Lowy Institute Paper 22

world wide webs

DIASPORAS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Michael Fullilove

LOWY INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY
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Executive summary

Diasporas – communities which live outside, but maintain links with, their homelands – are getting larger, thicker and stronger. They are the human face of globalisation. Diaspora consciousness is on the rise: diasporans are becoming more interested in their origins, and organising themselves more effectively; homelands are revising their opinions of their diasporas as the stigma attached to emigration declines, and stepping up their engagement efforts; meanwhile, host countries are witnessing more assertive diasporic groups within their own national communities, worrying about fifth columns and foreign lobbies, and suffering outbreaks of ‘diasporaphobia’.

This trend is the result of five factors, all of them connected with globalisation: the growth in international migration; the revolution in transport and communications technology, which is quickening the pace of diasporans’ interactions with their homelands; a reaction against global homogenised culture, which is leading people to rethink their identities; the end of the Cold War, which increased the salience of ethnicity and nationalism and created new space in which diasporas can operate; and policy changes by national governments on issues such as dual citizenship and multiculturalism, which are enabling people to lead transnational lives. Diasporas such as those attaching to China, India, Russia and Mexico are already big, but they will continue to grow; the migration flows which feed them are likely to widen and quicken in the future.

The strengthening of diasporas has important implications for global economics, politics and security. The world is becoming aware of the awesome economic power of remittances: in 2006, for instance, remittances to developing countries were probably almost as large as total foreign direct investment in developing countries, and three times the world’s combined foreign aid budgets. Diaspora networks can also stimulate bilateral trade and investment and mobilise other financial flows. On the other hand, high emigration
can impose a significant economic cost on those left behind in some developing countries.

In the political arena, diasporic groups are becoming more prominent players in host country politics, and their influence is being felt in their homelands, too. Homeland capitals are reaching out to their diasporas: singing their praises; creating diaspora institutions; ministering to their religious needs, as with Turks abroad; and engaging them in the processes of national politics. The trend towards awarding voting rights to citizens living abroad is throwing up many difficult questions – as seen in Italy, for example, where MPs elected by Italians abroad helped recently to vote one prime minister out of office and to vote confidence in another.

The spike in diaspora consciousness also raises noteworthy security issues. Diasporas provide foot soldiers for intelligence services and ethnically-based criminal networks, and they can foster extremism and sustain insurrections back home. On the other hand, while diasporas can be a medium for the transmission of social risk, they can also mitigate risk by supporting young people who might otherwise fall prey to more dangerous forms of identity politics, such as Jihadist Islamism. Finally, if diasporas can pose security threats, they are also subject to them. In many parts of the world, the demand for consular protection is surging, and homelands such as China are stepping up to meet this demand. This has implications for power politics, because states are likely to bump up against each other as they seek to protect their distant citizens.

The tightening of diasporic connections complicates life for national governments in many different ways. The existence of a large diasporic community affects the definition of the national interest – and of course the interests of homeland and diaspora are rarely identical. Diasporas pose new issues for governments, which they are poorly equipped to handle. Even as diasporas become stronger, they become harder to control: they are demanding, but it is difficult to make demands of them. Homelands are keen to work with their diasporas, but they are not good at operating outside their jurisdictions and their diaspora policies tend to be clunky and ineffective. Indeed, national authorities often have no idea where their people are living, let alone what they are doing and how they might be tapped. Accordingly, many governments are displaying bipolar tendencies in relation to diasporas, exhibiting equal generosity to their emigrants and meanness to their immigrants. It is inherently difficult to design public policy in relation to a distant population. In the immediate term, therefore, the principles that should guide homelands’ dealings with their diasporas are modesty and pragmatism. Perhaps nations can be global, but states usually cannot.

Host countries will also need to be realistic, by accepting that many of their people possess plural national identities. Like the mixobarbarians of Byzantine times, who were neither Hellenes nor barbarians but had qualities of both, many of us now live in frontier regions (whether physical or virtual) and hold multiple overlapping identities. We are all mixobarbarians now. Governments should be careful to separate broad issues of identity, therefore, from the urgent but narrower issues of security.

There are implications, finally, for the international system as well as its component states. The world would profit from the development of rules or understandings on a number of diaspora issues, including the cost of remittances, the permissibility of long-distance politicking and activism, and the protection of nationals. The triangular relationships between diasporas, homelands and host countries need to be managed adroitly to ensure they do not become toxic.

A famous international relations analogy likens states to billiard balls: unitary, unconstrained and functionally identical, zipping around the table, clicking against each other and bouncing off the cushions at predictable angles. This is a wholly inadequate description of the international system as it now operates, with states trailing people behind them, affecting the direction and pace of their movement. Diasporas are like ‘world wide webs’ emanating from states, with dense, interlocking, often electronic strands spanning the globe and binding different individuals, institutions and countries together. This Lowy Institute Paper follows those strands and describes the webs that they form.
Acknowledgements

This paper is dedicated to Gillian, my favourite diasporan.

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<td>AKP</td>
<td>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATM</td>
<td>Automated teller machine</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARIM</td>
<td>Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDA</td>
<td>Committee for Economic Development of Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief executive officer</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
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<td>DİTİB</td>
<td>Dîyanet İşleri Türk-İslam Birliği (Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs)</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
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<td>FIFA</td>
<td>Fédération Internationale de Football Association (International Federation of Association Football)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>IDEA</td>
<td>Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance</td>
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<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israel Defense Forces</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Information technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IZA</td>
<td>Institut zur Zukunft der Arbeit (Institute for the Study of Labor)</td>
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<td>KEA</td>
<td>Kiwi Expat Association</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<td>LA</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>NORAIM</td>
<td>Irish Northern Aid Committee</td>
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<td>NRI</td>
<td>Non-resident Indian</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFW</td>
<td>Overseas Filipino worker</td>
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<td>OWWA</td>
<td>Overseas Workers Welfare Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIO</td>
<td>Person of Indian origin</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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Chapter 1

Introduction

In mid-2006, a newly elected Italian member of parliament walked into the Chamber of Deputies in the Palazzo Montecitorio in Rome for the first time. As he passed beneath the flags of the Italian Republic and the European Union, the two Carabinieri standing guard at the door gave him a formal salute.

What was unusual about this scene was that the Italian MP in question, the On. Marco Fedi, is an Australian. He has lived in Australia for a quarter of a century, he has Australian children, and his family is based in Melbourne. Fedi serves in the Italian parliament – participating in Italian debates and voting on Italian laws – as a member of the Italian diaspora. Fedi is a representative, he says, of the Italian nation, which happens to extend beyond the borders of the Italian state. Thinking back later on that ‘amazing’ first day, Fedi observed that Italy is ‘a nation as large as the world.’

Diasporas have been with the world at least since the Jews were exiled to Babylonia. But in recent years they have become larger, thicker and stronger. Diasporas are the human face of globalisation. The story of Italy’s extraordinary electoral innovation in creating diaspora constituencies and electing diaspora MPs is only one of many examples of growing diaspora consciousness. In the arenas of economics, identity,
politics and security, diasporas are acquiring a new international salience. This Lowy Institute Paper seeks to plot this intriguing growth curve and evaluate its implications.

1.1 The meaning of diaspora

The term ‘diaspora’ derives from the ancient Greek word *diaspeirein*, meaning to sow or scatter.² It was used to describe Jews living in exile outside Israel, and the concept remains bound up with the Jewish tradition. Yet the word has come to be used much more broadly, and is now routinely applied to many different transnational communities, from Afghans to Zimbabweans.³

What is a diaspora? An ‘unruly crowd’ of possible definitions jostle for position, many of them exclusive, elaborate and quite theoretical.⁴ Taken at its broadest, a diaspora is a self-identified cultural community which has been dispersed from, but maintains links with, its place of origin.⁵ There are two important elements of this definition. First, diasporas are transnational: as Samuel Huntington puts it, they ‘cut across state boundaries’.⁶ Indeed, the homeland may not even presently constitute a state. Second, self-definition is key. The existence of a diaspora requires more than a mere population of expatriates. It requires members of a community to continue to identify with their homeland, and to cultivate ties both between themselves and with the homeland. Diasporas should not be thought of, I suggest, in terms of citizenship or the number of generations since emigration, but rather in terms of connectedness. Whether a sense of connectedness – and therefore membership of a diaspora – persists or evaporates over time depends partly on the cultures of the sending and receiving countries, but mainly on the individual.⁷ Certain other definitions in the literature refer to additional characteristics of some diasporas – a traumatic dispersal, for instance, or a troubled relationship with the host country, or the retention of original nationality – but these are not present in every case and should not be regarded as constitutive.⁸

1.2 The rise of diasporas

The starting-point of this paper is that diaspora consciousness is on the rise – for individual diasporans, for homelands and for host countries. This argument is not often made about diasporas in general,⁹ but in fact it is supported by a large body of evidence. *Diasporans* have always felt memories of their past tugging at them, but in a globalised world the pull is, for many, getting stronger – and easier to satisfy. That people are becoming more interested in, and knowledgeable about, their original homelands (or that of their ancestors) is showing up in different indicia, such as the international news they follow, or the sporting teams they back, or the culture they consume. With China’s geopolitical rise, ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and the Philippines are taking renewed pride in their origins, studying Mandarin, participating in lion dances and reviving their old Chinese surnames.¹⁰ ‘Roots tourism’ is becoming an important niche market, seized on by countries such as Ghana, which is courting African-American and Afro-Caribbean tourists keen to undertake ‘pilgrimages’ to discover their ancestral cultures.¹² In the world of football, the *Los Angeles Times* commented after a 1998 fixture between the US national team and Mexico that ‘Playing in Los Angeles is not a home game for the United States’; similarly the Turkish team attracted large and enthusiastic crowds to matches it played recently on German grounds.¹³ Diaspora organisations such as New Zealand’s Kiwi Expat Association (KEA) and Australia’s Advance are coalescing in order to facilitate networking and mentoring among professionals; others are lobbying tenaciously for extended political rights.¹⁴ Latinos in southern California and elsewhere, especially from the first and second generations, have formed hundreds of *clubes de oriundos* (hometown associations), which offer places to socialise and ways to promote development in the villages from which they or their parents set out for America.¹⁵ The Salvadoran-American head of one such committee told researchers: ‘I really live in El Salvador, not in LA... When I go back home to inspect the works paid with our contributions, I am as important as the mayor. In LA, I just earn money, but my thoughts
are really back home. These trends are only likely to accelerate in the future, as the exploding international interest in family trees and genealogical research is supplemented by ‘recreational genetics’—new and affordable DNA techniques that enable individuals to trace their ancestors back to the continent (or even the region or tribe) from which they sprang.\\n\\nThe spike in diasporic feeling is also being expressed in the arts. The British Museum is finding that its visitors are increasingly interested in their own histories: exhibitions of Bengali and Ghanaian objects produced sharp rises in visitor numbers from those local communities. Some of the finest novelists writing in English today, such as Kiran Desai, Rohinton Mistry, V. S. Naipaul and Salman Rushdie, are members of the Indian diaspora. Filmmakers such as Iranian-American Kayvan Mashayekh and French-Iranian Marjane Satrapi, British-Indian Gurinder Chadha, French-Algerian Tony Gatlif and German-Turk Fatih Akin, are creating films that feature people negotiating their plural identities. Young German-Turkish rappers in Berlin are sampling traditional Turkish music and borrowing their lyric structures from traditional Turkish minstrels, producing a unique variant of hip-hop. Multiple identities are good for the creative process, because as the art critic Robert Hughes has noted, ‘some of the most interesting things in history and culture happen at the interface between cultures.’ Those who live in what Hughes calls ‘border situations’ are often better placed to ‘read the image-banks of others.’\\n\\nNone of this amounts to ancestor worship; nevertheless, clearly something is happening.\\n\\nThere is also something important happening in homelands. Countries which long regarded their emigrants as second-raters, remittance drones or even traitors are now seeing them in a different light: as well-placed contacts, unofficial ambassadors and ‘gold-collar workers’. An avalanche of reports advocating closer engagement is falling from think tanks and parliamentary committees in countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In June 2007, Istanbul hosted the finals of the fifth Uluslararası Türkçe Olimpiyatları (Turkish Language Olympics), which brought together Turkic language speakers from around the world on a ‘wave of Turkophilia’, including the performance of folk dances and national songs.\\n\\nThe world is becoming aware of the awesome economic power of remittances: in 2006, for instance, recorded remittances totalled US$276 billion; including informal remittances, the total may be more than US$400 billion. About US$300 billion of these remittances went to developing countries. That is a very large number—almost as large as total foreign direct investment in developing countries and three times that of official development assistance—and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are seeking to design policies that increase the quality and effect of these remittances. Businesses are identifying lucrative profit-making opportunities. The one-time telegram giant Western Union has remade itself as the leading global provider of money transfer services, with 320,000 locations worldwide (and a record of advocating the liberalisation of America’s immigration policies). On Indian news portals, Citibank advertises its rupee checking accounts, money transfer facilities, calling cards and ATM cards for relatives back home. Satellite television channels such as Hindi language Zee TV and Chinese language Phoenix target their national diasporas; a new English-language satellite television news channel in Pakistan, DawnNews, has announced it will target second-generation Pakistanis living in the West whose Urdu is limited but whose emotional links with their country remain intact.\\n\\nPoliticians are travelling the world stumping for the expatriate vote, among them French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who told an enthusiastic audience of French citizens in London (‘one of the biggest French cities’) during his successful election campaign that ‘France is an ideal and not just a territory... France exists anywhere in the world where there are French people.’ Indeed, Sarkozy seemed to argue that France could learn a lot from the entrepreneurialism and ‘vitality’ of her expatriates.\\n\\nHome capitals, too, are trying to network with their diasporas. Heads of government are reaching out rhetorically; for example, New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark has said ‘our expatriates can see opportunities for us overseas through New Zealand eyes’. In 2006, Greek President Karolos Papoulias (who himself spent many years outside his homeland)
Meanwhile, host countries such as the US are becoming increasingly aware of the transnational communities in their midst, as older groups such as the Cuban-Americans of Miami are joined by new communities such as the Iranian-Americans of ‘Teherangeles’, who include among their number the mayor of Beverly Hills. London is the world capital of several diasporas. Several hundred thousand Russians have swept into ‘Londongrad’ in the past decade, doing deals (often in cash), upsetting the Kremlin from time to time, and snapping up football clubs (such as Chelsea, or ‘Chelski’ as it became known once it was purchased by Roman Abramovich) and fancy residences. (Winston Churchill’s famous Westminster apartment, 11 Morpeth Mansions, is currently on the rental market: the details are available on the Internet in both English and Russian.) Since Poland’s accession to the European Union in 2004, London has seen a huge influx of Polish immigrants, who now form the third largest ethnic group in England. A ‘Polandia’ subculture has arisen, with Polish meatballs on sale at markets near Marble Arch and Polish newspapers for sale at London news stands.

On the other hand, for some commentators London is not Londongrad or Polandia, but ‘Londonistan’, a hub for Islamists and a Petri dish for terrorism.

This kind of concern about fifth columns, much heightened since the terror attacks of 9/11 and 7/7, has produced a flurry of new laws to identify suspect individuals and organisations as well as new policies to promote cultural integration. Not...
were 191 million international migrants in 2005, which is more than a twofold increase since the 1960s. In other words, one in thirty-three people in the world is a migrant; the total number of migrants would, if gathered together, constitute the world’s fifth most populous country. According to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), in 2000 there were 70 countries where migrants accounted for 10% of the population; in six countries and regions they constituted more than 60% of the population. Countries which once sent migrants abroad, such as Italy, Ireland and Turkey, are now receiving them; people are not only moving from poor to rich countries but between poor and middle income countries as well. As the social anthropologist Steven Vertovec notes, migration flows replenish old diasporas and create new ones. Given that diasporas are self-defined, and the necessary sense of connectedness will often linger well beyond the first generation, the total membership of global diasporas, although impossible to quantify, would probably be significantly larger than the number of migrants.

Second, the revolution in transport and communications technology is expanding the opportunities for people to live overseas, and quickening the pace of their interactions with their homelands. Of course, transnational activities have taken place for a long time, but the new technologies are transforming their intensity and scope. Technological developments are transporting people, connecting them, and sometimes narrowing them. The increasing ease and declining cost of transporting people around the world, in particular by airliner, has made the idea of one-off migration a thing of the past for many people. The establishment of low-cost carriers and the creation of new international air corridors between provincial cities in the past decade have further strengthened connections with homelands. For example, British Pakistanis can fly direct from Manchester to Islamabad, and Sikhs and other Punjabis can take a direct service from Birmingham to Amritsar. Judith Brown observes that now ‘even relatively poor South Asians overseas travel back to the subcontinent, take their children there, and have a lively sense of belonging to families and wider kin groups which straddle national boundaries.’ When they are ‘home’, they visit their families, show their children their ancestral homes and introduce them to their cousins, attend weddings and arrange new marriages, undertake religious pilgrimages and engage in diaspora tourism.

Connectedness has grown exponentially, as the telegraph, the press, radio, television and transcontinental telephony have given way to computers, satellite television, the Internet, email, chat rooms, blogs, Internet telephony such as Skype, video-sharing sites such as YouTube, and social networking communities such as Facebook and MySpace. This trend, which has enabled information flows and interactions between people who are physically distant, has naturally enough benefited diaspora communities. British editor John O’Sullivan notes that this kind of technological progression ‘is not equal in its impact. It especially fosters cooperation among people who speak the same language and share the same cultural world… Its main international impact… is to elevate the importance of culture and downgrade that of geographical proximity.’ Expatriates can use these technologies to keep up with the news from home, maintain the currency of their social networks, and do long-distance business deals. Youn Aussies living abroad, for instance, often read The Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian online each day before anyone back home has woken up. NRIs use special matrimonial websites to find brides and grooms back in India or within the diaspora. Armenians have established a ‘Global Armenians’ Facebook group which allows for participant interaction, discussion boards, photo-sharing and event notification. (On the other side of the ledger, of course, people can use the technologies of globalisation for more sinister ends: Jihadists have moved into cyberspace, ‘the ultimate ungoverned territory’.)

As well as transporting and connecting people, though, new technologies are also narrowing their vision, herding like-minded individuals towards each other. Diasporas have been at the leading edge of technological adoption because of the particular challenges arising from their dispersed audiences. Ethnic newspapers, music videos and online magazines have helped diasporas to maintain their distinct identities. In the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, Indians in Britain got their fix of Hindi films via video cassette; now Bollywood is, according
to JPMorgan Chase, ‘waking up to the commercial potential of making movies for overseas Indians’. Companies such as Bollywood for You (B4U) are beaming Hindi films to subscribers around the world, and the industry’s writers are now featuring NRIs among their leading characters. In 2006 Western Union paid the producers of a Bollywood movie to include a scene in which one of their wire transfers saves the day. Satellite TV is the most powerful technology so far, because it enables expatriates to watch television routinely from their homelands and therefore ‘synchronise’ their lives with events at home. ‘It’s almost as if we’re living in Turkey, as if nothing really has changed for us’, one London resident told scholars. Indeed, the experience of Turks in Germany demonstrates all three technological effects of transportation, connection and narrowing. More than fifty flights transport individuals between Turkey and Germany each day; email and diasporic websites connect German-Turks in Berlin and Cologne with their homeland; and satellite TV enables them to spend their evenings and weekends in narrowcast, talking to their families in Turkish and watching Turkish television. One scholar, Hakan Yilmaz, describes this as a ‘tremendous increase in transnational capabilities that is fundamentally altering our idea of the space in which people live.’

The Economist summarised the impact of new technologies on diasporas in this way:

Scatter a few million émigrés across the globe, and, being everywhere in a minority, they are weak. They are influential only where they are concentrated, as, say, Swedes are in southern Finland; or where they are especially well-organised, as Jews are in the United States and Armenians are in France. That is certainly the way it used to be. But nowadays jet planes, rapid communication and in particular the internet have enabled dispersed exiles to come together cheaply and effectively for the first time in history.

Closely related to these technological changes is a third reason for the emergence of diasporas: the places where we look for and find our sense of identity seem to be changing. The hypothesis that globalisation would produce a global homogenised culture is proving partly right (we all read Harry Potter and shake our heads over Paris Hilton) but partly wrong. To be sure, many people’s horizons have been broadened by the cultural interactions that are possible nowadays. But partly as a reaction against the forces of globalisation, others are rethinking their identities and redefining them in what Huntington calls ‘narrower, more intimate, communal terms’. Technology allows individuals both to ‘mix with others’ and ‘huddle with their own’. The columnist David Brooks, among others, has identified this trend in Western societies, where ‘far from converging into some homogenous culture, we are actually diverging into lifestyle segments’, downloading views with which we agree onto our iPods, and moving into neighbourhoods full of people just like ourselves. So it is on the international stage too. Since the end of the Cold War, political ideology no longer exerts the same power over the human imagination; old factors such as nationality, religion and ethnicity are proving remarkably durable and, arguably, actually increasing in salience – and not only in that part of the world where the Soviet writ once ran and ethnicity was systematically repressed. Contrary to the predictions of Karl Marx, H. G. Wells and a host of other thinkers, ethnic and religious identification seems to be on the rise in many different regions.

