Joint Evaluation of Timor-Leste Community Policing Programme (TLCPP) and Hametin Koperasaun Hamutuk Polisia ho Komunidade (HAKOHAK)

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Executive Summary

This is a Joint Evaluation of the Timor-Leste Community Policing Programme (TLCPP) and the Hamutuk Polisia ho Komunidade (HAKOHAK) Project for the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT). Both programmes are four-year programmes; TLCPP focuses on strategy, training and operations for the PNTL and is implemented by New Zealand Police while HAKOHAK works ‘bottom up’ with communities and, simultaneously, ‘top down’ with the police institution and is implemented by The Asia Foundation (TAF). The evaluation was conducted in order to assist decision making on future support for community policing programming in Timor-Leste, as well as for the purposes of learning and accountability.

Relevance: Both programs are extremely relevant. The notion of community policing has evolved from a marginal position to one increasingly central to the identity of the Timorese police (PNTL). New Zealand support for these developments serves as a positive counterbalance to other, more militaristic, dynamics still very present within the organisation.

Effectiveness: The TLCPP has brought extensive New Zealand experience to the institutionalisation of community policing in Timor-Leste. The team queries the utility of TLCPP’s delivery model whereby solitary advisers, often unversed in relevant languages, are assigned to cover a handful of districts and work with the PNTL. Some PNTL district commanders are briding at what they perceive as overly intrusive performance management on the part of TLCPP advisers. Going forward, there are good arguments for the program to concentrate on support to the lower ranks of the police, including those who form part of the OPS (suku police), a Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) initiative to place a police officer in each of the country’s 442 sukus.

In evaluative terms, it is extremely hard to know what the effect of TLCPP work in terms of training has been since the programme began. Programme management is to be credited for identifying the need to work differently on police education, and are currently taking steps to embed a new approach to professional development.

The HAKOHAK has contributed extensively to the institutionalisation of community policing in Timor-Leste. The establishment of KPKs (community police councils) is the most visible component of the programme. HAKOHAK has adapted the concept in a manner that aligns with the cadences and cultures of Timor-Leste and fulfills their objective of demonstrating KPKs as a workable model for dispute resolution. Although early days, the KPK’s appear very popular and fulfill a community need.
The programme is also engaging in a wide range of other activities, including support for the establishment of a forum to discuss pertinent issues at a district level along with community outreach work and inputs into training. HAKOHAK’s commitment to evidence-based research is impressive. This includes the commissioning of analytical pieces and a police-community survey. Engaged, empowered and networked Timorese staff play an important part in ensuring that the program fits with prevailing realities and is not considered an outside imposition.

However, HAKOHAK is becoming a ‘victim of its own success’. PNTL and community leaders are clamouring for an expansion of KPKs to other sukus and other districts (Even with the rapid expansion of KPKs over the last few years, it is important to remember that around 80% of sukus are still not covered). Caution needs to be exercised in scaling up any pilot to ensure that resources are available to adequately finance, support and monitor such an expansion.

**Efficiency**: The two programmes have sought to increase their efficiency through steps taken to align their activities. For the PNTL, having two programmes ostensibly working on a similar set of issues is confusing, as well as time-consuming. There is considerable value for money to be found in HAKOHAK’s employment of principally Timorese staff. Not only is it economical, it also enables deeper engagement with Timorese networks including the PNTL and the GoTL.

The way that New Zealand manages the program is certainly inclusive but a consequence of this is that there appears to be no central ‘node’ of decision-making authority. The complexities of these relationships is most apparent in the management of the third-party monitoring services provided by Sustineo.

**Monitoring and Reporting**: Although TLCPP appears to have completed a number of outputs, determining the extent to which TLCPP have delivered on their intended outputs, and their short and medium term outcomes is extremely difficult. The TLCPP’s own reporting regime is difficult to understand. Sustineo's own work outputs have been of mixed quality.

The HAKOHAK’s monitoring and reporting regime is extremely praiseworthy. Again, the programme may be a ‘victim of its own success’ in that it has a wealth of information but more analytical capacity would be required to fully mine this data.

**Sustainability**: The sustainability of community policing programming in Timor-Leste depends in large part upon the continued enthusiasm of the GoTL and the PNTL for the concept, coupled with future budgetary commitments on the part of the GoTL. Any future donor programming should include a clear exit strategy.

**Cross Cutting**: The TLCPP Design proposed a particular focus on domestic violence through a range of activities. However, ‘gender’ has been much less of a focus in the actual programme.

HAKOHAK reporting, and interviews and discussions held by the evaluation team, indicates that domestic violence remains a major source of insecurity for
communities. Starting from a low base, HAKOHAK has increasingly engaged with issues of domestic violence although the effectiveness of their socialisations is not known. There is a tension between the resolution of domestic violence in the KPKs and the implementation of the Law Against Domestic Violence (LADV) which needs to be carefully monitored, as there are a variety of potential risks associated with the functioning of the KPKs from a gender perspective. There are ample opportunities for KPKs to be supported to engage in work centred on prevention of domestic violence, and to be better connected with the GoTL supported referral networks for women and children experiencing violence.

**Conclusion:** The team concludes that New Zealand should continue with a programme of support to the PNTL, but that the nature of this support should undergo refinement. A number of steps should be taken straight away in order to enhance current programmes, ensure improved value for money and prepare for a future iteration of programming. In summary, these are:

1. Ensuring all TLCPP and HAKOHAK events are badged as joint activities.
2. Ensuring program staff spend time working in each other’s offices.
3. The development of a program of applied research for informed decision making and programmatic design.
4. MFAT reviewing responsibilities for managing the Sustineo contract as well as reviewing the scope of services.
5. MFAT and NZ Police considering how New Zealand’s well-regarded work in the area of domestic violence in the Pacific could be better leveraged.
6. NZ Police revising their approach to training and broader professional development for the PNTL.
7. NZ Police moving away from the solitary adviser model by having advisers work in concert as a pair or trio, as appropriate, in order to support mutual learning.
8. NZ Police broadening their primary focus away from district command and towards OPS, a key component of the PNTL who have, till now, received inadequate attention.
9. MFAT and NZ Police provide modest support for OPS initiatives.
10. NZ Police employ more Timorese staff in substantive positions.
11. NZ Police should ensure that language assistants accompany all advisers in need of them on district travel.
12. HAKOHAK coordinate with relevant in-house TAF work-streams in order to leverage specific in-house expertise.
13. HAKOHAK to determine if it possible to further subcontract support work to NGOs in the future.
14. HAKOHAK to considering working with other government and/or non-government bodies to monitor and analyse KPK practice and outcomes.
15. HAKOHAK to ensure that existing KPKs receive continued attention.

Among the lessons that can be derived from the experience of the TLCPP and HAKOHAK, and which may be of relevance moving forward into the design of any new program are:

- Programmes need to evolve with time and prevailing circumstance.
Programmes, and in particular complex programmes such as TLCPP, require clear lines of authority and decision making.

In order to ensure maximum effectiveness and uptake of programming in the Timor-Leste a 'Timor-first' approach is optimal.

Programmatic efforts should be grounded in empirical findings and verifiable facts.

The sustainability of any new programming will require a financial and policy commitment from the GoTL, and may also benefit from the support of additional donors.

In the future there should be one programme rather than two.

It would be timely for any new programme to clearly articulate its exit strategy, to ensure the sustainability of its programming initiatives.

A clear Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Plan and strategy should be an integral part of any new programme.
2

Introduction

This evaluation report summarises the background, context, objectives and methodology of the joint evaluation of the Timor-Leste Community Policing Programme (TLCPP) and the Hametin Koperasaun Hamutuk Polisia ho Komunidade (HAKOHAK) Project for the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT). It also summarises key findings and conclusions, lessons learned and makes recommendations for the short-medium term and for longer term programming. The time period covered by this evaluation is 2011 to September 2014.

These two programmes build on previous endeavours of both New Zealand and The Asia Foundation (TAF) and are working to operationalise the Government of Timor-Leste’s (GoTL) commitment, enunciated in Decree Law 9/2009 Article 1(2), to ensure the Policía Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) have a community-based orientation.

The TLCPP is a four-year bilateral programme implemented by the New Zealand Police (NZ Police), with funding from MFAT. It is jointly managed between NZ Police, PNTL, MFAT, and the Timor-Leste Secretary of State for Security (SoSS).

The overall goal of the TLCPP is to build safe and secure communities, through effective and efficient community policing in Timor-Leste. The programme comprises three components:

- A **strategic component**, focused at the national level, providing support for PNTL to further develop and institutionalise its community policing policy, strategy, action plans, systems and procedures, and mechanisms for engagement with community stakeholders, and to develop special programmes on key community policing issues in consultation with districts;

- A **training component** to support effective recruitment and in-service community policing training (among all PNTL staff) that will develop knowledge and skills in community policing, and the motivation, confidence and commitment to implement such an approach; and

- An **operational component** in the districts focused on providing support for PNTL District Commanders and staff to institutionalise effective community policing

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1 This project is also known as Conflict Mitigation Through Community Oriented Policing Phase II (CMCOPP II). Throughout this evaluation report it will be referred to by its better known Tetun acronym of HAKOHAK.
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systems and procedures, and to deliver effective community policing at district, sub-district and village levels.

