objects and not others. This could be read as a tactical and strategic means of ‘queer survival’, making her everyday life inhabitable even within structures that limit her motility. Yet nevertheless, she is still at risk of being ‘stopped’ by clergy and congregations that recognise her as lesbian.

Michael was a Rotuman man who had been raised in Fiji. Like Lana, he was Catholic, but he had a very different relationship with religion. Part of our conversation follows:

Michael: the bible says, when you read the bible it mentions two worlds; one is the world, one is heaven. The heavenly world and the worldly world that Satan has cast up. They say that the world, well whatever we do in the world remains in the world. All the government of the day and the laws they pass on and rules, they will all be part of the world, it doesn’t belong to God. Then you choose whether you go to this [heavenly] world or you remain in this world [indicating on a diagram he has sketched]. If you remain in this world, you got to accept you for what you are.

…To attend this [heavenly] one you got to make a decision. …According to what I see you have to remain pure and try to stay pure in order to be accepted by God in this world. So you know about the Uniting Church? They had a vote and the majority of the vote allowed ministers, gay priests and gay and lesbian ministers. Now I can’t for it. Like if I want to have gay sex I stay here [indicating the worldly world] if I want to, I don’t think. If you want to practice gay sex you practice it here. You want to hold a church position, experience it from this. You can be gay - a straight gay - being gay but don’t have sex with a, a relationship with another gay, and you can become a minister. I’m okay with that. But if you gonna continue preaching in front of the church, but you’re having a sexual relationship with another one, that’s gay, I don’t think, I can’t.

Tulia (gently): that must be quite hard for you, to hold those beliefs

Michael: well I’ve always said I wanted to get married and one of the reasons is to have children and the other reason was that was the only way I could break away from the, my gay life. Because once I started having children I know I can concentrate, then I’ll have a wife and children and… I can live in a Godly world, I can put the world behind me [long pause]. You know why? Lucifer when they had that spiritual war, the fallen angel, God cast him here, he is the king of this world.
God reigns… Lucifer reigns in this one, so he… has the whole world to counter everything that God had created.

Even though Michael has religious convictions that do not condone homosexuality, he constructs a life story that makes space for him to have gay relationships in the present, without foreclosing his later ‘spiritual salvation’. In Michael’s story, Michael is ‘reaching’ towards salvation as a ‘shared direction’, ‘the Godly world’. Nevertheless, he sees himself currently ‘in’ the ‘worldly world’, where his body is ‘off-line’. His sexual behaviour positions him within the ‘worldly world’, and ‘stops’ him from being able to attain the ‘Godly world’.

The story contains seeds of an archetypal redemption journey. Michael’s story is that eventually he will cast aside the earthly world, get married and have children, and be part of God’s world. In the meantime, he experiences the motility of being able to reach queer bodies (bodies usually deemed out-of-sight) based on the ‘shared direction’ towards redemption, he will someday give them up. That is, the ‘shared direction’ generates a future self as a fantasy of subjectivity that Michael imagines he will fulfil. It is the ‘shared direction’ of the church and the fantasy of future subjectivity that it entails that allows Michael to continue having queer sex. That is, Michael swivels between the ‘shared direction’ of the church, and the proximity of queer bodies that move him ‘off-line’.

Michael’s dense biblical vocabulary and knowledge offers him motility and ease in a space where he might experience ‘stopping’. Michael takes up church language as ‘objects within reach’ as a means of not being made ‘Other’ to the ‘shared direction’ of the church. Michael (at least partially) takes up the ‘shamed self’ offered by the church, but simultaneously signals the proximity between the ‘shared direction’ of the church and shadow objects that are out-of-sight. This positions him within the body of the congregation, who we might imagine as similarly ‘reaching’ towards salvation and experiencing shaming when their bodies go ‘off-line’. That is, Michael’s engagement with religious terms and his claim to inherit the ‘Godly world’
allows him to lay claim to the privileging that goes with sharing the body of the church. He is able to partially resist the ‘Othering’ he might experience as an ‘outsider’ to the congregation.

There are still bodily limitations to the ‘swivelling’ body that twists between the ‘shared direction’ of the church and ‘background’ objects, in part defined by the powerful structural alignment of the church in Fiji. When I asked Michael about his future, he explained:

…but it’s like, very bleak. Like I said I have to be financially secure eh, mm like, I like to have my own job, and earn my own living, until then the future looks very bleak. Like I don’t have a future, see like that. I can’t think about the future because I’m unemployed.

Tulia: you don’t think things would change?

Michael: I think if the Holy Spirit came down on me right now things would probably change! [laughter].

Michael’s laughter showed a gentle cynicism – not about spirituality writ large, but about miracles in his life. To an extent the ‘shared direction’ of the church requires Michael to look at himself as the ‘Other’ – as a body not entitled – so that he experiences his own body as ‘stopped’ from reaching towards the miraculous. The interpellation of shamed subjectivity that Michael takes up through the church line colludes with the socio-economic structuring of poverty that likewise constrains his motility. The ‘stopping’ that Michael experiences as an unemployed man in Fiji – in part through the ‘fetishism’ (Ahmed 2006, 41) of poverty which unties it from its ‘background’ of global economic structuring – makes ‘shamed subjectivity’ difficult to resist.

Timoci is Indigenous Fijian and his family attended a Seventh Day Adventist church, which his parents still go to. The story he told about his church shows us both the costs (via ‘stopping’) and possibilities (via going ‘off-line’) opened up by challenging the ‘shared direction of the church.
We used to have this like, when we were form six, there’s this big examination, Fiji’s school leaving paper. And ah, we were in church and then people started to question my parents why I’m acting that way. Why am I being openly gay, and mixing around with their kids. And they think that I’m an old man to the society or something. And so I wasn’t invited to prayer meetings. This is tough. This really happened. I wasn’t invited to prayer meetings. We had to have prayer meetings before the exam. And there were like thirty of us in that church from different schools – they were gonna sit for the exam next week. This week they had the prayer meeting the whole week. At the meeting they have food, they have drink and whatever – and I wasn’t invited. But I’m a member of the church. My parents belonged to the church. My mother – my mother cried because she knew that I was left out. And then, I sat for the paper. I studied hard. And out of the thirty people that sat for the paper, I was the only one that passed! I was the only one that passed!

That was the only thing that picked them up. And before the results came out they told every single parent to come to church before the results come out, we’ll celebrate the pass rate. And they didn’t invite my parents. So when the results came out none of them passed, I was the only one that passed. So then, like when I walked in the gates on that day like I won a battle in the medieval times. Like a greedy pig battle. I just walked in I shook hands with everybody but I didn’t hate them. They said, ‘how did you do it?’ and I said, ‘maybe the Lord works in mysterious ways’.

Timoci’s account reveals how the queer body is looked at differently; he could not ‘extend’ into the body of the congregation. He experiences ‘stopping’ as an interpellation that renders him ‘Other’. His motility within the social space is first slowed or inhibited by the congregation who do not want him ‘mixing’ with their children, and then he is actively excluded. There is a relationship here between the shared direction of the church as inherently heterosexual and Timoci’s actions which bring shadow objects – sexuality as relegated to the background – into the congregation’s line of sight. As Timoci says, ‘people started to question my parents why I’m acting this way, why am I being openly gay’.

The retribution of the congregation is aimed at Timoci’s willingness to bring the unspoken/peripheral into the public realm. Thus, Timoci’s actions which bring queer sexuality into the line of sight brings the congregation – the body of the church – off-line, such
that the congregation itself experiences a moment of disorientation: ‘…the proximity of …bodies out of place can work to make things seem “out of line,” and can hence even work to “queer” space’ (Ahmed 2006, 161). The perceived threat of Timoci ‘mixing around with their kids’ brings us back to the proximity of bodies, which conjures the fear of other bodies going ‘off line’. This fear of proximity is a fear of contagion. Timoci’s exclusion from prayer meetings acts as an expulsion from the body of the church – it is a straightening device which allows the congregation to return to the ‘straight line’ of the church and enacts the designation of the ‘saved’ from the ‘unsaved’.

The ‘stopping’ that Timoci experienced is also enacted against his parents: ‘[a]nd they didn’t invite my parents’. Firstly, this signals the way that disgust is ‘sticky’ where objects or bodies are polluted by their closeness to the abject (Ahmed, 2004). Secondly, the ‘stopping’ of Timoci’s parents reveals the extent to which the church line is a ‘straight line’ for reproducing heterogender. As Ahmed argues, the ‘straight line’ is reproduced through ‘inheritance’, where the imagined ‘return’ of the gift of life is via the reproduction of the lives of the parent as compulsory heterosexuality. What is interesting here in the perpetuation of the ‘church line’ as a ‘straight line’ that requires the ‘stopping’ of Timoci’s body within the space of church, the reproduction of the family line is threatened, not via the lack of biological reproduction or even heterosexual pairing, but via the ‘stopping’ of the son which ruptures the gift of the parents. That is, when Timoci’s parents aren’t invited to the church celebration, it is as if they did not have a son.

The extent to which the congregation were able to ‘recognise’ and interpelate Timoci as queer/off-line reveals the extent to which his body is already ‘swivelling’, in the sense that his body has already turned towards objects that the church line requires to be out of sight, whether this is via ‘proximity’ to other bodies or ‘proximity’ to objects (as either things or
behaviours) marked as feminine. I am interested in the work done by the action of ‘stopping’ where Timoci is rendered ‘off-line’ via the interpellation of being queer/Other. Timoci does not accept the interpellation to the extent that he does not accept their shaming of him, he says, ‘I studied hard’. Timoci’s line of sight is thus not aligned with the shared direction of the church. He has a different ‘behind’, in part perhaps the trajectory of the global gay movement and the globalisation of Western pedagogy. But also, we could think about Timoci’s act of ‘swivelling’ between the direction of the church, and his own line of sight, as a habitual act that strengthens his body. The repeated requirement to turn this way and that is an act that builds his capacity to stretch. It is as if, when he is off-line he is able to look back at the church line from a different perspective that counters the privileging of the church and his designation as an ‘unsaved’ Other.

What is insidious about the ‘shared direction’ of the church line is that it aligns Christianity with entitlement that extends beyond the realm of the church, including the entitlement to achieve in education. Timoci’s statement that he ‘walked in the gates on that day like I had won a battle’ recognises that the church did not expect him to pass. Timoci’s exclusion from the prayer meetings was an act of stopping that relegated passing the exam as an object out of his reach. The decision of the church to have a celebration to celebrate the pass rate (and not invite Timoci’s parents) reinforces the idea that those that are in-line with the church via heterogender are entitled to inherit a life worth living. Paradoxically, the effect of this shared direction for the young people of the congregation is actually limiting. Their bodies congregate towards prayer and not towards study as a consequence of the privileging of the church line.

Timoci returned to the congregation when he has passed the exam. He reported, ‘I just walked in - I shook hands with everybody’. This shows the social motility within the church
he gains through passing the exam, which marks him as entitled to the shared direction of the church. Timoci’s statement that ‘[m]aybe God works in mysterious ways’ troubles the delineation of the ‘saved’/entitled from the ‘unsaved’/queer Other that is central to the line of the church. It lays claim to the sense of entitlement that the ‘shared direction’ of the church imbues, and equally confounds the way that he has been rejected and expelled by the church body by offering a different interpretation to both the gospel and the series of events. That is, Timoci’s statement works to disorient the congregation. The way that Timoci takes up the language of the church via an oft-spoken saying is a subtle act of resistance that keeps him at least partially in-line with his community. The subtle cheekiness of Timoci’s comment also takes up the style of Indigenous Fijian humour, where if challenged he can claim to be joking or teasing (Toren 2005).

Interestingly though, unlike other participants in my study, Timoci did not stay Christian. He said, ‘[r]eligion, that is the only weapon that the government can use against us, because this is a religious country’. I think of this statement in relation to the ‘behind’ and bodily capacity that Timoci accrues via the ‘swivelling’ body. That is, a body which is able to extend a different line of sight. In the same way that Timoci’s claim, ‘[m]aybe the Lord works in mysterious ways’, reflects his ability to refuse the interpellation to be a shamed subject, Timoci’s ability to consider religion as a political tool speaks of the accrued experience of being required to look at religion from outside the ‘shared direction’ of the church.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that the significance of Christianity in Fiji is connected to its alignment with key institutions such that it constitutes an Indigenous Fijian ‘shared direction’. This shared direction delineates the ‘saved’ from the ‘unsaved’, reaches towards ‘Other’
bodies, those marked as Indo-Fijian or queer. Within this context, queer Fijians (whether they are Indigenous Fijian, Indo-Fijian or another ethnic group even though these differences will have different effects) are ‘required’ to maintain a relationship with this line through interpellations that simultaneously ‘stop’ them and name them as ‘Other’ (Ahmed 2006).

