ADVOCACY AND RESISTANCE:
The Quest for a Post-war Commonwealth Government Role in Community facilities, Town Planning and Regional Planning, 1939-52

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Series Editors:
Shelley R. Schreiner & Clem Lloyd
This paper is concerned with the only attempt, prior to the 1970s era of DURD, to establish a significant role on the part of the Commonwealth government in urban and regional planning in Australia. Previous commentators on the period concerned - the 1940s - have contrasted the Commonwealth Housing Commission of 1943-44, in a context on post-war reconstruction fervour, with the demise of any Commonwealth role from the early 1950s to the early 1970s. These commentators have attributed this outcome to the general swing to the right in the late 1940s. The paper looks at three areas of CHC recommendations - community facilities, town planning and regional planning - and attributes the demise of Commission recommendations to an even more entrenched set of bureaucratic and political factors taking effect as early as 1944-45.

The paper documents the consistent gap between the CHC radical proposals and the more circumscribed follow-up efforts of the CHC's auspite body, the Department of Post-War Reconstruction. Most of these differences are seen to relate to the scale and pre-conditions of Commonwealth financial assistance to State and Local government, with the Commission pre-figuring a more financially generous but centralist role for the Commonwealth. The also documents the stark gulf between the Department's advocacy and its achievements. In the case of community facilities and town planning the DPWR's advocacy efforts, which began in earnest in early-1944, had virtually petered out by late 1945. In the case of regional planning, debate within the government went on longer and did result in some significant commonwealth initiatives in the late 1940s (though even these were more in the nature of major public works than regional planning enterprises). The paper suggests that outcomes in this area were more tangible than in the first two because regional planning was perceived to have strategic-military value.

The paper presents four major reasons for the failure of the Commonwealth Housing Commission's agenda to take hold. The first, and least important, was a certain weakness in DPWR's operations in the policy-making process, this weakness stemming from bureaucratic inexperience on the part of some of DPWR's recruits from outside the Public Service. The second factor was the consistent signal from Chifley, as Treasurer and (up to March 1945) Minister for Post-War Reconstruction, that 'newer' ventures in planning had to take a lower priority than housing - both in terms of financial and physical resources and even bureaucratic energies. The third, somewhat related factor was the unrelenting opposition of Treasury officials to the entry of the Commonwealth
into new fields of activity. A key aspect of the paper is its highlighting of the often misleading arguments and devious tactics of Treasury in its tussle with DPWR. Finally, the paper points to the lack of enthusiasm on the part of State governments generally for a Commonwealth entry into fields associated with State and Local Government and the strong antagonism of some non-Labor administrations in particular.

The paper thus presents a microcosm of many of the same issues and conflicts that were to surround the DURD venture in the 1970s.
INTRODUCTION
C.J. Lloyd

Australia's Postwar-Reconstruction era, broadly covering the years between 1943 and 1949, has been much invoked and cited in the literature of federal political history and public policy, yet it has attracted little in the way of rigorous analysis and detailed study. There have been valuable accounts of aspects of Postwar Reconstruction from participants such as H.C. Coombs, Lloyd Ross, L.F. Crisp and Ronald Mendelsohn, and some useful journal articles, but the fundamental administrative history of the period remains to be written. It is generally conceded that the Postwar Reconstruction years were seminal, and influential, but the enduring achievement from a ferment of policy documentation has been relatively meagre. Generally, the attempts to explain why policy implementation largely failed have been superficial and unconvincing.

An important attempt to document and analyse Postwar Reconstruction was made at a conference organised by the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University in September 1981. This brought together policy formulators and administrators, who were involved in the work of Postwar Reconstruction, with writers, academics and students active in its interpretation. The transcript of the conference, held by the Australian National Library, remains an excellent source for studies in the period, and several journal articles have been published on policy and administrative aspects of Postwar Reconstruction based on the conference proceedings.

Michael Howard contributed to this conference and he has continued the analysis of Postwar Reconstruction planning and housing policies, based on meticulous research into the vast amount of archival material that is now available. Howard's work challenges a number of the conventional interpretations of Postwar Reconstruction. For example, he suggests convincingly that federal initiatives in the crucial area of community, town and regional planning were stifled just as much by resistance within the federal bureaucracy and lack of political will on the part of Labor ministers as by such traditional scapegoats as the States and the non-Labor political parties. He also argues plausibly that important parts of the Postwar Reconstruction program...
had been virtually discarded by 1945-46, somewhat earlier than other analysts have suggested. The Urban Research Unit is happy to publish what it considers an important re-interpretation of important elements in Australia's federal administrative history and hopes that it will stimulate further productive discussion and analysis of an important period.

Clem Lloyd
December 1988.
Since Federation in 1901 there have been only two periods in which a political attempt has been made to establish a strong Commonwealth role in urban and regional planning in Australia. The first was the period of post-war reconstruction in the 1940s; the second, the period of the Whitlam government in the 1970s. Political analysis has focused very largely on the more recent of these two episodes. Various dimensions of political conflict in the 1970s over a Commonwealth role have been documented: conflict between the political parties, between the Federal and State governments and between Departments within the Federal government. That the Whitlam-Fraser period has received more attention is appropriate, since the scale of Commonwealth initiatives undertaken and the level of conflict aroused was greater than in the 1940s. Yet developments in the 1940s were not inconspicuous and the outcome of the conflicts of this time were of great long-term significance, establishing a political and policy paradigm that was not challenged until Whitlam's government and, then, as it turned out, unsuccessfully.

This work-in-progress paper presents a political analysis of developments within three areas of post-war reconstruction that directly manifested a concept of urban planning: 'community facilities', 'town planning' and 'regional planning'. The paper focuses on policy-making within the Federal government and negotiations between the Federal and State governments in these three related areas. A broadly similar pattern of political development is observed across all three areas: on the one hand, advocacy during 1943-5 of a greatly enlarged peace-time Commonwealth role, this advocacy within the Federal government centred on the Department of Post-War Reconstruction and this Department's off-shoot Reconstruction Commissions; and, on the other, resistance to this idea during 1943-5 and later, both from other quarters of the Federal government, mainly the Treasury, and from State governments. This
policy-making conflict was most intense and seminal during 1944-5, with the forces of resistance winning decisively.

The early post-war activity of the Commonwealth in the three areas examined did amount to something more than the negligible pre-war activity of the Commonwealth but it fell far short of the role conjured up by the 'planners' during 1943-4. Consequently, the weak role played by the Commonwealth government in areas loosely associated with the concepts of 'physical planning' and 'urban planning' in the two decades leading up to the establishment of DURD by the Whitlam government was not a development that can be attributed to the onset of the Coalition government in 1949, as Whitlam (1970) once implied. The pattern of a very weak role took shape during 1944-5 and was firmly entrenched by 1949. This paper will pay special attention to the obstacles to an expanded role, as these were perceived and argued within the Federal government in the mid 1940s.

In this respect the paper advances beyond the analysis contained in the three main (though short) commentaries on this topic to date - those of Sandercock (1977 and 1983) and Lloyd and Troy (1978). All three commentaries agree on the historic importance of the advocacy of a greater Commonwealth role that occurred in the period. To Sandercock,

_The Curtin and Chifley Labor governments of 1942-9 were the first federal governments to take an interest in the fate of Australian cities_

while Lloyd and Troy venture the opinion that

_The [Commonwealth Housing Commission's] final report of 25 August 1944 is a remarkable document, perhaps the most comprehensive and imaginative ever presented to a government in Australia. Implementation in full of [this] report would have given the Commonwealth an unparalleled opportunity to embark on a full-scale policy for urban and regional development. Ground which was won only with difficulty in the unfavourable climate of the seventies could have been taken in 1945 with much less effort._

All three commentaries also agree that, with the important exception of housing, very little of these 'wide horizons', these 'great plans and preparations', were
acted upon and brought to fruition, either before 1949 or in the two decades after. 4

All three commentaries seek to explain the Chifley government's poor record of implementation in terms of the general political situation in Australia in the late 1940's. Sandercock's argument can be paraphrased as follows. Ministers and public servants sympathetic to ideas of physical planning understood that the provision of community facilities and the exercise of 'town' and 'regional' planning ultimately entailed some degree of regulation of property rights and the private land market. In a context where economic regulation in general was failing to make headway against the propaganda of vested Big Capital interests and the restiveness and private material aspirations of the electorate, these circles simply lacked the confidence and energy to sustain these ideas. Lloyd and Troy also imply that physical planning was simply another casualty of the extraneous general push for 'private enterprise' (what Connell has referred to as a 'counter-mobilisation') but they also point to two other, obviously related contextual factors – the division of constitutional powers in the Federal system and the sheer weight of the Labor government's overall efforts in post-war reconstruction. 5

This paper is an advance upon these three brief commentaries in two ways. First, whereas the commentaries are limited to a summary of the recommendations and outlook of the Commonwealth Housing Commission (CHC), this paper also refers to the follow-up proposals and Cabinet submissions of the Department of Post-War Reconstruction (DPWR). Second, whereas the three commentaries fail to show how the general factors or forces of resistance were manifest in the specific fields under discussion, this paper does just this. In particular, the paper highlights the following constraining factors in policymaking in the three fields of community facilities, town planning and regional planning:

- weaknesses in the advocacy effort of the DPWR;
- the pervasive negative influence of Treasury officials;
- the special burden of the 'housing-first' policy;
and, as testimony to the impact of these factors during 1944-9;

- the relative unimportance in the three fields examined of the change of Party in office in 1949.