The TLCPP coordinates with the HAKOHAK project. The HAKOHAK Project is a four-year community policing project (October 2011—September 2015), implemented by TAF and the PNTL. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the New Zealand Aid Programme jointly fund the project.²

The goal of the HAKOHAK is to improve security in Timor-Leste by strengthening collaboration between citizens and the police through the achievement of three objectives:

- Strengthen the technical capacity of the PNTL, civil society, and community leaders to implement effective community-oriented policing (COP) practices;
- Build community police partnerships to reduce high risk threats to security; and
- Promote COP as a practical approach to policing within the PNTL, district administration, and local communities.

The two programmes have developed a set of common governance arrangements and shared work-plans, which are intended to ensure a coordinated approach. This enhanced relationship was not foreseen in the original design of either programme.

² In addition the HAKOHAK project is supported through a Program Partnership Arrangement (PPA) between TAF and the UK Department for International Development (DFID), as part of a multi country approach to support peace and stability through improved state-society relations. The Asia Foundation also collaborates with the Justice and Security Research Programme (JSRP) at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) producing a series of research papers on Theories in Practice. This series assesses the Theories of Change approaches in programmes managed by The Asia Foundation, and supported by DFID, in a number of countries in South and Southeast Asia.
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The Programmes and their Context

TLCPP

The TLCPP was conceptualised as a follow-up to a small pilot programme that ran from 2008—10. An independent evaluation of that project concluded that the project had 'contributed to the effectiveness of PNTL in demonstrating practically that community policing is an appropriate and implementable concept' but highlighted issues involving short deployment cycles, a lack of strategic programmatic direction and inadequate monitoring processes.\(^3\)

A new phase of support was developed in the early part of 2011. The design envisioned a bilateral programme of support – the previous phase had been implemented 'inside' the UN police mission – that would focus on three broadly defined areas of strategy, training and operations and would be implemented by a mixture of permanently stationed and 'fly in, fly out' advisers.\(^4\) The program’s underlying rationale – or 'theory of change' - is that increases in the PNTL’s organisational capacity and skills base will convert into improvements in the quality of the service it provides. The design recommended that responsibility for M&E be externally sub-contracted.

Getting the programme up and running took well over a year from the finalisation of the design. It took nearly 12 months to get an agreement signed between MFAT and NZ Police. Timorese authorities were preoccupied with preparing for and running three rounds of presidential and parliamentary elections and the withdrawal of UNPOL in 2011—12, meaning it was hard for New Zealand to get their attention, even after signing an MoU between the two governments in May 2012. Within the context of UNPOL departing, the arrival of a fresh batch of NZ Police advisers at the same time caused considerable confusion among many in the PNTL. As a couple of respondents explained, the PNTL wondered if this was UNPOL ‘coming back’. While this was obviously not the case, the ambitions of the original design were on a par with what (significantly larger numbers of) UNPOL had been trying to achieve in years previous.

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4 What was proposed in the design was different from that recommended in the 2010 evaluation. The evaluation team advised that a program could not work without advisers being deployed in country for a minimum of one-year. The team understands that the 'fly in, fly out' model was proposed for cost-saving reasons.
The TLCPP has gone through a number of iterations since the signing of the MoU. The most prominent change has been the modification of the ‘fly in, fly out’ model for a more permanently stationed presence. Other changes that have occurred include revisions to the TLCPP’s reporting regime as well as an evolving role for Sustineo, the professional services firm that won the tender for TLCPP M&E services.

HAKOHAK

The HAKOHAK project is a sequel (on a much larger scale) to a TAF pilot project on community policing that ran from 2008—10. The main feature of the initial project, known by the acronym CMCOP (Conflict Mitigation Through Community Oriented Policing) was the establishment of forums in parts of Dili and Baucau whereby community representatives would discuss matters of common concern with designated representatives from the PNTL. The project’s goals were to mitigate conflict and strengthen what were then fairly non-existent police-community relations. The TAF’s own 2008 survey found that only 12% of the public had come into contact with the PNTL.  

Little is known about the accomplishments or otherwise of this pilot project. Neither an in-house completion report was produced nor an independent evaluation conducted. None of the councils established by TAF in the pilot project now operate, raising questions about sustainability.

After a hiatus of over a year, an expansion of the project commenced officially in late 2011, with funding from USAID and New Zealand. A new manager arrived to take forward the second phase of the project. Documentation produced for the DFID PPA (Department for International Development Partnership Program Arrangement) has been useful in helping chart the evolution of thinking and practice of the programme.

The ‘theory of change’ of HAKOHAK revolves around the twin propositions that establishing what TAF call an ‘active state-community security model’ and working with PNTL would, together, contribute to strengthened state-society relations and a more stable environment in Timor-Leste. This entails working ‘bottom up’ with communities and, simultaneously, ‘top down’ with the police institution (‘theories of change’ are discussed in more detail in the M&E section of the report).

7 The only physical remnants of the pilot programme in Baucau and Dili appear to be a few weathered signs purportedly written by the local KPK exhorting members of the public not to throw litter.
**CONTEXT**

The two programmes are working within an operating environment very different from when they were designed in 2011. The environment has changed in three important respects, which have a number of implications for the effectiveness of the two programme’s approaches. Firstly, the Timorese police is more functional, more independent and much more self-confident even compared to three years ago. With the withdrawal of UNPOL in 2012, there is much more Timorese ‘ownership’ over police development. In a series of interviews, senior officers stressed that donors should be supporting the PNTL’s own blueprint for development, laid out in the form of their 2014—18 Strategic Plan as well as in the individual plans of district and unit commanders, and the VIP (Visibility, Involvement, Professionalism) strategic vision. A corollary of this sense of ownership is fatigue with ideas perceived to have explicitly international origins and/or presented primarily in a foreign language.\(^8\) The General-Commander of the PNTL told the team that it was now time for donors to ‘deliver’ according to the PNTL’s plans.\(^9\) Complicating donor attempts to do so is a continuing disjuncture between the plans and aspirations of the PNTL and those of the SoSS, who oversees the institution. The SoSS’s plan, known as ‘Police 2030’, appears different in a number of respects from PNTL’s plans, which makes it complicated for any donor to come up with a single programme of work that aligns completely with both plans. A Gabinete (working group) has been established to advance this process.

Secondly, the programmes are operating amidst the context of wider processes of administrative devolution.\(^10\) One particular unit of governance that is receiving a lot of attention is the suku, or village. Although during Indonesian occupation the suku was part of government, under the GoTL’s constitution, the suku ceased to be the lowest tier of formal government structure. Instead village authorities were recast as ‘community authorities or leadership’ and new laws place the village chiefs outside formal government, yet with a number of important governance responsibilities attached to their roles. The GoTL’s Programa Nasional Desenvolvimentu Suku programme (PNDS), with technical support from Australia, is providing annual grants of around $50,000 for small-scale infrastructure projects in each of the country’s 442 sukus.

Forward deployment of police is an important part of this overall decentralisation agenda. In 2013, the PNTL General-Commander approved the National Community Police Unit’s strategic plan, ‘Proximity and Visibility Policing Partnerships in Timor-Leste’. The strategy includes the establishment of 442 suku police officers (Ofisial

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\(^8\) As one senior figure explained, when refuting a question about perceived levels of different influence among different countries: ‘it is no longer the donors who decide here anymore. I am the person who decides’.

\(^9\) Interview with General Commander, Dili, 19 August 2014

\(^10\) For example, the GoTL is in the process of passing down authority to district and sub-district levels through the establishment of municipalities.
Polisu Suku - OPS) and is premised on the need for the PNTL to get closer to the people they serve. It is a popular initiative, supported by 97% of respondents in the 2013 TAF survey.\(^{11}\) Deployment and management of the OPS is the responsibility of the district commanders, while the national Community Police Unit in charge of the overall design of the programme and training of the officers. At the time of this evaluation, there was no clear implementation strategy for the OPS rollout. Funds to support this plan are not in the 2015 annual budgets of either SoSS or PNTL. It is currently being funded in an ad hoc manner. The Office of the President provided some funding for the project in 2013 but not in this financial year. There does not appear to currently be any costing of this ambitious initiative, and nor is it clear to the team if the institutional structures are in place to support its roll out.