This chapter has discussed the relationship between queer Fijians and the ‘church line’ as an exploration of how those subjected to ‘continual stopping’ manage attachment to powerful lines. We saw in this chapter that both Lana (an Indo-Fijian, Chinese and Samoan woman) and Timoci (an Indigenous Fijian man) were required to take up the ‘shared direction’ of the church at least partially, and this was related to the alignment of the church line with the reproduction of the family. That is, taking up the ‘shared direction of the church’ constituted Lana’s subjectivity as a daughter, thus reproducing both religion and heterogender. Taking up the church line then, is a condition of belonging, and of being recognisable as subject (see Butler 1997). When Timoci was expelled from the congregation, his parents were ‘stopped’ from being able to attend church celebrations that would have signalled their role as parents.

For Michael, being part of the ‘shared direction’ of the church was also a powerful means of not being made Other to it. As Ahmed (2006, 61) wrote, ‘bodies can take up spaces that do not extend their shape, which can in turn work to “reorientate” bodies and space’.

In this chapter I departed from Ahmed (2006) by arguing that queer bodies are required to maintain sustained relationships with what is both ‘on-line’ and ‘off-line’. Ahmed does not give an analysis of the work of queer bodies. Her book, *Queer Phenomenology*, moves from a discussion of ‘straight lines’ to a discussion of queer politics, and hence is intentionally more aspirational than descriptive. She is ungenerous in her discussion of queer bodies that stay ‘in-line’ by using the example of queer conservatism:

> [i]t is possible to live on an oblique angle, and follow straight lines. After all, conservative homosexuals have called for lesbians and gays to support the straight
line by pledging allegiance to the very form of the family, even when they cannot inhabit that form without queer effect… We could think of this in terms of assimilation, as a politics of following the straight line even as a deviant body (172-173).

I have argued that queer bodies are required to share ‘straight lines’ that constitute their subjectivities in socially meaningful ways (as daughters, as sons, as indigenous, as Christian and so on). When queer bodies share ‘straight lines’ they risk being interpellated as ‘internal Others’ (Munt 2007). This chapter has suggested that queer bodies ‘swivel’ between straight lines and alternative ‘lines of sight’ which allow them to experience queer moments and view powerful ‘shared directions’ differently. For Ahmed (2006), queer moments are temporal and subject to ‘straightening devices’ that return them to the ‘straight line’. While I agree, I do not think this gives sufficient attention to the sustained ways in which queer bodies are required to ‘swivel’ between ‘straight lines’ and what I am calling queer ‘lines of sight’.

Queer bodies are required to swivel as a condition of ‘queer survival’. In this context, I argue that agency is two-fold. Firstly, agency needs to be considered as both moments of resistance or ‘turning away’ from heterogendered lines. Secondly, agency needs to be considered as actions which allow you motility within powerful social sites and which may even be experienced as ‘turning towards’ straight lines. These may be actions you take to prevent yourself from being ‘stopped’. In this formulation, ‘queer survival’ is both what allows you to survive as queer and what allows you to survive. When Timoci was excluded from the prayer groups, he refused the interpellation of shamed subjectivity and thus ‘turned away’ from the church line. This is a straightforward example of resistance. However for Michael, staying in-line with the shared direction of the church, even though he was at continual risk of being ‘stopped’, was also a means of experiencing social motility and resisting ‘Othering’. What I have tried to emphasise is the role of ‘swivelling’ as an action that allows us to turn towards and away from ‘straight lines’ as a means of managing the continual ‘stopping’ or the risk of
being ‘stopped’. Swivelling remains an effect of ‘how heterosexuality shapes the contours of
inhabitable or liveable space’ (Ahmed 2006, 106). ‘Swivelling’ becomes an attribute of queer
bodies through the work we are required to do. Ahmed argued in relation to gender that:

[w]e acquire our tendencies as an effect of the direction of energy to this or that
side. The more we work certain parts of the body, such as this or that muscle, the
more work they can do… So if gender shapes what we ‘do do’, then it shapes what
we can do (60).

In this way, ‘swivelling’ becomes an attribute of bodies that cannot stay in-line. Drawing on
Fanon, Ahmed argued that bodies subjected to ongoing ‘stopping’ are disoriented and made
into objects. She says, ‘[f]rom Fanon we learn about the experience of disorientation, as the
experience of being an object among other objects’ (160). While this is true, survival as the
Other requires us to turn towards and away from this objectification. As the habitual (see
Ahmed 2006, 130-131) work that queer bodies do, I argue that swivelling generates the
attributes of being able to swivel. When Lana is able to go to church for a while, and then
leave again, these actions are made possible by the accumulation of moments of swivelling -
turning towards and away from the ‘shared direction’ of the church. Ahmed argues:

[w]e could even argue that compulsory heterosexuality is a form of RSI.
Compulsory heterosexuality shapes what bodies can do. Bodies take the shape of
norms that are repeated over time and with force. Through repeating some gestures
and not others, or through being orientated in some directions and not others,
bodies become contorted: they get twisted into shapes that enable some action only
insofar as they restrict the capacity for other kinds of action (91, emphasis original).

The notion of heterosexuality as RSI relies on the notion that our bodies are restricted by the
shared directions they face, and that the repeated work our bodies do shape their forms. But
for queer bodies, the body is subjected to ‘stopping’. The body both takes the form of the straight line and turns away from it. If the queer body is required to swivel to exist within heterogendered spaces, we could also say that this continual swivelling generates flexibility and strength; the contortion of the body towards and away from the straight line generates both the shape of the queer body and the types of future actions it can take. In this way, queerness is like yoga. The requirement of holding a posture generates the ability to hold that posture again. Timoci’s experience of rejecting ‘shamed subjectivity’ that required a queer line of sight as a turn away from the ‘straight line’. We could say that this generated the ability to look at religion in Fiji in a politicised way. ‘Swivelling’, of course, is not a ‘natural’ attribute of queer bodies, but is an effect of the conditions of surviving in heterosexual space.
Chapter Eight: ‘Shame on You’:

Violence, Powerful Masculinity and Mechanisms of Disgust in Fiji

This chapter examines the relationship between violence, disgust and shame through exploring acts of violence perpetuated against queer people in Suva. In this chapter I focus specifically on acts of violence perpetrated against those with biologically male bodies, who might identify either as ‘gay’, ‘transgender’ or ‘transgender gay’. In particular, I explore acts of violence that may have been a response to displays of femininity on male bodies. These violent acts are connected to the operation of heterogender in Fiji and the privileging of Indigenous Fijian masculinities.

These violent acts can be understood as disgust mechanisms that enforce heterogender, either by coercing the queer body back to the straight line, or through inscribing shaming designations of ‘self’ and ‘Other’. What I am calling ‘disgust mechanisms’ draws on Ahmed’s (2006) account of ‘straightening mechanisms’ and her (2004) conceptual work on disgust and shame. These disgust mechanisms act as ‘straightening mechanisms’ to reinscribe structural ‘straightness’ via the operation of heterogender. I argue that these disgust mechanisms work as acts of shaming because they are a performative means of subject-making (Butler 1997; Ahmed 2006), repositioning a hierarchical relationship between the disgusted subject and the shamed object.

Accounts of the shaming of queer bodies in Suva can be interpreted as instances of ‘stopping’, where shame ‘stops’ the body from moving along heterogendered lines and/or attaining the same motility of other bodies, particularly privileged Indigenous Fijian masculinities. George
(2008) has argued that the socio-political context of ethnic nationalism and militarism in Fiji has contributed to a powerful hegemonic notion of masculinity, which is reflected in claims by political elites that ‘describe[s] tolerance of homosexual behaviour as threatening the stability of key institutions in Fiji’s society’ (163).

In this chapter I explore the way that these powerful ethnic nationalist and masculinist discourses are enacted on and through bodies via ‘disgust mechanisms’. These disgust mechanisms are enacted in different social sites, including the family and the church. In this chapter I focus specifically on acts of violence as a particularly forceful disgust mechanism, which are aligned with taukeism, masculinity and the nation. George (2008, 173) has asserted that:

[i]nfluential political and religious figures have not hesitated to describe the threats posed to Fijian institutions should homosexuality be condoned. Indeed, in its most vitriolic form, their homophobic rhetoric has described physical threats such as tsunamis or spiritual punishments as curses that will be visited on Fiji if homosexuality is tolerated.

This chapter shows how homophobic discourses are enacted on bodies through acts of violence, and explores what the enactment of disgust through violence tells us about power. As Tomsen and Mason (2001, 259) assert, homophobic violence ‘is a hostile response to a gender disorder through which the perpetrator seeks to enact and reinforce gender boundaries and hierarchies…’. So we can ask what socio-political factors contribute to a situation where young queer people can be routinely subjected to acts of violation? What is behind acts that seek to dehumanise queer Fijians? Maintaining a focus on the role of disgust in acts which violently reinscribe binary gender reveals the gendered nature of shame. Shaming is aligned
with acts that are feminising (see Bartky 1990), and male bodies are shamed via their proximity to feminine objects.

Investigating violence against queer bodies in the Fijian context draws attention to the way in which disgust mechanisms are connected to the disavowal and projection of shame onto the body of the ‘Other’ (see Munt 2008). I argue that within the Indigenous Fijian context, the shaming of queer Fijians occurs through the disavowal and projection of shame inherently connected to the Indigenous Fijian nation. In the previous chapter, I have argued that the church is powerfully aligned with family and nation, such that there is a ‘shared direction’ within Fiji. To be Indigenous Fijian is to share this orientation ‘around’ the body of Christ and ‘towards’ the unsaved. I have argued that there is an inherent anxiety in this ‘shared direction’ about the designation of Indigenous Fijian bodies as both ‘saved’ and ‘heathen’, because the ‘shared direction’ of the nation harbours the spectre of the colonial past where Indigenous Fijians were designated as ‘unsaved’. This alignment is susceptible to ‘rupture’. In this chapter I argue that this anxiety can also be conceptualised as disavowed shame (see Munt 2008).

Violence acts powerfully as a disgust mechanism in part because it produces shame. Ahmed’s (2006) phenomenological analysis is particularly useful here because we can consider how violence acts as a disgust mechanism which ‘extends the reach’ of particular bodies such that they extend into the bodies of others. I address the violent acts of heterogendered boys on queer bodies as instances when they are able to enact Indigenous Fijian masculinity amongst peers. Drawing on Moore’s (1994) account of the role of ‘thwarted’ fantasies of (masculine) subjectivity in enabling violent rage, I argue that this ‘rage’ includes the disavowal of shame (see Munt 2008). Moore’s (1994) account of the role of fantasy in subjectivity is highly relevant here: it is a fantasy of entitlement which allows these perpetrators to ‘extend their
reach’ into queer bodies, as bodies that are able to be shamed and to which shame ‘sticks’. In this chapter, I envisage this ‘investment’ in a particular fantasy of subjecthood as enabling a particular ‘line of sight’ – that is, imagining the motility that is entitled to particular bodies/subjects. Violence against queer bodies, then, is as much about enacting hetero-masculinist subjectivities by young Indigenous Fijian men, as it is about enacting disgust on queer bodies.

This chapter then is positioned as an exploration of the conditions that compel some subjects to be shamed and not others. What enables particular bodies to induce shame in others? I look at how disgust mechanisms in Fiji work to induce shame in queer Fijians as sexual Others, and focus specifically on violent acts as one form that disgust mechanisms take. Participants gave poignant examples of instances where expression of sexuality met with prohibition in the form of physical and sexual violence. As Moore (1994, 149) asserts ‘sexuality is intimately connected with power in such a way that power and force are themselves sexualised, that is they are inscribed with gender difference and gender hierarchy’.

Violent acts against queer Fijians relate to alignment of social and political institutions, including nation and identity, the militarisation of masculinity, and heterogender such that they constitute a ‘shared direction’ that is directed towards the exclusion of Indo-Fijians from the nation, and the opposition of Indo-Fijian and Indigenous Fijian bodies (see George 2008; Trnka 2008; White 2005). These acts relate to the maintenance and production of power relations, including the normalisation of violence. As Perry (2001, 55) argues, ‘hate-motivated violence is used to sustain the privilege of the dominant group, and to police the boundaries between groups by reminding the Other of his/her “place”’. These violent acts are aimed at instances of ‘border crossing’ where biologically male bodies display femininity. I argue that the disgust mechanisms enacted through violence are powerful and difficult to resist because of the alignment of heterogender with the church, family and nation.
Shamed Bodies: Understanding Queer Bodies as Bodies Subjected to Shame

In this section, I explore the relationship between shame, and disgust mechanisms, and how particular versions of the self are produced through this process. In previous chapters, I addressed the ‘stopping’ of queer bodies within religion and family. As Ahmed (2006, 139-140) describes, ‘stopping’ is ‘an affective economy that leaves its impressions, affecting the bodies that are subject to its address… Being stopped is not only stressful, but also makes the “body” itself the “site” of “social stress”’. Thus, shame can be a form of ‘stopping’ and a consequence of being ‘stopped’. Shame becomes a condition of inhabiting space for someone who is not entitled to that space, and shame itself can be experienced as ‘stopping’ when it is experienced as the basis of suffering.