**Community Facilities**

Policy making in regard to a Commonwealth role in 'community facilities' largely took the form of an encounter between two small groups of officials within the federal government. The first group was located within the Community Facilities and Regional Planning Sections of DPWR and also in the DPWR's off-shoot apparatus, the CHC (the Commission reported to the Director-General of DPWR, not the Minister); the second group was located within the Social Services Branch of Treasury. The issue at stake was whether the Commonwealth government should undertake a funding role in this area. The first group and its superior, the Director General H.C. Coombs, was strongly in favour; the second group, led by Assistant Secretary H.J. Goodes, largely opposed. The tussle between the individuals on each side can be seen in terms of four phases, with the efforts of the DPWR officials petering out in the third phase, leaving the Treasury 'line' unchallenged in the fourth post-1946 phase.

The first phase began with the establishment of the CHC in April 1943 and ended with two events coinciding in August 1944, the submission to the Minister for Post-War Reconstruction of the CHC's Final Report and the penultimate drafting of a Commonwealth -State Housing Agreement (CSHA). The first moves on the DPWR/CHC side came with the submission of the CHC's First and Second Interim Reports in October 1943 and March 1944. In these reports the Commission set down two principles: the Commonwealth should not provide financial assistance to the State governments for public housing unless the States ensured that community facilities were provided on public housing estates; and the Commonwealth should contribute towards the cost of these facilities. The Cabinet submission on a post-war public housing scheme put forward (successfully) by DPWR in November 1943, in the wake of the First Interim Report, did not include any commitment to community facilities but the
submission foreshadowed a later, separate submission on this subject. Six months later the Commonwealth submission to a Commonwealth-State Housing Officers Conference (on the CSHA) indicated that the 'detailed recommendations' of the CHC on community facilities were now being examined by the government and would form the basis of later discussions with the States.

In these recommendations, set out in a separate chapter of the Final Report, the Commission distinguished between 'minimum' and 'later-stage' facilities. The former the Commission specifically identified as: shops; schools; 'playing areas'; 'infant health and pre-school child welfare centres'; and a 'meeting hall'. Because it believed that 'without these particular facilities any housing development may be a social failure' the Commission insisted that these facilities be built concurrently with houses, even in those estates to be commenced during the war and the immediate post-war period when the shortage of building resources relative to housing demand was likely to be acute. In this scenario the Commonwealth would have prime responsibility and power. It would bear one-third of the cost of land and construction (more in 'special circumstances') but it would make this assistance, and indeed all public housing assistance, conditional upon State and Local authorities erecting these 'minimum' facilities to the physical standards laid down by the Commonwealth itself (by a 'Commonwealth Community Facilities Committee').

Under the Commission's blueprint land would also have to be set aside from the outset for a wide range of later-stage facilities. Under headings such as 'health', 'recreational' and 'educational and cultural' the Commission specified an impressive list of desirable amenities, some (such as an 'adult health centre') quite novel. Construction of these amenities could be dovetailed with the easing of the housing crisis and the evolution of ideas and management skills by resident communities. Again, the cost of land and construction should be borne equally by the three levels of government. Finally, as the bridge between the minimum and the advanced facilities, the Commission called on the Commonwealth to finance unilaterally the construction of one experimental multi-purpose community centre in each State.
Even as it took shape, however, the Commission's strategy was being undermined by developments in housing policy. As early as August 1943 Treasury officers had raised objections to Commonwealth funding of community facilities (the grounds of objection have not yet been ascertained).\textsuperscript{11} Then, at the Premiers' Conference in January 1944 Chifley, in his capacity as Treasurer (rather than as Minister for Post-War Reconstruction), struck a warning note. Reports of post-war government programmes with large expenditures for 'town halls and other public buildings' were, Chifley said, misleading:

\textit{The view of the Commonwealth government is that houses for the people must come first; and because of the shortage of building materials, it is likely that those public building projects will have to stand over.}\textsuperscript{12}

But the coup de grace to the CHC idea of community facilities as a condition of public housing funding was delivered by the Federal government at the Premiers' Conference in August 1944. The CSHA 'clause' submitted by the Government (after consultation with Treasury) and accepted by the Premiers committed neither side. It merely empowered the Commonwealth Treasurer, if so inclined, to make an 'arrangement' for a financial 'contribution' by the Commonwealth to any State which chose to provide community facilities on a CSHA estate. Discussion of clause 15(3) at the Conference only pointed up the precarious attachment of the government to a Commonwealth role. At one point, in response to questions, Curtin remarked curtly to all the Premiers: 'If you do not like that provision you may leave it out of your legislation'.\textsuperscript{13}

The second phase of policy-making extended from August 1944 to a Commonwealth-State Housing Officers Conference in June 1945 and saw DPWR officials seek but fail to obtain belated Federal government endorsement of the 'minimum facilities' component of the CHC plan. Indeed, in a context of highly disappointing progress in building output, even DPWR officials themselves were forced to relinquish part of the CHC's set of 'minimum' recommendations. On two occasions, in July-August 1944 and in January 1945, Cabinet submissions were drafted by Lloyd Ross, Director of the Public Relations Division and Community Facilities Section of DPWR, in consultation with Grenfell Rudduck, senior officer in DPWR's Regional Planning Section.
Both sets of draft submissions put forward two recommendations, inspired by the CHC: (i) that the Commonwealth signal to the States its desire for them to proceed with the allocation of land and the construction of the CHC's 'minimum' facilities on CSHA estates, with the costs to be shared in the same way as CSHA housing costs; and (ii) that the Commonwealth allocate 40,000 pounds for the construction of the CHC's pilot community centres. On both occasions, although they had the firm support of Coombs, both submissions were withdrawn before they reached PWR Minister Chifley – the reason being the adverse reaction of Treasury.

In both instances the main objection raised by Assistant Secretary Goodes was the absence of a pre-existing policy for Commonwealth funding in this area. According to Goodes, the financing of the services envisaged had 'hitherto been solely the concern of State and local effort', an observation that overlooked the important recent precedents of Commonwealth funding of the National Fitness Council and the Lady Gowrie pre-school centres. In any case Goodes' objection begged the question: what were the merits or otherwise of a broad Commonwealth entry into this area?

Sensing the need for a substantive position on this question, especially in a context of increasing inquiries and requests from community organisations in regard to Commonwealth funding, Goodes made a decisive move. On May 4th 1945 the Assistant Secretary drew the Treasurer's attention to the need for a 'standard reply' and drafted just such a response. Chifley as Treasurer did not demur from Goodes' wording, so that the May 1945 text served as the basis for the Treasury/Treasurer stock response to community groups for at least the next decade.

The May 1945 form letter put forward two reasons why the Commonwealth was not prepared to assist in the financing of community centres. The first had to do with the Commonwealth's overall budgetary constraints, namely

*the Commonwealth’s heavy commitments both for war purposes and in the transition period, including that involved in the Commonwealth-State housing scheme.*
The second had to do with the autonomy of the State governments, the letter claiming that at a meeting of the National Works Council in August 1944 the Commonwealth and the States agreed that the financing of State and Local government programmes was 'wholly a matter for the internal arrangements of the State concerned'. 16 Both arguments were specious, the first partly so, the second completely so. On the first point, the real problem facing the Federal government in 1945, as Goodes' cover note to Chifley acknowledged, was shortage of physical, not financial, resources and the solution to this problem lay in physical measures, such as rationing of building materials. On the second point, the proceedings of the National Works Council at its meeting in August 1944 provided no basis whatsoever for the claim made and the implication contained in the Goodes draft letter. By prior agreement the meeting did not address the question of Commonwealth financial assistance for various types of State and Local public works. Two Premiers, it is true, did attempt to raise the issue - both, ironically, were clearly hoping to attract Commonwealth assistance - but the meeting reaffirmed that this question was one for a later meeting. (As it happened, neither full discussion nor resolutions, one way or the other, eventuated at later meetings of the Council). 17