Finally, it is important to note that both programmes are working within the context of a rapidly evolving security sector. Against the backdrop of these wider processes of decentralisation,\(^{12}\) there appears to be a profusion of providers beyond the PNTL that are engaged in ‘policing’. This includes groups known as seguransa voluntario, seguransa popular and kablehan that seem to be operating in different ways from district to district and, oft-times, suku to suku.\(^{13}\) Parts of state bodies, such as the Dirasaun Nasional Seguransa Publiku (DNSEP) also have some sort of quasi order-maintenance function.\(^{14}\) The subnational dynamics of these groups are not clear and opinions within the GoTL, PNTL and partners vary as to the utility or otherwise of these groups, the legal basis for their work, and any risks associated with their implementation.\(^{15}\) This situation on the ground is paralleled in some ways by ongoing confusion as to the status of ‘community policing’ at national level.\(^{16}\)

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12. Communities are currently engaged with multiple donor and government decentralisation processes at suku level with a large number of meetings. Some individuals in FGDS noted this has had the unintended consequence of placing stress on relationships. The HAKOHAK Team Leader raised with the team the alternative of KPKs being merged with suku councils in the future, rather than operating on a stand-alone basis.
13. In 2012 the Community Policing Commander based in Dili told one of the authors he was also keen on introducing an Indonesian style SISKAMLING system (Sistem Keamanan Lingkungan - neighbourhood security system) of voluntary youth group security, and had received formal approval from the Commander General but this had not translated to any budget allocation. The approval is contained in a document called Mata Dalan Siguransa Voluntariu Suku.
14. There is a DNSEP post at the popular Cristo Rei beach area. PNTL Officers told a member of the team that their role was to provide ‘maximum security’.
15. Djurdevic-Lukic (2014) notes that ‘Having a CPC, in addition to traditional and formal systems and other mechanisms for mediation, means that police officers assigned to the CPC need to work in different roles in a case by case basis, both with traditional structures and with the official justice system. Thus, the introduction of a CPC might be beneficial but also bring an increase in complexity and confusion in addressing grievances and seeking justice’.
16. A number of aspects of the PNTL Organic Law are not clear vis-à-vis community policing. The Organic Law describes how the police is organised at the District level but, while it specifies the types of units allowed, these do not include community policing. Whereas at the national level the National Director of Community Policing has responsibility, implementation at the District level depends to a very large extent upon the interpretation and priorities of the District Commander who sometimes can be of a higher rank than the National Director. In some instances this can mean that national community policing initiatives have little uptake at district level.
Evaluation purpose and methodology

PURPOSE
The primary purposes of the evaluation are:
1. **Decision-making** to inform the future shape, direction and support for community policing in Timor-Leste;
2. **Learning** to identify what is working and what is not, and apply these lessons learnt to continuously improve the delivery of TLCPP and HAKOHAK; and
3. **Accountability** to MFAT, partner country and other stakeholders for the resources provided and the difference they have made.

The results of the evaluation will be reported/disseminated to relevant partner Government institutions (namely PNTL and SoSS), USAID, TAF, NZ Police, and MFAT.

METHODOLOGY
A three-person evaluation team comprised of Gordon Peake (Team Leader), Bu Wilson (M&E Specialist) and Joao Almeida Fernandes (Timor-Leste security sector specialist) undertook fieldwork from 17 August to 3 September 2014 (see the Evaluation Plan for details). Prior to this time the Team Leader travelled to Wellington for briefings with MFAT and NZ Police, and met with Sustineo in Canberra. The fieldwork followed the methodology outlined in the evaluation plan, approved by the Evaluation Steering Committee (ESC), with minor adaptations to circumstances, in order to answer the agreed evaluation questions. The team reviewed a range of documentation provided by MFAT, TLCPP, TAF, GoTL and PNTL as well as seeking out other academic and policy documentation.

The team spent 17 days in country and was therefore not able to visit all the areas in which TLCPP and HAKOHAK are working. Nevertheless, the team is confident that the focus on three districts (including eastern, western and central), in conjunction with national level interviews, enabled it to form firm, grounded, conclusions. Fieldwork was carried out in Dili, Baucau and Liquica districts, and balanced a focus on the establishment of a unit for community policing at district level appears to be within the sole purview of the Commander (Art. 37/3), meaning, in effect, that there is no firm legal basis for community policing at district level. Art. 37/4 gives authority to the police substation to open police posts in the sukus, providing a legal basis for the suku police to be attached to sukus, as well as other types of police, as is happening in Dili. Revisiting the law is already part of the PNTL strategic plan for 2014—2018.
on national and sub-national programming. The team prioritised the use of Tetun language with Timorese informants, but also used English and Indonesian where appropriate.

Fieldwork comprised key informant interviews (KII) with donors, members of GoTL, PNTL, staff of the two implementing programmes, relevant local and international NGOs; and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with members of the community and members of Konsellu Polisiamentu Komunitária (KPK) in the sukus of Mate La Hotu (Dili District), Fatulia and Ostico (Baucau District), and Tibar and Ulmera (Liquica District). When feasible separate FGDs were conducted with men and women. Group meetings were held with members of the suku police (OPS) in Baucau and with members of the operations team in Liquica. Data collected was analysed and triangulated on an ongoing basis by team members together every day. Regular contact was maintained with MFAT, TLCPP, and TAF to clarify issues and information and report back on progress. This was of great practical assistance to the team and also forms part of a philosophical approach that evaluation findings should not come as a surprise to the programmes being evaluated.

On 2 September 2014 the team presented its preliminary findings in Dili in Tetun and English to the ESC and interested stakeholders. The fieldwork report was submitted to MFAT in Wellington earlier the same day. Short summaries in English and Tetun were provided to all attendees. Attendees included representatives of MFAT in Timor-Leste, senior members of the PNTL, a representative of the SoSS, the Team Leader and staff of TLCPP, the Team Leader of HAKOHAK and Director of TAF, representatives from AFP, JICA and USAID, the Indonesian police attache, and staff of Psychosocial Recovery & Development in East Timor (PRADET). On 12 September 2014 the Team Leader and M&E Specialist presented their preliminary findings in Wellington to MFAT and NZ Police. During both presentations the team received and noted feedback for incorporation in this report. Consolidated written feedback from the ESC and stakeholders was provided to the evaluation team on 24 and 29 October and informed the final evaluation report.

A small number of interviews were conducted after the in country work. Dr Ingvar Anda, Principal Consultant, Hau Meni & Associates played an oversight role to ensure that the evaluation process and report met MFAT Evaluation quality standards.

17 The team had initially selected the districts of Dili, Bobonaro and Liquica for fieldwork but Baucau was substituted for Bobonaro on the advice of the Evaluation Steering Committee (ESC).
18 These KPK are also referred to in English as Community Policing Councils (CPC).
19 Dr Anda has extensive experience in the design, implementation, review and monitoring and evaluation of development projects, with a range of bilateral and multilateral donor frameworks.
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EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Objective 1: Relevance - to assess the relevance of the TLCPP and HAKOHAK programme of work to the needs of Timor-Leste.

- To what degree do the projects remain relevant to communities and to PNTL (including headquarters, district commands and operational staff) and to partners, donors and other key stakeholders?

Objective 2: Effectiveness – to identify the intended results (outputs and outcomes, and associated achievements of the projects).

- To what extent have TLCPP and HAKOHAK delivered on their intended outputs, and their short and medium term outcomes (results)?
- What factors have affected the achievement, or otherwise, of the intended results?
- What are the on-going challenges affecting implementation? How should these be addressed?
- What (if any) are the unintended effects of TLCPP and HAKOHAK (both positive and negative)?
- Have the model/s, strategies, methods and approaches adopted been appropriate? Which are the most successful, and which are not so successful? Why is that?
- Are the relationships and arrangements between key stakeholders (Asia Foundation, MFAT (Wellington and Post), New Zealand Police (Wellington and TLCPP)) and other sector actors working well? Why is that? Why not? What can be done better? Has TLCPP and HAKOHAK been well coordinated?

Objective 3: Sustainability – to determine the extent to which the projects have (or are likely to) contributed to sustained development outcomes.

- How can local ownership of community policing approaches and community policing councils be enhanced?
- To what degree have the projects been effective in institutionalising a community policing philosophy across the PNTL?
- What will constrain/enhance the sustainability of the TLCPP and HAKOHAKs’ results?

Objective 4: Efficiency – to identify the extent to which the projects and the interventions have been efficient.

- To what extent were the arrangements and relationships between Asia Foundation, MFAT (Wellington and Post), New Zealand Police (Wellington and TLCPP), other sector actors and implementing sites efficient and provided value for money?
- Has there been value for money, in terms of delivering outcomes, using the optimal allocation of resources?
- What could be done differently to improve current implementation?
- Are there ways that TLCPP and HAKOHAK could be delivered more efficiently?
Objective 5: Cross-cutting – to determine the extent to which the programme has appropriately addressed gender and human rights, in line with NZ mandate.

- To what extent have the projects addressed gender and human rights through targeted interventions?
- What human rights and gender outcomes have been achieved?
- To what extent are gender, human rights and social outcomes likely to be sustained?
- How can the projects better address gender equality over the next two years?

Objective 6: to inform decisions on the future design and/or support to community policing in Timor-Leste:

- What, if any, future support for community policing might be required after 2015? What are the key future challenges and issues that will need to be addressed? How should these be addressed?
- What lessons can be drawn to inform the future design of TLCPP and HAKOHAK? What lessons can we learn from other community policing activities? What can we also learn from good development practice in community policing that would add value?
- What are the key changes to the current support models needed to ensure they are even more effective and efficient, remain relevant and contribute to sustained development outcomes?
- What else needs to be done? What are the alternatives?
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Findings

This chapter presents the findings of the evaluation team against the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. Whereas the sections on relevance, efficiency and sustainability address both programmes together, the effectiveness section deals with each programme separately. Findings about the M&E systems of each programme logically form part of the effectiveness section but are dealt with separately below. This is followed by a discussion of cross-cutting issues, with a principal focus on gender.