This does not necessarily mean we face a clash of civilisations; it does mean, though, that people searching for more ‘authentic’ identities may find them in the folds of their memory or their ancestry. The New York Times recently reported on an Italian-American woman from California, Angela Paolantonio, who visited her grandparents’ village of Calitri in southern Italy on holiday. She ended up purchasing her grandmother’s childhood home and now divides her time between the village and Los Angeles. ‘I really didn’t know I was searching for anything till I got here’, said Paolantonio. ‘Then I realized what I was missing and what it meant.’ In a globalised world, it is easier for such dual or multiple identities to co-exist: for a German-Turk, for example, to have ‘one foot in his village, another in Istanbul, one hand in Cologne and the other in Mecca’.
The end of the Cold War has reduced the global importance of ideology, but the shake-up that ensued has pushed diasporas to the fore in other ways, too. In the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, nationalism has returned in force; nations in Eastern Europe have moved their borders, altering the composition of their diasporas; democracy has spread, raising the issue of external voting in a more insistent fashion than before; the reshuffling of power politics that followed has changed host country attitudes towards certain homelands and the diasporas lobbying on their behalf (for example, US attitudes towards India and Indian-Americans); and rising powers boasting influential diasporas, such as China, have stepped forward.

Finally, the ability of people like the German-Turk mentioned above to live and do business across borders has been enabled by changes of policy by national governments. Although the trend is not universal, most countries have moved in the direction of opening their economies up to the world. The barriers to the international flow of people have not come down nearly so far as those to the flows of goods, services and capital. Nevertheless, the shift to a service economy has increased the value and tradability of human capital and created an international labour market, at least for the highly skilled.60 Just as governments have liberalised their economies, they have also practised more ‘diversity-positive policies’ such as multiculturalism, which have made it ‘widely acceptable for immigrants and descendants to sustain culturally distinct practices and diasporic identities.’61 One of the most notable examples has been the widespread liberalisation of citizenship laws to allow for dual citizenship, sometimes after lobbying by diaspora organisations. (Sending countries have typically changed their laws in an effort to retain their emigrants’ loyalty; receiving countries have done so to ease the way of new immigrants and spare them difficult choices during their process of integration.) According to a recent estimate, the number of countries allowing dual citizenship to most of their citizens has more than doubled in the past twenty years; even countries that were previously quite fundamentalist about exclusive nationality, such as the US, are becoming less so.62

1.4 The unmanageable diaspora

The story of diasporas is not a simple one, however. Even as diasporas become stronger, they become harder to control – including for the national governments whose policy decisions have accelerated their rise. States are becoming more interested in working with their diasporas, but many are struggling to do so effectively because it is outside their raison d’être, which is to monopolise legitimate authority within a delineated territory. The historian Charles Maier notes that nation-states consolidated themselves in the second half of the nineteenth century by filling their territories with prefectures, post offices, infrastructure and newspapers, stringing telegraph and telephone lines from border to border and criss-crossing their land with railroad lines. As a result, ‘far more points within the state’s territory could be supervised by administrators, opened for economic exploitation, mobilized for national purposes.’ However, the last forty years have seen, to some extent, ‘the waning of territoriality’, as territory ‘fades in importance as a political and economic resource’, symbolised by the rise of the microchip and the fall of the twin towers. Without exaggerating the point, both prosperity and security increasingly derive from networks, not bounded spaces.

States are aware of this change and are trying to adapt – remodelling their economies, restructuring their militaries and, lately, reaching out to exploit (or protect) their people abroad. But these extra-jurisdictional efforts are often clunky and ineffective: it is very difficult for governments to know where their people are living and what they are doing, let alone to influence their behaviour. There is also clear cognitive dissonance, driven by anxiety about international people movements: thus Western countries such as Australia simultaneously make it more difficult for emigrants to regain citizenship if they have lost it.63 The diaspora organisations which are springing up are nimbler than national governments but they, too, often find it difficult to organise their fellows. The leaders of these groups are not always representative and often they are not even elected.65 Sometimes well-known groups amount to
less than they first appear: one government official compares dealing with diaspora organisations to putting his hand into a pillar of smoke. In other words, diasporas are becoming more powerful and prominent – but no easier to marshal or direct.

1.5 Aim and scope of this Paper

The aim of this Lowy Institute Paper is to analyse the implications that flow from the strengthening of diasporas, for global economics, identity, politics, and security. Some of these effects are new; others have been around for a long time but are now manifesting in different ways. Diasporas raise some very difficult issues for policymakers, some of which will be aired in the chapters which follow. What are the economics of emigration and to what extent can remittances drive development? How are diasporas and homelands rethinking their relationships with each other? How are expatriates influencing the politics of their homelands and host countries, and what has been the response? What are the security implications of diasporas – are they recruiting sergeants for extremists and foreign intelligence services, or can they be mobilised to help rebuild their broken homelands? Finally, to turn the last question around, how can governments protect their people when they choose to live abroad? Over and above all these specific policy issues, what does the thickening of diasporas mean for nation-states and the international system?

If it is rare to look at diasporas from multiple analytical perspectives, the intention is to produce a three-dimensional view of the phenomenon. The paper also aims to help pull diasporas into the analytical mainstream by moving beyond the academic field of diaspora studies and drawing on general economics, politics and security studies literatures. That is not to say this paper is comprehensive, or anything like it; on the contrary it is deliberately selective and synthetic. Certain interesting cases will receive particular attention, but the chapters are thematic and the aim is get a sense of the overall picture – and how that picture is changing.

Two caveats should be mentioned. First, the issue of diasporas is related to debates about immigration, multiculturalism and ethnicity – diasporic attachment may be, to some extent, a counterweight to integration but it is also distinct from them. This paper is primarily about emigration, not immigration. While some chapters will explore how societies containing foreign diasporas organise themselves, the primary relationship under examination is that between diaspora and homeland, not diaspora and host country. Second, while this paper contains generalisations about various diasporas, they are of course not single-minded creatures. Diasporas are far from monolithic and different members relate very differently to their homelands. The Indian diaspora is divided not only by religion (Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Parsi and Christian) but also language, locality, caste and class; the Jewish diaspora contains both supporters and critics of Israel; the Turkish diaspora is just as diverse as Turkish society, including Kurds, Assyrians and Armenians, Alevi and Sunnis, conservatives and liberals, religious and secular Muslims. The effects of individual diasporans, therefore, are diverse.

A famous international relations analogy likens states to billiard balls: unitary, unconstrained and functionally identical, zipping around the table, clicking against each other and bouncing off the cushions at predictable angles. That analysis of states – each one ‘closed, impermeable, and sovereign’ – was always more parsimonious than accurate. Certainly, it is an inadequate description of the international system as it now operates, with states trailing people behind them, affecting the direction and pace of their movement. Diasporas are like ‘world wide webs’ emanating from states, with dense, interlocking, often electronic strands spanning the globe and binding different individuals, institutions and countries together. This Lowy Institute Paper follows those strands and describes the webs that they form.
Chapter 2

Demographics and diasporas

This chapter outlines briefly some of the demographics of diasporas, by way of background for the real substance of this paper: the implications for global economics, identity, politics and security.

2.1 Counting diasporas

It is very difficult, if not impossible, to estimate accurately the size of the various diasporas. In the first place, it is hard for homelands to follow their people’s movements once they leave their sovereign territory. Some foreign ministries direct their overseas posts to estimate the number of their nationals residing within the countries to which they are accredited, however these figures vary considerably in accuracy from place to place. Second, host countries have widely varying ambitions and capacities to record the presence of foreign diasporans within their own borders. There are data problems arising from definitional ambiguities in the collection of information, the problem of illegal (and usually invisible) immigrants, and the inability of some developing countries to conduct thorough censuses. Furthermore, Gabriel Sheffer reminds us that ‘data politics’ also come into play, when governments attempt to minimise local awareness of diaspora populations for political, cultural or religious...
reasons. One scholar refers to France as a ‘dark country’, for example, in the sense that its Republican ethos prevents the collection of census data on the ethnicity of French citizens. In any case, the membership of diasporas is essentially unknowable, because it is not a simple issue of citizenship, race, religion or even ancestry: rather, it is a matter of self-identification. Indeed, as we will explore in the next chapter, many individuals identify with two or more countries, and sometimes even with multiple diasporas. Accordingly, while the estimates of the size of various diasporas provided in this paper draw on the most reliable figures available, they should only be regarded as indicative.

Notwithstanding these problems, we can state with confidence that diasporas are large and they are growing. If there are almost two hundred million migrants in the world, as stated in the previous chapter, then we can expect the total number of people who feel a diasporic connection to another country to be larger than that figure, perhaps even a multiple of it. Four of the largest and most significant diasporas are those attaching to China, India, Russia and Mexico.

An old saying has it that ‘there are Chinese people wherever the ocean waves touch’. Chinese emigration has been taking place for centuries – from the early artisans, traders and other skilled workers down through the free emigrants and contract labourers or coolies of the nineteenth century to the young contemporary professionals who leave China to study and work in the US. Today it is estimated that there are more than 33 million overseas Chinese (huaqiao) and people of Chinese ancestry (huayi) living outside mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. This diaspora can be found in more than 150 countries but it is particularly prominent and wealthy in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia, where Chinese run huge swathes of the private economy. Amy Chua claims that ‘no minority in Asia is, or has ever been, as stunningly wealthy or glaringly market-dominant as the ethnic Chinese communities of Southeast Asia, who collectively control virtually all of the region’s most advanced and lucrative industries as well as its economic crown jewels’. According to some analysts, the combined GDP of the Chinese diaspora is as large as that of China itself; its members have undoubtedly been ‘indispensable contributors to mainland China’s spectacular economic growth’. In recent years there have been impressive new movements of ethnic Chinese into the lands on China’s periphery, including Burma (where experts believe a million Chinese may now reside), Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Siberia – and further afield, to regions such as Africa and the Southwest Pacific. In some of these geographies there are now several quite distinct Chinese communities, for example, in Solomon Islands, where there are stark differences (and some friction) between the established waku (Chinese or Asian) community and the newer arrivals, who tend to be more nationalistic and sharper in their business practices.

According to the Indian government, there are over 25 million overseas Indians, including both NRIs and PIOs, spread across 110 countries, with particular concentrations in the Gulf region, North America, the UK, South Africa, Southeast Asia, the Pacific, the Caribbean and East Africa. The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs estimates that about 60% of that number are PIOs, that is, they are of Indian ancestry but do not hold Indian citizenship. Indian emigration began en masse in the nineteenth century in the form of indentured labour bound for Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, Sri Lanka, Fiji and East Africa; financiers and traders conducting seaborne commerce in the wake of the British Empire; and Punjabi soldiers and police following the imperial flag. Three further waves have left since independence in 1947: professionals and small business people seeking greater opportunities in the West since the 1950s; contract workers heading for the Gulf since the 1970s oil boom; and IT professionals who have migrated to the US since the 1980s. If the Chinese diaspora is comprised largely of small businesspeople, the Indian diaspora is dominated by guestworkers at one end and professionals at the other – right up to the CEO of PepsiCo, Indra Nooyi.

There are Russians living in many parts of the world, including the US, Western Europe and Israel, but the largest number live on Russia’s own borders. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 25 million ethnic Russians living in the outlying Soviet regions were suddenly added to the ranks of the Russian diaspora – a diaspora towards which
the Russian political parties are very attentive. Moscow has identified Russian émigrés as a potential source of immigrants for a country in a demographic death spiral: in his 2006 state of the nation address, President Vladimir Putin initiated a program which provides incentives for Russian ‘compatriots’ living abroad to return to the motherland.

The Mexican diaspora, thought to consist of about 30 million people, is unusual in its heavy concentration in one region of one neighbouring country, being the southwestern United States (especially California, Texas, Arizona and Colorado, as well as Illinois). Many Mexican-Americans speak Spanish and celebrate certain Mexican holidays, and the Catholic Church remains a mainstay of the community. Mexican migration to the US during the twentieth century, much of which was illegal, was mainly characterised by unskilled rural workers seeking higher wages, although observers believe there has been a shift recently towards more highly educated and skilled people.

In addition to the ‘big four’, of course, there are many other diasporas, all of which have their own features: for example, the Filipino diaspora, eight million strong, scattered around North America, the Gulf, East Asia and Europe, which is profoundly important to the Philippines economy; the Cuban diaspora, dominated by the 1.5 million Cuban-Americans (predominantly clustered in southern Florida, where they have created an idealised Havana in Miami, including parks named for anti-Castro freedom fighters and Cuban botanicas, restaurants and cigar factories) who have exerted significant influence over American policy towards Fidel Castro’s Cuba; the Lebanese diaspora, a mercantile community spread across North and South America, Europe, West Africa and Australia; the Greek diaspora, situated predominantly in North America, Australia and Europe; the British diaspora, which consists of 5.5 million people if one includes only British nationals but at least ten times that number, and perhaps many more, if one adds those claiming British ancestry; the Irish diaspora, which could boast seventy million people if all individuals claiming Irish descent were included; and the New Zealand diaspora, which though small in absolute terms (between one-half and one million), is large relative to New Zealand’s modest resident population of about four million. A number of other diasporas are discussed in depth in later chapters of this paper. A summary of qualitative and quantitative data about selected diasporas is contained in Appendix 1.

Diasporas are big: they are also getting bigger. We can expect global diasporas to increase in size, for two reasons. The first is the increase in diaspora consciousness described in Chapter 1, which is likely to lead to the persistence of ethno-national connectedness into future generations. Second, the immigration flows which form diasporas are likely to widen and quicken in the future. The World Bank predicts that the number of people wishing to migrate from developing to developed countries will rise over the next two decades, because of the huge economic incentive: after adjusting for purchasing power, wage levels in high-income countries are approximately five times those of low-income countries for similar occupations. Furthermore, the wages earned go much further when they are remitted back to developing countries, where the prices of goods and services are much lower. Additional factors are also likely to drive immigration growth:

About 31% of developing countries’ population is below the age of 14, compared with 18% in high-income countries. We can thus anticipate a large influx in the age categories most suitable for emigration, as lifetime earnings from migration tend to be largest for those emigrating early in their working life. The surge in immigration since the 1980s has established large diasporas in high-income countries, which help to reduce the costs and risks of migration... The demand for immigrant services in high-income countries may also rise as the aging of the population shrinks the workforce and increases demand for services that immigrants can supply (such as nursing care). As income standards rise, the demand for other services that employ migrants (such as household and...
In other words, both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors are likely to expand global diasporas in the future.

### 2.2 Gold-collar diasporas

Social scientists in the field of migration studies have developed various typologies of diasporas. One such framework, proposed by Robin Cohen, focuses on the *reason for dispersal* and includes victim diasporas (such as the Jews, Africans and Armenians), labour diasporas (such as the Indians), imperial diasporas (most notably the British, but also the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, German and French) and trade diasporas (such as the Chinese in Southeast Asia and the Lebanese in West Africa and the Americas). To this list we could add another, more recent, type: the ‘gold-collar diaspora’, comprising highly skilled individuals.

The international migration of highly skilled people is, as the OECD has declared, ‘on the rise.’ Between 1990 and 2000, for instance, the number of highly educated people from developing countries who were residing in OECD countries doubled. This shift has been enabled by the various manifestations of globalisation: rapid technological change; more robust market competition; the global shift to a service economy; the internationalisation of education and declining cost of international job searching. Furthermore, economic change has begat policy change, as the immigration policies of countries such as Australia, Canada, the US and some EU member states have begun to formally privilege highly skilled workers. The result of all this has been what Bimal Ghosh describes as ‘a worldwide scramble for skills’ and the consulting firm McKinsey & Company dubbed ‘the war for talent’. This scramble continues even after people have moved on: international firms are now following the lead of universities in devising means of staying in touch with their ‘alumni’.

‘Gold-collar’ workers are, then, globalisation’s children. They are rarely forced to leave their homeland; rather, they are participants in a globalising labour market, choosing to take up opportunities where they find them. Indeed, for many gold-collar workers, the idea of one-off, one-way ‘emigration’ is redundant; they are highly mobile and are likely to relocate several times over the course of their lives. Australians abroad form one example of a gold-collar diaspora. Its membership of approximately one million people is relatively young, well educated, well remunerated, well connected and highly mobile (in addition to being well disposed to Australia). Indeed, the roll-call of Australians in influential international positions has raised some eyebrows: one former US State Department official refers jocularly to an ‘axis of ocker’, and Australians’ success on the British arts scene (where they lead London’s Southbank Centre, Sadler’s Wells Theatre, the London Philharmonic Orchestra, Wales Millennium Centre, the Edinburgh International Festival, and the English National Opera) led to a terrific whinge from the critic Norman Lebrecht, titled ‘Why do so many Aussies run the show?’

This new pattern of gold-collar movement is having an impact on the economics of emigration.
Chapter 3

Brain drains, bridges and flying money: The economics of emigration

Economic theory tells us that a diaspora can have very significant implications, both positive and negative, for its homeland. The usual prism through which the topic is discussed is that of brain drain versus remittances: on the one hand, emigration can reduce an economy’s human capital and hence its growth prospects; on the other, a diaspora can be a critical source of foreign income. To this dichotomy we need to add an emerging argument about the value of diaspora networks, which can help connect domestic businesses with international sources of trade, investment and knowledge. What follows is not a comprehensive account of the economic effects of international migration, but rather a snapshot of each of these three elements.

3.1 Brain drains, real and imagined

In a strict economic sense, brain drain merely denotes ‘the international transfers of human resources’ – but in the wider community the term is inevitably used in a pejorative way. The brain drain argument was popularised in the 1960s, but it has since been reinvigorated by
two developments. The first of these was empirical, namely the sharp increase in the mobility of highly skilled individuals described in the previous chapter. The second development was theoretical: the rise of ‘endogenous growth theory’. Whereas traditional growth theory suggests that countries with more educated workers will tend to have higher levels of output per worker, new growth theory goes further and posits that increases in human capital may lead to higher rates of growth of output per worker, not just higher levels.\textsuperscript{117} It argues that the productivity of human capital relates positively to the availability of other human capital; for example, scientists are more likely to generate new ideas when they have physical contact with lots of other scientists. The implication is that there could be substantial damage to a country’s economic performance and development prospects if it loses ‘too much’ human capital overseas.\textsuperscript{112}

Judging from media reports, many developed countries believe their brains are draining away, as local talent departs to join offshore diasporas. In countries such as Britain, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand and Australia, the brain drain narrative has proven irresistible to opposition politicians, university administrators and CEOs.\textsuperscript{113} According to Australian commentators, for example, the antipodean brain drain is ‘real and…growing’ and is ‘sapping Australia’s energy’; it ‘has reached its most critical level’ and may eventually ‘cripple us’.\textsuperscript{114} In fact, sometimes even the US – typically the villain in the story – is open to the argument that it is actually a victim of brain drain.\textsuperscript{115} From an empirical point of view, however, wealthy countries such as these rarely face meaningful shortfalls in human capital, for two reasons. First, they usually have an excess supply of skilled migrants from developing countries wishing to immigrate, and these inflows of skilled workers typically more than offset their outflows. In Canada, for instance, there are four times as many university graduates entering Canada from the rest of the world as there are leaving Canada for the US.\textsuperscript{116} Second, a significant proportion of skilled migrants from developed countries return to their homeland after a period away, often with enhanced human capital in the form of new skills, experience and contacts. These two factors – immigration inflows and return migration – point to an emerging pattern of ‘brain circulation’ among developed countries, rather than brain drains from them.\textsuperscript{117} Australia is a classic example where, notwithstanding media hype, immigration flows substantially exceed emigration flows and there is considerable churning of the diaspora’s membership.\textsuperscript{118}

The situation is different for many developing countries, however. Although some research indicates that the prospect of emigration may foster human capital formation in developing countries (as individuals interested in making their fortune abroad invest more in education), most experts emphasise the effect on the homeland’s economic growth and other negative externalities such as lost tax revenue and contributions to national public goods.\textsuperscript{119} The mitigating factors which apply to developed countries do not necessarily apply to the same extent to developing countries: highly educated people are relatively scarcer in poor countries, for instance, and the impact of emigration on the stock of human capital is less likely to be tempered by immigration. A recent study by Frédéric Docquier and Abdeslam Marfouk found ‘a remarkable increase in the brain drain in the past decade’ in some parts of the world. Countries in the Caribbean, Central America and Africa are enduring the highest emigration rates; in some small states such as Suriname and Guyana, more than 80% of the potential educated labour force lives overseas. Even leaving aside these small countries, the authors found ‘tremendous rates of emigration’ from places such as Haiti, Somalia, Ghana, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Madagascar, Vietnam and Lebanon.\textsuperscript{120} (See Table 2 below.) Ghosh points to some other extreme statistics: there are nearly four times as many Jamaicans with tertiary education in the US than in Jamaica; more Ethiopian doctors are practising medicine in Chicago than in Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{121} In these kinds of (admittedly atypical) cases, the loss of talent through emigration is likely to result in a major reduction in human capital, imposing a significant cost on those left behind.
3.2 Remittances and development

The second factor to consider in assessing the economic impact of diasporas is the financial flows that return to homelands, often in the form of remittances. If emigration can hurt a country’s economy, funds remitted by its diaspora can provide a valuable source of external financing. Until very recently, says one observer, ‘remittances were considered small potatoes, and possibly rotten ones. Experts saw them as minor amounts, “wasted” on consumption, and to the extent they originated with professionals, reminders of the brain drain.’ However, interest in the subject has surged in the last five to ten years in light of the extraordinary sums involved, as well as the emerging evidence that remittances can contribute substantially to economic development. One indicator of this increased focus is the dedication of the World Bank’s prominent annual Global economic prospects report in 2006 to the ‘economic implications of remittances and migration.’ Similarly, the IOM observes that ‘Diaspora is fast emerging as one of the forces for development in the globalizing world.’