In early May 1945 DPWR made its third and what was to prove last attempt to initiate a CHC-type Commonwealth funding role. On 10th May an inter-departmental meeting was convened by Coombs to firm up a Commonwealth stance on community facilities for an up-coming Commonwealth-State Housing Officers Conference. The May 10th meeting was presented with a long submission from Lloyd Ross which argued for a Commonwealth funding role, though in a very vague and (no doubt because of the housing bottleneck) defensive fashion. At this meeting Goodes made his second decisive move, by citing the form letter Chifley had approved as 'the Treasurer's attitude' to funding. This, again, was a mis-representation: in his cover note to Chifley Goodes had presented the form letter as a device to ward off outside organisations, pending a possible later policy decision on funding once the housing crisis had eased. At the same meeting Goodes successfully opposed a Lloyd Ross proposal for a 'Commonwealth Community Facilities Advisory Bureau'; this would be 'the thin edge of the wedge' of Commonwealth financial involvement. 18
The last step in this phase took the form of yet another Treasury block on a DPWR position; this time on the part of the Treasurer himself (seemingly). The May 10th meeting had agreed, Goodes acquiescing, that while the Commonwealth 'should not encourage the States to [build] extensive facilities at present', it should encourage them 'to provide adequate land for future facilities', the cost to be CSHA-shared. While the new Minister for Post-War Reconstruction, J.J. Dedman, endorsed this position, Chifley as Treasurer insisted that cost-shared land be limited to parks and playgrounds – as distinct from the full range of 'later stage' facilities that the meeting had countenanced. Accordingly, the joint Housing Officers' Conference in June 1945 was presented with a grim Commonwealth prospectus:

*The Commonwealth's attitude was that whilst it was agreeable to contribute towards services normally included in housing projects, such as roads, water supply, sewerage, electric light, etc; it was not prepared to go very far in contributing to community facilities...* 20

The third phase of activity in this area extended from the June 1945 Conference to late 1946 and was marked by a lingering attachment on the part of DPWR officials to the possibility of Commonwealth finance for the contribution of community facilities. The submission to Dedman and Chifley presented by Coombs as the position of the May 10th meeting explicitly foreshadowed a separate submission by DPWR 'in the near future' on this issue. In fact, the submission, Coombs said, would deal with the building of community facilities in 'built-up' areas as well as new CSHA estates, a matter on which Lloyd Ross felt strongly. In keeping with this prospect DPWR and its Minister Dedman declined to accept Goodes' 'suggestion' that they use the form letter he had devised for Chifley. Instead, for the next year or so (to late 1946) the Department and its Minister adopted a more open-ended form letter for outside organisations, one which said that the question of Commonwealth financial assistance 'had not yet been decided'. As it happened, no further submission was prepared by Ross or Rudduck and no Commonwealth aid for building purposes eventuated during the life of the first, ten year CSHA (nor, for that matter, the 1956 Agreement). 21
A number of factors would appear to have contributed to the fizzling-out of the DPWR advocacy effort. One factor was the personal outlook and style of Dr. Lloyd Ross, the most senior officer with specialist responsibilities in this field. Ross, who was stationed in Sydney (itself a weakness in terms of bureaucratic influence) had a passionate interest in the social theory and ethos of the community facilities 'movement' and in his role as promoter of research and information-exchange he functioned effectively. But Ross at times evinced an ambivalent attitude to government funding (the danger of 'paternalism') and his preparation of policy, including funding, submissions was surprisingly inept, probably a reflection of bureaucratic inexperience. A more important factor from mid 1945 was the bureaucratic separation of the DPWR units headed by Ross and Rudduck and the DPWR sections dealing with housing and building, both of which were moved into the new Department of Works and Housing set up in July 1945. This meant there was even less potential for leverage of community facilities into the CSHA, the more so because the Director of Housing, A.W. Welch, was a pragmatic generalist administrator, who lacked the intellect and vision of Ross and especially Rudduck, an architect-town planner. This bureaucratic development was not accidental; it was part of the inevitable breaking-up of the DPWR 'brains trust' planning function. A third, exacerbating factor which was accidental was the limited dissemination of the CHC's landmark Final Report. The Report was not tabled in Parliament until September 1945 (because of printing delays) and its public circulation was much less than anticipated (the Report did not sell at the price set and stockpiles were unintentionally destroyed). Whatever the reasons, the demise of the DPWR advocacy effort was symbolised by the termination of the Community Activities Bulletin in December 1946, a lively publication that had appeared regularly since November 1944.

From 1947 to the early 1950's, and probably later, the 'Treasury line' (as Goodes referred to it) became the sole Federal government public stance on the funding issue. The way in which the 1945 Goodes form letter was maintained and adapted deserves mention for the example it provides of Treasury thinking, tactics and influence in public policy processes. Not surprisingly, the letters sent out under the Treasurer's stamp, even during 1945-6, almost always avoided the suggestion that policy was in some sense under review or likely to change. More
surprisingly, until 1949 the letters avoided use of the term 'policy' at all — thereby avoiding the sense that the government had somehow made a conscious choice not to fund construction (which indeed it had in 1945). Instead, the letters merely asserted that 'serious constitutional difficulties' made Commonwealth funding impossible. This standard claim rested on two assertions: that community facilities were services 'primarily' provided by State and Local governments (correct); and that the National Works Council in 1944 had agreed that the financing of such services was 'a matter' for these governments (incorrect). 25

Was this argument sincere or merely a pretext? On the one hand, Goodes did present it to Fadden, in private, in 1950 as 'the basis' for the previous government's approach. On the other hand, it was not until 1950 that Goodes felt the atmosphere safe enough to draft a public reference for the Treasurer to CSHA clause 15(c), the provision that obviously undermined the 'constitutional' pretext. 26 Moreover, some of the replies to outside organisations after 1947 implicitly acknowledged that budgetary constraint was a 'difficulty' independent of any federalist problem. If the government was to assist one group, some letters said, it would be 'deluged' from all over the country. 27

With the change of government in 1949 Goodes and his staff continued to guide Treasurer responses on this issue and to do so in ways that indicated that the Department's real concern was and probably always had been — fiscal, not constitutional. When the incoming Treasurer was met with a barrage of requests from Councils in country areas, Goodes advised that the Coalition promises on aid for 'rural development' could not be interpreted in the way these organisations had done. 28 When in 1952 and 1954 community groups submitted for finance on the grounds that they were servicing populations largely comprising Commonwealth defence personnel, Goodes again urged rejection. The precedent, he said, would be exploited endlessly by State governments — a view which, of course, quite discredited his old contrived rationale about constitutional barriers. 29

So far this account has attributed the non-emergence of strong Commonwealth funding role to three factors — certain limitations of and within DPWR, the priority of finance for housing and Treasury's concern with overall expenditure
restraint. To what extent can the attitude of State governments also be considered a retarding factor? On the one hand there is clear evidence that at least some State Ministries were hostile to any Commonwealth activity that might conceivably interfere with their freedom of operation (including their ability to stay out of this general area altogether). In his submission to the May 10th 1945 inter-departmental meeting Lloyd Ross had listed as one obstacle to Commonwealth endeavour

_Apathy of some States to the problem; hostility of some States to Commonwealth assistance; difficulty of obtaining a general policy in co-operation with the States._

One especially suspicious government was the Dunstan-Hollway Coalition in Victoria in 1945. In January 1945 Coombs inquired whether an officer from the Community Facilities Section could liaise with State departments for the purpose of up-grading the central information service on State functions and amenities in this field. Whereas at least two States consented (both ALP governments), the Victorian reply was that community requests for information should be referred by the Commonwealth direct to the State government. Four months later Coombs made a second overture. Could an officer 'consult' State officers when 'advising' community organisations on the enhancement of facilities? This suggestion brought a quite hostile rebuke. The Victorian government's 'viewpoint' was that such activity was an 'intrusion into domestic matters of State'.

In all likelihood most State administrations were not 'gung-ho' on expanded funding for community facilities. The Annual Reports of the N.S.W. and Victorian Housing Commissions suggest that the new public housing authorities were extremely parsimonious in their release of funds for community buildings, though less so in their setting-aside of land (perhaps because the Commonwealth may have agreed to include some of this land in CSHA financing). Nor is there any evidence that State politicians made a concerted effort to pressure the Commonwealth for finance. But this is not to say they would have opposed or declined Commonwealth money, if it had been offered. In fact, at least two Premiers - Cain during 1947-9 and Playford in 1954 — lent their support to community proposals for joint-government funding of specific projects. The real obstacles, then, to the commitment of Commonwealth money were the
factors mentioned above, not the knowledge – vividly borne out in the CSHA housing negotiations – that the Commonwealth could not hope to tightly control the manner in which jointly funded programmes were administered by the States.35

Town Planning

In the area of town planning the pattern of Commonwealth role development had both similarities to, and differences from, the pattern observed in the area of community facilities. On the one hand, there was the same steep height between the Commonwealth role advocated by the Commonwealth Housing Commission, the role subsequently fought for by the Department of Post-War Reconstruction and the post-war role (or rather absence of role) that emerged in 1945. On the other hand, the interplay of the factors of resistance was somewhat different than it had been in the area of community facilities. Treasury opposition to a post-war Commonwealth role was again a decisive factor – arguably the decisive factor (especially in an important episode in 1950). But, unlike the area of community facilities, a second decisive factor of resistance was the attitude of State governments, especially at the Ministerial and Premier level. Weakness in administrative finesse was again apparent within DPWR but it is doubtful if this altered the underlying situation, while the urgency of the housing problem was not quite as important a constraint as it was in the area of community facilities.