RELEVANCE

The GoTL, through Decree Law 9/2009, Article 1(2), has committed the PNTL to a community-based orientation.\(^{20}\) Although the PNTL made an explicit commitment to community policing in 2009 this initially proved difficult to institutionalise, and community policing existed in significant tension with other militarising tendencies within the organisation.\(^{21}\) However, what just a few years ago was little more than a rhetorical ambition of a small number of people has, by 2014, become a relatively mainstream concept within Timor-Leste government and police circles.\(^{22}\)

\(^{20}\) Many hands have contributed to getting to this point. Most critically, enthusiastic champions of community policing within the PNTL have played a central role in advancing the concept. There has also been important support tendered over the years by United Nations police and donors such as Australia and Japan. Although not the subject of this evaluation, Japan’s ongoing work in this area, including sending significant numbers of PNTL to observe community policing in Bekasi in Indonesia, appears to be playing a useful role.


\(^{22}\) A compelling illustration of the difference in a relatively short time is to compare and contrast the messaging, words and public attitudes of PNTL commanders to the concept of ‘community policing’. In 2010, one of the authors participated in a sparsely attended ‘national forum’ on community policing that was memorable primarily for an impassioned impromptu intervention from the Commander of Dili District. The Commander told donors that he wanted guns and cars, not instructional videos on community policing. His words went down well with his fellow commanders who cheered with approbation. A much more lively, enthusiastic and positive atmosphere prevailed four years later at a subsequent national forum that the evaluation team attended. For further details of the first forum see Peake, G. (2014) ‘Why is it that so few of us appear to read reports? Because life is squelched out of them’ DevPolicy. Available at http://devpolicy.org/why-is-it-that-so-few-of-us-appear-to-read-reports-because-life-is-squelched-out-of-them-20140523/ (accessed 14 September 2014)
The HAKOHAK and TLCPP programmes were designed at a time when the PNTL was under the aegis of the UN. Handover of responsibility for policing from the UN to the PNTL occurred in 2011, and the UN departed in 2012. As discussed previously, in 2014 the PNTL has become a notably more functional, more independent and much more self-confident organisation.\(^{23}\) It is also operating in a much more stable environment although not one in which it has full primacy for order maintenance.

Twelve years after independence, the reach of the state in Timor-Leste (including the broader judicial system) continues to experience geographic, logistical and capacity constraints. Security in Timor-Leste continues to be provided by an assortment of security providers including community leaders and the PNTL. According to TAF’s 2013 survey, people ranked citizens (51%) and community leaders (21%) higher than PNTL when asked who was primarily responsible for maintaining security within their locality. Within this context, the further development of community policing has the potential to improve access to justice, policing and security. This can occur through PNTL building effective partnerships with communities, taking a problem solving orientation, and developing police structures and management procedures allowing decentralised decision making, accompanied by deep understanding of local communities and their contexts. The OPS initiative is a case in point.\(^{24}\)

It was apparent to the team that for the PNTL the notion of community policing has evolved over a period of several years, from a marginal position to one increasingly central to the organisation’s identity. This has occurred due to a confluence of donor programming and advocacy, existing customary practices and support within the PNTL. The palpable ‘demand’ for community policing - most notably in the form of the KPK was expressed to the evaluation team by a wide range of interlocutors – from senior PNTL officers to community members. This demonstrates the continued relevance of supporting community policing development in Timor-Leste. Supporting these developments also serves as a positive counterbalance to other, more militaristic, dynamics still very present within the PNTL.

\(^{23}\) Although the PNTL has evolved, significant challenges remain. The most recent report of the Provedor presented to the Speaker of Parliament on the joint operation in Baucau is salutary. It should also be noted that of the most recent batch of police graduates the vast majority were reportedly allocated to special policing units, and only a handful allocated to ‘regular’ district policing.

EFFECTIVENESS

TLCPP
The TLCPP has brought extensive New Zealand experience to the institutionalisation of community policing in Timor-Leste. TLCPP advisers appear to be engaging in a range of innovative endeavors although not all of these efforts appear to be captured in the programme’s reporting regime. Many members of the PNTL who participated in two study trips to New Zealand have been stimulated by the experience. For example, the District Commander of Dili told the team that his study trip had inspired him to institute a schools engagement programme. It will be important to capitalise on such enthusiasm.

The TLCPP appears to have had something of a ‘stop-start’ history but the team believes that NZ Police are to be given full credit for self-identifying issues with the programme and taking steps to address them. The new model of a cadre of in-country advisers is a significant improvement on the previous, rather flawed, fly in fly out model. It corresponds to best practice in development as well as being a recommendation of the Strategic Review of Policing. However, adopting this new approach has meant the programme has essentially had to re-start, with a consequent loss of momentum. Effectively, this has meant that a programme that is now over three years old began only about six months ago.

The team queries the utility of the current model whereby solitary advisers, often unversed in relevant languages, are assigned to cover a handful of districts and work with the PNTL. Although not articulated in a specific theory of change, the idea seems to be that by advisers working with the PNTL, management, procedure and work practices will ipso facto result in better service delivery by PNTL. In many ways, this is a new iteration of the UNPOL model (1999—2012) whereby expatriate police were tasked with mentoring, advising and building up their Timorese counterparts. There is no doubt that the TLCPP approach is a distinct improvement on what has gone before in that New Zealand police advisers are interested, prepared to be innovative and really want to make a positive difference. However the approach is insufficiently attuned to contemporary police realities in Timor-Leste, and both PNTL and advisers have noted the lack of traction achieved. Although it will not solve all issues, there may be some benefit in advisers engaging in districts in teams of two or three in order to facilitate mutual learning and support.

Times have also changed. The PNTL of 2014 is a very different organisation to when TLCPP was conceived in 2011. This greater level of ownership has meant that some PNTL district commanders are bridling at what they perceive as overly intrusive

25 Strategic Evaluation of Police Work Funded Under the New Zealand Aid Programme 2005—11, Pacific Regional report
performance management on the part of TLCPP advisers. At the same time, it is also important to recognise that there will continue to be varying levels of interest and appetite for adopting any changed policing practices. This will sometimes mean that despite very good efforts on the part of advisers there may not be immediately obvious outcomes. However, through collecting stories of change from advisers and PNTL alike, a more textured understanding of this interaction may be possible.26

Far away from the district command building is a group of PNTL in sore need of attention and support. These are the men and women of the OPS, a GoTL initiative to place a police officer in each of the country’s 442 sukus. These individuals are conceived as the ‘front line’ of police interaction with the community and appear to be engaged in a wide range of community level activities that, broadly, contribute to safety and security.27 These activities are wider than a western conceptualisation of ‘what police do’ and include a much broader notion of ‘policing’ that can cover issues as diverse as agriculture and public health.

By way of example, police are often at the front line of contact for people suffering trauma and mental illness. In discussions with a range of PNTL ranks, officers were very animated when asked about their work with members of the community who have physical or mental disability. There is an important link with violence against women, with mentally and physically disabled women suffering far higher levels of sexual and physical violence than an already high incidence in the general population. There is currently considerable donor and GoTL interest and developing momentum in the area of disability inclusive development that can be leveraged for these programmes. There is a clear case for developing skills in this area.

As noted previously, implementation of the OPS scheme in rural areas is lagging because of logistical, human resource management and financing issues. There does not appear to currently be any costing of the initiative.

These lower ranks of police are engaging in important work but police development programmes have traditionally neglected them.28 By way of example, one officer in Liquica told the team that the last time he received training was in 2003. The needs of the OPS revolve around logistics – some said they were using private motorbikes and phone credit to do their work – but also training that is attuned to their realities. The team welcomes the fact that TLCPP, together with HAKOHAK, is supporting the roll out of a course dedicated to OPS and hope that this course is not

26 An example of where structured stories of change approach would work is in evaluating the outcomes of the first and second study trips to New Zealand.
27 A somewhat analogous parallel to the OPS is the Community Auxiliary Police (CAP) in Bougainville and Community Officer programme in Solomon Islands. Learning from these and other programmes would be useful.
28 Programmes have tended to concentrate more on senior management at national, unit and district levels.
a ‘one-off’ but the first step in a process of ongoing professional development addressing the fact that the lower ranks of police have received comparatively little attention. There is a clear competitive advantage in having credentialed New Zealand police officers providing assistance in this area. Some funding assistance may also be useful. In a similar vein, the team commends TLCPP for commissioning a report on programming options to end violence against women. It is now very timely to incorporate the recommendations of this report within the broader review of professional development for the PNTL.

In evaluative terms, it is extremely hard to know what the effect of TLCPP work in terms of education has been since the programme began. Again, the TLCPP Programme management is to be credited for identifying the need to work differently on police education, and responding to the request of the Second Commander that the current training module on Community Policing is evaluated before further training is developed for PNTL staff. A professional educator is currently in country doing important foundational work on evaluating the training, and improving pedagogy and relevance to Timorese realities. This new approach recognises that classroom training is but a fraction of how adults learn. It is often stated that only 10% of education is accomplished in the classroom with 70% learnt by doing. The team believes this is important, potentially path-breaking work, which could mean an important role for NZ Police. On a related note there appears to be a misapprehension in some quarters that there is no entry point for contribution to recruit level curriculum development. This is far from the case.