Following Ahmed’s (2004) critique of pain, we could say that suffering is an emotional experience which shapes the body in particular ways, and simultaneously augments particular relationships to the social world. The suffering body experiences its own corporeality in a different way: ‘[t]he intensity of feelings like pain recall us to our body surfaces: pain seizes me back to my body’ (26). This inward-facing self struggles unsuccessfully to expel the internal pain sensation: ‘[p]ain involves the violation or transgression of the border between inside and outside, and it is through this transgression that I feel the border in the first place’ (27). The experience of suffering is thus a condition that significantly shapes our subjectivity. We might ask what happens when suffering is an ongoing or pervasive component of self.

Priya was a transgender woman who lived in Suva but had grown up in her rural village. She talked about her experience of suffering as a young person, explaining softly:

[i]t was very hard for me, being like this. I suffered a lot because I presumed that they knew I’m gay.
Priya’s suffering constitutes her differently from a non-suffering subject, her lived experience of pain positions her differently in the world. Ahmed (2004) suggests the indescribable nature of pain, in both ourselves and others, produces isolation which we attempt to overcome by connecting to others. ‘It is the apparent loneliness of pain that requires it to be disclosed to a witness… the solitariness of pain is intimately tied up with its implication in relationship to others’ (29). But, in Priya’s story this (indescribable) pain is rendered doubly untellable because it is intrinsically connected to her transgression of heterogendered norms.

These experiences then, tell us about the relationship between lived experiences of pain and shame, and the ‘disgust’ of Others, which I will explore through Priya’s story. This suffering is connected to feelings of difference, but also instances of ‘stopping’ including experiences of violence. Priya continued:

All the boys started to – to get the hots for girls. And I didn’t seem to have that. I was attracted to a boy, so I was very lonely. I had no one to tell, and the boy was my best friend… My family knew what I was doing and I had a couple of hidings and so on.

Here, Priya is rendered different from other boys when as a biologically male adolescent she is not attracted to girls. This shows the integral relationship between notions of masculinity and lines of heterogender. The inability to discuss her romantic feelings for another boy with anyone leaves her isolated, and simultaneously having ‘no one to tell’ contributes to her loneliness. This loneliness is also linked to her lived experience of suffering. The way that her ‘family knew what [she] was doing’ while simultaneously she had ‘no one to tell’ suggests that her sexuality was marked out in other ways. Priya’s explanation of a ‘couple of hidings’ raises a significant alignment between the enactment of violent ‘gender policing’ for troubling the heterogender system (see Tomsen and Mason 2001) with discourses around corporeal punishment. On one level, the languaging of ‘a couple of hidings’ signifies that these violent punishments were discursively constructed as ordinary (See Stewart 2002 for a discussion of
‘ordinary’ violence). However, it also raises questions about the relationship between the shame that queer subjects like Priya might feel and the role that violence plays as acts of shaming.

My intention here is to bring Ahmed’s (2004) two separate analyses of disgust and shame more closely into conversation with each other and her work on queer phenomenology (2006). What we are considering is the way that disgust is a mechanism which creates shame within the bodies of Others, by enacting the relationship between ‘self’ and ‘Other’ in discursive, spatial and material ways. To do this, I want to return to Priya’s suffering, and think about it in relation to shame.

Ahmed’s (2004) analysis of shame has several useful components. First, offering insight into the positioning of the subject, she says that shame ‘involves the de-forming and re-forming of bodily and social spaces’ (101). She suggests that shame involves an excruciating process of ‘turning’ away both from others and from the self, because the subject feels bad and feels itself to be the cause of the badness: ‘the subject’s movement back to itself is simultaneously a turning away from itself. In shame, the subject may have nowhere to turn’ (104, emphasis in original). Thus, Priya’s statement, ‘I was very lonely, I had no one to tell’, could reflect the double movement of shame, both the turn away from others as she tries to shield herself from the view of those around her, and simultaneously the loneliness of her own turn against herself. The experience of shame is conveyed in her statement, ‘[i]t was very hard for me,

---

6 While these two analyses are complementary, Ahmed doesn’t actually discuss them in relation to each other, except to compare the experience of the subject. I think this is because her analysis of shame over invests in the idea that shame stems from an action, ‘the badness of an action is transferred to me’ (105, my emphasis), rather than a relationship as I argue. This makes sense given that her chapter deals with the shame of White Australia towards indigenous Australians, and thus relates to shame of particular acts. I imagine that shame as felt by indigenous Australians might take a different shape, something along the lines of what I am arguing here about relationships, thus part of what is at stake here is whether the shame is held by those privileged or marginalised via the ‘shared direction’ of the nation.
being like this’, where she is both the instigator and the recipient of suffering, which she identifies is caused by her way of ‘being’. The story implies she is both suffering, and the cause of this suffering that is bound up in her queer subjectivity – that is, as inhabiting a body that is ‘off-line’.

Ahmed (2004) follows Sartre in suggesting that shame involves both the subject’s relationship with itself, and its relationship with others. The subject’s sense of itself is amplified through the engulfing nature of shame; ‘[i]t is the way in which shame fills up the self – becomes what the self is about – that has been interpreted as the difference between shame and guilt at the level of lived and bodily experience’ (105). Shame inherently involves the idea of spectators that observe the shame or shaming act: ‘even if a subject feels shame when it is alone, it is the imagined view of the [O]ther which is taken on by the subject in relation to itself’ (105). This concept of shame comes through in Priya’s narrative when she says, ‘I suffered a lot because I presumed they knew I’m gay’. Here, rather than reading Priya’s ‘presumption’ as suggesting that the village, family or community either did or did not know, we could read it as her internal relationship with them, where psychically their relationship to her are as spectators to her feelings of shame. Furthermore, Ahmed asserts that this relationship to others is hinged on pre-existing desire or love, which means that the perspective of others is crucial to the subject and that it is the value attached to this perspective that enables shame to be induced.

Ahmed (2004) draws on a psychoanalytic framework to suggest that the internalisation of the perspective of others alongside the relationship with self is constituted as the ‘ideal self’. She explains:

…such an ideal would be defined as an ego ideal, as ‘the self’ that a self would like to be …[s]uch an ‘ideal’ is what sticks subjects together (coherence); through love,
which involves the desire to be ‘like’ an other, as well as to be recognized by the other, an ideal self is produced as an approximation of the other’s being (106).

Beyond the love or desire that binds the subject to others and manifests as the ‘ego ideal’, what conditions compel subjects to take up or refuse this shame? In other words, why are some subjects able to be shamed and not others? Why does the shamed subject invest in the ego ideal in the first place, such that she is able to be shamed by it?

Here Bartky’s (1990) gendered analysis of shame in relation to oppression is imperative. In her discussion of women’s shame within the classroom, she turns her attention to the nature of ongoing marginalisation:

[n]ow if the primordial structure of shame is such that one is ashamed of oneself before the Other, who is the Other before whom my female students were shamed? ...The identity of this Other, whoever it turns out to be, will be hugely over determined, for women in a sexist society are subjected to demeaning treatment by a variety of Others.

The significance of this claim is that for marginalised groups, the identity of the onlooker or ego-ideal that inspires shame is aligned with the ‘shared direction’ (Ahmed 2006) of the privileged. Shame is therefore related to social motility. In this instance, we could say that the cohesion of heterogender as ‘a straight line’ which is aligned with key Fijian institutions means that heterosexual Indigenous Fijians – who are able to ‘extend their reach’ with ease through the body of the social – are able to induce shame in those who cannot ‘inherit’ the nation in the same way. For queer people in Fiji, the ‘ego ideal’ that inspires shame is heterogendered and masculine, and aligned with the family and church.
Amelia’s story poignantly revealed the complex relationship between shame and acts of shaming:

Amelia: um, sometimes it’s really hard and impossible for one, like I told you… I don’t know, [to] be happy or ….and I think – most of the girls [that] are gay [think like this]. What did I do to deserve the hidings and the being pushed around you know?

Tulia: tell me about why you think – what you have done to deserve this? Tell me about why you think this way?

Amelia: …mm something. Something I cannot say.

Tulia: okay

Amelia: [laughs slightly, then there is a long pause] you don’t mind?

Amelia’s mention of the ‘hidings’ and ‘being pushed around’ makes a connection between these violent acts and the way it is almost ‘impossible’ for her to be happy. These violent acts work as disgust mechanisms to position her in such a way that invokes the shame that is revealed through the question, ‘what did I do?’ Thus having been shamed positions her as shameful; ‘deserving’ of shame or guilt. The faltering half sentence, ‘most of the girls [that] are gay’, indicates that Amelia sees this way of thinking ‘as usual’, as common amongst queer Fijians. The positioning of Amelia as a shameful subject through acts of shaming that have been perpetrated against her is what (at least in part) invests events in her life (which remain unmentioned, and tellingly unmentionable) with a causative role. Amelia locates herself as a ‘shameful’ subject through past events or actions. Her explanation obscures the causative actions of the perpetrators.

Ahmed’s (2004) analysis of shame suggests that ‘the badness of an action is transferred to me’ (105). Instead, I would argue that a reversal is possible, the shame that is felt is transferred to an action or actions. The shame Amelia feels as the shamed subject, is transferred to her past actions – ‘[w]hat did I do to deserve this?’ – so they also become shameful as a means of
accounting for her shame and her violation. When acts of shaming reposition or reform the subject in relation to shame, the process of feeling shamed does not mean that the subject necessarily makes sense of this shaming through the same understandings that are occupied by the disgusted. As Bartky (1990, 95) explains:

the ‘feelings’ and ‘sensings’ that go to make up the women’s shame… do not reach a state of clarity we can dignify as belief. For all that, they are profoundly disclosive of women’s ‘Being-in-the-world’.

Thus we can ask, how do acts of shaming within Fiji come to affect queer subjectivity and the relationship between the queer self and the social world. The transference of shame from the shamed to past events obscures the relationship between shame and oppression so that powerful perpetrators are not held accountable for their actions. The following sections deal with the relationship between disgust and shame. I suggest we might understand acts of shaming as mechanisms of disgust that are constitutive of both the subject and the object of disgust.

**Disgust Mechanisms: The Enactment of Shame on Queer Bodies**

Disgust acts as a *mechanism* that works to position the subject as a ‘shamed subject’. The love or desire for the onlooker/ego ideal that compels shame (Ahmed 2004, 104-105) can be connected to the privileging of particular bodies (see Bartky 1990). Shaming is enacted through performative mechanisms of disgust that *positions* the ‘Other’/queer body in relation to the ego ideal or onlooker.

I am using the term ‘disgust mechanism’ as a means of describing the enactment of shame on particular bodies in ways that reinscribe heterogender – either through coercing the ‘return’ of the queer body to the heterogender line, or though delineating queer bodies as shameful.
Others and thus restoring the sanctity of the masculine body/nation. Thus, disgust mechanisms are a means of maintaining particular ‘shared directions’. Phenomenologically, disgust acts as a movement of bodies that initially moves the bodies closer, then draws them away (Ahmed, 2004). For this analysis I am drawing from Ahmed’s (2006) account of ‘straightening mechanisms’, as mechanisms that realign ‘queer moments’ with the ‘straight line’. Of course, a disgust mechanism is a form of straightening device. But what I am interested in doing here is bringing the concept of ‘straightening devices’ more closely into conversation with Ahmed’s (2004) earlier analysis of the cultural politics of disgust, to explore the work that disgust does phenomenologically on queer bodies. Disgust mechanisms are performative and enact a distance between self and Other.

Ahmed (2004) describes three significant aspects of disgust that I want to consider in relation to the ‘shaming’ of non-heterogendered subjects, and to take up in my explanation of ‘disgust mechanisms’. Firstly, Ahmed asserts that the nearness of the object to the (disgusted) subject is central to disgust: ‘it is not the object, apart from the body, that has the quality of “being offensive”, but the proximity of the object to the body is felt as offensive’ (85). Ahmed explains that the subject moves close to the object only to then pull away. In fact, the movement closer is obscured by this second movement away from the object. Secondly, Ahmed relates this to a psychoanalytic conception of abjection, where what is abject threatens to displace the sanctity of the self by revealing the abject as always already within. Ahmed asserts, ‘[a]bjecction is bound up with the insecurity of the not; it seeks to secure “the not” through the response of being disgusted’ (2004, 86). Finally, Ahmed develops an analysis of the ‘stickiness’ of disgust, whereby objects are contaminated by their closeness to other objects such that they become ‘sticky’.
As one object is substituted for another, or moves into another, a border is temporarily affected, despite the fact that neither object is inherently disgusting. Such objects become sticky as an effect of this substitution (2004, 89).

What is most significant for thinking through the way in which disgust engenders shame in the (so-called) disgusting object, is Ahmed’s (2004) explanation of the performativity of disgust:

[to name something as disgusting – typically, in the speech act, ‘That’s disgusting!’ – is performative. It relies on previous norms and conventions of speech, and it generates the object that it names (the disgusting object/event) (93, my emphasis).]