In a chapter on 'National, Regional and Town Planning' in its Final Report the Commonwealth Housing Commission derived its model of a Commonwealth role in town planning from a set of bold principles. Economic and social development, it began, must be governed by community needs, not by the profit motive, as in the past. Community needs could only be ascertained and satisfied by conscious planning; the war-time situation presented an unprecedented and vital opportunity to establish peace-time planning. The purpose of public housing could not be realised without 'town planning'; likewise town planning could not be achieved in isolation but only as part of regional and national economic planning. At the interface of town and regional planning lay the great problem of the 'unplanned cities' and the need for an 'urban' focus and structure.36
The Commission's overarching recommendation was for a 'Commonwealth Planning Authority'. The role of this statutory body would be to formulate an overall national economic and physical planning framework and, subject to Ministerial control, to 'direct' Commonwealth departments and exert pressure on State authorities to work within this framework. Within this apparatus the Commission wanted to see a 'Commonwealth Regional and Town Planning Council'. Along with the research and information functions, this body should have the power to

(i) Promote and co-ordinate policies on regional and town planning,...,

[and] (ii) suggest general principles for regional and town planning, with which State, regional and local authorities shall comply, after due regard to local conditions.

In a recommendation which echoed its stance on community facilities, the Commission recommended that Commonwealth finance for public housing not be made available to the States until they had taken steps 'to erect and implement regional and town planning legislation'.

The CHC acknowledged that 'replanning' of older suburbs and cities would involve 'large sums of money over many years'. Accordingly, the Commonwealth would have to contribute to this expense, in the form of loan advances and subsidies, provided that the replanning schemes - local, urban or regional - had been 'approved' by the Commonwealth Planning Authority. Finally, the CHC said, Commonwealth must establish a prestigious 'National School of Physical Planning' to provide a high standard of inter-disciplinary research and training in planning.

In the months leading up to and following the submission of the CHC's Final Report in August 1944 the Department of Post-War Reconstruction attempted to push a modified CHC agenda. The DPWR made seemingly no attempt to canvass the proposals for a Commonwealth Planning Authority and a Commonwealth Regional and Town Planning Council. But the idea behind these proposals - that the Commonwealth should exert pressure on the States to legislate for and implement town planning - was not entirely and immediately forsaken. The most ready-made and powerful instrument to pressure the States was the
Commonwealth's offer of subsidised housing finance. Resort to this means of pressure, however, carried political risks for the Federal government. As early as April 1943, at the inaugural meeting of the CHC, Chifley as Minister for Post-War Reconstruction had warned that

There are those who have great ideals on town planning and new cities, and it is a very desirable thing. Realities must be faced, however – realities being the pressure on governments to get moving on housing.\(^{39}\) As it happened, a link between housing and town planning was retained during the drafting of the CSHA in 1944 – due mainly to very strong advocacy to Coombs on the part of the Commission.\(^{40}\) The formal CSHA clause put to, and endorsed by the Premiers' Conference in August 1944 stipulated that

the States shall have adequate legislation to enable them to control the development of...
(d) town planning, and shall set up an authority, or authorities to cover these activities and ensure that these powers be exercised in a co-ordinated fashion.\(^{41}\)

This provision was a potential basis upon which the Commonwealth might have pushed for a CHC-type regulatory or monitoring role. Instead, in the year that followed, the Department of Post-War Reconstruction attempted but failed to consolidate or indeed establish any post-war role for the Commonwealth in relation to the States on town planning. At the instigation of DPWR, the Acting Prime Minister (F. M. Forde) wrote a long letter to each Premier in November 1944, highlighting the historic need and opportunity for proper planning of towns and cities arising from the commitment to large-scale post-war programmes of housing and public works. The letter proposed that a Commonwealth-State Officers' Conference be held to 'consider the [CHC's] suggestions' and to discuss legislation and implementation strategies being prepared by each State, with the hope of encouraging 'some degree of uniformity'.\(^{42}\)

The Prime Ministerial letter put forward two specific proposals, both of which had been formulated by DPWR and endorsed in principle by Cabinet.\(^{43}\) The first proposal was for each State to establish a 'State Town Planning Service' – a
small organisation of highly trained [planning] specialists' whose role would essentially be one of indirect quality control over Local governments. The central State body would 'advise' Local governments and, in conjunction with them, 'review' their plans and procedures. To encourage the States, the letter proposed that the Commonwealth finance 50% of the cost of these bodies for three to five years after the war (when the demand for planning would be at its peak).

The second proposal was for the Commonwealth to establish a Commonwealth Town Planning Bureau. The role of the Bureau would be to act as a resource back-up to the State Town Planning Services; it would not deal directly with Local governments. The November 1944 letter outlined certain functions that appeared non-contentious: the dissemination and exchange of research and information, especially from overseas; the provision and financing of professional training courses; and overall town planning in Commonwealth territories. But the letter also spoke of the Bureau 'assisting the States by undertaking special projects on their behalf' while follow-up documents prepared by DPWR (Grenfell Rudduck) and circulated to the States said that the Bureau, with a staff of 10-20 professionals, would 'undertake investigations of town planning problems in Australia' and 'co-ordinate the research work of all States'.

It soon became clear that several of the Premiers were not going to accept warmly the Federal government's overture. Two Premiers – Playford (South Australia) and Dunstan (Victoria) – announced they would only send 'observers' to the Commonwealth-State Officers' Conference set down for April 1945; in Dunstan's case, this was despite strong representations from associations representing architects, engineers and town planners for Victoria to send active representatives. In his letter finalising arrangements for the Conference, Dedman, as Minister for Post-War Reconstruction, emphasised that the purpose was to examine ways 'in which the Commonwealth [could] assist the States to give effect to their [own] policies'. Opening the Conference, Coombs was also at pains to reassure State representatives that the Commonwealth did not want 'to tell the States what sort of town planning legislation they should have'. The Commonwealth, Coombs said, did not want to encroach on areas that were not its 'proper preserve'.

Proceedings at the Conference also proved difficult for DPWR, but the Department eventually did make some headway. In the early stages most State representatives expressed resentment that the Federal government had underestimated State experience of and commitment to town planning (as one officer put it, 'town and regional planning wasn't discovered in Canberra in 1943'). No State representative pressed very actively for Commonwealth financial assistance though all States except South Australia indicated they were prepared to accept Commonwealth money – provided there were no strings attached. All States agreed that the chief problem they faced was a shortage of qualified town planners.

As the Conference wore on, attitudes softened, helped in no small part by the co-operative stance of the NSW representatives. At the end of the Conference DPWR managed to elicit a formal 'Expression of Opinion' that the Commonwealth Town Planning Bureau, in addition to its role in Commonwealth territories, should have three wider functions: a Secretariat for regular Commonwealth-State meetings on town planning; an education, publication and information function; and assistance to State educational institutions for training programmes for town planners. No mention was made, however, of the earlier, more contentious proposals for research and direct involvement in State town planning on an ad hoc basis by the Bureau. The Department also managed to elicit, on a somewhat more informal basis, Conference endorsement of the Commonwealth's 50% subsidy offer, the subsidy being widened to apply to town planners employed by Local governments as well as those employed by State governments. Significantly the whole tenor of discussion was that the offer carried 'no strings', something that was not made clear in the November 1944 letter. On this basis, the Department in June prepared a submission to Cabinet seeking approval for the Prime Minister to write to the Premiers to request ratification of the Conference decisions.

At this point the Department began to feel the impact of a second source of antagonism to its efforts. From the outset Goodes and his small number of staff in the Social Services Branch of Treasury had opposed the idea of any form of Commonwealth financial assistance to the States for town planning. In November 1944 Goodes had unsuccessfully submitted to Chifley (at that time
still Treasurer and Minister for Post-War Reconstruction) to have the 50-50 subsidy proposal rejected.

On that occasion Goodes had used four main arguments, most of which he was to repeat in mid-1945. First, he pointed out that no policy precedent existed for Commonwealth funding of town planning outside Commonwealth territories, a line identical to the one he had initially used in relation to community facilities (and Goodes himself drew attention to this). Second, he agreed that, as town planning impinged on social fields such as health and education, no decision on a long-term role in town planning should be made until a similar decision was made in relation to these other fields. Third, he agreed that Commonwealth financial assistance was superfluous as most States were already active in the area - how active, and with what degree of adequacy, he did not feel obliged to say. Finally, he insisted that a financial commitment to staffing would lead inexorably to pressure for cost-sharing of the total liabilities involved in the implementation of town planning (heavy expenses such as compensation for land resumption). When in subsequent correspondence with DPWR it was pointed out that the offer of finance was limited to five years, Goodes reverted to his previous (third) point.52

The proceedings of the Officers' Conference in April only hardened the Treasury position, prompting it to a series of ultimately successful manoeuvres. In late June Goodes submitted, through the Treasurer, for the DPWR agenda paper to be rejected, Goodes arguing that the 'no strings attached' post-Conference subsidy offer was but 'mere handing out of money gratuitously in relief of State budgets'.53 The Treasury submission paid off: Cabinet decided to defer the establishment of a Commonwealth Town Planning Bureau and negotiations over the subsidy until the Premiers' Conference in August.54