HAKOHAH

Similarly, the HAKOHAK has contributed extensively to the institutionalisation of community policing in Timor-Leste. The establishment of the KPKs is the most visible component of the programme. As of September 2014 HAKOHAK was in eight districts with 72 established KPKs. HAKOHAK is in the process of expanding to three more districts and developing 41 more KPKs (including ten more in Dili that are going forward). Most of the KPKs are less than 18 months old, making it perhaps too early to definitively judge their long-term effectiveness. The initiative is a popular one. A wide range of interlocutors – from senior PNTL officers to community members – spoke as one in voicing their support for the concept of KPK. The police commanders of Baucau, Dili and Liquica districts were among those who lauded this innovative initiative. A district commander explained to the team why the proposal was popular:

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29 For a guide to the origins, benefits and challenges of this education model see Kajewski, K. and V. Madsen (2013) Demystifying 70:20:10 White Paper, DeakinPrime
30 The Commander of the Centro Formasaun (Police Training Centre) requested that three to four of his instructors be allowed to visit New Zealand to better understand curriculum development in that context. The team believes there is great merit in this idea.
It gives power and authority to the community to resolve the situation. And it makes them feel important. Many of the issues can be resolved according to tara bandu. It motivates people and contributes to the situation being calm.

A notable exception is the district of Bobonaro where efforts (for both programmes) have not progressed in the ways intended, reportedly owing to opposition of the District Commander.

The concept of a mechanism for communities and police to work together on issues of common cause is not a particularly new one. Forums like this are staple features in many development interventions in societies with frayed or non-existent relationships between police and community and their value is the subject of continued lively debate among scholars. HAKOHAK would appear to have adapted the concept of a police community council in a manner that aligns with the cadences and cultures of Timor-Leste and fulfills their objective of demonstrating KPKs as a workable model for dispute resolution. Although it is early days, the KPK’s appear very popular and fulfill a community need. FGD participants were extremely positive about having a forum for discussing issues of common concern. Many credited the KPK as playing an important role in reducing conflict in their community although these claims appeared impressionistic and hard to verify.

In order to maximise the demonstration of the KPK model the team is of the view that some more intensive attention may be required.

The KPKs are far and away the most visible features of the HAKOHAK programme but the programme is also engaging in a wide range of other activities, which perhaps are not as well heralded. The programme has supported the establishment of the Komisaun Diretiva Distrital (KDD), a forum to discuss pertinent issues at a district level. The district administrator of Liquica told that team that he found the

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31 Most of the research on police-community councils has been in Africa. Some have pointed to the usually short shelf life of these initiatives and raised concerns that they tend to be the domain of an unrepresentative elite rather than the ‘community’ per se. Others see more reasons to be cautiously optimistic. In Sierra Leone, for instance, Bruce Baker argues that there are six important strengths to these types of arrangements. They ‘enhance the image of the police…[are] an instrument in improving mutual communication between police and communities…effective providers of criminal intelligence…a significant supplement to overstretched resources of the police…rais[e] awareness of security issues …and are universally valued by all stakeholders. Baker, B. (2008) ‘Community Policing in Freetown, Sierra Leone: Foreign Import or Local Solution?’ Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding Vol 2, Issue 1 pp.23-42

32 Many Timorese refer positively to the similarity between the Indonesian era Bimbingan Polisi Daerah (BIMPOLDA) or Village Guidance Police and the OPS. The similarity is the ‘access to policing’ that both models provide.

33 On at least three occasions, the team was told that the reduction in criminal cases being dealt with by the PNTL in the sub-district was an indication of the utility of the KPK. This would require further research to enable verification.

34 The team learnt that the PNTL are self-funding two of the KPKs in Ainaro district.
KDD a useful co-ordinating mechanism.\textsuperscript{35} The programme is supporting community outreach through television and radio and supporting training as well as other initiatives.

An important part of the programme, which should be lauded, is HAKOHAK’s commitment to evidence-based research, much of it supported through the DFID PPA. The programme has commissioned analytical pieces, managed a police-community survey and developed in-house contributions of high quality. The result is a substantial body of work that constitutes a valuable resource for researchers and, the team hopes, a repository of practical information for donors engaging in this sector. Also noteworthy is that the programme has engaged in its own reflective practice by working with an outside researcher who appraised its own theory of change.\textsuperscript{36} The programme’s commitment to debate, intellectual engagement and exchange – which goes well beyond what is strictly required in terms of the funders – is extremely commendable.

Engaged, empowered and networked Timorese staff play an important part in ensuring that the KPKs ‘fit’ with the prevailing reality and are not considered an outside imposition. The HAKOHAK ‘model’ of primarily employing Timorese staff has enabled them to develop strong bonds with PNTL and the community. Currently there are 15 people working for the programme directly, 14 of whom are Timorese, many with extensive experience working for the United Nations and other international organisations. Through their networks, contacts and a shared language the staff are able to gain easy access to government officials and police. This ‘Timor-first’ model contributes substantially to local ownership, engagement and, ultimately, sustainability as well as being a much cheaper delivery model.

A major problem that the programme faces is becoming a ‘victim of its own success’. PNTL and community leaders are clamouring for an expansion of KPKs to other \textit{sukus} and other districts (Even with the rapid expansion of KPKs over the last few years, it is important to remember that around 80\% of \textit{sukus} are still not covered). The team notes that HAKOHAK has subcontracted the setting up and resourcing of KPK’s in Viqueque and Dili to Asosiasaun HAK, a well-respected Timorese human rights NGO; with a plan to extend this to Manufahi and Covalima. Monitoring the effectiveness of this approach will be important for future planning.

Caution needs to be exercised in scaling up any pilot to ensure that resources are available to adequately finance, support and monitor such an expansion, which could be almost on a scale parallel to the PNDS programme. No donor should be

\textsuperscript{35} Unfortunately the team was unable to meet the District Administrator of Baucau as he had been called to a meeting in Dili.

\textsuperscript{36} The programme is to be commended for its reflective practice by working with an outside researcher who appraised its own theory of change. See Djurdjevic-Lukic, S. (2014)
expected to sustain this initiative alone; ‘dollar for dollar’ support from the GoTL will most probably be needed as well as people to oversee the expansion. One possibility worthy of further considerations is whether the functions currently undertaken by the KPK could be rolled into the responsibilities of the suku chief and council. Many of the same individuals would appear to be office-holders in both bodies, and there are clear efficiencies in such an approach. HAKOHAK could start engaging with relevant stakeholders in the Ministry of State Administration (ESTATAL) on socialising the programme given the parallels between its work and the decentralisation agenda.

Three additional issues should be considered (and programmed) going forward. First, there needs to be intensified attention to existing KPKs in the form of ‘refresher’ and more specific training, and linking with other sources of information and support. Developing a handbook for KPK members would be beneficial. Ideally this process would be the responsibility of the PNTL as part of their curriculum development, with an important supporting role from TAF.

Secondly, the team has some concerns about how gender issues are being dealt with in the KPK. Communities invariably cite domestic violence as one of the major problems affecting their community. Although the law is clear that domestic violence is a ‘public crime’ and therefore must be reported to the police, HAKOHAK reporting and evaluation team FGDs indicate that the KPK and other forums are being used as an alternative source for resolving these issues. Some creative thinking is needed about how to ensure these mechanisms empower women, safeguard human rights and work with, rather than undermine, the implementation of the Law Against Domestic Violence (LADV). This can be achieved by leveraging ‘in-house’ experience in the form of TAF’s recently commenced Ending Violence Against Women (EVAW) programme and NZ Police’s Pacific Prevention of Domestic Violence Programme (PPDVP), as well as GoTL programming through the respective district Rede Referral networks. Giving further attention to how the HAKOHAK programme might more successfully recruit and retain female staff would also support a strengthened programme in this area.

37 This may be happening more in some areas than others. OPS in Baucau stressed that KPK can not resolve domestic violence issues, and that the role of the KPK is prevention, and socialisation of the LADV.
38 The PPDVP focuses primarily on building the capacity of Pacific Police services to prevent/respond effectively to domestic violence. This includes the development and maintenance of effective partnerships between Police and other agencies/NGOs with a role in preventing/responding effectively to domestic violence. See http://www.ppdvp.org.nz
39 The Rede Referral Network includes support for gender based violence survivors at the district and sub-districts level through basic and specialized services, child protection officers and social animators in all sub-districts. The network includes the Vulnerable Persons Unit (VPU) of the PNTL. Once again the most logical entry point for engagement with the Referral Network would be through TAF’s EVAW programme, whose staff have long-standing relationships with members of the network.
40 The team notes that HAKOHAK has recently recruited two female staff that will commence shortly.
Thirdly, thought needs to be given as to how the activities of the KPK could be best monitored using an appropriate combination of in-house and independent monitoring and analysis to ensure that the inherent risks that come with all programmes of security and justice devolution are ameliorated. There is no indication that the KPKs that the team visited were going off-beam but there is simply no means of being sure what is going on with the other councils currently operating. It is neither appropriate nor sustainable to expect this to be task for TAF alone, although the programme could well play a role in terms of assisting a monitoring effort that could combine government and non-governmental organisations. The PNTL’s office of the Inspector-Geral, which has audit responsibilities, could make an important contribution to this oversight process.