The disgust of the disgusted subject is a mechanism of positioning herself in relation to the (disgusting) object. The double movement towards and away from the object of disgust changes the relationship between the two bodies so that they are distanced and positioned hierarchically. This movement works to induce a binary between ‘us’ and ‘them’, which supports the shared direction of the ‘us’. That is, it not only generates the ‘Other’ as a shamed object but also generates the ‘us’ as a subject that is not-shamed. This shifting of positionality is the mechanism which induces shame in the so-called disgusting object, and which makes it a shamed subject. It is as if the movement of the disgusted is not just away but above, so the shamed subject now has to ‘look up’ to meet their gaze. This mechanism can be seen as an interpellation or claim by the disgusted subject to occupy the space of the ego ideal. There are

Ahmed’s (2004) discussion of hate similarly asserts that hate involves the reordering of space and bodies, which involves the construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ as a threat, so that it has material impact on the bodies that are hated. I was interested in the work done by the difference between disgust and hate here. Whereas, Ahmed rightly claims that hate causes pain and/ or rage, I would like to suggest that disgust in particular bears a relationship to shame. It’s possible though, to think of disgust as a particular type of hate. So what then, is this crucial difference between hate and disgust? I think that disgust involves a particular relationship with the moral imperative of the disgusted (even if, following Ahmed’s comments about performativity) this is constructed in the disgust exchange. It is this moral imperative which occupies the space of the ego ideal for the shamed subject, and aligns the disgusted with purity and the shamed with pollution, which comes through in Ahmed’s analysis of Fanon (1986), in her discussion of hate.
parallels here with Bartky’s (1990) claim about how the judgment of others, including societal norms, are taken up by the subject. ‘What I am, that is, what I am made to be …is not always up to me to determine. Here, how I am and how I appear to the other converge’ (86).

As Ahmed (2004, 89) says:

disgust at ‘that which is below’ functions to maintain the power relations between above and below, through which ‘aboveness’ and ‘belowness’ become properties of particular bodies, objects, spaces (emphasis in original).

The advantage of thinking through the movement achieved through disgust as a ‘disgust mechanism’ is that it aligns disgust with the work of ‘straightening mechanisms’ drawing attention to the role that disgust plays in restoring heterogender and re-enacting the privilege of heterogendered bodies. There are some crucial differences between the dynamics of ‘disgust mechanisms’ as I envisage them and the ‘straightening mechanisms’ that Ahmed (2006) describes. Most prominently, ‘straightening mechanisms’ involve a perceptual shift such that the horizon changes – the world is remade ‘in-line’ with the straight line. What I argue occurs with disgust mechanisms is that the shift involves the coerced movement of the queer body – as an object ‘out of place’ or ‘off-line’ – such that the straight line is restored. The significance of this difference is that the queer body itself does not need to be ‘straightened’ for heterogender to be maintained – it can be expelled as the Other.

In the following section I explore acts of violence as disgust mechanisms. What is apparent here is both the way that these mechanisms act to shore up lines of heterogender, and the way in which queer bodies can be powerfully othered as a condition of maintaining this line. Simultaneously, exploring these acts of violence as disgust mechanisms allows for an analysis of the projection of shame through the acts of the perpetrator onto queer bodies.
Violence as a Disgust Mechanism

In this section, I explore the way in which violent acts can act as a particularly forceful form of disgust mechanism, projecting shame and alterity onto the body of the queer ‘Other’ and restoring heterogender. I draw on examples of violent acts on male bodies that are marked as ‘gay’, feminine, or ‘transgender gay’ from fieldwork in Suva. I argue that for heterogendered Indigenous Fijian boys/ men, violence against queer bodies act as disgust mechanisms that reassert their ‘fantasies’ of entitlement (Moore 1994) via both gender and the nation, and enact a disavowal of national shame (Munt 2008).

Disgust mechanisms ‘extend the reach’ (Ahmed 2006) of the disgusted, even into the bodies of Others/ queers. Disgust mechanisms enacted violently involve two different ways of restoring heterogender. Firstly through the feminisation of queer male bodies as a means of distancing them from the body/family/nation, and secondly through the masculinisation of queer male bodies as a means of reincorporating them into the body/family/nation. Violence operates as a mechanism of disgust that is constitutive of shame for the queer body because it moves the queer body ‘off-line’ while forcefully asserting the ‘shared direction’ of the family or nation as the ego-ideal. As Perry (2001, 55) argues, ‘[t]he tensions between hegemonic and counterhegemonic actors may culminate in violent efforts to reassert the dominance of the former and realign the position of the latter’. Interestingly, violent acts which either masculinise or feminise the queer subject are both interpellations at bodies which do not line-up, and as Tomsen and Mason (2001, 264) argue, ‘each form of hostility is intended to degrade its target’. Ahmed explains, ‘the “unrecruitable” body must still be recruited into this place, in part through the very repetition of the action of “being stopped” as a mode of address’ (140). Thus, these shaming acts can be thought of as interpellations that ‘stop’ the queer body.
I want to initially explore an act of violence as a disgust mechanism within the family. In the following account of violence by a father against his transgender gay child, the act of violence acts as a disgust mechanism to restore the family as heterogendered.

Ana: The first time I put on the earrings and my daddy pulled them off
Tulia: out? straight out?!
Ana: yes
Tulia: so did it bleed?
Ana: mm it did. Really painful and it swelled.

The father’s violent act in ripping Ana’s earrings out of her ears is aimed at Ana’s enactment of femininity on a male body that is expected to perform masculinity as a condition of familial belonging. It is clearly a moment of punishment for not enacting heterogender, one that violently forces the queer body to return to the straight line – the offensive feminised objects are removed from the body of the child so that the child is ‘straightened’. But simultaneously, the violent act leaves a bodily ‘trace’ (Derrida 1976) of the harm rendered on the queer body. The bodily trace is both the physical scars on Ana’s ear lobes and the psychic trace of shame. Thus, the child is marked out as queer through an act of shaming that makes her gender transgression visible even as it seeks to erase it.

Prior to the violent act, the earrings in Ana’s ears momentarily ‘queer’ the straight line. The proximity of the earrings (feminine objects) to a male body makes the child’s body an object of disgust. The action of pulling out the earrings transfers the disgust at the feminised male body from the child’s body and back to the earrings as feminine objects. The child appears forcefully returned to the ‘straight line’.
However this is tricky; the child is wounded in the process. I would argue that the trace of shame signals that the violent act does not simply return the child to the ‘straight line’, but simultaneously acts as a disgust mechanism that positions the child as a shamed Other. The father experiences the ‘stickiness’ of disgust (Ahmed 2004) where the gender transgression of his child is experienced as contaminating; it threatens his masculine and ‘saved’ sense of self. Recall as per Chapter Six that the cohesion of the family is instilled through the requirement to be ‘alike’, particularly through the line of inheritance (Ahmed 2006). In this moment, the proximity of the child through the family line is experienced as Ahmed’s first stage of disgust (2004). The feminine body of the male child threatens to contaminate the body of the father. The violent act is a disgust mechanism that creates distance so that this ‘stickiness’ is contained. When the father violently removes the earrings from the body of the child it is a disgust mechanism that distances the child from the father. The expulsion of the earrings from the body of the child is an expulsion of the child from the body of the father.

While the ‘stickiness’ of disgust contaminates the family so that it is a ‘queer’ object, the violent act locates the child as ‘queer’ – the site of shame as well as the site of transgression – such that the family (and the body of the father) can return to the straight line. In this way, the violent action works to extend the reach of the father. He enacts his entitlement via the ability to harm his child’s body. His physical and symbolic ‘reach’ performatively marks out the body of the son as a body-in-reach (the first part of disgust) as if he owns the child’s body, and a body to be distanced from (the second part of disgust). The body of the child experiences ‘stopping’ while being forcefully coerced ‘back’ to being in-line, but psychically the child experiences herself as shamed and Other. The child’s line of sight – how she sees herself – is denied (at least momentarily) through the inability to enact femininity through wearing the earrings.
One of the complexities here is that the violent act works to ‘masculinise’ the body – that is, restore it to the family line through the enactment of appropriate masculinity – but the violent act itself simultaneously feminises the body by marking it out as a body that is violatable.

This process is intrinsically linked to shaming because the disgust mechanism enacted by the father not only restores the family – through the body of the father – to heterogender, but also repositions the father’s body as the ego-ideal in relation to which the child’s shameful body is found wanting. The force of the violence is that there are no other alternative directions, it is an interpellation to ‘line-up’ which says ‘to exist is to be like me’. That is, it summons the bind of inheritance that requires the child to ‘take up’ likeness in the form of heterogender as a condition of the family line. As an act of harm the violence act conjures the limits of mortality. Part of the threat of violence is that it signals more violence, and the potential for annihilation. As Ritchie and Ritchie (1993, 7) argue, ‘[n]ot all coercive acts are violent… but all violent acts are coercive’. Here, the violent act coerces the subject towards taking up a particular ego ideal, that is to face the same direction as the father by taking up heterogender.

I now want to turn to an analysis of violent acts by groups of young men that act as public disgust mechanisms, and the role they play in producing the subjectivity of the perpetrators as masculine and Indigenous Fijian. Nacanieli (and other participants) gave several accounts of group violence against gays and transgender gays that occurred in routine public settings in ways that were marked out as ‘ordinary’ or as-usual. In particular, these acts of violence – which were often sexualised – were perpetuated by groups of young Indigenous Fijian men at secondary school, at neighbourhood parties and on the street. Stories about school included accounts of male gay students being forced to perform oral sex acts on heterosexual boys in the school toilets. For the male participants in my study this practice was widely known about
and routine. These acts play a significant role in policing gender (see Tomsen and Mason 2001) and enabling masculine Indigenous Fijian subjectivities. Nacanieli explained:

[0]ne day one was in my class and he got raped inside the classroom in lunch hour. There were six boys. They locked him inside and they took turns on him.

In this account the rape acts as a disgust mechanism, which forcefully designates the gay boy as the shamed Other. What is particularly horrific about this act of violence is that the repeated rape by different boys both produces and lays claim to a privileged ‘shared direction’. The force of the event in designating subjectivities relates to the structural and symbolic effects of repetition (see Butler 1990; Derrida 1967) Each perpetrating boy gets a ‘turn’ to rape and permissively watches a rape five times. The effect of the repeated rape act by different boys acts as a means of condoning the designation of the gay body as a body without an equal claim to subjectivity. The effect of this repetition is that the perpetrating bodies ‘line up’ as an effect of this action; they produce a ‘straight line’ that is directed towards the body of the Other. The rape act is an ‘iteration’ that accrues power (Butler 1990; Derrida 1967); it is effectively institutionalised or structured into a straight line through its repeated performance. The disgust mechanism transforms the gay boy into a ‘shamed object’/Other that performatively reinscribes the authority of the perpetrators as masculine and Indigenous Fijian. This performative act relies on the proximity between the bodies of the perpetrating boys. The work of the repetition of the rape is that the act appears ‘easy’, normalised and made ordinary, i.e. it becomes an act carried out by ordinary boys. The gay boy is treated as an object, rather than a person. That the overall effect is an interpellation or performative utterance of the victim as powerless/an object, both through the rapes, the number of boys and the locking of the door. Phenomenologically, the body of the gay boy becomes an object within reach that extends the ‘reach’ of the perpetrators, and extends their ‘ease’ within the social.
Tomsen and Mason’s (2001) research discuss the role of homophobic violence as a homosocial act where young men use violence as a means of asserting their masculinity in relation to each other. They assert, ‘[g]ay-bashing serves a dual purpose of constructing a masculine and heterosexual identity through simultaneous involvement with violence and by establishing homosexuals as an opposed group of social outsiders’ (267). We can read the repeated rape as a disgust mechanism intended to shame the victim through feminising him, and where violently enacting disgust shores up the masculine subjectivities of the perpetrators by marking them as different and superior. The repetition of the rape act performatively produces privileged masculine subjectivities amongst the boys and also reinscribes rape as a habitual gendered act; as an orientated action that men ‘do’ (Ahmed 2006; Butler 1990). The relationship between power and powerlessness, and disgust and shame is instructive here. The perpetrating boys ‘take up’ powerful masculinity – as a straight line that is reproduced through the repeated rape – as their embodied capacity to shame Others.

Moore (1994, 151) asserts that violent acts can stem from the obstructions of particular ‘investments’ in subjectivity, which she describes as ‘thwarting’. The relationship between Indigenous Fijian masculinity as enacted by the boys can be explored in greater depth via this notion of ‘thwarting’. Moore argues that we are emotionally, socially and materially invested in particular subject positions. This investment in subjectivity is intrinsically linked to particular fantasies of self; as Moore describes, ‘fantasies of identity are linked to fantasies of power and agency in the world’ (151). I would argue that in a phenomenological sense, these ‘fantasies of power’ could be understood as particular imagined directions, or ‘lines of sight’. The notion of ‘line of sight’ is useful here, because it evokes a social direction which is not (yet) necessarily structurally sustained via repetition in Ahmed’s sense of the ‘line’. Drawing on Ahmed (2006), the ‘investment’ in particular subjectivities that Moore describes evokes
what ‘coheres’, or keeps us ‘in-line’. Thus, ‘fantasies of power’ are ways of imagining the 

motility of our bodies in relation to the ‘shared direction’ implicit in particular subject 

positions, and significantly a particular relationship to other bodies.