Remittance flows are very large indeed. According to Dilip Ratha of the World Bank, global recorded remittances in 2006 reached US$276 billion, with the bulk of them (US$206 billion) going to developing countries. This is likely to be a significant underestimate of total remittances, however, since many remittances go unrecorded in national statistics. Rather than being transferred via official bank channels, they are carried home by the migrants themselves, sent back with relatives and friends, or transmitted via private systems such as Islamic hawala brokers, Chinese fei ch’ien (flying money) or the Filipino pakidala system. Model-based estimates and household surveys suggest that informal flows could add at least 50%, and perhaps more, to the official estimates – which means that global remittances are actually likely to be in the vicinity of US$400 billion, with about
three-quarters of that sum going to poor countries. (Indeed, in October 2007, the UN International Fund for Agricultural Development and the Inter-American Development Bank estimated that, including the hidden flows, migrants remitted US$301 billion, in 1.5 billion separate financial transactions, to developing countries in 2006.)

Such amounts are very significant when compared to other sources of external finance such as foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA). Remittances to developing countries are likely to be almost as great as FDI flows and perhaps three times the world’s combined foreign aid budgets; even if we limit our analysis to recorded flows, remittances represent two-thirds the value of FDI and twice that of ODA. Furthermore, these sums are surging: remittance flows to developing countries have doubled in size in the past five years and increased by six times since 1990. (See Figure 1 below.) Some of this reported growth is due to depreciation of the US dollar and some of it reflects more accurate data recording by banks and closer scrutiny since 9/11, but the underlying factor is the burgeoning migration to wealthy countries.

Remittances overwhelmingly travel from wealthy countries to poorer countries (although there are also considerable South-South remittance flows originating in countries such as the Russian Federation, Malaysia and China). In 2006, the top remittance-sending country – by a wide margin – was the US (US$42.8 billion), followed by Saudi Arabia (US$14.3 billion), Switzerland (US$13.9 billion) and Germany (US$12.3 billion). The top recipient countries in absolute terms were India (US$24.6 billion), Mexico (US$24.5 billion), China (US$22.5 billion) and the Philippines (US$14.9 billion). To take India as an example, remittances to that country have nearly doubled since 2001; in 2005 they exceeded all FDI, ODA and portfolio equity flows to that country put together. However, it is not only large countries such as India which benefit: as Ratha argues, ‘smaller and poorer countries tend to receive relatively larger remittances in proportion to the size of their economies.’ If we express remittances as a share of GDP, the top recipients in 2006 were Moldova (30%), Tonga (27%), Guyana (22%) and Haiti (21%). The absolute and relative rankings are set out below in Figure 2.

Remittances are, in other words, a big deal. As Ratha observes: ‘Remittances exceed 10% of GDP in 22 developing countries. They are larger than capital flows in 36 developing countries; merchandise exports in 12 countries; and the largest single commodity exports in 28 countries. They are larger than foreign direct investment in Mexico, tea exports in Sri Lanka; tourism revenue in Morocco; and the revenue from the Suez Canal in Egypt.’ The Philippines, where annual remittances constitute about one-eighth of GDP, is the example par excellence, as described in The New York Times Magazine:

With about one Filipino worker in seven abroad at any given time, migration is to the Philippines what cars once were to Detroit: its civil religion. A million Overseas Filipino Workers – OFWs – left last year, enough to fill six 747s a day. Nearly half the country’s 10-to-12 year olds say they have thought about whether to go. Television novellas plumb the migrants’ loneliness. Politicians court their

Figure 1
Recorded remittances and other financial flows to developing countries

USD billion

Remittances are by no means a complete answer to underdevelopment. We do not really know the effect of remittances on economic growth; they may cause currency appreciation; and they do not necessarily reduce inequality within recipient countries. Critics argue that they create dependency, letting bad governments off the hook and removing the incentive to reform their broken economies. Furthermore, we have to consider the debilitating social costs often paid by migrants and those they leave behind, which show up in no balance of payments statistics: loneliness and isolation, infidelity, absent parents and splintered families. Nevertheless, there is a growing body of evidence that remittances form an important piece of the development puzzle. Because they are personal flows, remittances tend to be well targeted; they are largely immune from the governance issues involved with official aid; research indicates that they have reduced poverty in countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and South Asia; they can improve a country’s creditworthiness and expand access to capital; and they are more stable than private capital flows and may even be counter-cyclical, rising during periods of crisis and conflict (for example, Lebanon and Haiti), natural disasters (for example, Central America after Hurricane Mitch) and state failure (for example, Somalia). This ability of remittances to avoid the herd-like behaviour of other capital flows, which can amplify the destructive cycle of boom and bust, has led one development economist to describe them as ‘the single most important source of insurance for many poor countries’.

It is not surprising, then, that policymakers are searching for ways to maximise the developmental impact of remittances. Some developed countries – New Zealand and Australia, for instance – are being urged to establish foreign diasporas within their own borders in order to create remittance flows to neighbouring developing states in the Pacific. In the short term, however, the most obvious reform would be the reduction of remittance fees and costs, which are, as the World Bank observes, ‘high, regressive and nontransparent’. Service providers usually charge a fee of 10-15%, and sometimes more, to handle the small remittances typically made by poor migrants. Increasing competition in the remittance market would help reduce these scandalous imposts and, according to survey

data, encourage migrants to remit more. Lower prices in the formal channels would also bring more migrants into contact with the formal financial sector, which would contribute to a second aim: the creation of a ‘banking culture’ among poor migrants. Remitting money via bank deposits (rather than cash in hand or in the post) is likely to encourage saving and prudent investments. Corporations are, to some extent, stepping up to provide these services in a more convenient way: for example, micro-finance specialists are now offering innovative financial instruments, such as cross-border mortgages, and communications companies are developing payment systems using new platforms such as the Internet and mobile phone messaging. Finally, humanitarians are considering ways to increase the flow of remittances to crisis situations, such as immigration reforms to allow remitting migrants to return to their homelands at times of crisis without jeopardising their right to return to their host countries.

3.3 Diaspora networks: From brain drain to brains trust

The third factor requiring consideration is the advantage which may accrue to a home economy from its expatriates’ international linkages. The World Bank has argued that ‘a large, well-educated diaspora’ can improve ‘access to capital, information, and contacts for firms in countries of origin.’ As cheaper and quicker transport and communications close the gap between diasporas and homelands, the extent to which skills are actually ‘lost’ with migration may be reduced. Ghosh suggests that ‘the new global changes are gradually shifting skill migration away from its fixed, unidirectional pattern, which, in the past, generally resulted in a permanent loss of talent for the home country, into a new transnational model of skills sharing.”

Recent research has pointed to a number of network benefits flowing from diasporas. First, there is good evidence that people living in a country other than their own can stimulate bilateral trade between the two markets. Immigrants’ ties to their homelands, including their knowledge of home country markets, languages, preferences and business contacts, can reduce transaction costs and facilitate trade. For example, Rauch and Trindade found that ethnic Chinese networks have a notable quantitative impact on international trade by helping to match buyers and sellers. Head and Reis found that immigration to Canada expanded trade flows between Canada and the sending countries. Saxenian has described the role played by Taiwanese, Indian and Chinese engineers in Silicon Valley, arguing that they have built bridges to their home countries and contributed to the growth of their domestic IT sectors.

Second, a diaspora can help to mobilise other balance of payments flows aside from remittances and trade. Overseas networks can be an important source of investment, whether directly, in the form of emigrants investing in their home economies (about which they will often possess useful knowledge) or indirectly, where they influence other investors’ decisions. There is anecdotal evidence, for instance, of Indians working at multinational corporations such as Hewlett-Packard influencing company decisions on where to base new operations, and studies have pointed to the importance of the overseas Chinese in promoting investment into China and Taiwan. Diasporas are also an emerging source of philanthropic funds for home towns and causes in sending countries.

Finally, given the mobility of highly-skilled people in particular, there is always the possibility of migrants returning home to match their internationally-acquired skills and contacts with their understanding of the indigenous culture. For example, India is currently enjoying something of a ‘reverse brain drain’: tens of thousands of Indian technology professionals with education or experience in the US and Europe are returning to live in Bangalore, Hyderabad, New Delhi and other Indian cities in order to cash in on the thrusting Indian economy. Network benefits are harder to quantify than the effects of brain drain and remittances, but they are real and important. Certainly, national governments are attracted by the idea of tapping the economic power of their diasporas, as evidenced by the profusion of expatriate-only foreign currency accounts, tax exemptions and so on. However, the track record here is mixed. Emigrants are no more susceptible than anyone
Chapter 4

We are all mixobarbarians now:

Diasporas and identity

This chapter describes how diasporic identities – diasporas’ view of themselves – are changing, and along with that how both homelands and host countries are altering their perceptions of the diasporas with which they interact. These changes are illustrated in the cases of the Jewish, Israeli and Turkish diasporas.

4.1 Diasporans and their homelands

‘Identity can be a complicated matter’, observes Amartya Sen with studied understatement. ‘In our normal lives, we see ourselves as members of a variety of groups – we belong to all of them. The same person can be, without any contradiction, an American citizen, of Caribbean origin, with African ancestry, a Christian, a liberal, a woman, a vegetarian, a long-distance runner, a historian, a schoolteacher, a novelist, a feminist, a heterosexual, a believer in gay and lesbian rights, a theatre lover, an environmental activist, a tennis fan, a jazz musician, and someone who is deeply committed to the view that there are intelligent beings in outer space with whom it is extremely urgent to talk (preferably in English)...
Each of these collectivities, to all of which this person simultaneously belongs, gives her a particular identity. None of them can be taken to be the person’s only identity or singular membership category."\(^\text{161}\)

National identity certainly deserves its inclusion in this list of non-exclusive attachments. It has always been elastic. The Mughal rulers of India dressed the walls of their private apartments in Delhi’s Red Fort with beautiful stone inlays of irises and other flowers that reminded them of their origins in distant Central Asia. The Straits Chinese in Southeast Asia merged Chinese and Malay customs (as well as those of their colonial masters) in their distinctive ‘Peranakan’ culture, which features its own language, dress and cuisine. Byzantine authors wrote about ‘mixobarbarians’, who were neither Hellenes nor barbarians but instead had qualities of both. Mixobarbarians made their lives on the frontiers of the empire, worshipping and trading in Greek in the morning and riding horses with barbarians in the afternoon.\(^\text{162}\)

This elasticity has been further stretched by the effects of globalisation that were described in Chapter 1. Many more of us now live in frontier regions – both physical and virtual – and hold dual or even multiple overlapping national identities. We are all mixobarbarians now: the British Pakistani in Bradford; the Irish-American in South Boston; the Chinese businessman in Nuku’alofa in Tonga; the Vietnamese-Australian in the Sydney suburb of Cabramatta; the Indian Sikh living in the mini-Punjab of Yuha City, California. Bekir Alboğa is a German-Turkish activist in Cologne, who dreams in Arabic, German and Turkish: his wife tells him he’s Germanic in his approach to life, but when he is with other Turkish Muslims he feels very Turkish. On the other side of the Rhine, the writer Amin Maalouf imagines a young man born in France of Algerian parents who ‘carries within him two different allegiances or “belongings”’... For the sake of argument I refer to two “belongings”, but in fact such a youth’s personality is made up of many more ingredients. Within him, French, European and other western influences mingle with Arab, Berber, African, Muslim and other sources, whether with regard to language, beliefs, family relationships or to tastes in cooking and the arts.\(^\text{163}\) Even in Israel, the locus of the Jewish diaspora, one finds many immigrants who remain attached to the countries of their birth, who form their own diaspora organisations and who sometimes live amongst each other, such as the South Africans of Ra’anana (or ‘Ra’anafontein’). There are senior Israeli officials – among them a lawyer from Melbourne who works for the foreign minister and an Australian convert to Judaism who advises the Israeli prime minister on the Jewish diaspora, of all things – who consider themselves (alongside other affiliations) to be members of the Australian diaspora.

These people’s diasporic affiliations are not necessarily their primary identity: for some it is at the core of their perceptions of themselves; for others it is more marginal. For many people, identity is more situational than hierarchical: they ‘switch on’ their multiple identities at different points, depending on their activities, their location and their company.\(^\text{164}\) However the kinds of phenomena recounted in Chapter 1 indicate that the relative salience of diasporic identification is increasing: that many people are laying greater stress on this aspect of their identities. If, as Maalouf writes, ‘every individual is a meeting ground for many different allegiances’,\(^\text{165}\) then diasporic allegiances are visiting the meeting ground more regularly, and staying for longer periods.

4.2 Homelands and their diasporas

Just as diasporans’ views of themselves are changing, so are homelands’ views of their diasporas. In those countries where a stigma once accompanied the practice of emigration, it seems to be disappearing. One finds a consistent story emerging, as homeland governments – alert to the need to keep pace with globalisation – redefine emigrants, who may once have been regarded as runaways or deserters, as friends and supporters. Thus Cuban emigrants, for example, are no longer *gusanos* (worms) but the ‘Cuban community abroad’; Mexican emigrants, once *pochos* (rotten fruit), are now a ‘very important’ part of the Mexican nation, which ‘extends beyond the territory enclosed by its borders.’\(^\text{166}\) In 2002, the then Mexican President Vicente Fox – who was himself criticised by his political opponents for providing insufficient support to undocumented Mexican emigrants to the US – told a crowd of
agreed that expatriates ‘too often delight in running Australia down from offshore.’\textsuperscript{171} The rhetoric from Canberra also changed markedly. A bipartisan Senate Committee published a supportive report, the Opposition urged action, and finally, in a speech to a summit of leading expatriates in December 2006, Mr Howard declared that ‘it is enormously to Australia’s advantage that we have a talented, energetic, achieving, highly successful diaspora…. This is a country of all the talents in all parts of the world.’\textsuperscript{172}

### 4.3 Host countries and their diasporas

Host countries’ views of the diasporas living within their borders – especially Muslim diasporas – are also changing, but in the opposite direction. The anxiety triggered by the al-Qaeda attack of 11 September 2001 has been sustained by a series of other incidents: the bombings by Jihadist terrorists in Bali in 2002 and 2005, Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005; isolated crimes by Muslims such as the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004; and social unrest such as the riots in the French banlieues (outskirts) in late 2005, which were actually driven by anger at living conditions rather than religion – as one scholar put it, they were ‘about Marx, not Bin Laden’ – but which involved young Muslims.\textsuperscript{173}

These events have led to outbreaks of ‘diasporaphobia’\textsuperscript{174} throughout the Western world. Multicultural London has been compared to ‘the \textit{Star Wars} bar scene’, and commentators have issued dark warnings about Muslim demographic aggression in ‘Eurabia’, with statistics often cited about the popularity of the name ‘Muhammed’ for newborn boys in various European countries.\textsuperscript{175} As late as November 2005, for instance, the columnist Mark Steyn claimed that he was more optimistic about the future of Iraq and Pakistan than he was about Holland and Denmark.\textsuperscript{176} Alongside this hysteria, though, legitimate concerns have been raised about ‘parallel societies marked by linguistic separateness, discrete neighbourhoods, places of worship, associations and spaces of leisure.’\textsuperscript{177} A lively scholarly discussion is occurring on the relationship between transnationalism and integration.\textsuperscript{178} Debates

thousands of Mexican-Americans in Fresno, California that they were his ‘heroic countrymen’: ‘You are the cultural engine, the permanent ambassadors of Mexican culture.’\textsuperscript{167}

Australia provides a good example of this progression. For many years, Australians had a complicated relationship with their émigrés, especially those who left the country in the 1960s and found success and prominence in Britain and the US. Resident Australians displayed equal amounts of pride in their accomplishments and resentment at any public comments they might make on Australian affairs. Any prominent expatriates who poked their heads above the parapet were liable to have them shot off. After one such incident in 2000, for instance, when the distinguished New York-based critic Robert Hughes was under the gun, commentators complained of ‘expatriatitis’ and stated that ‘loudmouth expatriates’ (who would be more accurately styled ‘ignorant foreigners’) should ‘learn to listen to what those in this country have to say.’\textsuperscript{168} In 2004, when the London-based writer and controversialist Germaine Greer published an article that was critical of Australian culture, the then Prime Minister John Howard described her comments as ‘patronising’ and ‘elitist’, concluding, ‘if she wants to stay in another country, good luck to her.’\textsuperscript{169}

In the last couple of years, however, the tone of Australia’s national conversation about its expatriates has been shifting. A number of major reports were published, including one by the Lowy Institute which argued that ‘the Australian diaspora represents a market, a constituency, a sales force and an ambassadorial corps’ and urged that the country ‘engage the diaspora in our national life and create a global community of Australians.’\textsuperscript{170} In 2004, the Lowy Institute commissioned opinion polling which demonstrated not only that Australians were not in the grip of ‘foreign poppy syndrome’ (a new and more virulent strain of the ‘tall poppy syndrome’, Australians’ traditional suspicion of high-flyers and big-noters), but that Australians were remarkably sanguine about their non-resident countrymen and women. For example, 91% of respondents agreed that expatriates are ‘adventurous people prepared to try their luck and have a go overseas’, whereas only 10% believed expatriates ‘have let us down by leaving Australia’ and only 14%
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identities: as one critic has suggested, many immigrants are ‘paper French’, not ‘wholeheartedly French’.185 Timothy Garton Ash is correct in arguing that neither ‘live-and-let-die separatist multiculturalism’ nor ‘secularist republican monoculturalism’ has worked.186 There is, of course, also a security dimension to these debates, which will be explored in Chapter 6.

4.4 Case study: The Jewish diaspora

The Jewish diaspora is the original diaspora. In the aftermath of their lands from the 8th century BC – in particular after the destruction of Solomon’s Temple in 586 BC and the fall of Jerusalem and the Second Temple in 70 AD – the Jews were dispersed around the Middle East and the world. The story of diaspora Jews is told at Beth Hatefutsoth, the Museum of the Jewish Diaspora in Tel Aviv: the exiles to Babylonia and beyond; the Ashkenazim and Sephardim; the pogroms; the remarkable creativity of Jewish scientists, artists and entrepreneurs; the Holocaust; the establishment of the modern state of Israel in 1948; and down through to the present. There are disagreements on the size of the world Jewish population, but the demographer Sergio DellaPergola estimates it comprises 13.1 million people, of whom about 7.8 million live in the diaspora. According to DellaPergola, Israel has now overtaken the US in hosting the largest community of Jews in the world: Israel contains just over 5.3 million and the US just under that figure. (This is quite a milestone: for the first time since the first century, ‘a plurality of world Jewry may be claimed to reside in the historical homeland.’) The other 2.5 million diaspora Jews are spread across a number of countries such as France (490,000), Canada (370,000), the UK (300,000) and Russia (230,000), with sizeable communities also to be found in Argentina, Germany, Australia, Brazil, Ukraine and South Africa.187 Sheffer notes that the big changes in recent times have been the consolidation of Jews into a smaller number of larger communities, and the almost total disappearance of Jews from North African, Muslim and Arab countries.188

on the wearing of the headscarf, *burqa* and *niqab* have ensued across Europe, including in Britain, where Jack Straw asked his constituents to remove their veils so he could talk to them ‘face to face’.179 The term ‘multiculturalism’ is falling out of vogue, replaced by ‘integration’.180 Many governments are searching for ways to accelerate the integration of diaspora groups into their national mainstreams, such as requiring applicants for citizenship to pass various tests of their knowledge of and commitment to their new country’s values. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown even floated the idea, before he moved into 10 Downing Street, of making them undertake community service.181 In the 2007 French presidential election, the Gaullists promised a new ministry for immigration and national identity and the Socialists called for more frequent flying of the *tricolore* and singing of *La Marseillaise*.182

These ideas are being grafted on to very different national systems for bringing immigrants into the fold. It would be possible to draw an ‘integration spectrum’ along which countries of immigration are ranged. At one end would be a country such as multiculturalist Britain, in which minority groups are, to a certain extent, dealt with collectively. Located at the other end would be republican France, which practises integration via assimilation, according to which newcomers are expected to become unambiguously French and the republic ‘must remain blind to ethnicity and religion’ (including by prohibiting conspicuous signs of religiosity in the schools).183 The US, where the politics of identity are increasingly influential but where national ceremonies and rituals such as flag-raising ceremonies and the Fourth of July continue to have what Francis Fukuyama calls a ‘quasi-religious’ character, would appear somewhere in between.184 The truth is, however, that no system has fully answered the difficult questions thrown up by large-scale immigration. In too many Western countries, Muslims in particular do not really know where they belong: they feel, as some say crudely in France, *d’avoir le cul entre deux chaises*, that is, their backsides fall between two chairs. The multiculturalism of Britain and much of northern Europe has invested excessive authority in unelected community leaders and created too many cultural ghettos. Equally, the militant secularism practised in France has ignored the religious and cultural dimensions of immigrants’
Many diaspora Jews provided succour to Zionists working towards the establishment of an Israeli state, and they were crucial to its survival through its infancy. Since the 1950s, for instance, interest-bearing securities known as Israeli bonds have been sold in the US, principally to American Jews, to fund major projects in Israel. ‘The Almighty placed massive oil deposits under Arab soil,’ an Israeli official explained to a US diplomat. ‘It is our good fortune that God placed five million Jews in America.’ Israel has always been central to Jewish identity, not only because of the need for a haven from anti-Semitism but because Jewish theology privileges the concept of a homeland – Eretz Israel, the land of Israel. The Book of Genesis describes the covenant the Lord made with Abraham and his descendants, which awarded them the promised land for all time. The birkat hamazon, a Jewish grace said after meals, asks that Jerusalem be blessed, and the Passover seder (ritual feast) traditionally concludes with the prayer: ‘Next year in Jerusalem!’