EFFICIENCY

The team notes that the two programmes have sought to increase their efficiency through steps taken to align their activities. There is, for example, now a joint work calendar and MFAT is to be credited with efforts to improve relationships and delineate responsibilities between the programmes. The SoSS is to be commended for taking a strong interest in programmatic cohesion through his active participation in the Programme Management Group (PMG).

While co-ordination is improving it is not yet optimal. In almost every interview, the PNTL referred to a perception that there is a ‘competition’ or ‘contest’ between the two programmes. For the PNTL, having two programmes ostensibly working on a similar set of issues is confusing, as well as time-consuming. It is not just Timorese authorities that are a bit confused. The team heard from several TLCPP advisers that they perceive HAKOHAK as better resourced when, in fact, the annual operating budget of TLCPP is three times larger.

In terms of value for money the two programmes cannot be readily compared as each brings its own relative advantages. However there is considerable value for money to be found in HAKOHAK’s employment of principally Timorese staff which is not only economical, but also enables deeper engagement with Timorese networks including the PNTL and the GoTL.

The way that New Zealand manages the program is certainly inclusive but a consequence of this is that there appears to be no central ‘node’ of decision-making authority. The Activity Manager for the TLCPP programme is located in Wellington, and significant responsibility is also undertaken by the First Secretary in Dili. Arrangements between the Wellington and Dili offices of MFAT, and the New Zealand mission to Timor-Leste, are complex. The Wellington office is responsible for the budgeting, tendering, and contract management, while the Dili office is responsible for operational matters.

41 A notable exception to this trend was the district of Liquica, where there appears a very close relationship between advisers from the respective programmes.
Zealand police in Wellington and the TLCPP programme in Dili are complex. While devolution of management of the programme to Dili might enable more grounded knowledge of the programme to be applied, there does not currently appear to be sufficient resources allocated at post for this to occur.

The complexities of these relationships is most apparent in the management of the third-party monitoring provided by Sustineo discussed above. In the case of Sustineo this complexity appears to contribute to lack of clarity of roles (due to multiple interpretations and revisions of tasks), slow decision making (due to the large numbers of people involved in managing the relationship) and less than optimal utilisation of what a contracting company could offer. It would be timely for MFAT to review the current arrangements for overall management of the programme. Reviewing, streamlining and improving the arrangements for management of the relationship with Sustineo are urgent.

The team interviewed other donor organisations implementing a variety of community policing programming including the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Australian Federal Police (AFP) funded TLPDP programme, and the Indonesian police attaché. While there is always the potential for improved coordination between donors the team found that both TLCPP and HAKOHAK are providing programming that is different to, but compatible with, other programming on community policing. Regular contact between the two programmes and other donors to exchange information is occurring.

**MONITORING AND REPORTING**

Sound and evidence-based monitoring is a pre-requisite for effective management of programmes and greatly assists in enabling effective evaluations. The two programmes are seeking to catalyse change in complex, rapidly changing systems, meaning that activities and planned outputs can, and should, change as the programme evolves. Accordingly, monitoring systems need to help staff to understand what works and why in their interventions, and how programme activities have contributed to these outcomes. This then enables targeted experimentation and adaptation appropriate to the evolving circumstances.

The complexity of the operating environment means that neither programme is able to directly attribute outcomes to their programmatic efforts. Consequently both programmes have sensibly chosen to use contribution analysis, together with other M&E methodologies.  

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42 As Djurdevic-Lukic (2014) notes there is ‘an ongoing challenge to find an effective middle ground between exhaustive and expensive analysis to prove contribution, and a simple acceptance of an assertion’, p. 39
Contribution analysis requires a clear understanding of the attribution problem to be addressed, and a clear theory of change with explicit risks and assumptions. It uses an iterative process of collecting evidence and assembling contribution stories (and challenges to those stories), the collecting of further evidence to revise and strengthen the contribution story, until a plausible story supporting the theory of change is produced.43

**TLCPP**

TLCPP reporting is provided both by TLCPP itself and by Sustineo. The reporting of Sustineo and TLCPP do not appear well integrated. The team is unsure as to why TLCPP has not made more of Sustineo’s source material in the production of their own reports.

The delays in ‘getting started’, changing to a different delivery model, the use of a revised results framework from May 2014, turnover of TLCPP advisers over the life of the programme, and changes in personnel within Sustineo has produced delays and discontinuity. All of these factors underpin and affect the extent to which the effectiveness of the TLCPP programme can be assessed. Difficult inter-personal relations have compounded the situation.

The fundamental issue that appears never really to have been cleared up is what Sustineo’s contribution should be. All parties seemed confused. One Sustineo adviser explained that the messages about ‘who should be doing what’ were constantly changing and were confusing. Another former adviser believed that Sustineo’s role should have been that of a ‘critical friend’, yet for whatever reason it appears that it was difficult for Sustineo to get ‘inside the tent’ with TLCPP. The current TLCPP Team Leader believes that he is required to ‘keep a distance’ from Sustineo in order to maintain Sustineo’s ‘independence’. With such divergent views the utility of Sustineo to TLCPP is reduced. The TLCPP does not feel like the Sustineo framework is ‘theirs’ and the relationship appears to be considered as heavy burden rather than a potential asset.

A lack of clarity in reporting lines covering the relationship between Sustineo, MFAT, and the NZ Police complicates matters still further, a situation described by one observer as ‘confusion upon confusion’, and by staff of the two programmes as ‘too many cooks in the kitchen’ and ‘a train wreck’. Some Sustineo advisers believed that lack of clarity about where authority lay between NZ Police and MFAT may have been at the heart of this issue, one noting this resulted in ‘long periods of silence’ when Sustineo raised matters that needed addressing. There appeared to be confusion as to who Sustineo were supposed to be collaborating with on the details of M&E approaches.

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Sustineo’s own work outputs have been of a rather mixed quality. Although Sustineo correctly identified that a process of contribution analysis should take place, the processes currently being followed are not able to produce convincing evidence to gauge TLCPP’s contribution. This may be due to a combination of very ambitious TLCPP outcomes, and an early division of responsibilities for aspects of the contribution analysis where Sustineo was responsible for determining outcomes, and the TLCPP was responsible for collecting information on the activities to outputs (with Sustineo having a role to collate and discuss annually).  

Sustineo have provided a baseline combining whatever seems to be available in the way of PNTL crime statistics, TAF surveys and Belun monitoring. Their Participatory Organisational Capacity Assessment (POCA) process is designed to track the PNTL’s own perception of their developing competence, trustworthiness and accessibility, but without additional work to explore a) the veracity of these perceptions, and b) the contribution of TLCPP, a contribution analysis will not be possible. Early (germane) suggestions from Sustineo for reflective practice and analysis of adviser journals appear to have got lost somewhere along the way.

The methodology for the contribution analysis, including dividing responsibility between Sustineo and TLCPP for components addressing outcomes and activities/outputs has not been effective and needs to be reviewed urgently. Consideration should be given to enhancing contribution analysis through the collection of stories of change from advisers and PNTL alike, through processes such as outcome mapping or a rigorous application of the Most Significant Change (MSC) method.

The TLCPP’s own reporting regime is difficult to understand. The reports use terms interchangeably, number programme components in different ways in different reports, and use a variety of descriptors for each of the three components/outcomes. The reporting does not sufficiently differentiate what it is that the PNTL are undertaking/have achieved and what TLCPP has undertaken/achieved. For example, there is little in the programme’s monitoring regime that allows evaluators to gauge the TLCPP adviser contribution.

Many statements about achievements are little more than hunches insufficiently grounded in verifiable evidence. This means that the reports do not contribute to understanding what works and what does not. The reports also appear to take a lot of time to produce and the Team Leader is concerned that what is required is not clear.

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45 Discussions with the Sustineo adviser during the final stages of drafting this report indicate that Sustineo are attempting, in the upcoming 2014 POCA, to address these issues.
Although TLCPP appears to have completed a number of outputs, determining the extent to which TLCPP have delivered on their intended outputs, and their short and medium term outcomes is extremely difficult. This is for the following main reasons:

- The logic framework model and revised results framework nominate ambitious outcomes for the programme, and many of the activities found in the workplan are described in fairly vague terms. The combination of these factors will inevitably make reporting difficult.
- Reporting by TLCPP is not sufficiently clear to determine if outputs have been achieved, or to give an indication of where an 'in progress' activity is up to. It is possible that TLCPP reporting is underselling the programme's achievements.
- Although there is a programme logic, a clearly articulated theory of change is absent. Similar to many other police development programmes it seems to be principally assumed that close proximity between experienced international police and local police will automatically result in improved performance of the local police. This absence of a theory of change makes interrogating the link between activities and outcomes difficult.
- Determining TLCPP's contribution to PNTL change is not currently adequately supported by the contribution analysis provided by Sustineo. The separation of responsibility for measuring outputs (TLCPP) and outcomes (Sustineo) is not viable. A deepened and more inquisitive approach to contribution analysis will be necessary going forward.
- The reports would be more valuable if they were prepared to reflect on challenges for the programme.