Investment in masculinity is linked to fantasies of social and material entitlement. In the 

Indigenous Fijian context, this investment in masculinity is inextricably linked to fantasies of 

entitlement via physical strength, religiosity, military might, proximity to other masculine 

bodies, and superiority over feminine bodies. Moore (1994) suggests that violence can be 

understood in relation to the ‘thwarting’ of particular investments in masculinity. Moore 

argues that:

\[
\text{thwarting can be understood as the inability to sustain or properly take up a} \\
\text{gendered subject position, resulting in a crisis, real or imagined, of self-} \\
\text{representation and/or social evaluation… thwarting can characterize the inability} \\
\text{to receive the expected satisfactions or rewards from the taking-up of a particular} \\
\text{gendered subject position or mode of subjectivity (151).}
\]

I want to continue with my analysis of the role of ‘thwarting’ for young Indigenous Fijian 

masculinities for a while longer. Phenomenologically, ‘thwarting’ acts as a form of ‘stopping’ 

that curtails the subject’s (fantasy of) motility within the social. The fantasy of Indigenous 

Fijian masculinity that is thwarted is a fantasy of entitlement within Fiji. Phenomenologically, 

it is the imagined ‘reach’ of the body, which is the ‘reward’ of enacting masculinity or 

investing in the straight line. That is, it is a fantasy of power in relation to other bodies and 

objects. What is at stake for the imagined ‘shared direction’ of Indigenous Fijian masculinity 

such that it would be threatened by the queer body? What does the queer body represent 

such that it needs to be ‘shamed’ to restore the reach of the boys via heterogender and 

masculinity? The fantasy of entitlement these young men have as a result of their physical
bodies – via the alignment of the Indigenous Fijian nation, religion and militarism – does not match their lack of social power in the global world, where Fiji is economically and politically marginal. As young men they have not yet ‘inherited’ the social privilege given to them via family or chiefly hierarchy. As Tomsen and Mason (2001) draw on Connell’s (1995) notion of ‘protest masculinity’ to describe the marginal masculinities of young men that carry out violent homophobic acts in an Australian context. They describe how the ‘manly claims’ of a young man convicted for murder ‘reflect the limited material and cultural resources available for the achievement of a masculine status among groups of young men’ (268). In Fiji, these acts are able to enable masculinity in part via the pervasiveness of militarism: socially, culturally and politically (see Teaiwa 2001). Teaiwa has described the extensiveness of militarism through everyday language. She emphasises the inherent masculinist and ethnic delineation of this pervasive militarism that has occurred through a complex colonial and political history. Exploring the relationship between homophobia and violent masculinity in Fiji, George (2008) discusses acts of violence that followed on from the 2000 coup. She explains:

[tright]levision and newspaper reports of these events were filled with images of an armed, indigenous militia… the overwhelming images of the more serious violence that occurred during this period suggested a model of hypermasculine behaviour that was uncompromising, and drew strength from its collective force (170).

Indigenous Fijian masculinity is aligned with the entitlement to enact violence on others, with few alternative ways of enacting powerful masculinity. In this context, where violence offers a powerful ‘shared direction’, a group of young men can enact their masculinity via violence which is extreme, punitive, and orchestrated as a group.
Thus, the ‘perceived’ thwarting that occurs via the proximity of the queer body is symbolic; the queer body stands in for the emasculated body. The proximity of femininity on a male body is ‘sticky’ or contagious, and it threatens to contaminate the heteromasculine ‘line of sight’ of the perpetrators. The queer Indigenous Fijian male body represents the body that cannot extend its reach; where power does not flow as the social attribute of indigeneity and maleness. The queer body ruptures the fantasy of social motility from the indigenous male body as the site of innate agency. It provokes anxiety for the ‘shared direction’ of the nation by embodying the abject; an indigenous male body that is not powerful. As such, the queer body represents a threat not just to the masculine body but to the nation. As Moore (1994, 154) explains, ‘[t]he inability to maintain the fantasy of power triggers a crisis in the fantasy of identity, and violence is a means of resolving this crisis because it acts to reconfirm the nature of a masculinity otherwise denied’.

**Violent Masculinity as a Requirement of the Shared Direction of the Nation**

Drawing on Bhabha, Munt (2007) argues that the nation is ‘a desired object, representing a projected yearning for a perfectly consolidated self, paradoxically beyond the self’ (59). In Fiji this ‘projected yearning’ coheres as a ‘shared direction’ that requires powerful masculinity as a condition of its coherence. The significance of violent acts as a means of enacting a fantasy of power reveals the extent to which violence against the queer body is linked to the repressed shame inherent in maintaining a particular Indigenous Fijian nationalist/ethnic stance. This stance forms a potent cultural requirement for Indigenous Fijian identity-making: to be ‘in-line’ with this ‘shared direction’ of Indigenous Fijian identity-making is to be taukei (‘full-blooded’ Indigenous Fijian) and Christian. This line is also inherently heterogendered through the requirements of church and family. In the previous chapter, I argued that a ‘shared
direction’ has been not only sustained but strengthened through historical intersections between Christianity and chiefly hierarchy. Nationalist Anti-Indian discourse acts as a ‘straightening device’ – a forceful mechanism for directing bodies along this line which is simultaneously ethno-nationalist and masculinist. Trnka (2008) asserts that the violence following the 2000 putsch drew on discourses of ‘Indo-Fijians as vulagi, or foreigners, who had usurped the rights of the taukei, or Indigenous Fijians, to govern Fiji’ (3). This shared direction involves a fantasy of entitlement to govern Fiji, which is played out as a fantasy of entitlement of power over the Other. George (2008) similarly discusses the sense of entitlement that has characterised Indigenous Fijian violence, saying that:

[i]t is …not surprising that [post-coup violence and looting] exist[s] in the collective memory of many young Fijian men who live in and around Suva as comparable to ‘Christmas’, a period when it became justifiable, even legitimate, to help yourself to what you wanted (172).

As Munt (2008) argues:

[n]ationalist ideology is sustained by shaming those it considers to be external to its real and imagined borders, but it saves special regard for the repudiation of its internal Others, those who are considered to be supplementary to the nation’s needs, that it would prefer to make invisible or expulse (55, my emphasis).

In the Fijian context, the disgust aimed at queer bodies – particularly male bodies that enact femininity – signals the extent to which they are ‘internal Others’ that need to be ‘expelled’ or rendered ‘invisible’ in order to maintain the ‘shared direction’ of the nation; that is, to shore up the difference between those that are considered ‘Indigenous Fijian’/‘taukei’ and the imagined ‘external’ other ‘Indo-Fijian’/‘vulagi’. In a context where being Indo-Fijian has been
marked out as feminised by being passive, weak and non-physical, being hyper-masculine is a condition of being Indigenous Fijian (George 2008; White 2005).

Munt (2008) explores the relationship between nationalism and homophobia for American Irish, pointing out the relationship between disavowed shame and homophobia. For Munt, the homophobic response of St Patrick’s Day march organisers in New York in 1991, who refused to allow a LGBT Irish organisation to participate, is inherently linked to the loss that characterises diasporic identity. This psychic loss is played out as desire for the imagined nation. The nation is imagined as inherently heterosexual. She argues, ‘this idealization inevitably contains the unspoken shame of not-belonging, hence it is a queer attachment’ (71). Munt’s concept of disavowed shame in relation to the homophobia of the nation is instructive for making sense of what is at stake for Indigenous Fijian masculinity and the direction of the nation. Indigenous Fijian nationalism is inherently uneasy as a ‘shared direction’. Indigenous Fijian men are both powerful and not. On one hand, Indigenous Fijian masculinity is imbued with fantasies of entitlement (to the nation, to salvation, over other bodies), but simultaneously the material and global conditions of Fiji are constraining. Thus the disavowal and projection of shame onto the bodies of ‘internal Others’ acts as a ‘straightening device’ for staying in-line with the shared direction of the nation.

Again, I was particularly aware of the extent to which the shared direction of the six boys extends inside the body of the boy who was raped, and that this act produces them as masculine and Indigenous Fijian, and him as ‘Other’. This is again related to a fantasy of entitlement, or reaching into the body of the ‘Other’. That is, Indigenous Fijian masculinity entails the entitlement or motility to enter into other bodies as if they are objects. The act is feminising; it is an interpellation to make sense of the boy’s body as ‘feminine’ on the basis of being enterable. But it is more than this. The repeated rape and witnessing of the event signals
the extent to which it was marked out as ordinary or condoned, and an act of punishment. Mason’s (1997) notion of bodies that are ‘doubly dirty’ – while in a different context – is relevant here. She argues that violence against lesbians relies on pervasive discourses of women’s bodies as dirty, and of lesbian sex as therefore ‘doubly dirty’ (Mason 1997; Tomsen and Mason 2001). Femininity marks out the body as being rapeable and ‘less than’ (Braidotti 2011). In this context, male bodies which enact femininity are ‘doubly rapeable’ – the boys feel a sense of entitlement to rape – not just on the basis of femininity, but also because the proximity of femininity to a male body ‘deserves’ punishment because it debases masculinity and threatens its rank.

I want to turn to an example of violence as a disgust mechanism which shows the extent to which the shaming of ‘internal Others’ is linked to the desire to expel them and to maintain the ‘shared direction’ of the nation. Priya discussed an extremely violent act against her:

[t]here was this man who took me to his house. He locked everything up, and he did this scar [shows me a deep scar along the back of her neck and shoulder] and ah, he raped me. He raped me and look at that [showing the scar]. He wanted to kill me.

This violent act shows the extent to which the perpetrator was able to dehumanise Priya. As Roy claims (2002, 17), ‘Dehumanization is a prerequisite to acts of extreme violence because it allows us to deny that our actions are actually hurting, even killing, another human, another one of “us”’.

The act of violence Priya describes is an attempt at the expulsion of the queer body from the nation. Again, this act speaks to the fantasy of entitled masculinity held by the perpetrator. The ‘reach’ of the perpetrator extends into her body (via both the act of rape and the stabbing) and enacts his fantasy of entitlement to a particular social and relational order that Priya confounds. Here I thought about the doubled effect of disavowed shame for the
perpetrator: that the desire to annihilate her could be understood as a projection of sexual
shame onto the body of the victim because of the uncomfortable proximity of desire and
disgust. Priya is rendered multiply ‘shameable’ because she is ‘doubly dirty’ (Mason 1997): she
is both transgender and a sex worker. As Bartky (1990) says about the construction of women
as shamed subjects:

[o]ne wonders too whether there is any relationship between women’s shame –
both the shame that is directly linked to embodiment and the shame that is not –
to the persistence of religious traditions that have historically associated female
sexuality with pollution and contagion (90).

Thus we could say that Priya’s rape and attempted murder signal ‘gender policing’ through
the punishment of both gender and ‘moral’ transgressions, showing the alignment of the lines
of heterogender and lines of Christianity.

**Conclusion**

At the time of my fieldwork several people related the story of a young man, who was
perceived to be gay, being attacked and raped using a cassava by a group of young men in
Suva. Four days later he collapsed at home and was admitted to hospital, where he died of
infection. Beyond the horror of the violence itself, there is the tragedy of the delay – that the
violence was so shaming that it stopped him from seeking medical help sooner. Tomkins
(1995) asks:

[h]ow can loss of face be more intolerable than loss of life?... Shame is an experience
of the self by the self... Shame is the most reflexive of affects in that the
phenomenological distinction between the subject and object is lost (cited in Munt
2008, 85)
This chapter has argued that this lack of ‘distinction between the subject and the object’ is enacted through ‘disgust mechanisms’ that work by projecting shame onto the body of the Other, and reinforcing the ‘disgusted’ as the ‘ego ideal’ (see Ahmed 2004). What I have claimed here is that this mechanism simultaneously constitutes the queer subject as both queer (or Other) and shamed, and the perpetrator as both heterosexual/masculine and disgusted, such that this performative process of subjection is inherently emotional.

Understanding that violent acts against ‘queer’ Fijians are both naming and shaming allows us to make sense of the pervasive and complex effects of violence.

The consequence of powerful ‘shared directions’ is that the shaming of those that are othered is internalised through the ‘self turning against the self’ (Ahmed 2004). This alerts us to the need to think about disgust mechanisms and shame politically, and as an issue of social justice.

As Bartky (1990) explains in the context of women’s shame:

[w]hat gets grasped in the having of such feelings [of shame] is nothing less than women’s subordinate status in a hierarchy of gender, their situation not in ideology but in the social formation as it is actually constituted (95 my emphasis).

To the extent that violent masculinity in Fiji is a ‘shared direction’, that has emerged from the alignment of more recent political events as well as historical structures, there are complex ramifications for how these discursive directions play out. The violent acts carried out against queer Fijians because they ‘thwart’ (Moore 1994) the fantasies of entitlement that haunts Indigenous Fijian masculinity reveals how ‘shared directions’ are enacted on and between bodies.