Jewish immigration to Israel, aliyah (ascending or going up), is seen by many as a praiseworthy act, and under Israel’s Law of Return, any Jew has the right to immigrate to Israel and gain citizenship. Of course, this cultural and religious emphasis on return to Israel complicates the position of the Jewish diaspora, since according to some religious Jews, ‘living outside the land is theologically a sign of failing to fulfill God’s plan.’

The attachment of diaspora Jews to Israel remains strong today, maintained by family ties to Israeli citizens and sharpened by a sense of Israel’s precarious position in the Middle East and perceived anti-Israel bias in the media. The alphabet soup of Jewish diaspora organisations makes for a strong brew. Threats to Israel’s security invariably lead to spikes in diasporic support: for example, an appeal by an American umbrella organisation, the United Jewish Communities, during Israel’s 2006 war against Hizballah in Lebanon raised US$340 million in six weeks. That said, many community members have observed that the nature of the attachment is changing, especially for new generations who did not live through the Holocaust, the War of Independence, the Six Day War, or the Yom Kippur War but rather became politically conscious at the time of more recent conflicts such as the wars in Lebanon and the two Palestinian intifadas. There is a body of sociological research pointing to a distancing of younger American Jews from Israel; for example, a recent research project led by Steven Cohen of Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion found that American Jews under the age of 35 were significantly less attached to Israel than their elders. The Economist observes that ‘Young Jews today... are searching for identity, spirituality, meaning and roots’; some are finding new ways of ‘doing Jewish that have little to do with Israel or even religion’, such as studying Jewish culture and engaging in tikkun olam – ‘world repair’ or social activism, which can include campaigning against genocide or undertaking volunteer work in the developing world. The past year has seen the establishment of groups such as Independent Jewish Voices in the United Kingdom, which seeks to counter what it regards as the uncritical support given to Israel by the mainstream British Jewish organisations (though its statements have been strongly criticised by other diaspora Jews).

Notwithstanding these changes, Jewish affiliation with Israel is still remarkably close compared to other diasporas, partly because of the elastic relationship between Israeli security and Jewish identity. As Yossi Shain argues: ‘When security is threatened, debates over identity recede... when perceptions of acute insecurity are evident, they may rapidly create a sense of kinship solidarity that overwhelms other dimensions of identity.’

Israel’s view of the Jewish diaspora is also changing, in at least three important ways. First, the country’s historic dilemma – whether to persuade diaspora Jews to make aliyah on the ground that only in Israel can they be safe and fully themselves, or to legitimise the diaspora’s existence by working with it – has largely been resolved in favour of the latter. It is becoming rare to hear talk of diaspora Jews living in the galut (exile), with all the associated negative connotations. The old attitude still persists in some quarters: in 2004, for instance, the then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon angered the French Jewish community by warning its members of ‘the wildest
anti-Semitism here and suggesting they ‘move to Israel, as early as possible… it’s a must… Only through aliyah will Israel maintain its character as a Jewish state. Only in Israel is it possible to lead a fully Jewish existence.”] Generally, though, pragmatism rules, and most Israelis now accept that many Jews will never make aliyah and that good Jews can flourish in the diaspora. A related change is that the traditional view that diaspora Jews should not criticise Israel as they don’t bear the burdens of life in the Jewish state appears to be softening. Israeli leaders are more likely to see Jews in chutz laaretz (the rest of the world) as ‘stakeholders’ and less likely to dismiss diaspora criticism out of hand.

Finally, Israel is reaching out to the Jewish diaspora in new and interesting ways. Of course, the state has always put a premium on diaspora relations. Israeli prime ministers have traditionally had an adviser on diaspora affairs (a position that has been held by some prominent Israeli figures, such as Avrum Burg, later Speaker of the Knesset) and they invariably meet with the local Jewish communities when they travel abroad. There is a Minister for Diaspora Affairs as well as a World Jewish and Inter-Religious Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the head of which comments that the diaspora is Israel’s ‘most important strategic ally in the world.’

There have long been programs such as Nefesh B’Nefesh which seek to encourage aliyah. However more recently, Israeli institutions have established innovative new programs which implicitly accept that many diaspora Jews will not make aliyah and instead seek to entrench their sense of Jewish identity and attachment to Israel. In the past decade, for instance, Taglit (Birthright Israel), which is funded by the Jewish Agency for Israel, the Israeli government and several philanthropists, has brought 120,000 Jewish young adults to Israel for a free ten-day experience that some credit as being ‘transformative’. Masa brings young Jews to Israel for longer periods, a semester or a year. These kinds of ‘Israel experiences’ are popular with Israelis, who regard them as tax money well spent, and, according to sociologists, they have a powerful effect upon the participants’ adult Jewish identity and feelings of affiliation towards Israel.

### 4.5 Case study: The Israeli diaspora

The Jewish diaspora is unique, in that it is religious and ethnic in character as well as national. More analogous to other national diasporas, perhaps, is the lesser known diaspora consisting of Israeli citizens who have emigrated from Israel. Data on the Israeli diaspora is not robust, but it probably numbers between one-half and three-quarters of a million people, who live mainly in North America, Europe, Australia and South Africa. Its members include both sabras (native-born Israeli Jews) and Israeli immigrants who have moved on again, and they tend to be relatively young and well educated. Some have left Israel to escape the Middle East and its conflicts. Others have left for religious reasons – secularists who find Israel too theocratic, and Orthodox who find it too secular. However the primary motivation, as it is for most contemporary migrants, is a desire to improve their economic situation.

Historically, members of the Israeli diaspora have tended not to involve themselves in local Jewish communal organisations and activities but rather have retained a strong Israeli identity and continued to live like Israelis. Rina Cohen observes that ‘Israeli and diaspora Jews speak different languages, read different books, sing different songs, eat different kinds of food, and enjoy different kinds of sports.’ As Gallya Lahav and Asher Arian put it, the communities ‘exist in two different shtetls or villages.’

Another historical reason for the distance between the two groups was the stigma attaching to Israeli émigrés. To emigrate from Israel is to make yeridah or ‘go down’ – the literal opposite of aliyah – and emigrants are sometimes known as yordim. Since the basis of Zionism is an “ingathering of exiles”, write Lahav and Arian, “the notion of a diaspora in the Israeli case seems antithetical to the founding principles of the Israeli nation-state.” Apart from violating Zionist principles, emigration could seem like desertion when Israel’s security was threatened: one interviewee told me that the traditional view was: ‘if you’re not here, you’re missing in action’. The 1970s marked the high point of this perspective, with public inquiries into the phenomenon of emigration, and the then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s infamous
have opened a bayit yisraeli (Israeli house) to act as a cultural centre for local Israeli communities and to host celebrations, lectures and performances. The Israel Defense Forces are reported to be stepping up their efforts to recruit Israelis living abroad. The attitudinal change is also reflected in the country’s media. As one account has it:

Israeli tabloids used to be the brave defenders of narrow-minded patriotism. The very idea of sabras leaving their wonderful native country to seek their fortunes elsewhere was anathema... Then, at some point during the hedonistic Nineties, all this changed. Suddenly, successful Israeli expatriates, especially hi-tech pioneers, became objects of admiration featured on magazine covers in idolizing profiles. The relevant terminology also changed, with yordim haphazardly giving way to “Israelis living overseas”, and the time-honored attitude of mixed disdain and pity giving way to unceaseless envy.

The transformation of Israelis’ opinion of their émigrés may well, over time, change the self-perception of Israelis... to adopt a defensive tone about their move and emphasise its temporary nature; however, as their position normalises, they are less likely to regard themselves as ‘sitting on their suitcases’. Similarity, the previously cool relationship between the Jewish and Israeli diasporas may also warm up as Israeli thinking... is already some research, as well as anecdotal evidence, indicating that the distance between the communities is closing.

4.6 Case study: Turks in Germany

The Turkish diaspora is entirely different from its Israeli counterpart in origins and character, yet it is exhibiting some similar trends. According to the Turkish government, there are approximately five million Turks abroad, of whom about four million live in Europe, with
sizeable communities in France (360,000), the Netherlands (350,000), Austria (200,000), Belgium (160,000) and the UK (115,000). By far the largest community, though, is found in Germany, where there are over 2.5 million Turks – more than half the entire diaspora. In fact, the Turkey-Germany corridor is the third most travelled migration corridor in the world. Unlike most Muslim populations in Europe, such as the Pakistanis in Britain or the Maghrebis in France, the Turks came to Germany not as former colonial subjects but as economic migrants. During the 1960s and early 1970s, German companies recruited nearly one million temporary Turkish workers, often poorly educated people from rural Anatolia; after the program was halted, the community continued to expand via family reunification and spousal migration as well as the birth rate. Over the course of nearly half a century, this population has brought colour and diversity to German society and transformed areas like the Kreuzberg borough of Berlin: but it has also influenced Turkey’s identity. According to academic Hakan Yılmaz: “The borders are becoming permeable. When German-Turks come home to visit family, they bring a certain European attitude to life, sometimes to the remotest villages. You will find German-style townhouses in the Black Sea region of Anatolia. The best and cleanest toilets in Turkish gas stations are operated by German-Turks who have re-immigrated. They bring discipline and attentiveness to time back to Turkey.” (A similar phenomenon occurs with respect to British-Turks: one can find English Victorian terrace houses in central Anatolian villages such as Sivas. In the same manner, there are faux-Italianate villas in villages in the Philippines which have sent maids to Italy.)

The most important recent change has been the realisation on the part of both the Turks themselves as well as the German government that the community is in Germany for good. Initially, the immigrants assumed their stay would be temporary: they lived in dormitories, remitted most of their incomes back to Turkey, and continued to speak in their mother tongue. Equally, the German government, which regarded them as Gastarbeiter (guestworkers) and Ausländer (foreigners), made little effort to integrate them into German society. However, over time, as conditions in Turkey (including recessions and coups d’état) made the idea of return less attractive, they brought their families over, moved into their own residences and had German-born children. The shrinking cost of transport and communications also made it easier for them to stay because they did not have to cut off their links to home – they could return annually or even spend six months of every year in their home village. All this has forced Berlin to accept the reality of Turkish immigration and permanent settlement. In 2000 the German government introduced a new nationality law that moved from the principle of *jus sanguinis* (the ‘right of blood’, which privileges genealogy in conferring citizenship) to a modified version of *jus soli* (the ‘right of soil’, according to which citizenship is granted to all those born within the borders of the state). The most important effect of this reform was to open up German citizenship to many more Turks; previously, as Fukuyama observes: ‘A second or third generation Turk who spoke only German had a harder time achieving naturalization than a recent ethnic German refugee from Russia who spoke not a word of German.’ All these developments are spurring the integration of many Turks into German society. For some, though, the reverse is the case: the decision to stay is liberating them to be more assertive about their language, religion and traditions. If you are more confident about your position, you are also likely to be more confident about drawing attention to yourself. In the phrase of Turkish academic Ayhan Kaya, it has become ‘easier for German-Turks to live on “both banks of the river” at the same time.’

The mindset of the Turkish government and Turkish people has also shifted. Turkish émigrés were never condemned as traitors but they were patronised by Turkey’s urban elite as second-class citizens: they were Almanci (Turks who have adopted German ways), wealthy but unsophisticated. However a reasonably dynamic Turkish middle class is emerging in Germany, the members of which are not *döviz makinesi* (‘remittance machines’) but ‘Euro Turks.’ Turks are becoming aware – even proud – of the success some of their cousins are achieving in Germany, in football, the arts and business. The tourism entrepreneur Vural Öğer, who started out selling package tours home for guestworkers and went on to found the budget airline AtlasJet, and now represents the...
participating in government-sponsored dialogues; on the other hand, it is an outpost of the Turkish state. Both Turkish and German are spoken at its events. Visitors to DITİB’s headquarters in Cologne are struck by the many portraits of the founder of the Turkish republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, displayed on its walls – sometimes scowling, sometimes peering bravely into the middle distance, in one photo looking like a 1930s matinee idol in white tie and tails. The main foyer of the building features portraits of the German and Turkish presidents and both national flags – but sitting a few inches above them all on the wall is Atatürk’s image. Furthermore, DITİB’s leaders are not local German-Turks elected by their community, but Turkish government officials paid by Ankara. The current president of DITİB, Sadi Arslan, wears a second hat as religious counsellor at Turkey’s embassy in Berlin; he has previously served on similar postings in Sweden and at the Vatican.

This contradiction has presented both DITİB and the German government with problems from time to time. The International Crisis Group argues, for instance, that Germany has ‘outsourced management of Islam, relying on what is essentially an extension of the Turkish state... to tend to religious needs.’ The President of the Diyanet, Ali Bardakoğlu, admits that ‘sometimes foreign governments misperceive Diyanet’s activities as interference in their sovereign activities.’ However the arrangement suits the interests of both Berlin and Ankara, propagating a liberal interpretation of Islam which appeals to the German authorities, and helping to keep in... harmony and peace.’ In 1971, responding to demand from Turkish emigrants but also to prevent Islamists from mobilising amongst them, the Diyanet began providing religious services to Turks abroad. The Diyanet trains and sends Turkish Imams (or ‘religious officials’, as Turkish civil servants are wont to call them) on four-year overseas postings to serve Turkish expatriate communities overseas; currently it has about seven hundred Imams in Germany, covering an estimated 70% of German mosques. The Diyanet’s German proxy, Diyanet İşleri Türk-Islam Birliği (Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs) or DITİB, facilitates pilgrimage to Mecca and burial in Turkey, and raises funds from community members for the construction of new mosques.

DITİB is a strange creature: on the one hand, it represents the interests of German-Turks, providing comment to the media, for instance, and

German Social Democrats in the European Parliament, is a poster boy for this new class – and Ankara is reaching out to them. Eva Østergaard-Nielsen argues that the ‘largely economic project of labour rotation has now been replaced by a political project to tie citizens abroad to the State’. Ankara no longer refers to the Turkish diaspora as ‘our workers abroad’ but ‘our citizens abroad’; it is stepping in to provide them with Turkish language instruction; it is convening meetings of Turkish-origin members of foreign parliaments and inviting Turkish citizens living abroad home for consultations. According to Østergaard-Nielsen, ‘Turkey wants its citizens abroad not to assimilate into their receiving countries, but to settle as Turks.’ The current AKP-led government is more partial than its predecessors to the idea of Turkish emigrants integrating into their host countries, learning the local language and acquiring citizenship – but it, too, wants them to retain their ties to Turkey.

In some ways the precursor to this approach was religion. In Turkey, the highest Islamic authority is the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate of Religious Affairs), a government institution which appoints Imams, organises religious affairs and provides ‘sound religious information’ to believers. The Diyanet’s ideology, according to Katherine Pratt Ewing, stresses a ‘unitary Turkish identity expressed in Islamic language’, plays down differences between Muslim sects in Turkey and emphasises that ‘Islam is a religion of harmony and peace.’ In 1971, responding to demand from Turkish emigrants but also to prevent Islamists from mobilising amongst them, the Diyanet began providing religious services to Turks abroad. The Diyanet trains and sends Turkish Imams (or ‘religious officials’, as Turkish civil servants are wont to call them) on four-year overseas postings to serve Turkish expatriate communities overseas; currently it has about seven hundred Imams in Germany, covering an estimated 70% of German mosques. The Diyanet’s German proxy, Diyanet İşleri Türk-Islam Birliği (Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs) or DITİB, facilitates pilgrimage to Mecca and burial in Turkey, and raises funds from community members for the construction of new mosques.

DITİB is a strange creature: on the one hand, it represents the interests of German-Turks, providing comment to the media, for instance, and
The triangular relationships between diasporas, homelands and host countries are highly variable, but a pattern can be detected. In many cases, it seems that diasporas and homelands are moving towards each other, while host countries are growing concerned by the existence of foreign diasporas within their jurisdictions. National identity, always elastic, is becoming even more complicated. (The differences between the Jewish and Israeli diasporas, which are little understood outside Israel, are indicative of the complexity of the issue.) The stigma associated with emigration in countries such as Israel, Turkey and Australia is declining and in its place we are seeing a realistic acceptance that increasing numbers of individuals are leading transnational lives. On the other hand, many states are still tempted to assert the prerogatives of sovereignty over their far-flung people.

Identity matters, not least because it shapes behaviour. The next two chapters examine the relationship between diasporas and political and security behaviour.

Chapter 5

Nations as large as the world:

Diasporas and politics

The impact of émigrés on the politics of both their homelands and their host countries is an old story; in fact it was already an old story in the eighteenth century when the Jacobite pretender Bonnie Prince Charlie plotted his return to the throne from various redoubts on the Continent. However, these relationships are increasingly operating in new and different ways. Furthermore, other developments are taking place: diasporas are becoming instruments of soft power; sending countries are reaching out politically to their emigrants; and there is an increasingly prominent debate about diasporas and democracy, which is illustrated in the intriguing case of the Italian electoral system.

5.1 Diasporans and their host countries

Analysis of the influence of diasporas on the politics and foreign policies of their host countries typically centres on the US, for a couple of reasons. The first is that US foreign policy matters; even after its Iraq folly, the country has extraordinary reach. America is the only country with a truly global foreign policy. Every day, most foreign ministers in
the world wonder at least once: ‘What does Washington think about this?’ The second reason is that US politics is unusually receptive to ethnic influences, due to the heterogeneity of the American population and the design of American institutions. In particular, the strength of the congressional voice on US foreign policy amplifies the role of lobbies, including ethnic lobbies. 242

Diasporas have long influenced US foreign policy – both in promoting the interests of their homelands (such as the Irish, Greek, German and Jewish communities) and stirring up opposition to the ruling regime at home (such as Cuban-Americans). In the 1950s, the power of ethnic lobbies was thought to be declining along with assimilation, but in the 1970s and 1980s, ethnic identity made a comeback – to the point where Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan were not shouted down when they overstated their case in 1975 in this way: ‘the immigration process is the single most important determinant of American foreign policy.’ 243

Former Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger has claimed the US has ‘less of a foreign policy in a traditional sense of a great power than we have the stapling together of a series of goals put forth by domestic constituency groups’. 244 The truth is less dramatic than these formulations: as Alexander DeConde argued in an influential book, highly motivated and organised ethnic groups have sometimes exercised significant influence, but they have not altered the fundamental direction of American foreign policy. Ethnорacial concerns are ‘a prominent determinant of American foreign policy’, but they are not ‘the engine of history’. 245 Two examples indicate the position: on the one hand, Washington’s support for the recreation of Poland after the First World War was linked to the Polish-American vote; on the other, the development of the special relationship with the UK was not impeded by the Anglophobia of Irish- and German-Americans. 246

James Lindsay notes that the US is actually host ‘to remarkably few ethnic foreign lobbies. One looks in vain, for example, for Dutch, French, Canadian, Italian, or Norwegian lobbies’. He suggests that ethnic groups tend to weigh in on foreign policy only when certain factors are present: for instance, they came to the US as political exiles; their homelands are threatened by their neighbours; and they are sufficiently successful to be able to afford to play the Washington influence game. Whether a lobby prevails or not depends on the characteristics of the lobby itself as well as the circumstances in which it operates – in particular, public opinion, the merits of its case and the positioning of other powerful interests on the issue. 247 For every critic decrying the splintering effect ethnic lobbies have on US policy, there is another who sees them as ‘part of American pluralism or as counterweights to traditional political elites’. 248

With those caveats in mind, it does seem that the pace of diasporic effects on US foreign policy has quickened since the end of the Cold War. The Soviet collapse led to two mutually reinforcing phenomena in the 1990s: the rise of identity politics and the liberation of US foreign policy from its Cold War straitjacket. Huntington argues that ‘during the Cold War… the interests of refugee diasporas from communist countries broadly corresponded with the goals of American foreign policy. Eastern European diasporas promoted the liberation of their countries from Soviet rule; Russian, Chinese, and Cuban diasporas supported US efforts to weaken or end communist control of their homelands.’ 249

The Cold War’s end, however, complicated matters: in many cases ideological opposition to homeland governments gave way to renewed identification with and support for the homeland; in other cases, such as the Cuban and Iraqi communities, it further poisoned feelings towards the regime at home. In the 1990s, Huntington complained of diasporas influencing American policy ‘towards Greece and Turkey, the Caucasus, the recognition of Macedonia, support for Croatia, sanctions against South Africa, aid for black Africa, intervention in Haiti, NATO expansion, sanctions against Cuba, the controversy in Northern Ireland, and the relations between Israel and its neighbours.’ 250 A decade later, he wrote of political ‘proxy wars’ fought between diasporas in America: Armenian groups helping defeat pro-Turkish congressmen; a senatorial election which was ‘as much a contest between Indians and Pakistanis as between Republicans and Democrats’. 251

The argument is easily overstated: for instance, Shain reminds us that American support for diasporic opposition to Communist regimes waxed and waned with changing American strategic interests. 252 (Many Croats believe, for example, that Washington declined to support anti-
Communist Croatian networks because it was concerned not to push the Yugoslav leader Marshal Tito back into the Soviet orbit. However, the Cold War’s end does seem to have widened the political space in which diasporas can operate, as we can see in the examples of the Iraq war and the Armenian genocide debate.