HAKOHAK

The programme’s monitoring and reporting regime is praiseworthy. Probably the least impressive part of it is the official reporting, where the format appears to have been dictated to by the need to adhere to higher-order compulsory USAID (numeric) indicators. However, this is made up for in many other ways. These include: thoughtful contribution analysis contained in HAKOHAK reports to DFID; maintenance of a detailed database relating to participation in KPK; community perception surveys; and detailed research on a variety of topics pertinent to the programme. Again, the programme may be a ‘victim of its own success’ in that it has a wealth of information but more analytical capacity would be required to mine this data and make it accessible to the programmes.

Apart from being extensive, HAKOHAK monitoring is also responsive. One example is that following a realisation that community and police dispute resolutions were occurring when the project team was not present, the existing monitoring system was adapted through the development of two logbooks to systematise this reporting for both the PNTL and TAF. It is now planned to use logbooks, which will
allow for trend comparisons and the ability to quantitatively assess progress towards TAF’s Theory of Change.

A future focus on end-user satisfaction with the KPK, combined with monitoring of KPK outcomes to ensure that such hybrid governance arrangements do not exclude or disadvantage marginal or vulnerable groups, undermine implementation of the LADV, or deviate from their anticipated role will be important. As noted elsewhere in this evaluation report, such monitoring should not be the sole responsibility of HAKOHAK but could also include the PNTL, other parts of TAF and other civil society organisations.
**SUSTAINABILITY**

The sustainability of community policing programming in Timor-Leste depends in large part upon the continued enthusiasm of the GoTL and the PNTL for the concept, coupled with future budgetary commitments on the part of the GoTL. The rolling out of the OPS to every *suku* and the possible expansion of KPK’s will need to be costed to inform decision making of both GoTL and donors. Any future donor programming should include a clear exit strategy.

Clarifying Sustineo’s role and reporting arrangements can hopefully contribute to a better sense of what is and is not working with the TLCPP programme, and what aspects of the programme need to be strengthened to ensure longer term sustainability. Similarly, further consideration of how KPK’s can be assisted to include the needs and interests of women, while supporting the implementation of the LADV will help to ensure the utility, and hence sustainability, of the KPK’s.

A continued emphasis on the employment of Timorese staff in the HAKOHAK programme, and a new emphasis on the employment of Timorese staff in more substantive roles within TLCPP will increase ownership of development initiatives, and longer term sustainability.

The current sub-contracting of KPK support work to NGOs like *Asosiasaun HAK*, may, if effective, be a model that could improve the sustainability of KPK.

**CROSS CUTTING ISSUES**

The New Zealand Aid Programme requires cross-cutting issues of environment, gender and human rights to be effectively integrated into all New Zealand Aid. This section deals principally with findings in relation to gender. As noted above there also appear to be opportunities to support the PNTL in developing the skills of front line OPS to work with people with disabilities including those with mental illness. Environment as a cross cutting issue does not feature in either of the programmes evaluated and therefore is not discussed here.

The TLCPP Programme Design (2011) identified (correctly) that women in Timor-Leste face particular difficulties in accessing both the traditional justice system and the formal legal system, that the GoTL had recently passed the LADV (although there were challenges in its implementation including by police), and that female police in the PNTL faced a number of obstacles in carrying out their duties and in obtaining promotion. The Design proposed a particular focus on domestic violence through a baseline; activities aimed at improving knowledge, attitude and practice in the PNTL; and the maintenance of close working relationships with relevant GoTL departments and civil society.

Although a prominent component of the design, ‘gender’ has been much less of a focus in the actual programme. For example, there are no specific activities listed in the 1 January—30 June 2014 TLCPP report which address these issues, although it
is stated that there has been good progress on consolidating coordinated activities with key service providers including the Vulnerable Persons Unit - VPU (although this is erroneously referred to as the Victims Protection Unit), PRADET, FOKUPERS, the Secretary of State for the Promotion of Gender Equality (SEPI) and ALFeLa (Legal Assistance for Women and Children). The nature of this coordination is not elaborated upon.

The TLCPP 2013 Annual Report mentions gender only glancingly. It notes that as a result of the PNTL trip to New Zealand in March 2013 crime prevention initiatives in Liquica District particularly relating to domestic violence were commenced. Reporting notes 'the exemplary leadership of District Commander Natercia Soares Martins to progressively empower women and establish a "zero tolerance" of domestic violence' in Liquica district. Ongoing TLCPP support for these activities is not detailed and nor is there any mention of relationships between the 'exemplary' PNTL commander and the programme.

One of the TLCPP advisers has considerable experience in, and remains involved with, the PPDVP programme. In addition, an NZ Police technical advisor with subject matter expertise in domestic violence police programmes visited Timor-Leste in September-October 2013. The subsequent report outlining the issues and opportunities identified by the advisor has been delivered by TLCPP to District Commanders to initiate dialogue. The report outlined the intention to follow up with all District Commanders in early 2014 to identify those domestic violence related options identified by PNTL as relevant for adoption within the various Districts. It is not clear whether this has occurred.

There are currently no women advisors employed on the TLCPP programme, although there is a female language assistant. Like other Timorese staff on the program, this individual has a record of substantive work and her skills could well be utilised in a wider way than simple translation tasks.

One of the significant risks for the HAKOHAK programme is the management of how the KPK’s address domestic violence. The passing of the LADV in 2010 was a significant milestone for Timor-Leste which through making domestic violence a public crime, effectively removed any role for local leaders in resolving these cases.

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46 This adviser sees considerable scope for incorporating aspects of the PPDVP programme into TLCPP programming.
47 An advisor on youth programming also visited but the status of his report is also unclear.
48 The LADV is intended ‘to provide a legal framework to effectively prosecute cases of domestic violence, as well as to prevent domestic violence and provide assistance to victims. Importantly, the LADV recognises domestic violence as a public crime. This is intended to send a clear message to the community that domestic violence is unacceptable and ensure all cases are brought before the courts’.
Implementation of the law has faced a number of challenges but is starting to gain traction.\textsuperscript{49} However, it is also recognised that the way that the formal legal system deals with cases of domestic violence has not generally been producing very satisfactory outcomes for women.

HAKOHAK reporting and the results of the evaluation team's FGDs indicates that domestic violence remains one of the top sources of insecurity for communities. Starting from a low base, HAKOHAK has increasingly engaged with issues of domestic violence through the provision of security grants focussed on socialising the LADV, and one security grant has been provided on addressing the negative impact of 'witch' convictions.\textsuperscript{50} The effectiveness of these socialisations is not known although HAKOHAK reports a significant decrease in domestic violence in one suku (suku Ostico) following the socialisation activity.

Yet, HAKOHAK reports that the KPKs have also been involved in successfully resolving cases of domestic violence. While reducing domestic violence is undoubtedly a good thing the question remains of whether the KPKs are operating within the law, whether these 'resolutions' are producing good outcomes for women affected by violence, and the durability of the 'solutions'. HAKOHAK's baseline report in 2012 indicated that there were potential risks associated with the functioning of the KPKs from a gender perspective.\textsuperscript{51} The following recommendations were made:

- The HAKOHAK programme should proactively explore mechanisms to include women's interests and concerns in the work of CPCs [KPK] to ensure inequitable practices engaged in at suku level will not be further strengthened through the mechanism of the CPC.
- The HAKOHAK programme should proactively ensure that the mechanism of the CPC neither ignores the prevalence of domestic violence, nor inadvertently provides support to current illegal and inequitable mechanisms of resolving domestic violence.
- The HAKOHAK programme should explore creative ways to ensure that the mechanism of the CPC promotes, rather than hinders, women’s access to policing.

In responding to these issues the HAKOHAK commissioned an in-depth study on why some KPKs decided to prioritise domestic violence initiatives and other did not.

\textsuperscript{49} See e.g. JSMP (2013) Law Against Domestic Violence: Obstacles to Implementation three years on. For details of increasing implementation of the law see monitoring reports and press releases available at http://www.jsmp.tl
\textsuperscript{50} A number of district commanders told the team that witchcraft was a major security issue in their area of responsibility.
\textsuperscript{51} Wilson, B. (2012) The Asia Foundation Dili, Timor-Leste Community Oriented Policing Program II (HAKOHAK) Baseline Study
Although still very much in draft form the report seeks to provide insights on community understandings of domestic violence; the effectiveness of current responses and prevention measures; challenges faced by those prioritising domestic violence as a social issue; and ideas as to the future direction(s) of domestic violence prevention in Timor-Leste. With some further work such a focus could form a useful programming resource for both programmes.

There would appear to be ample opportunity for KPKs to be supported to engage in work centred on prevention of domestic violence, and to be better connected with the GoTL supported referral networks for women and children experiencing violence. The newly commenced EVAW programme at TAF is well placed to support the HAKOHAK programme in this work.