The Treasury Assistant Secretary kept up the pressure. In July DPWR drafted a letter from the Prime Minister to the Premiers, requesting discussion of town planning at the Premiers' Conference, but specifically on the two sets of proposals endorsed by the Officers' Conference (the Bureau and the 50% subsidy).55 In response, Goodes wrote to DPWR, requesting that it couch the invitation in general terms and omit reference to specific proposals. At the same time Goodes also advised Chifley not to 'stress' the question of financial
assistance at the Conference.\textsuperscript{56} When DPWR went ahead with its original draft, Goodes stuck to his position and on the eve of the Conference again urged Chifley not to 'press' the subsidy offer.\textsuperscript{57}

This time Goodes' lobbying proved completely successful. Discussion on this item at the Conference was brief and the outcome, for DPWR, utterly negative. The first to speak was Dedman who reiterated the proposals agreed to by the Officers' Conference. He was followed by the NSW Deputy Premier, J.M. Baddeley who, after outlining his government's approach, said NSW had 'no objection to Commonwealth financial assistance'. The Victorian Premier, A.A. Dunstan, spoke next, arguing forcefully against the idea of a Commonwealth role ('duplication'). The only other speaker was Chifley who commented:

\textit{I assume from your remarks that you [Dunstan] consider that the matter ought to be left to the States'}

- at which point discussion lapsed and the meeting moved to the next item. Whether or not his comment caught the outlook of the other Premiers, it is clear that Chifley made no attempt to persuade the Premiers - for example, by capitalising on the attitude of the NSW government.\textsuperscript{58}

Worse still for DPWR, in negotiations with the States over the final draft of the CSHA in the weeks leading up to the Premiers' Conference, the Department had been forced to truncate the draft clause bearing on town planning. Now only legislation, not machinery and implementation, was to be required of the States.\textsuperscript{58} Reviewing the Premiers' Conference proceedings in the weeks that followed, Coombs and his staff decided to abandon both the idea of the Bureau and the salary subsidy. Their efforts now turned to negotiation with the new Department of Works and Housing over responsibility for town planning in Commonwealth territories.\textsuperscript{60}

In the months and years that followed only a few small traces of the CHC and DPWR vision materialised. Under the aegis of the Minister for Post-War Reconstruction the Universities' Commission financed Extension Lecture series on town planning at the two major universities.\textsuperscript{61} Within the Department of Works and Housing a small 'Town Planning Service' (a staff of three specialists)
was set up to cater for Commonwealth territories. And perhaps on a few ad hoc occasions grants for town planning purposes were made to locations of Commonwealth defence establishments. But the general role of the Commonwealth remained the same as it had been before 1939 – non-existent. This position was encapsulated by the Minister for Health and Social Services (N.E. McKenna) in 1949, when explaining away a one-off grant to a defence centre:

*The Commonwealth would of course, be travelling beyond its proper sphere if it were to embark promiscuously on town-planning projects throughout Australia. That is not the function of the Commonwealth in normal circumstances. It is a matter for the State governments and for municipal authorities.*

The Commonwealth position was confirmed in an even more explicit fashion in 1950 and in a manner which underlined the pre-eminent influence of Treasury on the internal counsels of the Commonwealth bureaucracy and Ministry. On two occasions, February and October 1950, Prime Minister Menzies received a formal request from the N.S.W. government for the Commonwealth to contribute one-third of the projected cost of implementation of the Cumberland County Council scheme, with the same proportion of the cost to be borne both by the State and Local governments. The archival documents on this matter have not yet been studied but the main argument used by N.S.W. Premier McGirr in public was the proposition that it had been the Commonwealth which had required the State, through the CSHA, to introduce the legislation in the first place.

The Federal government's rejection of this request in December 1950 bore all the hall-marks of the Treasury line. Just as Goodes had done on the issue of community facilities, the letter of reply from Menzies put up three reasons. First, it appealed to 'custom': it had 'been accepted over a long period' that town planning was not a field for the Commonwealth. Then, it attempted to bolster this point with the familiar, fatuous reference to the meeting of the National Works Council in 1944. Finally, the Menzies letter of reply introduced the fiscal argument, no doubt Treasury's real concern. Consent to this request, the letter said, would necessarily set a precedent and 'mean the assumption by the Commonwealth of a new and costly responsibility'.

20
Regional Planning

Most of the patterns observed in the two fields of policy so far discussed can be observed in the related field of regional planning. Once again there was a gulf between the broad concept and recommendations of the Commonwealth Housing Commission and the follow-up position of the Department of Post-War Reconstruction. Because regional planning was perceived by other quarters of the Federal government to encompass a broader or perhaps different range of government activity, policy initiation within DPWR in 1944 was not the preserve of the same small number of officers as was the case with community facilities and town planning. As for impediments to the acceptance and implementation of CHC and DPWR proposals, the decision to give priority in planning to housing was of significance, as it had been in the case of community facilities and at one point threatened to be in town planning.

The major impediment to the development of a strong peace-time Commonwealth role, however, was the same factor that had been a major block on Commonwealth town planning incentives: the problem of the States. More so perhaps than with town planning, this factor operated not only through the actions of State governments themselves but through the anticipation of State reactions by Commonwealth officers. The attitude and influence of Treasury officers has not been fully studied but the evidence points to a fairly negative outlook. Overall, it must be said, however, that the role of the Commonwealth that did develop was of some significance, unlike the case of community facilities and town planning. The main reason for this was probably a perception amongst the State governments, as well as the Federal government, that regional planning had economic and especially military-strategic value, unlike community facilities and town planning. Nevertheless, the importance of the pre-1949 role should not be exaggerated; nor, accordingly, the significance of the victory of the Liberal-Country Party government in 1949.

As with town planning, the Commonwealth had no pre-war general involvement in 'regional planning', nor for that matter had the States. In the 1930s Federal politicians in both the Country Party and the ALP had made frequent reference to the desirability of a 'de-centralisation' of industry and population. The first occasion on which the term 'regional planning' was evident in relation to post-war preparations by the Federal government was the inaugural meeting of the
'Reconstruction Sub-Committee on Public Works' in May 1942. It is possible that the term, and the concepts associated with it, had arisen from war-time military organisation; at least three Commonwealth authorities had based their administrative apparatus on 'regions', the exactness of the definition of 'region' varying in each case. Outside the Government, by 1942 a variety of organisations were beginning to advocate a case for post-war public works in terms of 'regional' utility and appeal.

From the outset there were marked differences both in the degree of support for regional planning among Commonwealth reconstruction authorities and in the nature of the concept they articulated. The Secondary Industries Commission which, like the CHC, was an offshoot of DPWR, tended to talk in terms of 'decentralisation'. Even here, in keeping with its highly pragmatic approach, it was slow to develop ideas about an overall approach. The Office of the Commonwealth Co-ordinator-General Works and the Public Works Section of DPWR, on the other hand, managed to instigate a resolution in April 1944 by the National Works Council, calling on responsible authorities to 'review the possibilities of planning electricity and water conservation projects on a regional basis'.

The Commonwealth Housing Commission proposed a very much wider form of regional economic planning. Both in its recommendations for a Commonwealth Planning Authority and a Commonwealth Regional and Town Planning Council within the Authority the Commission made it clear it wanted planning at the regional, as well as national and town level, to encompass nothing less than the

(a) use and development of all land;

(b) movements, distribution and growth of the population;

(c) distribution of industrial activities, so as to secure a balanced economic development of primary, secondary and other industries; and

(d) amelioration of the conditions of urban and rural life.
- that is, virtually the entire economic and social structure. (The CHC did not itself make any recommendations about the content of such a broad plan. In this its Final Report exhibited a characteristic of much other contemporary writing on town and regional planning - trenchant argument for the scope and apparatus of planning with very little hint of the political conflicts and choices that would be expressed through this apparatus.)

The differences in approach amongst the advisory authorities as to the scope of regional planning were paralleled within the Department of Post-War Reconstruction and may have had their source there. The departmental differences were encapsulated in a seminal paper written by the economist P.A. Dorrian, soon to specialise in the Public Works Section. The paper delineated three concepts: 'De-centralisation', which amounted to an undisciplined 'spreading of economic activity over the face of the countryside'; 'Project Planning', which represented the co-ordinated deployment of secondary industry, public works and housing in the regional area; and 'Regional Planning', in which the attempted co-ordination also encompassed transport, immigration and social welfare services. Regional planning, the paper said, aimed at economic and social 'self-sufficiency', the key to which was a 'strong metropolitan centre'.

Over the next three months, a polarisation of views around these concepts occurred within the 'think-tank' circles of DPWR. Three architect-town planners (Rudduck, Walter Bunning and J. Oldham) who worked on housing, community facilities and town planning issues, strongly affirmed the necessity for 'integrating' economic and social development. On the other hand, three economists and one political scientist (N.G. Butlin, A.H. Tange, G.G. Firth and L.F. Crisp respectively), criticised this approach as grossly unrealistic, claiming it under-estimated economic, political and constitutional complexities. The resultant critique put to the Director-General by the Director of Research (J.G. Crawford), himself an economist, was an affirmation of this more limited position. The 'paramount' fact, Crawford insisted, was that planning for integrated regions with a strong identity would 'heavily invade the field of State's rights'. The most fruitful approach for the Commonwealth was to select a few unsettled and under-developed regions, preferably with strategic
importance, and seek to set up planning apparatus jointly with the one or more States involved.74

This strategy of 'half-planning' was subsequently endorsed by the government and submitted to a Premiers' Conference in October 1944. The reaction of the Premiers showed that Crawford had not exaggerated the touchiness of State authorities. A resolution was readily accepted:

That comprehensive surveys of the resources of important regions would be carried out according to principles to be agreed upon between the Commonwealth and the States.