The environment in which the Bush Administration decided to invade Iraq in 2003 was uniquely permissive. As Gideon Rose argues, victory in the Cold War had strengthened America’s international position to such an extent that there were few external checks on its behaviour; 9/11 gave the White House comparable freedom of action on the domestic front.\textsuperscript{252} Heightened threat perception on the part of Americans drove US action, but low threat reality enabled it.\textsuperscript{254} In deciding to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime in Baghdad by force, President Bush and his advisers ignored Machiavelli’s warning to princes against listening to exiles, and consulted sympathetic Iraqi émigrés such as Kanan Makiya and Ahmed Chalabi. The Iraqi diaspora did not conjure the American invasion of their country into being; however, certain diasporans certainly contributed to the Bush Administration’s overoptimism about the reception Coalition troops would receive, and provided moral cover for US actions.\textsuperscript{255} (Not that this lesson has necessarily been learnt by all the responsible parties. In 2007, former Administration hawk John Bolton said: ‘There are all kinds of ways to change the [Iranian] regime. We have an extensive diaspora of people with Iranian heritage in America who we don’t use effectively.’\textsuperscript{256})

In the case of the Iraq war, then, some elements of the Iraqi diaspora helped to reinforce a decision of the Bush Administration that was born of American primacy. But the end of the Cold War has also complicated matters for the executive, because the falling away of Cold War simplicities has made more areas of American policy contestable, opening up cracks in which ethnic lobbies can exert their leverage. The Armenian diaspora is a case in point. The mass killings of Armenians by the Ottomans from 1915 was the most important event in modern Armenian history and it is an adhesive that binds the diaspora together. Its members are highly effective in lobbying politicians around the world to characterise those massacres as genocide, even though any such recognition gravely offends the Turkish authorities. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s description of the killings as genocide in 2006, for example, led Ankara to withdraw the Turkish component from NATO manoeuvres in Canada.\textsuperscript{257} After a nasty public debate in the same year featuring duelling full-page advertisements in \textit{Libération}, France’s National Assembly voted to criminalise the denial of the Armenian genocide, which caused the Turks to suspend military ties with France and blacklist French arms dealers.\textsuperscript{258}

An even bigger \textit{contretemps} occurred in October 2007 when the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives voted in favour of applying the genocide label, notwithstanding Turkey’s strategic importance as, in the words of an anxious President Bush, ‘a key ally in NATO and in the global war on terror.’\textsuperscript{259} As the Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi (who hails from California, a state containing a large and formidably well-organised Armenian-American community), prepared to put the bill before the full House, the stakes became clear. Turkey recalled its ambassador to Washington and American commanders voiced fears that Ankara might reduce logistical support to US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example by denying the US access to the Incirlik air base. The vote also threatened to undercut Washington’s ability to restrain Turkey from launching cross-border incursions against Kurdish separatists in northern Iraq, who had repeatedly attacked Turkish forces.\textsuperscript{260} However, in late October, the proponents of the resolution and the Democratic leadership stepped back from the brink, postponing a vote on the resolution until 2008. It appeared that they had taken President Bush’s point: ‘With all [its] pressing responsibilities, one thing Congress should not be doing is sorting out the historical record of the Ottoman Empire.’\textsuperscript{261}

The Armenian example is a good illustration of the extent of diasporic power over host country politics – and its limits. The fluidity of the post-Cold War environment allowed the Armenian community to put their demand before the nation’s very highest legislative authorities, impeding the executive’s national security strategy and diminishing Washington’s influence on a close ally. However, in the end, core US
5.2 Diasporans and their homelands

The political influence of diaporas has often been felt in host countries. But as The Economist observed a few years ago, ‘now something new is taking place: diaporas are increasingly exerting influence on the politics of the countries they have physically, but not emotionally, abandoned.’\textsuperscript{266} In the time of cheap international travel and instantaneous communications, it is much easier to have a meaningful and dynamic relationship with a homeland thousands of miles away. There was a notable example of overseas Greeks attempting to pressure a reluctant Athens to carve a giant effigy of Alexander the Great on a cliff face on Mount Kerdyllion – to the considerable disquiet of the Macedonians.\textsuperscript{267} Slovak nationalists in the US and Canada are said to have encouraged Slovak separatism in the aftermath of the Velvet Revolution.\textsuperscript{268} Elements of the Turkish diaspora in Germany and other European countries, such as the Alevis (a heterodox Shia denomination of Islam) have been ... Lebanese diaspora living at the other end of the earth are political powerbrokers back in their home towns in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{269}

Finally, diaporans are returning to their homelands to enter politics in greater numbers than ever. There is a rich tradition of exiles, from Giuseppe Garibaldi through to Ho Chi Minh, Ayatollah Khomeini and Benazir Bhutto, going back to their home countries after periods abroad. The decades M. K. Gandhi spent in South Africa were critical to his political formation and his later victories in the fight for Indian independence. In South Africa he experienced discrimination, developed his concept of satyagraha (non-violent resistance) and learned to transcend the religious, linguistic, regional, caste and class backgrounds of Indians to create a national movement. The historian Sugata Bose says Gandhi ‘returned after two decades with his conception of Indian nationality deeply influenced by his overseas experience… [he] extended his regional homeland abroad and connected it back to a larger, extraterritorial conception of India.’\textsuperscript{270}

The tradition continues today; indeed, it extends to different countries and types of people. As diaporans’ ties to home thicken
and the countries of the former Soviet Union democratise, emigrants are being pulled into the politics of their homelands. *The Economist* reports that Turkey’s governing AKP party ‘has parachuted diaspora leaders into safe electoral seats in Turkey to reward them for fund-raising abroad. Afghanistan has pondered putting its ex-king back on the throne. Bulgaria has turned its ex-monarch into a prime minister. The Balts have been émigré importers on an almost industrial scale. Since becoming independent in 1991, Estonia has recruited from the diaspora two foreign ministers and a defence minister, plus lots of civil servants, especially in the foreign ministry. Latvia’s popular president was brought back from Canada. It has also had the services of an American-Latvian defence minister, a bunch of members of parliament and a handful of diplomats, all mustered from the ranks of its émigrés. Lithuania’s huge diaspora has supplied it with a president [and] the current chief of general staff (both Lithuanian-Americans).’

Returnees can meet with resentment, of course, as South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki has found; some find that their physical absence from the country has deprived them of networks that long-distance connections cannot replace. However the phenomenon is unlikely to abate, and it may have important consequences. The journalist Mary Dejevsky observes that soldiers returning from the American Revolutionary War are cited as one of the factors precipitating the French Revolution; disillusioned Russian veterans of the war in Afghanistan undermined the Soviet Union; Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping honed their thinking in Paris. What, then, will be the long-term political repercussions for, say, China of having so many of its future élite educated in the West?

### 5.3 Case study: Indians in the United States

One group whose political reach encompasses both its host country and its home country is the community of Indians who have crossed the kalapani (dark waters) and found their way to America. The Indian diaspora in the US is large – about 2.5 million, according to the US Census Bureau – and growing quickly. In the past five years India has overtaken China as a source of immigrants to the US: in 2005 more than eighty thousand people born in India obtained legal permanent residence in the US, making India a larger immigration source than China, the Philippines and Vietnam and second only to Mexico. In Washington, Indian-Americans are seen as a newly muscular political lobby, one that helped elect Congressman Bobby Jindal as the first non-white governor of Louisiana in more than a century, and helped secure congressional approval for the 2006 US-India deal, which promises to allow New Delhi to buy fuel, reactors and other technology to expand its civilian nuclear program. Of course, success leads to visibility, not all of it welcome. In 2007, Barack Obama’s presidential campaign implied that his rival for the Democratic nomination was an Indian fifth columnist, referring in a leaked opposition research memorandum to ‘Hillary Clinton (D–Punjab).’ One of the reasons for the community’s new influence is organisational: Indian-Americans are self-consciously modelling their activism on that of Jewish Americans and using the Jewish community’s lobbying efforts, in the words of the Chairman of the US India Political Action Committee, as ‘a benchmark.’ (In fact, there are many commonalities between the two communities, including the premium they both put on education, the recent improved relations between Israel and India, and the fact that both countries are threatened by Islamic extremism.) The other reason is structural. India’s post-Cold War emergence as a newly assertive Asian nuclear power and a potential counterweight to China means that Indian-Americans making pro-Indian arguments to US policymakers are pushing on an open door.

Indian-Americans are also leaving their mark on *Indian* politics, albeit in a more subtle way. The US Census Bureau reports that Indians are perhaps the most successful immigrant community in the US: highly educated, highly paid, and overwhelmingly white-collar. The senior Indian diplomat Dr S. Jaishankar observes that the extraordinary success of these individuals has played a role in catalysing domestic economic reform, by raising the standards and aspirations of Indians in India. Furthermore, Indian-Americans appear to be affecting Indians’ view of America. At a time when anti-Americanism is rising in most parts of the world, Indians are notably pro-American. According to the Pew Research Center’s 2007 data, only a few large national
populations hold more favourable views of the US than Indians, who are more pro-American than, for instance, South Koreans, Canadians, Italians, Britons and Germans.\textsuperscript{280} If India is edging strategically closer to the US, that shift is being enabled by America’s popularity among Indians. A partial explanation for that popularity must be the fact that most large villages in India have someone based in the US, making a go of things, and spreading – via letters, emails and visits home – a positive image of America as open, meritocratic and wealthy.\textsuperscript{281} This is even more the case, of course, amongst the Indian élite: Dr Sanjaya Baru, the spokesman of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, says he does not have a single friend or relative who does not have a relative in the US.\textsuperscript{282}

### 5.4 Diasporas and soft power

Joseph Nye has written of the salience of ‘soft power’ in international relations: ‘A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it.’\textsuperscript{283} In these terms, Indian emigrants to the US are augmenting America’s soft power on the subcontinent. More often, though, diasporas will influence host countries’ view of their home country – and (as Washington is finding to its detriment) perceptions are not peripheral to national foreign policy. Senator Franco Danieli, Italy’s Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has special responsibility for Italians abroad, says that Rome wants to promote the Italian approach to life internationally – not only to increase Italian exports but also so that foreigners want to imitate Italy.\textsuperscript{284} An Israeli official told me that when dealing with states such as China, Israel sometimes plays on ‘the myth of the huge Jewish superpower’, able to call on highly-placed supporters all over the world. Australians abroad are certainly instruments of Australia’s soft power. Because of the nature of its membership, the Australian diaspora helps to project a positive and contemporary national image: according to The Times, ‘Aussies are seen as competent, confident, smart, cultivated and literate.’\textsuperscript{285}

However, diasporans can also reduce a country’s soft power. There is an ongoing debate about how Muslim immigration to Europe is shaping European views on those immigrants’ homelands, as well as on broader issues such as the Middle East peace process and Islam in general. Some Israeli commentators believe that Europeans’ concerns about their own Muslim populations are making them more sympathetic to Israel.\textsuperscript{286} Some so-called ‘white Turks’, or members of Turkey’s secular elite, feel that the Turkish communities in Western Europe are more representative of traditional rural life in Anatolian villages than they are of modern Turkey. Interviewees are quick to point out the differences between the lifestyles of people residing in Istanbul compared to those residing in Cologne.\textsuperscript{287} The President of the Diyanet, Ali Bardakoğlu, observes: ‘Turkish society renews itself on a regular basis, but Turks overseas are frozen in time. Europeans get to know about Turkish society and Islam via these communities, which are not representative of Turkey.’\textsuperscript{288} Some Turks worry that Europeans’ interactions with members of the Turkish diaspora may even be driving down public support for Turkish accession to the European Union, although it is difficult to prove the correlation.\textsuperscript{289} Certainly, it is true that emigrant culture can calcify, failing to develop along with life in the homeland; this phenomenon may well sour some Europeans’ perceptions of Turkey. On the other hand, given the cultural contribution made by Turkish immigrants to their host countries, their successes in business and professional sports, and their lack of propensity for religious or political violence, we should be careful about concluding that their net effect is negative.

This example raises the broader issue of so-called ‘frozen culture’, the tendency for groups to maintain their culture of origin as it was at the time of emigration.\textsuperscript{290} An important question for the future is whether such frozen cultures will be thawed by the new technologies that allow emigrants to stay up-to-date with developments at home. Asu Aksoy and Kevin Robins have argued, for instance, that satellite TV ‘brings the ordinary, banal reality of Turkish life to the migrants living in London… The “here and now” reality of Turkish media culture disturbs the imagination of a “there and then” Turkey – thereby working against the romance of diaspora-as-exile, against the tendency to false idealisation of the “homeland”’.\textsuperscript{291} On the other hand, there are powerful countervailing forces at play, most importantly the human
propensity for nostalgia. This particular dynamic will have important implications – for emigrants’ identities, their soft power, and their relationship with their homelands.292

5.5 Homelands and their diasporas

Homelands are not unaware of the growing coherence of diasporas. In fact, all over the world governments are struggling with the question of how they can use their national diasporas, in the process creating ministers and ministries, departments, high-level committees and commissions. Jagdish Bhagwati refers to a ‘diaspora’ model of state behaviour, ‘which integrates past and present citizens into a web of rights and obligations in the extended community defined with the home country as the center.’293 Alan Gamlen surveyed the diaspora engagement policies of seventy countries and found that for many – both rich and poor, on the geographical periphery and closer to the centre – reaching out to emigrants is becoming the norm. He identified three types of activities: the development of a state-centric diaspora that shares a sense of common belonging and the creation of state institutions dedicated to the diaspora; the extension of political and social rights to the diaspora, so as to play the role of legitimate sovereign; and the extraction of obligations (whether financial or political) from the diaspora on the premise that emigrants owe their loyalty to their sovereign.294 We can see examples of these approaches everywhere, for instance in government economic incentives aimed at Malaysians abroad;295 in forums held in London and Atlanta on the Kenyan diaspora’s role in directing investment to the homeland;296 in the revamping of Ethiopian embassies’ diaspora outreach efforts;297 in the issuing by Mexican consulates of matricula consular (registration cards) certifying that the bearer is a resident of the US;298 and in the creation of state institutions to deal with diasporas, sometimes specific ministries but more often units within foreign ministries, such as the Italy’s Directorate General for Italians Abroad and Migration Policies, presided over by Senator Danieli.299

Morocco and China provide two different but equally instructive examples of emigrant engagement. As Hein de Haas relates in a new study,300 Morocco has seen significant emigration since independence in 1956 – to the former colonial power, France, but also to Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Germany, the Middle East and North America – and its diaspora now comprises about 2.5-3.5 million people. For the first three decades, Morocco addressed these emigrants (who were mainly guestworkers) as its subjects, actively discouraged their integration into host societies, and maintained a network of control across Northwest Europe consisting of diplomatic missions, mosques and government-controlled migrant associations (or Amicales). However since the early 1990s, and partly due to a worrying drop in remittances, the government in Rabat has moved ‘from a focus on controlling to what appears to be an active courting of the Moroccan diaspora’. The security network has been partially dismantled and official attitudes towards integration have been relaxed. Emigrants are now officially designated Marocains Résidant à l’Étranger (Moroccan residents abroad) rather than Travailleurs Marocains à l’Étranger (Moroccan workers abroad) and the community is spoken of as a ‘diaspora’. The Moroccan media, and even the King himself, trumpet emigrants’ achievements. A foundation has been established, financed out of remittance revenues, to strengthen diasporic links, in particular through the annual Opération Transit, which facilitates Moroccans’ trips home for summer. The government is less concerned about Moroccans engaging in political participation abroad, perhaps because it sees that such activities can sometimes further the regime’s interests. This was the case with a number of international protests in 2005 by Moroccans calling for the release of their fellow nationals detained in Algeria by Polisario, the rebel movement fighting to separate the Western Sahara from Morocco. De Haas gives Rabat high marks for its new diaspora policies, which have contributed (along with more general reforms to Moroccan society) to spectacular growth in remittance flows and holiday visits.

(Morocco’s new strategy is not without its problems from the European perspective. In 2006, for instance, the loyalties of Khadija Arib, a Dutch-Moroccan Labour member of the Dutch parliament, were questioned by her fellow MPs because of her membership of a migration
working group of the Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l’Homme, a council advising the King of Morocco on human rights issues.\footnote{301} It was claimed that belonging to such a group was incompatible with her membership of the Dutch parliament.)

Beijing’s attitude to its emigrants has been cyclical. Pál Nyíri relates that the Song and Yuan dynasties banned emigration, viewing it as disloyalty to ancestors and ancestral land; the Ming dynasty relaxed the restrictions; the Qing renewed the ban and even cleared the coastal strip of its population; but in the last two decades of the Qing dynasty (including the early years of the twentieth century), officials reversed course and sought to put overseas Chinese to use in modernising the Middle Kingdom. Beijing’s assertion of its right to make political and financial claims on its emigrants encouraged a view in host countries that Chinese were potentially disloyal. Sun Yat-sen’s Republic of China brought overseas Chinese into the national mainstream by issuing them with passports and awarding them voting rights; for the first thirty years of its existence the People’s Republic tried to extend courtesies to overseas Chinese investors while remaining cognisant of the concerns of the Southeast Asian nations where many of them lived.\footnote{302}

However, since Mao Zedong’s death and the onset of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms – and especially since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre – Beijing has ramped up its outreach efforts, for instance by sponsoring various programs to enable young people to visit the homes of their ancestors, assisting with the development of hometown associations, and encouraging overseas Chinese organisations to support the People’s Republic of China (PRC) position on issues such as the status of Hong Kong and Taiwan. Chinese officials certainly provided guidance to (which is not the same as exercising control over) overseas Chinese during the worldwide protests against the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and in the run-up to elections in Taiwan in 2000.\footnote{303} Joshua Kurlantzik argues that in the past ten years ‘diaspora Chinese have become vital to Beijing’s global charm offensive’, as the PRC cultivates ethnic Chinese tycoons, supports new Chinese history textbooks for diaspora schools, and treats with diaspora groups as part of its proxy war for legitimacy against Taiwan.\footnote{304} Xiang Biao observes that Beijing has put particular emphasis recently on those who left China after the 1980s and were relatively well educated, seeing them as an aid to the internationalisation of the Chinese economy.\footnote{305}

During the same period, government efforts have been supported by a revolution in Chinese media discourse on the topic. In the 1980s, Chinese students overseas were unpatriotic and their host countries were ‘brain plunderers’; now emigration is celebrated as a patriotic and modern act. Historical expressions such as ‘sons and grandsons of the Yellow Emperor’ are being heard again. According to Nyíri, ‘media reporting on the overseas Chinese has been put to the service of a triumphalist, unificatory and mobilizing myth of Chineseness as an eternal cultural condition inherited with blood’. So-called ‘new migrants’ are presented as folk heroes: ‘educated, clever, ambitious, unscrupulous, and poor’. Once the Chinese Communist Party called on overseas Chinese students to ‘return to serve’ (huiguo fuwu), but since the 1990s the slogan has been simply ‘serve the country’ (wei guo fuwu).\footnote{306}

The Moroccan and Chinese diaspora strategies seem impressive. In the main, however, the notable feature of homeland expatriate engagement efforts is actually the gap between ambition and capacity. In contrast to other aspects of diasporas, there is actually less to this topic than meets the eye. Quite often one hears assertions that the outreach efforts of some particular state are ‘best practice’ – Singapore and South Korea are popular examples – but on closer examination its policies turn out to be insubstantial. The problem, of course, is that national governments are not well equipped to deal with the fluidity and international reach of diaspora networks. Many governments have no idea where their emigrants are (much less their emigrants’ descendants), let alone what they are doing and how they might be tapped. In his book, Who are we?, Samuel Huntington presents homeland governments as deliberate, purposeful, far-sighted actors encouraging their people to emigrate, directing expatriate investment into favoured projects and organising their diasporas so to promote homeland political interests in host societies. He claims that Mexico is ‘a dramatic example of the intensified activity by foreign governments to influence American policy and to mobilize their diasporas for that purpose. Other governments making parallel efforts
include those of Canada, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Israel, Germany, the Philippines, and China, with annual spending by many of them reaching into tens of millions of dollars and in a few cases probably exceeding a hundred million dollars.\footnote{In reality, outreach programs are often underfunded and inconsistent.} Being both second-order in importance and extremely difficult to resolve, diaspora issues very often fall between bureaucratic stools.

In relation to Turkey, for example, Østergaard-Nielsen cautions that ‘while Ankara’s changing perceptions of its citizens abroad are interesting… it is important not to over-state the effectiveness of the policies directed at these citizens.’ The factors limiting Turkey’s success are applicable to a number of homelands: ‘perceptions are not easily translated into political agency’; ‘bureaucratic practices are not easily coordinated or streamlined’; and ‘“Turkey” is not a unitary actor’.\footnote{India is another case in point. Notwithstanding all the thinking that has been done, New Delhi’s grandly-titled Ministry for Overseas Indian Affairs has fewer than fifty employees on its books (that’s about one official for every half-million Indians abroad).} The Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (which was recently reduced in length from three to two days) is described by the journalist Urmi Goswami as ‘a big jamboree’, consisting of lots of people who are not quite sure what they’re doing there.\footnote{Israel’s Diaspora Affairs Ministry no longer exists: a new minister was recently appointed (after the position was left vacant for a year), but it is a part-time role and he has no civil servants reporting to him.} Given their disabilities, why do states attempt to direct their diasporas towards national ends? One might as well ask: Why do lions roar? Why do funnelweb spiders bite? States do what they do – but when it comes to relating to their emigrants, few do it well.