One of the positive initiatives undertaken by HAKOHAK in the past year is supporting the National Community Police Unit and service provider PRADET to provide three days of training to Dili District suku Police Officers, and School Police Officers – focusing on engaging with youth around issues that have potentially negative consequences for them, including prostitution and pornography, and drugs and alcohol abuse. The programme also supported PRADET to conduct drug and alcohol abuse training with police at the village level aimed at reducing alcohol-related incidents and domestic violence.

As noted above, HAKOHAK to date appears to have had some difficulty recruiting and retaining female staff. A gender programme officer was recruited in 2013 to assist in managing domestic violence prevention activities across all districts but has subsequently left the programme.
Conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned

The team concludes that New Zealand should continue with a programme of support to the PNTL, but that the nature of this support should undergo refinement. The team recommends a new design be developed for New Zealand assistance following the end of these current phases of programming.

The team is of the view that a number of steps should be taken straight away in order to enhance current programmes, ensure improved value for money and prepare for a future iteration. The recommendations, which align with PNTL and GoTL plans, for the current programmes are:

**SHORT to MEDIUM TERM**

1. **TLCPP and HAKOHAK** should offset perceptions of competition by ensuring that all events held by either programme are organized jointly and badged as joint activities.

2. **TLCPP and HAKOHAK** should spend more time working together in each other’s offices in order to learn from each other and develop joint programming.

3. In order to have an evidence basis for future decision making and programmatic design, **TLCPP and HAKOHAK** should agree upon a programme of applied research that: (1) assesses the cost of rolling out the OPS initiative (2) assesses and costing the alternatives of a) maintaining and/or expanding KPKs b) merging KPKs with suku councils, (3) mapping the profusion of security providers and assisters in Timor-Leste. This is core business for both programmes. The process will involve combining an analysis of existing data with new areas of inquiry. For this initiative to be successful, it will entail a partnership with the PNTL and the SoSS.

4. **MFAT** should review the responsibilities for managing the Sustineo contract as well as reviewing the scope of services. Consideration could be given to Sustineo providing a wider range of services, in particular writing the quarterly and annual reports. Consideration needs to be given to methodologies that will include, but not be limited to, the systematic collection of adviser and PNTL stories of change in order to contribute to an analysis of what does and does not work.

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54 The team welcomes the TLCPP Team Leader’s initiative to locate some local staff in The Asia Foundation offices.

55 Ideally this process should happen fairly quickly in order to inform future budget discussions.
5. **MFAT and NZ Police** should actively consider how New Zealand's well-regarded work in the area of domestic violence in the Pacific could be better leveraged using the 2013 scoping report as a starting point. On a related note the programmes should consider how to support PNTL and communities in addressing mental health because this is an important policing issue.

6. **NZ Police** should revise their approach to training and broader professional development for the PNTL in light of the review that has been commissioned.

7. **NZ Police** should consider moving away from the solitary adviser model by having advisers work in concert as a pair or trio, as appropriate. This would facilitate mutual support and learning for NZ Police. It should not entail an expansion in police numbers.

8. **NZ Police** should broaden their primary scope of focus away from district command and towards OPS. Obviously, continued engagement with district and sub-district commanders and PNTL leadership, including the Commander for Community Policing will be critical during this process. It will also require even further and closer collaboration and coordination between TLCPP and HAKOHAK.

9. Being mindful of sustainability concerns, **MFAT and NZ Police** should consider if some modest funding should be provided to support the OPS initiative. This would not entail the payment of salaries, but rather modest support for equipment.

10. In order to ensure that the programme is able to provide advice adapted to Timorese realities **NZ Police** should employ more Timorese staff in *substantive* positions. This will also entail a reorientation of current staffing. There is no compelling reason why additional NZ Police need to be employed on the programme.

11. In order to maximise more meaningful interaction with district PNTL, **NZ Police** should ensure that language assistants accompany all advisers in need of them on district travel.

12. **HAKOHAK** should coordinate with TAF’s EVAW programme and other relevant work-streams in order to leverage specific in-house expertise.

13. **HAKOHAK** should review the effectiveness of subcontracting *Asosiasaun HAK* to provide support to KPKs with a view to determining if it is a useful model for subcontracting support work to NGOS in the future.

14. **HAKOHAK** should consider the benefits of working together with other government and/or non-government bodies to monitor and analyse KPK practice and outcomes, with view to management of inherent risk.

15. **HAKOHAK** should ensure that existing KPKs receive continued attention including through refresher training and the development of a handbook summarizing the role of the KPKs which can serve as a resource guide.

**LESSONS LEARNED**

Building upon the recommendations laid out in the previous section the following lessons derived from this evaluation are intended to be of use to all stakeholders as they discuss future programmatic direction for New Zealand.
• As operating environments and context changes, programmes need to be able to change with the times. Such adaptation and experimentation can be best supported through rigorous M&E processes that can inform decision making.
• Programmes, and in particular complex programmes such as TLCPP, require clear lines of authority and decision making. Consensus and collaboration should be encouraged but ‘the buck needs to stop somewhere’. In the case of this programme, this means the designated MFAT officer with responsibility for the programme needs to have clear and unambiguous final decision-making authority. Who that person is – or where that authority rests – is, ultimately, a decision for MFAT.
• In order to ensure maximum effectiveness and uptake of programming in the Timor-Leste (and possibly other) contexts a 'Timor-first' approach is optimal. This means prioritising the employment of principally Timorese staff into substantive positions and working largely in Tetun. Putting 'Timorese first' also implies an alteration of program management, with teams and their operations working to a Timorese-set schedule. Progress may be slower, but it is likely to be more enduring and sustainable. It may also include more extended engagement with, and possible subcontracting to, recognised Timorese NGOs.
• Analysing and basing decisions on information is a central principle of modern policing organisations. In New Zealand and many other parts of the world, police organisations use data such as crime statistics, victimisation surveys, incident reports and incident analysis in order to devise solutions to problems and prioritise efforts. Thorough and meticulous use of data should be replicated in policing programmes funded by New Zealand, with programmatic efforts grounded in empirical findings and verifiable facts.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS
If the recommendations for the immediate term noted above are followed New Zealand will be in a better position to consider the most appropriate means to support the development and maintenance of safety and security in Timor-Leste.
1. The sustainability of any new programming will require a financial and policy commitment from the GoTL, and may also benefit from the support of additional donors.
2. In the future there should be one programme rather than two. This will be more efficient and effective and will ensure that the currently separate components are better integrated.\^56
3. It would be timely for any new programme to clearly articulate its exit strategy, to ensure the sustainability of its programming initiatives.
4. A clear Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Plan and strategy should be an integral part of any new programme.

\^56 Recognizing the inherent differences in character of the two implementing agencies, it may be worth considering an MFAT based Project Coordinator to oversee management, performance and coordination.
Joint Evaluation of Timor-Leste Community Policing Programme (TLCPP) and Hametin Koperasaun Hamutuk Polisia ho Komunidade (HAKOHAK)
## Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police</td>
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<td>ALFeLa</td>
<td>Asisténsia Legál Feto no Labarik (Legal Assistance for Women and Children)</td>
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<td>BIMPOLDA</td>
<td>Bimbingan Polisi Daerah</td>
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<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Community Oriented Policing</td>
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<td>CMCOP</td>
<td>Conflict Mitigation Through Community Oriented Policing</td>
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<td>CMCOPPII</td>
<td>Conflict Mitigation Through Community Oriented Policing Phase II</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Community Policing Council (same as KPK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNSEP</td>
<td>Diresaun Nasional Seguransa Publiku</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESC</td>
<td>Evaluation Steering Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVAW</td>
<td>Ending Violence Against Women</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<td>GoTL</td>
<td>Government of Timor-Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAKOHAK</td>
<td>Hametin Koperasaun Hamutuk Polisia ho Komunidade</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>JSSF</td>
<td>Justice Sector Support Facility</td>
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<td>KDD</td>
<td>Komisaun Diretiva Distrital</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interview</td>
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<td>KPK</td>
<td>Konsellu Polisiamentu Komunitária</td>
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<td>LADV</td>
<td>Law Against Domestic Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MFAT</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Most Significant Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>OPS</td>
<td>Ofisial Polis Suku</td>
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<td>PNDS</td>
<td>Programa Nasional Desenvolvimentu Suku</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNTL</td>
<td>Polícia Nacional Timor-Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>POCA</td>
<td>Participatory Organisational Capacity Assessment</td>
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<td>PPA</td>
<td>Partnership Programme Arrangement</td>
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<td>PPDVP</td>
<td>Pacific Prevention of Domestic Violence Programme</td>
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<td>PRADET</td>
<td>Psychosocial Recovery &amp; Development in East Timor</td>
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<td>SEPI</td>
<td>Secretary of State for the Promotion of Gender Equality</td>
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<tr>
<td>SISKAMLING</td>
<td>Sistem Keamanan Lingkungan (Indonesian neighbourhood security system)</td>
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<td>SoSS</td>
<td>Secretary of State for Security</td>
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<td>TAF</td>
<td>The Asia Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLCPP</td>
<td>Timor-Leste Community Policing Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLPDP</td>
<td>Timor-Leste Police Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWM</td>
<td>Working with Men</td>
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