But a more probing proposal, that

the formation of representative advisory bodies be encouraged, and use made, wherever practicable, of such bodies as already exist

had to be qualified, at the behest of at least two Premiers, by an agreement that such bodies would direct relevant enquiries to the Commonwealth 'through State government channels'. 75

The October Premiers' Conference had established that the Federal government would not be in a position to achieve the maximum co-ordination of economic development and social welfare. One resolution provided that each government would delineate 'regional boundaries' in the territories for which it was responsible. The Commonwealth's submission to the Conference gave the purpose of this operation as the classification of public works, 'employment trends' and de-centralisation of industry projects. Housing, health and education, as well as immigration and land transport, were not mentioned.76

This position of partial planning had not been settled for by the Federal government solely because of the Federal division of powers. One DPWR officer (L.F. Crisp) who was somewhat of an authority, did believe that a 'Yes' vote at the 'Fourteen Powers' Referendum would give the Commonwealth much more scope for thorough regional planning.77 But there were other considerations, political and bureaucratic, inhibiting the government. In July 1943 the Minister for Post-War Reconstruction had told the Director of
Research that housing had a 'higher' priority than regional planning. Accordingly, the Policy Director informed his staff that their enthusiasm for exploring this new mode of planning must not 'swamp' their work in formulating measures for the post-war expansion of housing.\textsuperscript{78}

The decision taken at the 1944 Premiers' Conference moulded the nature of regional planning activities for the next five years. The range of initiatives taken by the Commonwealth and the States, sometimes in conjunction and sometimes not, fell far short of the model propounded by the CHC and related staff inside the DPWR. Commonwealth effort fell into three categories: research, education, and resource allocation.

The main resolution at the Premiers' Conference in October 1944 had provided for joint Commonwealth-State research surveys of 'important' regions. As they had foreshadowed, all State governments undertook the definition and mapping of intra-State regions over the next two years. These maps contained basic geographical data and also some economic analysis, such as structure of employment and volume and type of production. The Commonwealth played some part in this activity. It was 'consulted' in this data-gathering by at least one State and probably more.\textsuperscript{79} It gained agreement in principle at an Officers' Conference in May and a Premiers' Conference in August 1945 for a 'regular exchange of information about regional resources'.\textsuperscript{80} By September 1947, when the second Officers' Conference on regional planning was held, it had collated from the States a 'regional map of Australia'. Whether it had been supplied with the accompanying geographical and economic data is doubtful, however.

Commonwealth research activity was at its most concerted in regard to select regions. Officers in the 'Regional Planning Division', which had been formed within DPWR after the Premiers' Conference of October 1944, continued to do general background research on what seemed economically promising regions, such as the Ord, Clarence and Gwydir River areas. The Division also undertook intensive land use surveys, in conjunction with other specialist Commonwealth agencies, in areas of interest to more than one State or to the Commonwealth directly.\textsuperscript{81} At least some of this work led to, or was part of, a broader executive
effort (eg. the inter-governmental/legislative agreements on the Murray and Snowy Rivers and on Northern Australia). 

The Commonwealth also pushed in the direction of education and publicity, in spite of the check it had received at the Premiers' Conference in October 1944. From late 1944 through to 1949, the Regional Planning Division produced a monthly *News Summary*, a magazine with the same aims as the *Community Activities Bulletin* and somewhat similar deficiencies – namely a tendency to exaggerate popular support for the Department's concepts and to avoid discussion of their political complexities and ramifications. This magazine and other publications were, nevertheless, a valuable source of cross-information for the twenty to thirty regional bodies that had formed around Australia. All these 'committees' had some problems in common, not the least being the reluctance of the State governments to devolve powers and functions. Through the DPWR publications the government continued to pay lip service to the strengthening of these regional organisations (the Federal Opposition did not) but little impact was made in the late 1940s on the power or status of these entities vis à vis State governments.

In terms of resource allocation and the outlay of expenditure the Federal government's major achievement was undoubtedly its leadership in the negotiation of the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electricity Scheme. While this scheme was of great significance as an inter-governmental public works project, its significance as an overall regional planning exercise is more open to question. In any case the project was limited to one regional area; the Commonwealth did not develop a regionalist role in the allocation of public works generally. Neither the Regional Planning Division nor the Office of the Commonwealth Co-ordinator-General of Works seem to have been consulted beforehand by the States on regional factors bearing on the selection of public works. Nor was the Division's handful of pet regional profiles made the basis of priority projects by the States. For that matter, there was no public evidence that the Commonwealth itself was trying to bring a regional approach to bear on the long-term capital works programmes it had drawn up the field of defence, civil aviation, shipping, postal services, war service housing and immigration. The furthest the government went was to undertake studies of the regional context and 'prospects' for at least two of its major capital works projects.
In the mind of DPWR, one policy question falling within the framework of the regional concept was 'de-centralisation' and here the Federal government did attempt a significant expenditure initiative. Under the heading 'De-centralisation of Secondary Industries – Commonwealth Responsibilities' the government put a resolution to the August 1945 Premiers' Conference proposing Commonwealth

_Provision of financial assistance to the States, especially in respect of the capital and/or operating costs of particular undertakings provided - (a) examination reveals that the success of the project in the general national interest and that the financial costs involved are substantial in relation to the State or States concerned._87

In supporting de-centralisation DPWR also fought to retain the concept of balanced and integrated regional planning. According to this concept, the key to the stability and growth of a region was a strong and varied urban centre. Accordingly, DPWR emphasised in the material it sent out to enquirers in 1945 that

_De-centralisation must not be interpreted to mean indiscriminate scattering of single towns around the countryside.'single industry' towns should be avoided as far as possible._88

Chifley also spoke along these lines at the Premiers' Conference. While he stressed the economic inefficiency of urban conglomeration he also insisted there was no prospect of successfully founding secondary industries in the smaller States except in the capital city.89

The discussion at the August Conference showed that the Premiers were a long way from grasping or accepting this regional approach. It also showed they had no intention of allowing Commonwealth interference in their own approach to de-centralisation. Moreover, they displayed an optimism about the prospects for reversing the 'drift to the cities' that did not reflect an awareness of the need for expensive incentives to private industry.90

This angle had been discussed at a Conference of the Secondary Industries Commission with State Liaison Officers in November 1944. The Conference had identified several factors amenable to governmental manipulation:
'transport, labour supply, power and fuel, water supply, suitable factory accommodation, housing and immigration'. In the period following this Conference only one instance has been found of inter-governmental investigation along these lines. In January 1945 correspondence began over a national system of freight concessions – at the instigation of the Commonwealth. The States seemed to prefer to tackle alone the question of assistance to interested firms. This at least was the message the Commonwealth received from the Premiers of New South Wales and Victoria at the August 1945 Premiers' Conference. Both were adamant that 'in such a big subject as de-centralisation, the Commonwealth ought not to determine the policy of the States'.

After 1945 the States did not adopt a regionalist approach to de-centralisation. Measures of assistance to private firms were introduced (without the foreshadowed Commonwealth subsidies). But generally there were no preconditions pertaining to the encouragement of regionalisation. The sale or lease of the new Commonwealth munitions factories proved a second stimulus to de-centralisation. But the majority of plant was sited on the fringes of the existing major cities, too close to form the nuclei of adjacent regions.

The question of whether the development of Commonwealth activities in regional planning in the 1940s was retarded by Treasury officials is one worth further enquiry. Of relevance here is the fact that, according to Butlin and Schedvin (1977), Cabinet in July 1945 rejected a DPWR proposal 'to establish a fully-fledged Commonwealth authority to administer de-centralisation policy', Cabinet 'preferring a less conspicuous intrusion into the field of the States and one without financial obligation'. Butlin and Schedvin's observation on the general fate of early post-war de-centralisation efforts is also germane:

*It was generally accepted that a serious attack on the problem [of de-centralisation] depended on detailed Commonwealth-State co-operation and the expenditure of large sums of money, but the Commonwealth was not prepared to make a large financial commitment and the States were more interested in competing between themselves for new industries.*

28
Research for this paper has not as yet confirmed that Treasury was a source of opposition to the DPWR submission in July 1945 but two pieces of evidence so far collected suggest Treasury would have been opposed to the 'expenditure of large sums of money' in this area.