5.6 Diasporas and democracy

One of the ways that homelands assert their role as their emigrants’ legitimate sovereign – thereby throwing up all sorts of thorny theoretical and practical questions – is by involving them in the processes of national politics. States extend representation to their diasporas in a variety of different ways: one can draw a continuum of diaspora political representation based on the directness of the role afforded to emigrants.\footnote{At the ‘indirect’ pole is the convening of meetings of diasporic MPs, as Turkey did recently when it met with ethnic Turkish members of foreign parliaments.} This kind of engagement with diaspora representatives has no implications for the homeland’s democratic processes. A little further along the continuum are consultative councils or expatriate parliaments (whether elected or appointed), which advise the government of emigrants’ views but have no legislative authority, such as France’s Conseil Supérieur des Français de l’Étranger (High Council of the French Abroad), Switzerland’s Auslandschweizer-Organisation (Council of the Swiss Abroad) and Finland’s Ulkosuomalaisparlamentti (Finnish Expatriate Parliament).

Further still down the continuum is the provision of voting rights to non-residents, a phenomenon which is the subject of a new and exhaustive report by International IDEA. External voting is not unheard of in history: the Roman emperor Augustus invented a form of external voting for city offices, for example, and Wisconsin allowed soldiers fighting in the Union army in the US Civil War to lodge absentee ballots. In general, however, it is a twentieth century phenomenon, indeed some established democracies provided no external right to vote until the 1980s and 1990s. Since the end of the Cold War, and the attention to electoral rules which accompanied the democratisation of the former Communist bloc, there has been remarkable growth in the extension of voting rights to non-residents, to the point where external voting in some form is currently allowed by 115 countries and territories. (There is, of course, enormous variation in eligibility to vote, types of elections to which external voting applies, and voting procedures, in particular whether non-residents need to vote in person or can do
The evidence of a trend is clear: countries have introduced external voting (for example, Mexico, whose innovation has prompted much interest on behalf of other Latin American countries such as Chile, El Salvador and Guatemala); others are extending it to new groups (for example, Ghana); the IOM has run out-of-country voting for post-conflict countries with significant diasporas such as Iraq and Afghanistan; and during the same period only a few countries have abolished external voting (for example Armenia, because of fears of unbalancing the political system). Turnout generally remains low compared to in-country participation, although an external voting population can still have a considerable impact on election results, as the next section demonstrates. Furthermore, it seems likely that as we work the kinks out of remote electronic voting, interest in external voting will continue to grow.

Certainly, democratic politicians are doing their best to drive that demand by taking their campaigns to wherever the voters happen to be – especially those candidates whose message resonates with the kind of outward-looking voters who are likely to emigrate. The entrepreneurialism of the French diaspora in Britain matched the mood that swept Nicolas Sarkozy into power in Paris in May 2007. A few months later, the million or so Poles living in Britain and Ireland helped the liberal Civic Platform leader Donald Tusk (who campaigned on the streets of London, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Dublin) to tip Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice Party out of office in Warsaw. Given that expatriate Poles are enjoying the benefits of EU membership, it is only logical that many of them – as well as their families at home in Poland who are receiving the funds they are remitting – would have voted for the pro-European Tusk. During the November 2007 Australian federal election campaign, the Mandarin-speaking Labor leader (now prime minister) Kevin Rudd advertised his wares on a seven metre high billboard in the Tsim Sha Tsui district of Hong Kong.

External voting raises some difficult issues, which are yet to be fully explored in normative political theory. The right to vote is usually regarded as a universal right, and a corollary of citizenship. Furthermore, emigrants often retain a strong sense of connection with their homeland and a keen interest in the outcome of elections at home – individuals have even been known to FedEx their postal votes home to ensure they are counted in an election. In the Internet age, they can be just as well-informed as their friends at home. On the other hand, no right is unlimited. The demand for expatriate participation must be balanced against the principle of electoral legitimacy – the notion that elections should be determined by those who have a stake in the outcome. Emigrants are often largely beyond the jurisdiction of their home government. Generally they do not pay homeland income taxes, drive on homeland roads or use homeland services, so in that sense they feel the consequences of homeland elections less than residents. An appropriate balance must therefore be struck between emigrant rights and electoral legitimacy. There are also practical difficulties and costs associated with running elections beyond a country’s borders while still attempting to guarantee the principles of universal, equal, secure and secret suffrage. To give one extreme example, the provision of an external vote in Afghanistan’s 2004 election to Afghans displaced to Pakistan and Iran was controversial because of Islamabad’s and Tehran’s strategic interests in Afghanistan. In the end, the IOM rejected an offer from Pakistan for extensive assistance with the poll because it might have impugned the electorate’s trust in the electoral process.

At the very end of the continuum of diaspora political representation is the reservation of specific parliamentary seats for non-residents, the occupants of which are elected by non-residents. International IDEA reports that eleven countries enable their citizens abroad to elect their own representatives to the national legislature: Algérie, Angola, Cape Verde, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Italy, Mozambique, Panama and Portugal. For example, French citizens abroad are represented in the Senate by twelve senators not elected directly but rather selected by a college of 150 elected members of the Conseil Supérieur des Français de l’Étranger. After Croatia gained independence, its first president, Franjo Tuđman (who himself owed a great deal to Croatia’s large diaspora), established a special electoral district in the single-chamber parliament for overseas Croats; the exact number of seats assigned to it is now determined after every election depending on the number of votes cast.
The most dramatic and colourful example of the election of diaspora representatives, however, is that of Italy in 2006-2007, when expatriate MPs helped to vote one prime minister out of office and to vote confidence in another.

5.7 Case study: Italians abroad and the Tremaglia law

There are thought to be about 60 million people of recent Italian descent outside Italy (roughly equivalent to Italy’s resident population), of whom perhaps five million retain Italian citizenship. Italian emigration achieved operatic proportions in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Large communities of Italians formed in the US (especially in the period preceding the First World War), Western Europe, Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Australia (especially after the Second World War). As Italy grew wealthier in the 1970s, the numbers slowed dramatically and the character of the emigrants changed from unskilled or semi-skilled workers to students, tourists, academics and white-collar workers. Italy has always recognised a generous version of jus sanguinis, according to which a person with a single Italian grandfather is entitled to citizenship. Furthermore, the Italian constitution confers voting rights on citizens regardless of their place of residence. Prior to 2001, however, Italian citizens living abroad wishing to vote had to return to their home town on polling day in order to cast their ballot. This situation was reversed by la legge Tremaglia (the Tremaglia law), which passed that year with near-unanimous support, and which awarded citizens a postal vote and their own parliamentary representation – twelve members in the Chamber of Deputies and six in the Senate. The law established a Circoscrizione Estero (Overseas Electorate) from which these eighteen representatives are elected, which is divided into four zones: Europe; South America; North and Central America; and Africa, Asia, Oceania and Antarctica.

Several factors combined to produce this policy change. First, there was an element of partisan politics: the conventional wisdom was that increasing the participation of overseas voters would favour Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s incumbent Forza Italia-led government. Second, the cause was championed tenaciously over many years by an old-fashioned Italian nationalist MP, Mirko Tremaglia, whom Berlusconi appointed Minister for Italians Abroad. According to Stefano Silvestri of Italy’s Istituto Affari Internazionali (Institute of International Affairs), Tremaglia is a romantic idealist for whom this issue was never about votes, but about reviving eternal blood ties. Finally, Tremaglia’s campaign coincided with a notable revival in diaspora consciousness of the part of Italiani all’estero (Italians abroad). Italian society really only cohered in the mid-twentieth century, with the development of national institutions such as the media and the school system. Most Italian emigrants missed those changes: they were poorly educated, spoke a regional dialect rather than Italian, and were attached to their home villages rather than Rome (which they had probably never visited). However since the 1980s, there has been a global renewal of Italianità (Italianness), kicked off by Italy’s victory in the 1982 FIFA World Cup and powered by national political reconciliation and economic growth. The world got interested in Italy, and Italians abroad – who, thanks to new dual citizenship policies in their host countries, could obtain Italian citizenship – found a new pride in their homeland.

The first major test of the Tremaglia law was the general election of 2006 – the closest in the history of the republic – in which about one million Italians abroad cast a vote. To everyone’s surprise, the overseas bloc’s vote broke in favour of Romano Prodi’s centre-left coalition, which gained seven out of the twelve seats in the Chamber of Deputies and four out of the six slots in the Senate. Prodi quickly gained a comfortable majority in the Chamber, but the result in the Senate was too close to call until the external votes were counted and it emerged that Italians abroad had won Prodi a razor-thin 158-156 Senate majority. Symbolically at least, it seemed that Silvio Berlusconi had been tossed out of the prime minister’s residence, the Palazzo Chigi, by such unlikely individuals as Senator Nino Randazzo from Melbourne, Australia. The following year the eletti all’estero (overseas MPs) once again played a critical role in Italian politics by helping Prodi win a vote of confidence from the Senate. Unconfirmed press speculation had it...
that a ‘foreign’ Italian senator from Argentina voted in favour of Prodi after coming under pressure from the president of Argentina.  

Senator Randazzo’s story provides a sense of the peculiarities of the system. In 1952, he left the island of Salina, off the coast of Sicily, to migrate to Australia. More than half a century later he was welcomed back by flag-waving island residents as Salina’s first senator – except that he now represents people who live on the other side of the globe. Randazzo and his colleague in the Chamber of Deputies, Marco Fedi, represent an enormous swathe of the world, stretching from Wellington, New Zealand to Aleppo, Syria; their constituents include Italian soldiers serving in Afghanistan, baristas in the inner Melbourne suburb of Carlton, and research scientists in Antarctica. Fedi’s take on the Italian system stands in striking contrast to Tremaglia’s. Rather than seeing it as an opportunity to export Italian culture, Fedi seeks to import the global experiences of Italians abroad. He cites as an example his ability to tell officeholders in Prato, a city in Tuscany with a large Chinese community, of his experiences with multiculturalism in Australia. Fedi believes that ‘citizenship should be a contagious disease’ and sees the overseas MPs as a ‘precursore’ (precursor) of where the world is heading.

Optimists like Fedi and academic Alastair Davidson see Italy’s external voting system as a far-sighted attempt to democratise globalisation. Other observers report that the eletti all’estero are acting as an effective non-partisan lobby for emigrant interests. But there is no doubt that the electoral innovation is causing stresses and strains. The virtual electorates are enormous, staff and travel budgets are limited, and the year-round parliamentary sitting schedule is hard on families living abroad. Another external member of the Chamber, On. Gino Bucchino from Canada, says he has found the experience ‘quite frustrating’ and that, at least at first, other MPs treated them like ‘Martians’.

The electoral roll is outdated, leading to many ballots being returned unopened to consulates; others had to be burned because poor local postal systems delivered them late. The online edition of the Roman daily La Repubblica posted a video allegedly depicting an instance of electoral fraud in favour of Randazzo and Fedi taking place in a Sydney garage, with a voter filling out multiple ballots. The video appears to have been manufactured, but it points to the difficulties inherent in any external election.

There are also issues of legitimacy to consider. The link between elected and electors is weak from both a practical and conceptual point of view: one Italian woman asked, not unreasonably, how much australiani know about the problems of Italians in Italy. Because fewer votes are required to win an external seat than an in-country seat, the system does not represent ‘one Italian one vote.’ The law confers rights but few obligations on those living in the Circoscrizione Estero, who are not subject to many of the laws on which their representatives are voting. Finally, it is not necessarily straightforward for these MPs to marry their loyalty to their constituents abroad with their duty to the Italian republic. Sergio Romano noted in Corriere della Sera, for instance, that during the Falklands War, Italians in Argentina tried to modify Rome’s pro-British policy; another well-known columnist, Beppe Severgnini, asks what position an Italian-Argentinian MP would adopt on Argentinian sovereign debt, given that many of that country’s bondholders are Italian. Would she be more concerned with creditors’ rights or debtors’ rights? The response of On. Franco Narducci, an Italian member from Switzerland – that the eletti all’estero can help to mediate such bilateral disagreements – is upbeat but not entirely convincing. Not all conflicts of interest are prone to mediation, and it is surely only a matter of time before a transnational parliamentarian is crunched between two directly opposing forces.

Not every host country was comfortable assisting the Italian authorities hold their election. Intriguingly, the country which was most violently opposed to the idea of its nationals voting for, and sitting in, a foreign parliament was Canada – the avatar of multiculturalism. Ottawa reluctantly agreed to participate in the process just months before Canada’s own federal election, allegedly on the urging of the then foreign minister, whose riding contained many voters of Italian ancestry. However, a review of the issue was announced shortly afterwards, and in 2007 the new conservative government decided against allowing Canadian citizens to participate in the future. Internal government notes reveal that Ottawa was concerned about the ‘impact of such a
practice on the integration of newcomers in an increasingly diverse Canada. Public opinion also appeared to be against it, with one television poll finding that 63% of respondents were opposed to the election of a Canadian resident to the Italian parliament. The Tremaglia law may also have run afoul of Canadians’ concern about immigrants treating the country as a ‘parking space’, a feeling which ran high after the Israel-Hizballah war of 2006, when Canada spent millions of dollars repatriating Lebanese-Canadians, some of whom promptly returned to Lebanon after the fighting had stopped. Not all Italian-Canadians were in favour of the ballot, either: one wrote in The Globe and Mail that it was ‘representation not only without taxation, but without responsibility to boot’.

The Tremaglia law is a brave experiment, and there is something strangely impressive about it. It is also revealing – of the difficulties governments face when they choose to operate outside their national jurisdictions, and of the inconsistencies in their responses to globalisation. It is remarkable how generous Italy is to its emigrants, given how ungenerous it can be to its immigrants. The transformation from a country of emigration into a country of immigration has been a struggle: as Donna Gabaccia observes, the Filipinos, Africans, Chinese, Turks, Egyptians and others who have arrived on its shores since the 1970s have faced the same kind of discrimination that Italians confronted in the US a century earlier. Even today it is easier for a New Yorker with an Italian grandfather to obtain Italian citizenship than it is for the child of an Albanian immigrant who has lived her whole life in Milan. One gets the impression that Italy is embracing globalisation and shrinking from it at the same time.

In conclusion, diasporas are affecting the politics of their host countries and their homelands – directly and in more subtle, perceptual ways. Many homelands are attempting to embrace their diasporas, however their reach is generally unimpressive. They are also extending voting rights to their citizens abroad (often without accompanying obligations), with variable results. It is not an easy thing to democratise globalisation.

Chapter 6

Long-distance nationalism: Diasporas and security

There has always been a link between migration and security – as demonstrated, for instance, by the internment of Japanese-Americans during the Second World War. But after 9/11, the link was drawn much more clearly. Washington and other national capitals moved quickly to securitise migration by tightening borders and restricting entry policies. A related process occurred within the academy, as security scholars expanded their focus from violent conflict as it occurs between or within states to how violence can be transmitted from state to state via migration flows. The global shifts described in this paper – including the growth in diaspora consciousness, the emergence of denser transnational networks, the end of the Cold War and the rise of new powers and non-state actors – raise important security issues. This chapter will deal with four: the relationship between diasporas, crime and espionage; the diasporic link to Jihadist terrorism (which is important, but not in the way that many suppose); the troubles that diasporas can cause back in their homelands, by fostering extremism and sustaining insurgencies; and the remarkable expansion in the demand for – and provision of – consular assistance and protection.
6.1 Diasporas, crime and espionage

Most migrants are law-abiding people intent on creating economic opportunities for themselves and their families. Nevertheless, the diasporas which they form can provide shelter and foot soldiers for transnational ethnically-based criminal networks. Given the pace of modern communications and travel and the multiculturalism of the wealthy Western economies, ethnicity can be a very effective organising principle for a criminal network – a source of trust and social capital in a highly fluid milieu. The US National Intelligence Council has observed that ‘Ethnic-based organized crime groups typically prey on members of their own diasporas and use them to gain footholds in new regions.’

Fiona Adamson argues we are seeing something genuinely new: ‘the globalization of ethnically based criminal networks and their ability to forge alliances with one another – organizing themselves internationally, just as any legitimate business might do in a global economy.’ The activities of these networks affect the personal security of their victims, but of course their impact is felt more widely than that – for instance, on the funding of local conflicts in states such as Sierra Leone and Colombia, and on the governance of weak and broken states whose authority is susceptible to challenge.

Observers are noticing a number of criminal groups expanding their operations into international diaspora communities, including the Chinese Liu Yong, Zhang Wei and Liang Xiao Min syndicates, the Japanese yakuza, the Russian Sizvanskaya Grooipoivka, the Ukrainian Savlokhov Group, the US-Italian Cosa Nostra and the Mexican Carillo Fuentes organisation. There are also examples of criminal methodologies being re-imported home via reverse diasporic flows, such as the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, which consist of Central American men who grew up in US-based street gangs before being deported from the US.

Of all the ethnically-based networks, the expanding reach of the Chinese organisations, which extends to most cities with large ethnic Chinese populations, is causing the most alarm to law enforcement agencies. Sometimes the diasporic link is highly specific: the members of the Teochow, a powerful crime group in Europe known for its tight organisation and institutional loyalty, are connected by a common dialect and origin in a few villages near the city of Shantou in Guangdong province. In an influential article a decade ago, Willard Myers argued that the liberalisation of the PRC economy has created new opportunities for the Chinese criminal groups, which trade in drugs, people, weapons, counterfeit currency and other items through guanxi (reciprocal obligation) networks. Myers argued that some of these groups, which boast historical links to the Kuomintang, have had a parasitic relationship with Taiwan, expanding their activities in those countries to which Taipei has disbursed funds or directed investments.

Diasporas have always been happy hunting grounds for homeland intelligence services. Since the 1980s, for instance, Chinese, Cuban, Israeli, South Korean, and Russian diasporans have been convicted of spying on the US on behalf of their homelands. In 2006, Britain charged a British corporal of Iranian descent, who had served as a translator for the commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, with passing secrets to Tehran. Even non-state services have played on diasporic connections. RAND Corporation has pointed to Hizballah’s use of the Lebanese Shi’ite diaspora to gather intelligence which has informed attacks on Israeli targets abroad. In November 2007, a story broke about a Lebanese woman, Nada Nadim Prouty, who emigrated to America, obtained US citizenship by paying an unemployed man to marry her, found employment with the FBI and the CIA, and then allegedly provided government secrets to a Hizballah activist.

The importance of diaspora espionage appears to be increasing in light of two developments. First, the liberalisation of the Eastern bloc after the fall of the Berlin Wall has altered the approach taken by the intelligence services of former Communist states to their diasporas. There is a trend towards such services viewing diasporans less as targets of information-gathering than as instruments of it; in turn, the decline of ideology as a motivating force and the rise of ethnicity makes diasporans more likely to answer the call. For instance, a former Russian intelligence officer makes this observation: ‘In the Soviet period, the Kremlin treated Russian refugees as traitors and enemies, but now it
is turning them into a fifth column. Naturally, money remains a primary motivator for espionage, as demonstrated by the remarkable case of Gao Zhan, a Chinese sociologist affiliated with American University who was detained by Beijing in 2001 amid accusations she spied for Taiwan, released after pressure from Washington, but who subsequently admitted selling sensitive American technology to China even after her release.

The second, related, development is the rise of China as a great power. Beijing’s increasing confidence, diplomatic dexterity and military capability would, if plotted on a chart, produce a growth curve that is every bit as impressive as the country’s recent economic performance. Observers have described China’s expanding clout in Southeast and Northeast Asia, its thickening ties with US treaty allies such as South Korea and Australia, its emerging influence in resource-rich countries in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, its role in the new Asian institutions such as the East Asia Summit and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and its quickening interactions with the UN. Its espionage capabilities are also attracting the attention of analysts and officials.

In common with a number of states, Beijing still expends a good deal of energy monitoring its diaspora (in particular, members of Falun Gong). One ethnic Chinese resident of Australia observed recently: ‘For many Chinese here, it’s like we have two governments: the Australian one, who we pay taxes to, and the Chinese government that watches us.’ But China also seeks to exploit its people to an unusual degree. The Chinese services take a ‘vacuum cleaner’ approach to collection. According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, Beijing is thought to run the largest human intelligence operation in the world, relying heavily for data-gathering on many thousands of Chinese visitors, students, business people, academics, journalists and other non-professional agents who are visiting or residing in target countries for legitimate purposes. ‘Gentle patriotic pressure is put on Chinese nationals to assist in this task, and many are willing to contribute to their nation’s continued economic and technological advances in this way. There is also, of course, the potential for coercive pressure to be applied by targeting family members who remain in China.’ Western intelligence officials claim that Chinese diplomatic missions are also energetic in their efforts to turn overseas Chinese into informal agents of influence who ‘run in the same direction’ as Beijing. The favoured approach is to appeal to ‘Middle Kingdom pride’, which ‘runs deeper than state ideology’.

The FBI believes that China poses the most serious current espionage threat to the US, and America is clearly the main target for the Chinese services. However Chinese defectors to Canada and Australia have alleged that Beijing manages large numbers of informants in Chinese diaspora communities in these countries too, including a network of 1000 spies and informers in Australia. Western security services have acknowledged that their intense focus on counter-terrorism since 9/11 has come at the expense of monitoring the informal intelligence networks of states such as China. The difficulty with penetrating diasporic communities is not only the lack of language skills and cultural background: the painstaking process of gaining security clearances is doubly difficult when an applicant has spent substantial periods of time in foreign countries of interest. As the services come to recruit more successfully from within foreign diasporas, a related problem arises: the need for ‘bicultural’ intelligence officers to negotiate their allegiances and differentiate between their ethnic and national loyalties.