Queer bodies are not always shamed or shamed uniformly by these mechanisms, and whether or not shame is taken up, or how it is taken up by the subject depends on what is behind and...
near to the subject. Butler’s (1997) account of the refused interpellation might be instructive here. Shame is sticky (Ahmed 2001, Munt 2008), but whether or not shame sticks or slides off depends on your place in the world. However, the alignment of lines of heterogender, taukeism, family, religion and nation in Fiji is such that for Fijian queers, shame would be difficult to resist.

Understanding violent acts as disgust mechanisms allows us to understand more about the conditions that compel people to take up shame. Violent acts coerce the uptake of shame because they simultaneously enact a hierarchical relationship and reinforce the perpetrator as the ego-ideal. Even though this interpellation can be refused, this chapter has shown how these mechanisms are already aligned with the ‘shared direction’ of the nation/family/church. These violent acts are powerful because they enact shaming and subjectivity simultaneously. In the examples in this chapter, the ‘shamed’ subjects are likely to at least partially invest in the ego-ideal of the perpetrator, because the ego-ideal of the perpetrator is aligned with the direction of the family and the nation. In the first example, the removal of the earrings signals the significance of inhabiting a masculine body as a condition of belonging in the family. In the gang rape that took place at a secondary school, the actions of the perpetrators signal the significance of inhabiting a masculine body as a condition of being Indigenous Fijian.

Munt (2008, 60) describes the nation as ‘a keenly felt phallic imaginary’. In Fiji, ethnic nationalism augments the heterogender system by providing a ‘shared direction’. Staying ‘in-line’ with this ‘shared direction’ requires the policing of gender transgressions, which act as ‘straightening devices’ that simultaneously reinscribe heterogender and the masculinist, taukei vision of the nation. As Munt explains ‘…nationalisms are not invested solely in pride, sometimes they are intractably linked to feelings of shame’ (55).
This chapter has explored the role of shame in sustaining the ‘shared direction’ of the nation. Indigenous Fijian masculinity is able to be enacted through acts of violence that project ‘disavowed shame’ onto queer bodies. These disgust mechanisms work performatively to reinscribe heterogender, and bolster (hetero)masculinity as a condition of being Indigenous Fijian.

The ‘disavowed shame’ of the Indigenous Fijian nation is two-fold. Colonial history has acted as a disgust mechanism. The movement of missionaries to Fiji reflects the initial movement closer that is inherent to the disgust process. The subsequent ‘movement away’ happens discursively through the binary construction of the ‘pure’ Christian, and the Other ‘impure’ savage. The stickiness of disgust involves the marking out of everything that is impure: Indigenous Fijian spiritual belief, Indigenous Fijian bodies, brown skin, etc. To follow a trajectory of Indigenous Fijian nationhood, is to face ‘towards’ enlightenment and position the nation in opposition to the Indo-Fijian Other. However, as Munt (2008) describes there are inherent ‘ruptures’ in the nation. There is an ongoing slippage between the marking out of the converted as ‘pure’, and the ‘impure’ bodies of heathens, because of the ‘stickiness’ between savagery and brown bodies through imperialist discourse. This means that the disgust mechanism must be continually enacted to mark out the entitlement of particular bodies and reject the abjection threatened by the trope of the ‘savage’. The bodies of queer Fijians as ‘internal Others’ (Munt 2008) must be continually marked out and expelled.

Exploring violence as disgust mechanism allows us to consider the relationship between gender policing and shame: that is, the effectiveness of disgust mechanisms lies in their ability to imbue both gendered subjectivity and shame. Shaming demands the ‘internal other’ (Munt, 2008) to line-up with the ego-ideal of the disgusted. For Moore (1994, 154), violence is a ‘sign of struggle for the maintenance of certain fantasies of identity and power’. In this chapter
I argued that femininity on male bodies (that might be read as either ‘gay’ or ‘transgender’) acts as a symbolic threat in that it stands in for the ‘lack’ of the nation vis-à-vis the inherent ‘ruptures’ (Munt 2008) of this fantasy, and it stands in for the shame that taukei masculinity is not as powerful as it ought to be. Taukei masculinity involves a fantasy of entitlement to enact power over Others. Taukei masculinity is reinstated via violent disgust mechanisms both because violence is ‘in-line’ with masculinity as an object within reach, and because violent acts extend the ‘reach’ of the self into the body of the Other. The violent rage that Moore (1994) describes as stemming from moments of ‘thwarting’, when fantasies of masculine entitlement are denied, could actually be linked to ‘disavowed shame’ (Munt 2008). The shift here is that we could ask whether shame is inextricably linked to gender. Orienting the body in-line with masculinity requires the disavowal of shame as a condition that allows the body to ‘line-up’, and therefore the threat of being shamed is simultaneously what is ‘behind’ and acts as a ‘straightening device’. As Ahmed (2004) argues shame is sticky: the heterosexual boys and men in this chapter enacted disgust mechanisms to create distance between their bodies and queer bodies.

In the examples of violence I have discussed there have been two different processes within these disgust mechanisms. In the first example, the action of the father to tear out earrings from his child’s ears worked to police gender by bringing the queer body back into line. Removing earrings from his son worked to restore the heterogendered/family line. We could say that this act was an interpellation to belong. The act of bringing the male body back in-line requires ‘masculinisation’ through the removal of objects ‘marked’ as feminine from the proximity of the male body. Simultaneously though, the violent act still acted to induce shame, and signals the extent to which taking up the image of the father as ego-ideal is a requirement of being a son (as a condition of inheritance). In contrast, in the second two
examples, the disgust mechanism worked to ‘return to the straight line’ by expelling the queer body. These acts of violence required ‘feminisation’ of the queer body via treating the body as an object (without entitlement to bodily integrity). Through these acts the masculinity of the perpetrators was performatively reinscribed via their ability to ‘extend their reach’ into the Other. Understanding the gendering of these acts – as acts which alternatively masculinise or feminise bodies – gives us a clearer conception of how ‘gender policing’ works via violence: that is, some violent acts restore heterogender through straightening the queer body, whereas other violent acts restore heterogender through expelling the queer body. In the context of Fiji, enacting masculinity is linked to the ‘shared direction’ of the Indigenous Fijian nation. In this way, masculinity in Fiji is often performatively reinscribed through violence. Queers are a symbolic threat or ‘internal other’ (Munt 2008) precisely because they trouble Indigenous Fijian fantasies of the entitlement of powerful male bodies.
Conclusion: Stopping, ‘Straightening’ and Swivelling:

A Phenomenology of the Queer Body in Fiji

This thesis has explored the lives of queer Fijians through a phenomenological lens that makes use of Ahmed’s (2006) account of the shared directions of bodies and the production of ‘straight lines’ to consider the relationship between heterogender, ethnicity and nationalism. The ‘shared direction’ of Fiji requires that Indigenous Fijians take up heterogender as an ordinary condition of being Indigenous Fijian. The nation has been aligned with ethno-nationalism and militarist masculinity. My thesis has explored how the ‘straight line’ of heterogender is reproduced through different sites that are imperative to the national imaginary: the family, the church and the nation. In the family, heterogender is made compulsory through the disciplinary mechanisms of ‘closeness’, which shapes the body via the requirement to be ‘alike’ and close to the ‘spoken’. This orientation relegates queer sexuality to the ‘background’ such that silences reproduce the family as a straight line. Heterogender is reproduced through the relationship between the ‘church line’ and Indigenous Fijian subjectivity through the requirement of being ‘saved’. I have argued that colonisation and the colonial mission has produced an irreducible anxiety for Indigenous Fijians, where the ‘shared direction’ of the imagined Christian nation towards the ‘saved’ depends on the disavowal of the colonial designation of Indigenous Fijian bodies as the unsaved Other.

The conditions for the reproduction of heterogender in Fiji have underpinned an ethno-nationalist ‘shared direction’ that privileges hyper-masculine and militarist Fijian bodies (see George 2008; Teaiwa 2005). This thesis captured a particular moment of time during the early- to mid-2000s in Fiji, prior to the 2006 coup d’etat. Fiji has endured a complex political and historical backdrop where recent cycles of violent coups, ongoing racialised tension
towards the Indo-Fijian population who are descended from indentured labourers and the
colonial Othering of dark skinned people contribute to an anxious and defensive Indigenous
Fijian national identity.

The lived experiences of queer Fijians show the effects of an ethno-nationalist and masculinist
‘shared direction’. A hypermasculinist ethno-nationalism in Fiji operates to Other Indo-Fijians
bodies as ‘unsaved’, weak, and feminised (George 2008; White 2005). In this context of
masculinist ethnonationalism, queer Fijians risk ‘disorienting’ (Ahmed 2006) or ‘queering’ the
nation. They threaten to disrupt the hyper-masculinity of the Fijian body or challenge the
spiritual entitlement of the Fijian church. Queer Fijians act as ‘internal Others’ (Munt 2008)
that thwart the identity project of the nation because they trouble the binary between
Indigenous and Indo-Fijian bodies by drawing the indigenous body close to attributes it is
required to disavow: femininity, imagined ‘weakness’, visible sexuality, and ‘heathenism’.
Drawing on Ahmed’s (2004) analysis of disgust, we could say that queer indigenous bodies are
‘sticky’; they threaten to contaminate or cohere to the Indigenous Fijian nation and thus
threaten the ‘shared direction’ towards Indo-Fijian bodies as Other.

In what follows, I review some of the significant conceptual apparatus of this thesis in order to
make connections between queer Fijian experiences of marginalisation across different sites.
That is, to draw together how a phenomenology of the queer Fijian body might be
characterised by experiences of stopping, straightening and swivelling. This review of
conceptual apparatus also draws attention to the ways that the empirical working through of
Ahmed’s *Queer Phenomenology* in a particular location has led to some empirically driven
reconceptualisations of Ahmed’s theoretical terms. I then turn to an engagement with
Foucault (1982) and Butler (1997) to attend to how Ahmed’s (2006) account of ‘straight
lines’, ‘stopping’ and ‘straightening mechanisms’ speaks to theoretical conceptualisations of
the relationship between power and the subject. Finally, I assert that Ahmed’s account of
‘shared directions’ offers a means of engaging both critically and politically with the conditions
that produce domination. I argue that when ‘shared directions’ are produced and reproduced
as ‘straight lines’ they require more coercive mechanisms to maintain them. I argue that in the
context of Fiji, what is necessary to reduce the harm of both violent straightening mechanisms
against queer bodies and the violent Othering of the Indo-Fijian community is queer
interventions into the national imaginary, such that Fiji takes a different, more diffuse ‘shared
direction’.

**Straight Lines**

Ahmed (2006) uses the concept of ‘straight lines’ to describe how heterosexuality is
reproduced as normative, as a line that bodies are required to follow. Ahmed’s (2006)
conception of the ‘gift of inheritance’ and the ‘promise of return’ articulates how bodies act as
repetitions or iterations on the ‘straight line’ in a performative account of heterogender
(Butler 1990, 1997; Ahmed 2006). The ‘promise of return’ conceptualises the subject’s
investment in the straight line to describe how heterosexuality becomes compulsory. The
subject is invested in the ‘straight line’ because the ‘gift of inheritance’ is conceived of as an
‘unrepayable debt’ that commands ongoing return. Ahmed asserts that the ‘straight line’ is
perpetuated via the ‘gift of inheritance’ because of the requirement that the child inherit the
life of the parent. The ‘gift’ is able to compel action because it relies on past accumulations
that accrue force: ‘the heterosexual couple is “instituted” as the form of sociality through
force’ (84). We could deduce that the subject experiences the ‘gift’ as more powerful or
compelling than itself; partially as an effect of the ‘prior accumulations’ of the line. When the
child takes up the ‘gift’ by taking the form of the parents, we could say it takes up
heterogendered subjectivity because of the accumulated weight of heterogender.
My use of the concept of the ‘straight line’ in my thesis supports Ahmed’s (2006) assertion that the ‘straight line’ of heterogender colludes with racialisation: ‘race would be a series of [social] attributes that are reproduced through sexual reproduction and that are passed down through generations as the gift of its line’ (121). I have used the ‘promise of return’ to describe queer Fijians’ complex investment in heterogender and ethnicity, to describe how heterogender acts as a condition of ‘being’ Indigenous Fijian. Heterogender is thus a component of being ‘recognisable’ as a Fijian subject. I have argued that within Pasifika families, closeness acts as a straightening mechanism by requiring the reproduction of proximity and similarity. This closeness compels the return of silence as a ‘return in kind’ (Liu and Ding 2005) that stands in for the reproduction of heterosexuality.

My thesis has advanced Ahmed’s (2006) conception of ‘shared direction’ by exploring how a shared direction was reproduced and institutionalised across different social sites. Ahmed asserts, ‘the lines we follow might also function as forms of “alignment,” or as ways of being in line with others… We are “in line” when we have the direction that is already faced by others’ (15). My thesis has shown how during the early- to mid-2000s in Suva the institutional alignment of family, church and nation cohered as a ‘straight line’ that produced and reproduced a ‘shared direction’ for the Indigenous Fijian imaginary. That is, institutional and social alignments collectively produced a set of conditions for being an Indigenous Fijian and belonging in the Fijian nation because heterogender is reproduced as a ‘straight line’ through the church, the family and the nation. The powerful effect of institutional and historical alignments is that ‘shared directions’ accrue force and produce dominance (I explore dominance later in this chapter).