The first piece of evidence is Goodes' notes to Chifley on the 'Regional Planning' item at the August 1945 Premiers' Conference. Referring to the question of the financing of regional resource surveys, Goodes claimed that the Commonwealth position at the October 1944 Premiers' Conference was that 'the primary responsibility belonged to the States and that the Commonwealth would make a contribution where the work would benefit the Commonwealth as a whole' — a position he advised Chifley to maintain. Goodes' account was incorrect, indeed misleading. The Commonwealth submission had made no mention of any 'primary responsibility' and had said that, in addition to surveys of national value, the Commonwealth 'was prepared to share costs of regional organisations such as those implicit in resources surveys'. While at one point in discussion at the Premiers' Conference, Curtin did signal a position identical to the one claimed by Goodes, on further questioning from the Premiers, Curtin and also Chifley made it clear that the terms and extent of Commonwealth financial assistance was open to future negotiation. Goodes also referred to a DPWR proposal for publicity. The Commonwealth-State Officers Conference on Regional Planning in April 1945 had recommended a 'publication' on government plans to cater for the 'widespread public interest' in the subject. Goodes advised the Treasurer that publicity 'might well be confined to a comprehensive press statement'.

The second piece of evidence pertains to DPWR's staffing estimates for its Regional Planning Division in 1948. Whereas the Public Service Board had to that time approved only nine permanent positions, the Department sought for approval for thirty-three positions. P.W. Nette, a Treasury Assistant Secretary, counter-submitted that the DPWR bid was 'excessive'. Nette based his case on the views of State government officials, ascertained directly by Treasury:

From conversations had by Treasury with Regional Planning Officers from the State[s], it is clear that the feeling in the States is that the Commonwealth should devote itself to limited fields beyond the scope of any individual State, and avoid overlapping with State activities.
In the light of evidence such as this and the discussion above concerning other obstacles or factors of resistance it is surely necessary to question the assessment of Lloyd and Troy (1978) that

* The accession to power of a coalition government led by R.G. Menzies effectively shuffled any comprehensive plan for urban and regional planning and development into an administrative limbo. Menzies’ 1949 policy speech set the theme for Commonwealth attitudes to urban and regional development in the laissez faire generation which was to follow.100

The conclusion of this paper is that the closed horizons and attitudes of the 1950’s had descended well before 1949. In the three fields examined here, the key defeats for the ‘New Order’ were all inflicted during 1944-5.

Postscript

The historical analysis in this paper gives rise to questions pertinent to the fields of urban studies and public policy. The paper, for example, invites comparison between developments in the 1940s and the rise and fall of an urban and regional planning role at the Commonwealth level in the 1970s. It also raises the question of whether housing is a natural priority of government over community facilities and planning of the physical environment. Presumably the reason Chifley indicated to DPWR that housing had priority over the three fields studied here was because he believed it to be a much bigger political issue. But was this belief based solely on the assumption that voters wanted decent housing before community facilities and town plans?; or was it also a reflection of the fact that the resurgence of the movement for community facilities and physical planning did not occur until the early 1940s, a few crucial years after the resurgence of the slum abolition movement? (indeed, the leadership of the two lobbies overlapped).101

The paper also showed that while Chifley, as Minister for Post-War Reconstruction, did impose a broad framework on Commonwealth action in the three fields studied (i.e. the 'housing-first' framework) within this framework he was willing to rely, as Treasurer, on crucial strategies formulated by Treasury officials. In other words, the paper provides evidence both of
Ministerial independence from bureaucratic policy advisers and Ministerial reliance on these advisers. Perhaps, if its formulation had been studied more closely, Chifley's 'housing-first' framework might also have been seen as, in part, the product of Treasury influence.

In any case, the tactics used by Treasury in the three fields studied here should be of special interest to students of public policy-making. As evidenced by this paper, these tactics included the following:

- in the face of pressure for a Commonwealth entry into a new field, the avoidance of any reference to the substantive merits or otherwise of entry and, instead, the making of a tautological appeal to 'custom', by saying that the field at issue had 'always been' the responsibility of another level of government;

- when the absence of a substantive justification against entry could no longer be sustained, the basing of such a justification on distorted, indeed fabricated evidence (e.g. the reference to the National Works Council);

- the 'selling' of this unsound justification to the Minister on the basis of its being merely a convenient, temporary 'facade' to ward off outside lobbying, pending a proper policy review as soon as circumstances became more favourable;

- in policy-making confrontations with another department, the presentation of the Minister's facade as the Minister's substantive 'attitude';

- the omission of the foreshadowed policy review, even when circumstances did become more favourable; and

- in policy and resource allocation battles with another department, the obtaining of information detrimental to that department by means of direct – and presumably secret – contact with that department's counterparts (indeed rivals) at another level of the Federal system.

The general question arises as to whether such tactics are typical of the behaviour of Treasury and other departments at other times and circumstances.
In the specific case of Treasury, posing this question also leads to another general question about underlying motivation. Is hostility to new fields of expenditure and governmental activity to be attributed simply to the Treasury's (or, in the 1980s, Department of Finance's) function of expenditure-revenue management? Or can it be attributed also in part to the impact of theoretical assumptions (in the form of macro-economic theory) or social value-judgements (that certain fields are economically or socially more desirable than others)? Analysis of the role of Treasury in these terms is long overdue in the Australian public policy and administration literature.
Footnotes

1. This paper is a slightly expanded and revised version of a seminar paper presented to the Urban Research Unit in December 1986.


5. See footnote 3.


7. Minister for Post-War Reconstruction (MPWR), Cabinet Agenda 565, Nov. 1943, CRS A2700 XM, Vol. 8, Australian Archives (AA). See also Director-General, Dept. of Post-War Reconstruction (D/G, DPWR) to MPWR, 7 Aug. 1944, A571, item 57/3574, Pt. 1, AA.

8. DPWR, 'Commonwealth Housing Plans. Immediate and Post-War: Memorandum prior to Conference of Commonwealth and State Officers to be held at Canberra on 16th and 17th May 1944', P44/201, VGA.

10. ibid., p.113-115.

11. Goodes, H.J. to White, R.H.D., 16/1/45, A571, item 57/3574, Pt. 1, AA.


14. D/G, DPWR, draft Cabinet submission, 24 July 1944, CP43/1, item 44/334, Pt. 1, AA; D/G, DPWR, draft submission, August 1944, A571, item 57/3574, Pt. 1, AA; Attachment to: G. Rudduck to R.H.D. White, 12 Jan. 1945, A571, item 57/3574, Pt. 1, AA.

15. Goodes, Assn. Sec., Social Services Branch, Treasury to D/G, DPWR, 14 August 1944, A571, item 57/3574, Pt. 1, AA; Note of phone call from Goodes to D/G, DPWR, 31 Jan. 1945, A571, item 57/3574, Pt. 1, AA.

16. Goodes to Treasurer, 4 May 1945, A571, item 57/3574, Pt. 1, AA.

17. The National Works Council was a body similar in composition to the Loan Council; its purpose was to attempt to co-ordinate the planning and implementation of public works programmes in the early post-war period. The August 1944 meeting of the Council was mainly taken up with two issues. The first was whether the individual State governments were to retain control over the setting of their public works priorities; the Council decided that any decision on priorities by the Council would have to be 'subject to the agreement' of the State concerned. The second issue was whether the Council should endeavour to standardise the terms of financial assistance by State governments to local governments and semi-government authorities. The Council postponed a full deliberation but the drift of discussion was not favourable to this idea. In no sense did any of the viewpoints expressed in connection with these two issues carry an implication that Commonwealth financial assistance for community facilities or any other type of public works traditionally carried out by State or Local governments was constitutionally improper or politically undesirable. The National Works Council, 'Minutes of Proceedings' and 'Reports of the Commonwealth Co-ordinator General of Works', 1943-1950, National Library.

18. Ross to Goodes, 4 May 1945 and notes by Goodes on meeting of 10 May 1945, A571, item 57/3574, Pt. 1, AA.

19. Note by Goodes, 4 June 1945 on memo from D/G, DPWR to MPWR, 28 May 1945, A571, item 57/3574, Pt. 1, AA.
20. NSW Housing Commission, 'Record of Commonwealth and State [Housing] Officers' Conference, held in Melbourne on 5th, 6th and 7th June, 1945, p.2, File 54/326, NSW Housing Commission Library.

21. For replies by DPWR and its Minister after June 1945 to requests for Commonwealth financial assistance, see CP43/1, item 44/334, Part 1 and 2, AA.

22. At the IDC meeting on 10 May 1945 Welch, representing the Department of Labour and National Service, opposed the addition of community facilities to the immediate building programme. The assessments of Ross, Rudduck and Welch are based on broader research into the housing and building areas of post-war reconstruction: for example, Howard, M.J., State, Business and Unions in the Restructuring of the Building Industry in Australia, 1939-52, Industrial Relations Papers, Research School of Social Sciences, A.N.U., 1987.

23. Author interview with R.S. Mendelsohn, 11 Dec 1984. Mendelsohn was a key housing Research Officer within the Federal government for most of the period 1941-9 and had worked closely with the CHC.


25. See, for example, correspondence between Treasurer (drafted by Goodes) and Calwell (M.P.); James (M.P.); National Fitness Council; Braybrook Shire Council and Clare District War Memorial Centre during 1946-9. A571, item 57/3574, Pt. 2, AA.