6.2 Diasporas and terrorism

There is no question that migratory flows can be conduits for terrorism. Robert Leiken, for instance, has argued that while states customarily see immigration from an economic perspective, terrorists view it from a strategic perspective. But are the banlieues of Marseilles and the ghettos of Montreal breeding grounds for Jihadist terrorism? The thinking on the issue of Islam and diasporas can get confused. It is not
helpful to think of a ‘Muslim diaspora’, both because Islam is not a national affiliation and also because of its diversity (for example, there are observant and ‘cultural’ Muslims; Sunni, Shia, Sufis, Alevi, Ismailis and so on; liberals, traditionalists and literalists; and many different national Islamic traditions). For most Muslims, a national identity (for example, Egyptian, Indonesian or Australian) sits comfortably alongside their religious identity. It is true that some Muslims are focused, very broadly speaking, on Dar al-Islam, the historical lands of Islam. However most Islamists (that is, those with an ideological conception of Islam) are not concerned with a particular existing nation-state; the Islamic state they seek to establish would transcend existing national boundaries, which they see as Western impositions.

One well-known terrorism commentator has argued that ‘all attacks in the West, with the exception of the Oklahoma City bombing, have had some form of diaspora involvement…’ From this history, we must conclude that diasporas are vulnerable to indoctrination and participation in terrorist activity. This statement is factually incorrect and analytically weak. The networks of Jihadist Islamism are actually quite different from diaspora networks: they are animated not by a national ideology but a religious one; their target audience is not a particular ethnic cohort but the umma, the worldwide community of Islam. Many of the same factors that are leading to the rise of diasporas – people movements, transport and communications technologies and, to some extent, policy decisions by states – are also contributing to the emergence of Jihadist Islamism, but this is a very different form of identity politics. It is not diasporas that turn disaffected young Muslims in the West into tools of destruction; to some extent at least, it is their resistance to diasporas. Some of the individuals who bombed New York, Pennsylvania, Washington, London and Madrid came from immigrant communities (others were short-term travellers) but one reason they were susceptible to the fundamentalist siren song is that they lacked their parents’ connection to the culture of their homeland – that is, they were insufficiently diasporic.

The most persuasive advocate of this thesis is the French scholar Olivier Roy. There are radical Muslim groups active in Europe with close links to their countries of origin, argues Roy, such as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). However, the more dangerous form of radicalisation, which has motivated the most deadly attacks on Western targets, is different: it is ‘a transnational Islam divorced from its country of origin.’ Today’s radical Imams and their followers are not concerned primarily with regime change in their homelands: rather, they preach a deterritorialised Islam and fight a worldwide Jihad. They tend to reject traditional homeland culture: hence 9/11 leader Mohamed Atta’s refusal to be buried according to ‘un-Islamic’ Egyptian rites, which was reminiscent of the Saudi Wahhabis’ rejection of music, dance and novels, and the Taliban’s proscription of traditional Afghan cultural forms such as kite-flying and singing birds. Roy characterises most al-Qaeda-style terrorists as ‘supranational and socially atomized’, usually with Westernised experiences of education, language and matrimonial affairs. ‘Before a Muslim in Europe can become a supranationalised radical, he… must lose most if not all connection to the diaspora.’ Neofundamentalist movements do not ‘target communities with ties in a culture of origin, but individuals in doubt about their faith and identity… they address the universalist yearning of Muslims who cannot identify with any specific place or nation.’ In Roy’s view, the phenomenon of ‘born-again Muslims’ in Europe ‘represents a radical disconnection between the country of origin and the new generations’.

For Fukuyama, Roy’s analysis of radical Islamism in the West as a product of modern identity politics rather than something that is necessarily inherent to Islam means that ‘the problem of jihadist terrorism will not be solved by bringing modernization and democracy to the Middle East.’ How can such terrorism be defeated? The problem is far from simple, but certain principles flow from Roy’s argument. Western security services must be vigilant in pursuing violent Jihadists who shelter in diaspora communities but careful to explain to the wider public that they form a tiny minority of those communities. Immigrant communities are not to blame for terrorism, and contrary to the lazy assertions of some commentators and politicians, neither is diasporic feeling among immigrants. Diaspora consciousness may actually reduce the alienation felt by Muslims living in Western countries. It is
noticeable that Turks in Europe – who have, as we have seen, strong diasporic bonds to Turkey – seem to be less susceptible to universalist Islam than Arabs, and Turks have not counted prominently among Jihadist operatives in the West. Indeed, the International Crisis Group has observed that the experience of Germany, with its predominantly Turkish Muslim minority, ‘shows that a significant Muslim population at the heart of Europe need not produce either violent Islamist groups or destabilising social unrest’. National governments need to be careful, therefore, that frustration at their inability to keep this menace beyond their borders does not lead them to overreact domestically with regulations which alienate the very diaspora communities they need to keep on side.

6.3 Diasporas and homeland security

There is a substantial literature on the topic of diasporic support for extreme and even violent political behaviour at home, which demonstrates that ‘the communities wrapped up in an ethnonational conflict often extend far beyond the arena of fighting’. The scholar Benedict Anderson calls this phenomenon ‘long-distance nationalism’, and worries that it ‘creates a serious politics that is at the same time radically unaccountable. The participant rarely pays taxes in the country in which he does his politics; he is not answerable to its judicial system… he need not fear prison, torture, or death, nor need his immediate family. But, well and safely positioned in the First World, he can send money and guns, circulate propaganda, and build intercontinental computer information circuits, all of which can have incalculable consequences in the zones of their ultimate destinations’.

The classic assumption in this field is that in relation to homeland disputes, diasporans may be ‘unwilling to accept a compromise because on the one hand the conflict is of low cost to them and on the other hand the conflict may have become an integral part of exile identity’. The interests of diaspora and homeland, in other words, are rarely identical. Yossi Shain has observed, for instance, that a diaspora may perceive a homeland territory’s ‘identity function’ more clearly than its practical value, so that ‘altering the geographic configuration of the homeland state for the sake of peace may be more disturbing to some diaspora elements than to some segments of the homeland community’. We see this trend in relation to historic bilateral disputes, such as the hostility of some Armenian diasporans to improved relations between Armenia and Turkey, and international political negotiations such as the 2004 talks on the future of Cyprus, when Turkish-Cypriots abroad were sometimes more negative about the UN’s compromise proposal than the Turks of northern Cyprus.

Similarly, some of the more uncompromising figures in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict live outside the Holy Land. Shain notes that while Yitzhak Rabin’s government enjoyed the support of most Jewish Americans in relation to the Oslo peace accord, it ‘also became the target of venomous opposition from more conservative sectors of the diaspora. In addition to outright hostility directed at government officials, diaspora groups that opposed the peace process financed a public relations campaign against the accords, gave financial support to the Jewish settler movement in the occupied territories, and established US affiliates of key right-wing Israeli parties to financially support their political campaigns against Rabin and his Labor Party successors, Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak’. In the prelude to the Annapolis summit of November 2007, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert publicly rejected assertions by some American Jewish leaders that the status of Jerusalem was not an Israeli issue but ‘a Jewish one’. On the Palestinian side, pragmatists living in the Palestinian territories, such as Professor Sari Nusseibeh, the Rector of Al-Quds University, are often attacked by radicals abroad. The criticism flowed in the opposite direction in a March 2007 debate in Doha on the right of return. A fascinating exchange took place between Ali Abu-nimeh, a Palestinian refugee who lives in Ireland and who established the Electronic Intifada, and Bassem Eid, the founder of the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, who lives in the Aqabat Jaber refugee camp in Jericho. ‘He is not living in a refugee camp’, said Eid, ‘and I wish that Mr Abu-nimeh one day will come to replace me in Aqabat Jaber in Jericho for one month… we know ourselves much more than any other Palestinian who is living outside
who has no connection to the realities.\textsuperscript{381} The divide between diasporic and local attitudes is sometimes similar to Israeli novelist Amos Oz’s dichotomy between a Shakespeare play and a Chekhov one. At the end of a Shakespearian tragedy, every wrong is righted and justice is done, but the stage is strewn with dead bodies; a Chekhovian tragedy, on the other hand, ends with the company disillusioned and heartbroken, but alive.\textsuperscript{382} The diaspora mindset matters, however, because as Shain records, diasporas can act as independent actors, converting peace negotiations from a two-level game into a three-level game.\textsuperscript{383}

Security threats can be created when refugee flows pool in diasporic communities on the borders of the home state. ‘All too often’, argue Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, ‘where large numbers of refugees go, instability and war closely follow.’\textsuperscript{384} Hutus fleeing Rwanda for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) after the Rwandan genocide of 1994 launched cross-border attacks on the new Tutsi-led government and helped precipitate a civil war, regime collapse and millions of deaths in the DRC.\textsuperscript{385} Palestinian refugees participated in the Black September conflict between the Jordanian state and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and catalysed Lebanon’s civil war.\textsuperscript{386} Afghani refugee camps in Pakistan in the 1980s functioned as incubators for the Taliban – and more than three million Afghans remain outside their country today.\textsuperscript{387} More than 2.2 million people (almost 10% of the population) have fled Iraq for neighbouring countries since the US invasion.\textsuperscript{388} Byman and Pollack warn that in the event of an all-out civil war in Iraq in the future, this stream could become a flood – which could upset delicate sectarian balances and provoke unrest in Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It would also have serious implications for Iraq’s security, not least because ‘the immediate presence of hundreds of thousands of traumatized Shiites could… generate domestic pressure on Tehran to intervene directly in Iraq’.\textsuperscript{389}

Moving beyond the home country’s immediate borderlands, diasporas in the distant West have long played a role in funding and supporting insurgencies against the home regime. RAND observes that insurgents in Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Lebanon, Russia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Northern Ireland and Kosovo have all received diasporic support in the form of money, arms or recruits. For example, diaspora Kosovars were, according to the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, ‘the most radicalized part of the Kosovar Albanian community’ and were heavily implicated in the establishment of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).\textsuperscript{390} Several hundred Albanian-Americans fought in the KLA’s \textit{Batalioni Atlantiku} (Atlantic Brigade): American journalists in Kosovo interviewed KLA soldiers with thick accents from the Bronx, Chicago and Detroit.\textsuperscript{391} Insurgents generate this kind of support in a number of ways: by stoking emigrants’ long-distance nationalism, by playing on their guilt, and by coercion.\textsuperscript{392} Although the evidence is not categorical, it seems that diasporas can, in the words of economist Paul Collier, ‘make life for those left behind much more dangerous’. Collier authored a World Bank study in 2000 which found that a post-conflict country with a large diaspora in the US is six times more likely to relapse into conflict than a similar country with a small diaspora.\textsuperscript{393}

In the last couple of decades, three developments have changed the way diasporas interact with homeland insurgencies. First, the advancements in transport and communications outlined in Chapter 1 have concentrated diasporic minds on difficulties at home and improved the ability of insurgents to capitalise on this awareness.\textsuperscript{394} In 1992, Benedict Anderson decried the long-distance nationalist who ‘finds it tempting to play identity politics by participating… in the conflicts of his imagined \textit{Heimat} [homeland] – now only fax-time away.’\textsuperscript{395} Since then, of course, technologies have been developed, commercialised and distributed globally which bring such a person much closer to his homeland than does the fax. Second, the relative importance of diasporic support for insurgencies surged in the post-Cold War period, not only because of the increased frequency of ethnic and intrastate conflicts, but also because Washington and Moscow withdrew their support from some of their proxies. As RAND noted, state sponsorship of insurgencies, for so long a prominent feature of superpower rivalry, was ‘no longer the only, or necessarily the most important, game in town’.\textsuperscript{396} However the third development – the attacks on the US on 9/11 – may have interrupted this trend by rendering anti-state violence
less acceptable, both to diasporas and host governments. Historically, host governments have been slow to close down these connections to insurgents – in part because of the difficulty in separating out insurgency supporters from the rest of the diaspora and the political costs of doing so, but also because the effect of the support was felt in the homeland, not the host country. After 9/11, Western governments realised they could not afford to be sanguine about faraway terrorism, and their security services acted accordingly.

These developments can be observed in the cases of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA). In 2001, RAND regarded the Tigers’ experience as ‘the apex of how an insurgent organization can exploit a diaspora for its own ends... The LTTE network straddles the globe and effectively integrates the Tamil diaspora into one overarching external system that constitutes the lifeline for LTTE guerillas on the ground. The Tigers raised ‘war taxes’ and received donations from Tamil communities in countries such as the UK, Australia and Canada, as well as income from NGOs, criminal activities and Tamil-run businesses (for which the LTTE sometimes covered the initial capital costs). The exiled Tiger leadership was sheltered by the diaspora, and pro-Tiger websites run by expatriates were more sophisticated than Colombo’s official efforts. Many of these benefits still accrue today, but 9/11 changed the game for the Tigers, for several years at least. Western security forces cracked down on LTTE front organisations; Tamil emigrants found it easier to avoid forced remittances; and diaspora leaders encouraged the LTTE to pursue a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Diasporic pressure appears to have been one of several factors which led to the LTTE’s unilateral ceasefire declaration in December 2001. (Four years later, however, hostilities between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE resumed.)

The succour which Irish republicans have long received from Irish-Americans was institutionalised, after the commencement of the Troubles in the 1960s, in the form of the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAIM) and other organisations. For several decades, some of these organisations provided funds and weapons (including the Provos’ rifle of choice, the Armalite) to the IRA, shielded IRA fugitives and supported the families of republican prisoners; the broader Irish-American community lent political clout to the republican cause. The US government (which was not a target of IRA operations) ‘interfered only fitfully with the IRA’s efforts to raise money or acquire weapons.’ In the 1990s, however, Washington waded right into the issue. The US was motivated in part by President Bill Clinton’s personal interest, but it was also liberated by the end of the Cold War, which had, according to Feargal Cochrane, ‘glued the Northern Ireland conflict into the international political system in a manner that made US policy innovations extremely unlikely.’ (The ‘bipolar reductionist split’ pushed Washington and London together and led republican paramilitaries to align themselves with the PLO, the African National Congress and the Libyan regime.) An American push for peace was also urged by the increasingly prosperous Irish-American community, for whom images of IRA operations were highly disturbing. Cochrane argues that ‘the evolution of the Irish-American lobby, from its demands for immediate British withdrawal from Northern Ireland to its role as cheerleader and core-funder of incremental peaceful change, facilitated a constructive engagement with the US administration.’ Furthermore, ‘Irish-America’s soft power was a vital factor in leading republicans towards the view that democratic politics rather than paramilitary violence was the way forward.’

The 9/11 attacks on the US (which in many cases were met by Irish-American police and fire officers) further reduced any tolerance within the community for terrorist activities. President Bush’s former special envoy for Northern Ireland, Mitchell Reiss, argues that Irish America’s influence on the peace process was felt very clearly in early 2005, after the IRA’s robbery of the Northern Bank and the murder of Robert McCartney in Belfast. Prominent Irish-Americans such as Senator Ted Kennedy and the broader community ‘delivered very strong public and private messages to the IRA (and Sinn Féin) that the IRA simply had to end the war, commit itself to a purely peaceful and democratic path forward and decommission its weapons. And six months after the 2005 St Patrick’s Day events, all of these steps had taken place.’
Most of the official and scholarly attention, with good reason, is given to what Østergaard-Nielsen calls ‘the dark side of diaspora politics’. However as the LTTE and IRA cases demonstrate, diasporas can play a role in dampening conflict and encouraging dialogue; their remittances can fuel development as well as violence. Whether the overall effect will be positive or negative in any particular case is not easily predictable, but it probably depends on a range of factors including the history of the diaspora in question and its reasons for dispersal, its relations with the host society (including its influence and economic success) and its relationship with the homeland. It is too soon to say just what effect new technologies such as the internet will have on the nexus between diasporas and homeland security (or, indeed, how long the chilling effect of 9/11 will last). These technologies are, on the one hand, an operational boon to groups such as the LTTE, and they enable visual representations of violence and repression that are invaluable in radicalising far-flung populations. On the other hand, we used to think that diaspora communities (for example, elements of Irish America) funded extremists at home because they were not fully aware of positive developments that had occurred since they had left – that is, they had an old black-and-white image in their head. How will this change as people find it easier to interact with their homeland and stay up-to-date? Might they become more moderate when the black-and-white photograph is replaced with a virtual tour? Collier is certainly right to advise that the international community should build diasporas into peace processes, emphasising that even if diasporas are not bearing the costs of extremism and violence, their countrymen and women are. Host governments, for instance, should put clear limits on the activities of diaspora organisations within their jurisdiction.

6.4 The protection of diasporas

Diasporas can pose security threats – but they are also subject to them. If 9/11 demonstrated the difficulties of defending the American homeland against asymmetric attacks, for instance, how can Washington protect the millions of Americans who live outside their homeland? New threats to Western nationals abroad are coinciding with escalating demands for consular assistance, and foreign ministries around the world are groaning (often literally) under the weight of public and political expectations. Of course, consular protection is not only a diaspora issue: many people requiring help are short-term travellers, not emigrants; and many individuals who identify with a homeland may not actually be nationals of that country who are eligible for assistance. Nevertheless, diasporas are an important constituency for consular services, and a problematic one: in most cases the homeland government knows little about them; and because they are more deeply embedded in their host countries than tourists or business travellers, they can be harder to protect.

As the strategic analyst Hugh White writes, the ‘basic idea of statehood suggests a very limited role for governments in protecting its citizens overseas. The state’s primary responsibility is to protect its citizens – and others – while they are in its sovereign territory. This is the area in which the state has the monopoly of legitimate force. Leave the state’s sovereign territory, and the state has neither the means nor the responsibility to protect you. Of course it has never been that simple.’ There is another, contradictory, element of national sovereignty: what the Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy describes as ‘a very old theory holding that all individuals belong to some sovereign and that this identification follows them wherever they may go.’ It is this belief which informed the Romans’ claim of immunity from local authorities: ‘Civis Romanus Sum’ (‘I am a Roman citizen’). Over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries, as international travel began to reach significant levels, these two principles resolved into a general rule that ‘citizens abroad were to submit to the full operation of local law.’ Sometimes the balance shifted back to the earlier principle, as with the imperial powers’ negotiation of extraterritoriality for their citizens in the early 19th century, or Britain’s infamous expedition to Abyssinia in 1868 to rescue a few missionaries and other hostages from the clutches of Emperor Theodore II, described memorably in George MacDonald Fraser’s novel, Flashman on the March. But if consular questions have developed into political spats and even military conflicts from time to
time, the long-term tendency has been towards a more limited view of governments’ responsibilities to their citizens abroad.

However, several interrelated factors – the surge in international travel and migration, the media’s appetite for stories about fellow nationals in extraordinary situations, and a string of recent global events with major consular implications, including 9/11, the Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005, the Madrid bombing and Boxing Day tsunami in 2004, the London bombing and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the Israel-Hizballah war of 2006 – have driven up demand (from both diaspora and homeland populations) for the provision of consular assistance to nationals abroad. Diplomats complain that this issue keeps them awake at night – and with good reason, for where consular services are judged to be insufficient, the criticism is immediate, as the Canadian, Australian, Swedish, Norwegian and New Zealand foreign ministries, to name only a few, have found recently. These kinds of developments are not occurring everywhere, and indeed where they are taking place they are sometimes causing a backlash, with complaints about dual citizenship and demands that recipients of assistance refund the cost to the government. Nevertheless the trend is reasonably clear.

The issue is also causing new bilateral headaches. For example, Indonesia is thought to have more than a million citizens working in neighbouring Malaysia, whom it regards as pahlawan devisa (foreign exchange heroes). However their presence is a sensitive issue for both sides: on the one hand, Malaysians believe the Indonesians cause crime; on the other hand, given that the two countries are bangsa serumpun (sharing the same roots) but Malaysia is smaller and significantly richer, Indonesians are alert to slights against their kin. The issue is becoming increasingly serious, both because of the growth of the Indonesian population in Malaysia and because Indonesia’s democratisation means that Jakarta is now more susceptible to public pressure. The August 2007 beating of an Indonesian karate referee by plainclothes Malaysian police in Nilai, a town near Kuala Lumpur, for example, led to protest demonstrations in Jakarta and other Indonesian cities, threats to ‘sweep’ Malaysian citizens in Indonesia, calls for a revival of the 1960s ganyang Malaysia (crush Malaysia) campaigns from the days of Konfrontasi, articles from commentators querying Malay solidarity, appeals for boycotts, and eventually an apology from Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi to Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Homeland governments are acting to meet the new public demand for consular assistance. White argues that consular work has moved from the margins to near the centre of the priorities of Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), for example, and the numbers bear out that claim. The number of Australians receiving consular assistance doubled from 1996-1997 to 2003-2004, and it will have leapt again since then. However, far from satisfying the demand, the provision of assistance is only driving demand higher: ‘As the Government has undertaken more and more high-cost, highly-publicised consular activities… Australians have come to expect the same levels of support if they find themselves in trouble, and the Government finds itself trapped in a cycle of rising expectations.’ Filipino politicians are highly sensitive to the acute political issue of emigrant protection. The execution of Filipina maid Flor Contemplacion in Singapore in 1995 led to the passage of legislation known as ‘the migrant workers’ Magna Carta’; the kidnapping of a Filipino truck driver in Iraq in 2004 caused President Macapagal-Arroyo to pull the Philippines out of the US-led coalition; and an agency, the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), has been established to care for emigrants.