When we inherit ‘straight lines’ we do not only take them up because we perceive of them as an unrepayable obligation of the ‘family line’. We take them up because of the force of past
accumulations – the alignment of the ‘straight line’ across powerful institutions that signal a ‘shared direction’ that is always already marked out as good or right. Subjectivity is taken up in relation to a ‘shared direction’ that is constituted as the ego-ideal, as a preferable version of the self. It is the alignment of institutions like the family, church and nation that obscures the possibility of other directions. The ‘shared direction’ is performative in the sense that it constitutes the subject through the act of taking that direction. So for example, throughout this thesis we have seen that heterogender coheres as a ‘straight line’ that produces an Indigenous Fijian subject as ethnicised, heterogendered, as a member within a family and a congregation. To not take the ‘shared direction’ is to risk being forcefully Othered and lack social motility across a range of social sites. It is the alignment of the ‘shared direction’ across the family, church and nation that so powerfully generates a promise of a future as a valuable self. We could see this through the violent actions of Indigenous Fijian boys in Chapter Eight: their motility to enact violence was enabled through a ‘shared direction’ of hypermasculinity and moral indignation.

**Straightening Devices**

Ahmed (2006) describes ‘straightening mechanisms’ as perceptual. They restore the ‘straight line’ of heterogender following a moment of disorientation through our ability to reorient ourselves using horizon lines. Ahmed gives an analysis of female inversion; where the representation of one woman as masculine restores the straight line by inscribing a hetero line of desire from a masculine body to a feminine one. Thus, the restoration of the ‘straight line’ depends on the alignment of the body with prevalent heterogendered discourses. However, this formulation obscures the work done by bodies and institutions to restore the ‘straight line’ when bodies appear ‘off-line’. Ahmed’s formulation also inadvertently only pertains to
the straight body: a body which is able to firstly inhabit the straight line, and then align itself with heterogendered norms.

My working through of Ahmed’s (2006) concept within my empirical project has shown that ‘straightening mechanisms’ can instead be conceptualised as mechanisms which work to restore the ‘straight line’ through either the action of returning the queer body to the straight line, or through expelling the queer body so that the ‘shared direction’ of the line is restored. Conceptualising ‘straightening mechanisms’ as involving the work of bodies and institutions to ‘return’ or expel the queer body requires a more complex conceptualisation of power because it shows that the reproduction of the ‘straight line’ is less automatic. It perplexingly reveals that the ‘straight line’ of heterogender is less habitual because it requires more work to maintain.

I have used the concept of ‘straightening mechanisms’ throughout my thesis to explain the discursive, embodied and institutional processes which reinstate or maintain the ‘straight line’ when it is threatened or disoriented by a queer body. In Chapter Six I asserted that closeness acts as a ‘straightening mechanism’ because the requirement to be ‘like’ means that sexuality is relegated to the ‘background’. The effect of this ‘straightening mechanism’ is that bodies maintain silences about queer sexuality, queer family members are rendered ‘ghostly’ (Liu and Ding 2005), and the ‘straight line’ of the family is maintained. In Chapter Seven I argued that the churches decision to exclude Nacanieli from prayer meetings worked as a ‘straightening mechanism’ that restored the ‘shared direction’ of the ‘saved’ by expelling the queer body. In Chapter Eight, I argued that violent acts work as ‘straightening mechanisms’ that simultaneously produce shamed and disgusted subjectivities (I discuss this further below).
‘Straightening mechanisms’ are enacted through a diverse range of technologies including conversational traces, bodily actions, and institutional processes to reproduce structural heterogender. The concept of ‘straightening mechanisms’ was useful because it allowed for an analysis of queer experiences of marginalisation across different sites in a way that made sense of personal, collective and institutional motivations for restoring the status quo. Further research could look at whether the ‘straightening mechanisms’ that restore other hegemonic ‘shared directions’ work similarly or differently from mechanisms that restore heterogender.

Conceptualising ‘straightening mechanisms’ as involving the labour of particular bodies and institutions to ‘return’ other bodies to the ‘straight line’ means we need to turn our attention to bodies that take on the work of ‘straightening’ or maintaining the straight line. That is, we need to ask, whose bodies work to restore structural heterogender? What conditions would give way to violent retribution or expulsion? What ‘shared directions’ are these acts mandated by? Ahmed (2006) draws our attention to social investment by arguing, ‘following lines also involves forms of social investment… through such investment in the promise of return, subjects reproduce the lines they follow’ (17). In Chapter Eight, I argued that the group rape of a gay boy in a classroom was an appellation that produced a shared privileged subjectivity for the perpetrators. It was an act that performatively produced them as masculine subjects, and enacted their investment in the hypermasculine and ethnonationalist ‘shared direction’. Yet those boys are not the most privileged hetero-masculine subjects in the Indigenous Fijian nation relative to the religious or chiefly elite. Instead, their actions constitute a claims-making for the rewards of the ‘shared direction’ as an extension of their social reach.
**Disgust Mechanisms**

I mobilised Ahmed’s (2004) account of disgust and shame alongside her account of ‘straightening mechanisms’ (Ahmed 2006) to assert that ‘disgust mechanisms’ are technologies of power that performatively enact shame onto the bodies of people who do not ‘line up’ with heterogender. Disgust mechanisms are highly relevant in Fiji, where they enable particular bodies to ‘line up’ with the ethno-nationalist direction of the nation through acts that project their disgust onto others. Phenomenologically, disgust mechanisms reconfigure distance and (hierarchical) space between bodies so that the dimensions of being above/below and close/far are experienced as an attribute of particular bodies. Disgust mechanisms produce disgusted actors and shamed subjects because they act as a form of interpellation – or claims-making – by the ‘disgusted’ to be the ego-ideal. Disgust mechanisms are effective at producing shame in the other in part because they are already ‘aligned’ with powerful ‘shared directions’. Recall Lana’s words about the church in Fiji that I discussed in Chapter Seven: ‘[t]hey say you live in sin. You’re gonna burn in Hell’. The ability of this interpellation to induce shame is intrinsically connected to the way it aligns the bodies of the disgusted with the ‘shared direction’ of the church and nation, and positions the queer subject as the ‘unsaved’ Other, an inherently disparaged identity. What is especially significant here is that the ‘shamed subject’ also participates in the ‘shared direction’ of the family, church, and nation as a condition of its subjectivity.

In Chapter Eight, I argued that in Fiji, acts of physical and sexual violence work as powerful disgust mechanisms that shores up the masculinity of the perpetrators and produces shamed subjectivities for queer Others. In Fiji, violence operates as a forceful claims-making by Fijian men to occupy the space of the ego-ideal. Violent disgust mechanisms work as straightening devices because of the ability for physical and sexual violence to act as a technology of
coercion. The queer body is either expelled from the ‘straight line’ or brought back in-line because violent acts have the power to shame.

There are two related reasons as to why violent acts in Fiji can take such a pervasive, public and visible form as a disgust mechanism against queer Others. Firstly, there is the privileging of violent masculinity within Fiji (even to the extent that violating someone publicly is not necessarily shame-inducing for the perpetrator). This is related to the militarisation of indigenous masculinity within Fiji (Teaiwa 2005). The Indigenous masculine body is routinely inscribed with the capacity to inflict harm as a form of gender-mediated agency. As such, I have described the way that Indigenous Fijian masculinity is embedded with an entitlement to extend its reach into the bodies of Others.

Secondly, violent acts against queer bodies are permissible because of the dehumanisation of queer people. This dehumanisation is related to queer Fijians’ designation as ‘unsaved’ Others. I have argued that the violent expulsion of the queer body as an internal ‘Other’ works as a straightening mechanism to maintain the ‘straight line’ of the nation. The dehumanisation of queer Fijians is underpinned by the moral certainty of the Christian nation (see Ryle 2005) that is already directed towards the expulsion of Indo-Fijian bodies as ‘unsaved’ Others. This is significant because the ‘shared direction’ of the Indigenous Fijian nation as a Christian nation is already underpinned by the disavowal of the colonial past and the colonial designation of Indigenous Fijian bodies as ‘unsaved’ Others.

**Stopping**

Queer Fijians as the ‘internal Others’ (Munt 2008) of the indigenous nation are subjected to ongoing instances of ‘stopping’ where queer bodies are unable to extend the same ‘reach’. Ahmed (2006) conceptualises stopping in two ways: as moments where bodies experience
‘being stopped’ as an interpellation, and when bodies experience a lack of motility in social sites that privilege others. I have argued throughout this thesis that queer bodies in Fiji experience continuous stopping across different, significant sites for making meaning of their lives.

Queer Fijians could be routinely ‘stopped’ for their displays of sexuality or gender that do not ‘line-up’ with heterogender. In Ahmed’s conceptualisation, ‘stopping’ acts as a ‘straightening mechanism’: ‘stopping’ in Fiji acts as an interpellation that disrupts the forming of subjectivities that threaten the indigenous ethno-nationalist ‘shared direction’. Because heterogender augments the reproduction of multiple significant forms of self-making; this ‘stopping’ disrupts claims to belong within the family, of being Christian or ‘saved’, and of being Indigenous Fijian. When the queer body is stopped, the queer subject experiences an interpellation not to exist in two ways. Firstly, the queer body is asked to ‘line-up’ and be Fijian (and/or Christian, or a daughter, etc.) at the exclusion of being queer. An example of this was shown in Chapter Eight, when the father violently ripped earrings from Ana’s earlobes. Through this violent act, the father distanced a feminised object from the male body of his ‘son’. The effect was to bring the queer body back ‘in-line’ with Indigenous Fijian masculinity. Ana experienced this stopping as a violent obstruction of her motility to reach towards her desired feminine subjectivity. It was an interpellation by her father to constitute her as his (good or valued) son by not being feminine.

Secondly, the queer body is ‘stopped’ by being expelled ‘off-line’ as the queer Other; that is, through an interpellation to not be recognised as Indigenous Fijian (or as a Christian, a daughter, etc.), or to not exist. We can see through my empirical work that this straightening mechanism restores the ‘straight line’ by realigning it with the ‘shared direction’ through the exclusion of the queer subject. An example of this was in Chapter Seven, when Nacanieli was
excluded from prayer meetings. This exclusion meant that he was not recognised as part of the congregation, nor as having equal value or moral standing.

These formulations of ‘stopping’ as a negative interpellation towards the queer body – as a call not to be – differs from how interpellation is usually understood as a call to be that is taken up by the subject. However, this ambivalence is already present (see for instance, Butler 1997). Calls to be a particular subject are always calls to exist within the conditions of the law. That is, they are calls that disavow the possibilities for being a subject conceived of differently or outside of the law. Butler’s (1997) formulation of gender melancholy similarly describes the foreclosed loss of homosexual desire as a condition of being the heterosexual subject. She asserts ‘…what might it mean to think of social sanction as working through foreclosure, to produce the possible domain in which love and loss can operate?’ (25). We can think of the ‘shared direction’ as foreclosing the possibility of other love objects.
Stopping and Straightening Mechanisms as Technologies of Power

To bring Ahmed’s (2006) conception of ‘straightening’ into conversation with Foucault’s (1980) insights into power; we might say that ‘straightening mechanisms’ work through alignment between privileged discourses of heterogender that operate to constitute a pervasive world-view. Ahmed’s work, then, is a useful theoretical tool for refining Foucault’s (1982) diffuse notion of power relations and conceptualising the relationship between knowledge and power. Foucault’s diffuse notion of power relations has been critiqued because of the conceptual murkiness between when power acts productively to produce dominant discourses, and when power produces resistance or agency. The distinction between the subordinating effects and resistive effects of power can be made clearer through drawing on Ahmed’s (2006) explanation of directionality.

Ahmed’s phenomenological conception of direction works with a productive conception of power, but provides a palpable distinction for when discourses converge forcefully into alignments that have dominating effects. Foucault (1982) asserts ‘…what makes the domination of a group… together with the resistance and revolts that domination comes up against… is that they manifest in a massive and universalising form, at the level of the whole social body, the locking together of power relations with relations of strategy’ (795, my emphasis). That is, bringing Foucault and Ahmed together, we could say that power acts diffusely but is aligned through discourses and ‘straightening mechanisms’ into privileged ‘shared directions’.

Dominant discourses produce ‘straight lines’ – which in effect is when discourses are aligned such that they are able to have forceful consequences in producing particular objects and subjects. ‘Straight lines’ work as a conceptualisation of how power works productively to produce coherent world-views as ‘shared directions’ and account for why some discourses/straight lines can become dominant through their relationship to pre-existing
alignments. Although I have drawn on Ahmed’s notion of ‘straight lines’ and the work of straightening devices to theorise the operation of heterogender, it might be usefully drawn to analyse other forms of domination, for instance, racism.