26. Treasurer to Drakeford, (M.P.) (on behalf of Braybrook Council), May 1950, A571, item 57/3574, Pt. 3 AA.

27. See, for example, Treasurer to McBride (M.P.), (25 Oct 1949) and Boorowa Council Shire Clerk (4 Nov 1949), A571, item 57/3574, Pt. 2, AA.

28. Goodes to Treasurer, 27 Feb 1950, A571, item 57/3574, Pt. 3, AA.

29. Goodes to Treasurer, 1 Sept 1954, A571, item 57/3574, Pt. 3, AA.
30. Ross, 'Memo on Commonwealth Assistance for Community Development', attached to memo from Ross to D/G, DPWR, 21 May 1945, CP43/1, item 44/334, Part 1, AA.

31. D/G, DPWR (for P.M.) to Premier, 3 Jan 1945, P45/273, VGA; Sec., Premier's Dept. to P.M., 23 Feb 1945, P45/273, VGA.

32. D/G, DPWR (for P.M.) to Premier, 3 May 1945, P45/273, VGA; Sec., Premier's Dept. to D/G, DPWR, 11 June 1945, VGA.

33. NSW Housing Commission, Annual Report, 1945/6 (p.9), 1947/8 (p.8) and 1948/9 (p.11). The Commission claimed that 12% of the allotments acquired by 30 June 1948 had been reserved for parks, shops, schools and 'other essential community requirements'. The Commission also admitted, however, that at mid-1949 plans to build 'community halls' in the larger estates had only reached the design sketch stage. For Commonwealth-State practice in relation to cost-sharing of land for non-residential purposes, see O'Connor, L.P.D., 'Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement: Report', 31 July 1947, p.27, NSW Housing Commission Library.

34. Premier of Victoria to Prime Minister (P.M.), 15/8/47, A571, item 57/3574, Pt. 2, AA; Premier of South Australia to Minister for Supply, 7/7/54, A571, item 57/3574, Pt. 3, AA.


38. Ibid, p.36-40.

39. 'Minutes of Meeting of Commonwealth Housing Commission', 28 April 1943, CP 44/1, S/1944/15, AA.

40. E.g., Chairman, CHC to D/G, DPWR, 5 Jan 1944, CP 194, item 43/1423, bundle 3, AA.

41. Ministry of PWR, 'Details of Commonwealth-State Post-War Housing Plans - Material prepared by the Conference of Housing Officers held in
May 1944', p.5, appended to Circular from P.M. to Premier of Victoria, 22 July 1944, P44/201, VGA.

42. See, for example, Acting P.M. to Premier, Victoria, 16 Nov 1944, P44/2306, VGA.

43. Secretary, Cabinet to MPWR, 11 Nov 1944, A571, item 44/3961.

44. Acting P.M. to Premier, Victoria, 16 Nov 1944, loc. cit.; MPWR, Agendum 749, November 1944, A571, item 44/3961, AA; DPWR, 'Suggested Commonwealth Town Planning Bureau', February 1945, CP194, item 45/120, Bundle 7, AA.

45. See correspondence on P47/1528, VGA.

46. Dedman to Premier, Victoria, 15/3/45, P47/1528, VGA.

47. DPWR 'Notes [transcript] on Commonwealth-State Officers' Conference on Town Planning', 12 April 1945, p.1-2, 14, CP194, item 45/120, bundle 7, AA.

48. ibid., p.3-16.

49. ibid., p.18-23.

50. ibid., p.16-18.

51. MPWR, Agendum 749A, 14 June 1945, A571, item 44/3961, AA.

52. Goodes to Treasurer, 10 Nov 1944, A571, item 44/3961, AA.

53. Goodes, Briefing Note on Cabinet Agendum 749A, 30 June 1945, A571, item 44/3961, AA; see other notes by Goodes and his staff on same Treasury file.

54. Secretary to Cabinet to MPWR, 7 July 1945, A571, item 44/3961, AA.

55. DPWR draft of letter from P.M. to Premiers, July 1945, A571, item 44/3961, AA.

56. Goodes to D/G, DPWR, 26 July 1945, A571, item 44/3961, AA; note by Goodes re Premiers' Conference, 26 July 1945, A571, item 44/3961, AA.
57. Goodes to Treasurer, 'Treasury Notes for Discussion on Town Planning', 20 August 1945, A571, item 44/3961, AA.


59. See Clause 3(1) of the Commonwealth and State Housing Agreement Act 1945.

60. See correspondence between D/G, DPWR and D/G, Dept. of Works and Housing (DWH), Sept-Nov 1945, MP74/F29, G6220, AA.

61. See correspondence within DWH, Oct-Nov 1945, MP74/F29, G6220, AA.

62. Report by Town Planning Service to Assistant D/G, DWH, 22 Aug 1945, MP74/F29, G6220, AA.


65. SMH, 3 Jan 1951, p.1, see also SMH, 4 Jan 1951, p.2.

66. 'Minutes of Meeting of Reconstruction Sub-Committee', 11 May 1942, MP38, G1645, AA.

67. The 'War District Agricultural Committee' under the Department of Commerce; the Civilian Requirements Board under the Department of Supply and Development and the Research Section, Department of the Army in planning an 'emergency administration' in case of invasion.

68. Ministry of Post-War Reconstruction, The Work of the Secondary Industries Commission, Melbourne, 1948, p.1-49. See also minutes of meetings of the Commission on AA files A461 S590/1; A461, S590/3 and A461 S5590/5 - these files cover the key period October 1943 to August 1944.

69. NWC, Minutes of Meeting, 24 April 1944, p.6 (National Library).


71. Dorrian, P.A., 'Regional Planning', 1st draft (undated) and 2nd draft (10 June 1943), CP194, bundle 2, item 43/1175, AA.
72. Memos by J. Oldham (21 June 1943), Rudduck (21 June 1943) and Walter Bunning (6 June 1943) in CP194, bundle 2, item 43/1175, AA.

73. N.G. Butlin (memo, 13 June 1943), A. H. Tange (memo, 15 June 1943) and G.G. Firth (memo, 10 June 1943), and L.F. Crisp. (memo, June 1943) CP194, bundle 2, item 43/1175, AA.

74. Crawford, J.G. to D/G, DPWR, 1 Sept 1943, CP194, bundle 2, item 43/1175, AA.

75. PC, Proceedings, Oct 1944, p.19, 27.

76. See memo from D/G, DPWR to MPWR, undated, GHC-48-15, Reserve Bank Archives (RBA).

77. Memo by L. F. Crisp, June 1943, CP194, bundle 2, item 43/1175, AA.

78. Crawford to Bunning, 28 June 1943, CP194, bundle 2, item 43/1175, AA. The words quoted were Crawford's.


81. Conference of Commonwealth and State Regional Planning Officers held on 15 and 16 Sept 1947, 'Minutes', p.8-10, P48/322, VGA.

82. The land use surveys commissioned or conducted by DPWR were completed and published by the Department of National Development in the early 1950s. A full set is held by Bailleau Library, University of Melbourne. See also, Butlin, S.J., and Schedvin, C.B., War Economy 1942-1945, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1977, p.714-15.

83. DPWR, Regional Planning Division, News Summary: regional planning developments in Australia, Nos. 20-33, 1946-48, held by Bailleau Library.

84. NWC, 'Minutes' and 'Reports of the Commonwealth Co-ordinator General of Works', 1943-50, NL.

86. Conference of Commonwealth and State Regional Planning Officers, 1947, p.2, loc. cit. The Minister Dedman did not specify the major projects to which he was referring.

87. PC, Proceedings, August 1945, p.70-72.

88. DPWR, 'Notes on De-centralisation of Industry', 25 Oct 1945, 'semi-confidential' statement 'sent to enquirers' (prepared by the Regional Planning Division), MP 1/1, Box 1, AA.

89. PC, Proceedings, August 1945, p.70.

90. ibid., p.70-72

91. Secondary Industries Commission, 'Notes on Conference of SIC with State Liaison Officers', 9 Nov 1944, CP44/1, S590/21, AA.

92. Acting P.M. to Premier (Tasmania), 5 Jan 1945, E.J. Ward Papers, ms. 2396/11/36, NL.

93. PC, Proceedings, August 1945, p.71-72.

94. In 1949 DPWR published a count of the number of firms who had bought or leased Commonwealth munitions factories built in the 1940s. The factory sites for 38 of these firms was classified as 'cities', the sites for 217 firms as 'outskirts of capital cities' and the sites for the remaining 38 firms as 'country'. DPWR, Wartime Factories With a Peace-Time Future, Melbourne, 1949, p.6-8.


96. Goodes to Treasurer, 'Notes for Discussion on Regional Planning', 20 August 1945, A571, item 44/4232, AA.


98. Goodes to Treasurer, 20 August 1945, A571, item 44/4232 AA.

99. Treasury Assistant Secretary (Banking, Trade and Industry) (P.W. Nette) to Secretary, Public Service Board, 20 July 1948, A571, item 44/4232, AA.

101. The most noteworthy example is W.O. Burt, a Victorian activist whose focus broadened from slum clearance and re-housing in the 1930s to urban, regional and national economic planning by the mid-1940s.

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