**Interpellation and the Queer Subject**

This section offers a theoretical engagement with Ahmed (2006) and Butler (1997) as a means of reflecting on the relationship between the queer subject and power. Following Foucault (2008), Butler (1997, 2) argues ‘if… we understand power as providing the very condition of its existence and the trajectory of its desire, then power is not simply what we oppose but also… what we depend on for our existence’. Thus, she argues that becoming a subject inherently involves subjection via the productive effects of power that produce the conditions of subjectivity.

I suggest that Ahmed’s (2006) concept of the ‘gift of inheritance’ can be usefully understood as an interpellation that compels the subject to take up the ‘straight line’ as a condition of its social existence. The interpellation is conceived of in two parts; the hail of the policeman and the response of the subject through which subjectivity is formed (Althusser 1970). The process describes subjectivity as the moment we recognise ourselves through the naming of a powerful other. For Althusser, interpellation describes the ideological bond of the subject to the rule of law. Butler’s (1997) theoretical reworking of interpellation astutely observes that the response of the subject is not the only response possible, the call might be misheard or misrecognised, or refused. Butler asks, ‘[w]hy does this subject turn toward the voice of the law, and what is the effect of such a turn in inaugurating a social subject?’ (5). She argues that the subject is compelled to turn, because ‘it promises identity’ (108).
Ahmed’s (2006) account of ‘the gift of return’ provides a reconceived interpellation where the parents ‘hail’ the child as heterogendered. The gift proffered by the parents is an unrepayable debt, i.e. the social conditions of the child’s own survival. Ahmed’s conception of the ‘gift of inheritance’ signals the psychic attachment between the subject and heteronormative conditions because of the dependence of the child on its mother for continued existence: ‘there is no possibility for not loving, where love is bound up with the requirements of life’ (Butler 1997, 8). The powerful figure of the interpellation offers the ‘straight line’ – as the rule of law - as a condition of taking up the ‘shared direction’. In my research, this can be seen as the expectation by Indigenous Fijian bodies and institutions that all bodies take up heterogender as a condition of a life able to be valued. In particular it would be the expectation by Ana’s father that her male body would display appropriate masculinity as a condition of being his son. Or, the expectation by the church that Indigenous Fijians will take up that ‘shared direction’ of salvation.

As Butler (1997) shows the subject does not necessarily respond to the hail of the policeman. Likewise, while structural heterogender shapes behind the body: it does not necessarily effectively compel the subject to cohere to the ‘straight line’. Subjects can and do ‘refuse’ the requirements of the line. To proceed with my example from Chapter Eight, this might be the moment when Ana puts earrings in her ears. This moment might be conceived of as a queer ‘line of sight’, when the body turns away, or swivels, from the ‘shared direction’.

My research showed the subject’s refusal of the interpellation is met with further attempts to interpellate through coercion; straightening mechanisms operate to return the resistant or different body in-line with the straight line so that it takes up subjectivity under duress, or is expelled off-line as the ‘Other’. Being expelled off-line as the ‘Other’ may be experienced as ‘stopping’: as a lack of motility within a privileged social site. But it might also be experienced
more forcefully, as a push away. For instance, when Timoci is told not to come to church
events he experiences this as a forceful act of marginalisation. Butler’s (1997) notion of
psychic subjection/subjectivity follows Foucault (2008) in maintaining a distinction between
the operation of productive power and the use of force that is seen as repressive: ‘the psychic
operation of the norm offers a more insidious route for regulatory power than explicit
coercion, one whose success allows its tacit operation within the social’ (21). Yet, through my
analysis of violent disgust mechanisms, I am unconvinced that this distinction holds. Instead,
it seemed that ‘explicit coercion’ similarly occurs within conditions of productive power such
that violent force could produce subjectivities in relation to the ‘psychic operation of norms’.

There is a need to conceptualise or theorise moments when subjects take up the ‘straight line’
on the basis of ‘reward’ conceived of as a ‘shared future’, and when subjects take up the
‘straight line’ on the basis of violent coercion or punishment. Straightening mechanisms that
return the subject to the straight line, or expel the body from the straight line through violent
coercion or force might be phenomenologically conceptualised as a pull (i.e. as a return to the
straight line) or a push (i.e. expulsion).

As I argued in Chapter Eight, disgust mechanisms act to create shame for the subject as well as
to reinstate the sanctity of the ‘straight line’ through the production of the ‘disgusted’. The
idea that this performative moment generates emotions as well as heterogendered or queer
subjects is significant. We saw how, when Ana’s father pulled her earrings from her ears; the
act both ‘returned’ her to the straight line – through distancing the feminised objects from her
body - and simultaneously marked her as the shamed Other. I would argue that when subjects
take up the straight line on the basis of violent coercion or punishment; shame is reproduced
alongside subjection and subjectivity. This was evident in the stories of Ana and Priya when
they talked about feelings of guilt and isolation. These experiences are likely to be mixed with
other powerful emotions that also deserve exploration. For instance, the fear that follows acts of violence may well act as a powerful mechanism for ‘stopping’ the motility of queer bodies. This is clearly an area for further research.

The phenomenological effects of straightening mechanisms on queer bodies complicates Ahmed’s (2004) account of compulsory heterosexuality; where heterosexuality is compulsory on the basis of the requirement to inherit the parent’s life; or a ‘shared direction’ towards the social good. What does it mean when in some contexts, heterosexuality is compulsory on the basis of compulsion towards shared rewards, but in others heterosexuality is compulsory on the basis of mechanisms of violence? We can make sense of the different conditions for the reproduction of heterosexuality in the Anglo-West as compared to Fiji. In the Anglo-West, heterosexuality is less compulsory because it is not a totalising requirement for inheriting the nation. In fact, as Puar (2007) point outs through her analysis of ‘homonationalism’, the nation in the Anglo-West can be reproduced through the trope of homosexuality as a marker for liberalism. In the West, discourses about the human rights of GBLT communities can be mobilised to justify intervention in the Rest (Asia, Africa and the Pacific), with a ‘shared direction’ to liberalise so-called ‘regressive’ or ‘traditional’ states.

**The Swivelling Body: ‘Queer Survival’ and the Agency of the Queer Subject**

This thesis has argued that within the conditions of stopping and straightening technologies that marginalise and other queer bodies, the queer body is required to swivel as a condition of its survival. While Ahmed (2006) describes queer moments as perceptual instances when the subject is disoriented, I suggest that the queer subject experiences moments of going ‘off-line’ as *turning away* from the ‘straight line’. ‘Swivelling’ is underpinned by Butler’s (1997, 12)
notion of ‘resistance within the terms of reiteration’ because it suggests bodily movement produced through the conditions of the ‘straight line’. Conceptualising the movement of the queer subject as a repeated movement of turning towards and away from the straight line allows us to make sense of the relationship between queer bodies, straight lines and the straightening mechanisms that act on them. The concept of ‘swivelling’ emphasises the ongoing, sustained relationships queer bodies might have with both the conditions of the straight line, and queer lines of sight.

In my research in Fiji, queer subjects were not able to move away from the ‘straight line’ because it was deeply embedded in a pervasive ‘shared direction’ that marks out the conditions of their subjectivity as Indigenous Fijian, as daughter and sons, as Christians, and as citizens. In other words, they were multiply invested in heteronormative conditions. Alongside this, ‘straightening mechanisms’ operated to coerce bodies that trouble heterogender back ‘in-line’.

I have explored the swivelling action of queer bodies in relation to religion as a means of investigating queer agency. For example in Chapter Seven, I talked about Michael’s deeply-held religious convictions and suggested his belief in future redemption enabled him to ‘swivel’ between gay sex – as a queer line of sight – and religious doctrine. Simultaneously, turning towards the ‘straight line’ of the church through his biblical knowledge offered him motility that he may not otherwise have experienced.

I suggested through my exploration of ‘swivelling’ that it is important to conceptualise queer agency in two ways; as what allows you to survive as queer (i.e. as ‘turning away’ from the straight line), and what allows you to survive (i.e. as turning towards the straight line) within heteronormative conditions. There has been a tendency for queer research to focus on the
queer transgression of the heteronormative instead of the sustained ways that we might reproduce the straight line in order to experience motility in social sites where we risk being stopped.

I would have liked to focus more on queer moments of ‘turning away’, particularly following queer lines of desire. What experiences, pleasures, bodies or objects might draw you off-line even within fraught and painful conditions? I hope to resume this work in the future. Its omission was substantially an effect of the talanoa I engaged in with participants; that the stories that emerged were primarily about experiences of marginalisation and I chose to honour the weight of those words.

I have argued that ‘swivelling’ is a means of turning the body: turning the head, or twisting at the waist. While Ahmed (2006) has asserted that heterosexuality is like RSI: through habitual iterations the movement of the body is restricted through sociality. I have argued that queerness is like yoga: the repeated requirement to twist or flex through sociality might produce flexibility or strength. ‘Swivelling’ opens up possibilities for being a broader theoretical tool. It could be a way of theorising all queer bodies, all marginalised bodies, or all bodies that occupy ambivalent allegiances to powerful ‘shared directions’. This could be a fruitful area for further research.

‘Shared Directions’ without ‘Straight Lines’: Conditions of Possibility for a New Fiji through Inheritance’s Queer Effects

What possibilities are there then, for an Indigenous Fijian queer subject? The conditions for queer Indigenous Fijian subjectivity would be where the queer body could inherit family and cultural lines. A rare point of difference was Luke’s story of his father’s acceptance. I gave an analysis of Luke’s story in Chapter Two where the line of inheritance is continued through the
form of the queer son in a way that reproduces the cultural line. The story gives an indigenous account of queerness - queerness as Fijian – rather than queerness as Other or Outsider. What this signals is the way that these alignments are not inherent but an effect of both subsequent repetitions and ‘straightening mechanisms’ that work to align Fijianness – or i Taukei – with heterogender.

Theoretically, I have come to see this as the extent to which a ‘shared direction’ is required to be reproduced through a ‘straight line’ (i.e. what must cohere) or whether collective subjectivity can be reproduced through more diffuse ‘shared direction’. A diffuse ‘shared direction’ might mean that while you are oriented towards that direction through habitual acts; the ‘shared direction’ can be reproduced without particular actions as the necessary requirements. Where you have a more diffuse shared direction, there is less requirement for the work of straightening mechanisms to return the body to the ‘shared direction’.

George’s (2008) account of gay activists in Fiji that subverted masculinist and ethno-nationalist norms by strategically wearing sulu paired with less traditional items of clothing seems pertinent here. The gay activists playfully called this practice ‘reclaiming the sulu’. I wondered about the extent to which the practice might also be embodied; through the juxtaposition/proximity of feminine male bodies paired with sulu. That is, we could read the actions of queer activists in Suva as a particular form of claims-making: as a claim to be Indigenous Fijian and queer, to belong. The practice could be seen as a performative iteration of Fijian subjectivity without the reproduction of the straight line. That the practice undermines the ‘shared direction’ of the Indigenous Fijian nation as both hypermasculine and ethnonationalist is significant; the ‘straight line’ in Fiji is sustained through racialisation as well as heterogender. Queer bodies pose a challenge to the ethnonationalist ‘shared direction’.
Increasing social justice in Fiji may well require such coalitional strategies amongst marginalised people.

**Conclusion**

The ‘shared direction’ of Fiji is intrinsically linked to underlying anxiety and foreclosed grief of colonisation, which means that the ‘shared direction’ is towards unsaved bodies, and Indo-Fijian Others. Queer Fijians thwart this fantasy of identity because they represent what is fearful; the spectre of unsaved indigenous bodies, femininity, imagined ‘weakness’ and so forth. As such, they are an ‘internal Other’ (Munt 2008). When queer Fijian bodies are ‘stopped’ they are prevented from having the same motility as other bodies (to reach closeness in the family or reach privilege within the church). ‘Stopping’ is also an interpellation where their subjectivity as Fijian is called into question. Straightening devices are mechanisms that work to restore the ‘straight line’ of heterogender through returning the queer body to the straight line, or by expelling the queer body from the ‘shared direction’. In this context, the queer body is required to ‘swivel’ between the requirements of hyper-masculine ethno-nationalism and queer ‘lines of sight’. An example of this was Nacanieli’s humour and insight into his treatment by the congregation. His ability to joke while also troubling the assumptions of the church, ‘[m]aybe the Lord works in mysterious ways’ could be seen as the ability to ‘look back’ on the church line from a different perspective. The ability of the queer body to repeatedly turn – and look back towards the conditions it has come from - might produce new forms of strength, flexibility and resilience.
References


Baba, Tupeni, Okusitino Mahina, Nuhisifa Williams, and Unaisi Nabobo-Baba. 2004.


New York: Routledge.

226


Crath, Rory. 2010. “Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others.” *Resources for Feminist Research* 33, no. 3 4


doi:10.1080/07399330902801302.


Halapua, Winston. 2002. *The Role of Militarism in the Politics of Fiji*


Steven Ratuva. 2000. Ethnic politics, communalism and affirmative action in Fiji*

[microform]: a critical and comparative study / Steven Ratuva. Thesis PhD-- University of Sussex.