Perhaps the most interesting case is that of China. Although Beijing’s attitude to the protection of overseas Chinese has waxed and waned over the last couple of centuries, the default position – which is consistent both with diplomatic imperatives and the norm of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states – has been to remain aloof. However, a new attitude seems to be emerging along with China’s rising global influence, the steep increase in the number of Chinese travelling overseas and the growing presence and visibility of Chinese companies and their employees in unstable foreign markets. In the wake of public pressure, the Chinese foreign ministry has announced it is retooling itself in order to provide better consular services and the China Daily has reported on ‘unprecedented government efforts’ to help Chinese
people in trouble overseas. ‘Serving the people is the essence of China’s diplomacy’, says the ministry’s director of consular affairs, and diplomats have been instructed to ‘go all out to help Chinese citizens in accordance with international laws’. The last two years have seen some revealing instances of this approach. In late 2005, Chinese officials expressed sharp displeasure over the mistreatment of ethnic Chinese by Malaysian authorities after images were produced of a naked woman being forced to do squats in a police lock-up. It was only after a Malaysian minister travelled to Beijing to apologise that it emerged that the woman in question was actually an ethnic Malay. (The incident was reminiscent of the 1904 abduction of a presumed American citizen, Ion Perdicaris, by a Berber chieftain, which led President Theodore Roosevelt to send a squadron of warships to Morocco for his rescue. In fact, however, Mr Perdicaris had renounced his American citizenship forty years earlier.) China also muscled up to Pakistan in July 2007, when intelligence analysts and diplomats reported that China’s strongly-expressed concern about militant attacks on Chinese citizens in Islamabad suspected of ‘loose morals’ was critical in President Pervez Musharraf’s decision to lay siege to the Red Mosque – a rare direct confrontation between his government and the radicals.

In the Southwest Pacific, China is engaged in a struggle for geopolitical advantage with Taiwan, involving a great deal of chequebook diplomacy. An Australian journalist, Graeme Dobell, argues that Beijing has ‘achieved a leading position in a surprisingly short time’ through the concentration of diplomatic resources (China is now thought to have more diplomats in the Pacific than either the US or the regional metropole, Australia) and financial assistance (namely, the provision of ‘an array of relatively cheap goodies – official visits to China for politicians, a willingness to construct buildings and sporting facilities, and no overt interest at all in “governance” apart from the crucial issue of diplomatic influence.’) At the same time, the Chinese diaspora in the island states of Melanesia is growing rapidly with the arrival of ‘new Chinese’ emigrants who are, unlike their predecessors (who had ‘fled the chaos and poverty of their homeland’), ‘proud sons and daughters of the new China.’ In 2006, anti-Chinese riots broke out in Solomon Islands and Tonga, motivated partly by prejudice and envy but also by anger at political interference by foreign powers, especially Taipei. China responded by leasing foreign charter planes to airlift hundreds of overseas Chinese out of both Honiara and Nuku’alofa. In the same year, Beijing also organised evacuations from violent situations in East Timor and Lebanon. This kind of exercise is not unusual for developed countries, but it is a new thing for China. Beijing has also promised to extend consular assistance to Taiwanese citizens in emergencies. According to a consular official: ‘We always consider Taiwan compatriots our own flesh and blood and will use all our resources to provide consular assistance and protection for them without any reservation. In this way, we can let them feel the motherland’s love for them.’

The concern, of course, is that if states become more forward-leaning in asserting their right to protect their citizens when they are outside their borders, international disputes are sure to follow. That is especially the case when the states in question are rising in both ambition and capacities. It is not difficult to imagine, for instance, circumstances in which a distressing situation involving overseas Chinese somewhere in Southeast Asia escalated into conflict. What if communal violence in Fiji caused a future Indian government to send some of its spanking new warships to the Southwest Pacific in order to protect Fijians of Indian origin?

The other problem is, in a sense, the opposite one: governments are not well equipped to deliver the enhanced consular protection they are setting out so enthusiastically to provide. There are clear limits to governments’ knowledge of conditions in foreign countries – and, even more so, to their ability to extend assistance where required. This is particularly the case in relation to nationals who have lived overseas for long periods of time: even though they may regard themselves as diaspora members, their homeland government is unlikely to know much about their situation. For example, DFAT estimates that only about 14% of Australians residing abroad have chosen to sign up with the online register it maintains in order to locate Australians in an emergency. States are, in other words, accepting new risks and
responsibilities that they are unable to bear, and it is bound to get them into all kinds of trouble. One recent example of such trouble, involving a short-term traveller rather than a diasporan, was the case of former deputy German foreign minister, Jürgen Chrobog. In 2003, Chrobog helped win the release of European hostages kidnapped in the Sahara, personally delivering a large cash ransom to intermediaries of the kidnappers. The German foreign ministry had cautioned its nationals against travelling in Algeria at that time, and subsequent to those events Chrobog opined that some Germans travelling overseas have a ‘social security mentality’. Unfortunately he was then himself kidnapped along with his family while holidaying in a remote part of Yemen – despite foreign ministry warnings that Germans travelling there were in danger of abduction.430

Hugh White neatly sums up the paradox of modern consular assistance in this way:

It is one of the stranger characteristics of foreign policy in the 21st century that at a time when globalisation is thought by many to be making the nation-state less and less important, as global citizens seem increasingly to cut themselves loose from national roots to lead cosmopolitan lives, governments around the world... seem to face ever-rising expectations from citizens that they will accept greater and greater responsibility for the safety of their citizens overseas. So while citizenship for the individual seems to mean less and less, the responsibilities expected of (and accepted by) the state to protect citizens abroad seem to grow.431

The rise of diasporas has meaningful security implications, then – for organised crime, espionage, the terrorist threat against the West, insurgencies and peace processes, and the protection of nationals abroad.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

The evidence set out in this paper confirms that diasporas are getting larger, thicker and stronger. Indeed, the consistency of the changes is striking. Diaspora consciousness is rising among many different communities, from Italians to Indonesians; diasporas are organising themselves better, like the New Zealanders, and sometimes learning from each other, as with Indian-Americans and Jewish Americans. Homeland societies as dissimilar as Australia and Israel are revising their opinions of their diasporas as the stigma attached to emigration declines; homeland capitals such as New Delhi and Ankara are engaging more energetically with their people abroad, sometimes with positive results and sometimes with perverse ones. Both phenomena are visible in the case of China: diaspora Chinese are taking more interest in their Chinese identity; and Beijing is taking more interest in its emigrants, collecting information from them and providing more robust consular protection to them. Meanwhile, host countries are struggling with the difficult questions raised by more assertive and visible diasporic groups within their own national communities and are enduring periodic outbreaks of diasporaphobia.

The narratives of many of these national diasporas is being driven by a number of common factors, in particular migration growth, technological
changes which are connecting, transporting and sometimes narrowing people, and major geopolitical events. The end of the Cold War has been especially influential, redefining diasporas (as in the case of Russia), altering homeland diaspora strategies (for example, Morocco), bringing forward rising powers such as China and remaking their policies, spreading democratisation and external voting to new territories, and changing host country attitudes towards diasporic homelands (as with US policy towards India and the conflict in Northern Ireland).

Naturally, the developments have not been all one way. Many diasporans are increasingly interested in their homelands, but some could not care less. Diasporas can cause security threats, but they can also help to calm them: Irish-Americans and overseas Tamils have done both. Diasporas may even help to inoculate some populations from viruses such as Jihadist terrorism. Even if there are inconsistencies and contradictions, however, the trend is clear.

The tightening of diasporic connections is being felt around the world. The national identities of both host countries and homelands are being affected: it is commonplace to celebrate the cultural richness diasporans bring to their host countries, but the Victorian terrace houses of Anatolia demonstrate that the effect is not unidirectional. Remittances have become a critical source of external financing for developing countries such as the Philippines, India and Mexico – one with great developmental potential. Gold-collar workers as well as blue-collar workers are contributing to their homelands’ economies. Diaspora networks are stimulating trade and investment. Furthermore, the political flows from diaspora to homeland – in the form of ideas, influence and votes – may turn out to be just as powerful as the financial flows. Diasporans are influencing host country politics, as we saw with the congressional resolution on the question of the Armenian genocide. Emigrants are serving as ambassadors for their homelands (both for good and for ill); they can also function as instruments of their host country’s soft power, as is the case with Indian-Americans. From the security perspective, diasporas are, as the British Ministry of Defence put it, ‘a medium for the international transmission of social risk’, including transnational crime, espionage, inter-communal violence and terrorism; but it seems they can also mitigate risk, by supporting young people who might otherwise fall prey to more dangerous forms of identity politics.

The existence of a large diasporic community affects the definition (and the achievement) of the national interest – and of course the interests of homeland and diaspora are rarely identical. Events affect diasporas differently from homeland populations; they raise new problems that governments are not used to handling; they are demanding, but it is difficult to make demands of them. Diasporas rope countries together more tightly: if a large number of your people reside in another country, for instance, and they contribute a large chunk of your GDP, then the other country’s economic policies (not to mention its immigration and internal security systems) help determine your national welfare.

Diasporas deserve our attention, therefore – and all the more so if the trends identified in this paper continue. Let us speculate for a minute about developments in the future, if emigrants feel increasingly enmeshed in the national endeavours of their homelands. What if homeland electoral authorities were to enfranchise diasporas in order to resolve vexed national questions: as The Economist notes, ‘just imagine what would happen in Ireland, north and south of the border, if Irish-Americans were allowed to vote in Ireland’s or Ulster’s elections.’ What if ethnic lobbies continue to grow in strength, splintering the foreign policies of democratic states? How can police forces and security services prevent ethnically-based criminal and espionage networks from developing parasitic relationships with increasingly cohesive diasporas? Will we see states bumping into each other as they strive to protect people who are emotionally, but not physically, part of the nation? Could a rising demand for consular assistance lead rising (or falling) states into adventurism and the use of force? Finally, what kind of a backlash will we see against the rise of diasporas? Could anti-immigrant feeling in countries such as the US, Britain, France and Italy cause governments to restrict immigration and thereby choke off the remittance flows to which some countries are growing addicted? Will we see host countries demanding exclusive loyalty from those people living within their borders – and if so, will they forswear the role of
souvereign in relation to their own emigrants, refusing to grant rights to or extract obligations from them?

To date, few governments have been able to bring this kind of consistency to their approach. Thus Italy gives the vote to its emigrants but is niggardly towards its immigrants. Australia makes it harder to gain citizenship in the first place, but easier to regain it once it has been lost. After gaining independence, Croatia allocated nearly twice as many parliamentary seats to diaspora Croats as it did to ethnic minorities within Croatia. Nicolas Sarkozy campaigned for votes abroad and he plainly believes that French emigrants remain French; in fact, he seems to see them as the personification of the France he wishes to build. Yet he takes a different view when it comes to residents of France: when a woman of North African heritage questioned Sarkozy about his own family roots in the Hungarian nobility, for instance, he replied: ‘You are not Algerian, but French. And I am not Hungarian.’ In 1999, Ottawa refused to allow the Canadian newspaper magnate Conrad Black to sit in the British House of Lords, but a few years later it allowed Canadian citizens to vote and stand for the Italian parliament. When it comes to diasporas, in other words, many governments are displaying bipolar tendencies.

The other notable feature of homeland governments’ responses, apart from their inconsistency, is their ineffectiveness. Points of principle (for example, whether to grant representation to non-residents) are difficult enough; the other problem is implementation. Homeland governments are reaching out to their diasporas, but they are not good at operating beyond their borders. New diaspora institutions are often ineffective; accommodating diasporans in your democratic processes is not easy; consular assistance is hard to deliver and liable to cause difficulties. The truth is that diasporas are not easily managed. Perhaps nations can be global, as the Italian-Australian MP Marco Fedi argues, but states usually cannot. Of course, this leaves the field open for first movers. Governments that manage to devise effective means of dealing with their emigrant populations are likely to gain a significant advantage over their rivals. If they can draw their emigrants into the national mainstream, they will make their countries larger – not only demographically but also culturally, politically and economically.

The principles which should guide homeland governments’ dealings with their diasporas, at least in the short to medium term, are modesty and pragmatism. Designing public policy in relation to a foreign population is inherently difficult. The creation of large new bureaucracies such as diaspora ministries would please diaspora organisations, but is unlikely to capture real benefits for homelands. A better approach would be to proceed gradually; work across departments rather than establishing new ones; observe what works and distribute those practices throughout the bureaucracy; ensure that government rhetoric does not get too far ahead of the reality; and be driven by emigrants’ preferences rather than trying to hitch unwilling individuals to some grand national strategy. Working pragmatically with diasporans while they are abroad is more sensible than fixating on their return: if Israel can manage this despite its particular historical circumstances, then other states should be able to make a similar leap. This kind of modest diaspora policy is more likely to succeed than the alternative. Just as importantly, it is less likely to induce a backlash on the part of resident nationals disturbed by the showering of public monies, benefits and rights on individuals who have elected to live elsewhere.

What about host governments? It is hard to offer policy prescriptions given the diversity of national approaches that exist, but we can suggest that host countries will need to accept the reality that many of their people have plural national identities. That is not to say that immigrants are not emotionally attached to the country in which they live, but simply that many have a mix of affiliations, including a persistent affiliation with their homelands. It is often impossible, in other words, to reduce one’s identity to a single descriptor. Governments will always be preoccupied, of course, with the question of creating an integrated and cohesive national community. The answer is likely to lie along the lines proposed by Francis Fukuyama: promote an inclusive national identity and a common liberal culture; allow naturalisation and citizenship on a non-ethnic basis under conditions that are less (rather than more) onerous; deal with people as individuals not just as members of groups; and provide dignity to immigrants and other marginalised groups by ensuring they have jobs. Host governments should also be careful to
separate the broad issues of identity from the urgent but narrower issues of security. A real danger for states facing internal security threats is that they overreact, thereby alienating their constituent communities, doing violence to the values they seek to protect, and diminishing their appeal to the potential future immigrants whom they need to replenish their human capital.

There are implications in all this, too, for the international system as well as its component states. As DeParle observes: ‘The movement of people – the most intimate form of globalization – is the one with the fewest rules.’ The triangular relationships between diasporas, homelands and host countries need to be managed adroitly, in order to maximise the possible benefits flowing from diasporas and minimise the likely adverse consequences. The world would profit from the development of rules (or at least understandings between states) on a number of the issues raised in this paper, including the cost of remittances, the permissibility of long-distance politicking and activism, and the allocation of responsibility for the protection of nationals.

The world should remember, finally, the advantages as well as the disadvantages accruing from the rise of diasporas. There is a tendency for homelands to see migration as economically dangerous and for host countries to see it as socially threatening; but in fact there are usually benefits to be had for both sides. Furthermore, there is another, broader dimension to consider. As Amin Maalouf writes, diasporans ‘live in a sort of frontier zone criss-crossed by ethnic, religious or other fault lines. But by virtue of this situation... they have a special role to play in forging links, eliminating misunderstandings, making some parties more reasonable and others less belligerent, smoothing out difficulties, seeking compromise. Their role is to act as bridges, go-betweens, mediators between the various communities and cultures.’

Robin Cohen argues that in an age of globalisation, ‘the world is being organized vertically by nation-states and regions, but horizontally by an overlapping, permeable, multiple system of interactions.’ Diasporas represent one such system. Diasporas are world wide webs – encircling the globe heedless of national borders, connecting people with distant geographies and governments, binding countries together and pulling them into each other’s way, and complicating the processes of international relations.
## Appendix 1: Table of selected diasporas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diaspora</th>
<th>Indicative size</th>
<th>Primary locations</th>
<th>Examples of diaspora consciousness</th>
<th>Examples of homeland's engagement with diaspora</th>
<th>Examples of diaspora's influence on homeland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>UK and Ireland, Western Europe, North Asia, North America, Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Strong expatriate organisations e.g. Advance, survey evidence of attachment to homeland</td>
<td>Change in government rhetoric, public opinion</td>
<td>Projection of contemporary image internationally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>33 million +</td>
<td>Southeast Asia, North America, Africa, the Pacific, Australia</td>
<td>Resumption of Chinese names, diaspora tourism, strong diaspora organisations, international protests in support of PRC positions, fei ch’ien payments transfer system</td>
<td>Sponsorship of diaspora visits, relationships with diaspora organisations, altered public discourse about emigrants, provision of consular protection</td>
<td>Remittances, trade and investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>1.5 million</td>
<td>US (especially Florida)</td>
<td>Strong cultural coherence, ‘Little Havana’ in Miami</td>
<td>Minimal, although some change in rhetoric</td>
<td>Impact on US-Cuba relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>8 million</td>
<td>North America, the Gulf, East Asia and Europe</td>
<td>Pushidala payments transfer system</td>
<td>Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, cultural prominence of OFWs</td>
<td>Remittances, importance in Filipino politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>25 million +</td>
<td>The Gulf, North America, UK, South Africa, Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, East Africa and Fiji</td>
<td>Strong cultural coherence, diaspora tourism, consumption of Bollywood films and other Indian media</td>
<td>High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, PIO cards</td>
<td>Remittances, investment, growing Indian-American lobby helped secure congressional approval for 2006 US-India nuclear deal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>Up to 70 million</td>
<td>US, UK, Canada, Australia, South America</td>
<td>Cultural coherence (e.g. participation in St Patrick’s Day celebrations)</td>
<td>Ministerial attendance at international St Patrick’s Day celebrations, political rhetoric</td>
<td>Irish-Americans’ impact on Northern Ireland peace process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli</td>
<td>$50,000-750,000</td>
<td>North America, Europe, Australia and South Africa</td>
<td>Strong Israeli identity</td>
<td>Shift in political rhetoric and media coverage, incentives to return</td>
<td>Trade and investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora</td>
<td>Indicative size</td>
<td>Primary locations</td>
<td>Examples of diaspora consciousness</td>
<td>Examples of homeland's engagement with diaspora</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>Up to 60 million</td>
<td>US, Western Europe, South America, Canada, Australia</td>
<td>Rising sense of Italianità (Italianness) since the 1980s</td>
<td>Tremaglia law, generous citizenship rights, Directorate General for Italians Abroad and Migration Policies</td>
<td>Dissemination of Italian culture, recent influence of diaspora MPs on Italian politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>8 million</td>
<td>US, Western Europe, Canada, Russia, South America, Australia</td>
<td>Strong Jewish identity, influential communal organisations, Theological, cultural and political focus on Israel</td>
<td>Strong political engagement with diaspora, 'Israel experience' programs</td>
<td>International support for Israel, influence on Israeli politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>30 million</td>
<td>US (especially California, Texas, Arizona, Colorado and Illinois)</td>
<td>Hometown associations, cultural, religious and linguistic coherence</td>
<td>Political rhetoric, external voting, matricula consular</td>
<td>Remittances, effect on US-Mexico relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>2.5-3.5 million</td>
<td>Western Europe (especially France, Spain, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium and Germany), North America, Israel</td>
<td>International rallies against Polisario</td>
<td>Shift in policy and rhetoric towards courting the diaspora, e.g. Opération Transit</td>
<td>Remittances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>500,000-1 million</td>
<td>UK and Ireland, Australia, US</td>
<td>Energetic diaspora organisations, e.g. KEA</td>
<td>Government's 'talent initiative', political rhetoric</td>
<td>Projection of contemporary image internationally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>25 million +</td>
<td>Countries on Russia's periphery, US, UK and Western Europe, Israel</td>
<td>Significant anti-Kremlin activism within the diaspora</td>
<td>Political rhetoric, incentives to return</td>
<td>Remittances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>5 million</td>
<td>Western Europe (especially Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria, Belgium and UK), US, Australia</td>
<td>Cultural coherence, popularity of Turkish language satellite TV, strong diaspora organisations, e.g. DITIB, Milli Görüs</td>
<td>Diyanet’s provision of religious services to diaspora</td>
<td>Remittances, effect on European views of Turkey, supply of political candidates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Various case studies and examples throughout this paper.
## Appendix 2: List of interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professor Sencer Ayata</td>
<td>Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 7 June 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Sanjaya Baru</td>
<td>Media Adviser to the Prime Minister, New Delhi, 3 November 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Simone Battiston and Dr Bruno Mascitelli</td>
<td>Swinburne University of Technology, Sydney, 20 September 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Tal Becker</td>
<td>Policy Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, 3 June 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vivek Bharati</td>
<td>Advisor (National Policy, Programme &amp; Projects), Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi, 2 November 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anita Butler</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, by telephone, 20 March 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cons. Amb. Antonella Cavallari</td>
<td>Chief of Staff to Senator Franco Danieli, Italian Deputy Foreign Minister, Rome, 23 October 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marty Davis</td>
<td>Head, Zionist Activities Department, World Zionist Organization, Jerusalem, 3 June 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Professor Hayriye Erbas</td>
<td>Ankara University, Ankara, 7 June 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eran Etzion</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Israel National Security Council, Jerusalem, 4 June 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haim Ghiuzeli</td>
<td>Director, Databases, <em>Beth Hatefusoth</em>, Tel Aviv, 4 June 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urmi A. Goswami</td>
<td>Special Correspondent, <em>The Economic Times</em>, New Delhi, 2 November 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colin Hill</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, by telephone, 16 March 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Ahmet İçduyuğu</td>
<td>Koç University, Istanbul, 8 June 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr S. Jaishankar</td>
<td>Joint Secretary (Americas), Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 3 November 2006.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Professor David S. Katz  Tel Aviv University, Istanbul, 6 June 2007.
Professor Kemal Kirişi  Boğaziçi University, Sydney, 11 October 2007.
David Kreizelman  Foreign Policy Associate, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Jerusalem, 3 June 2007.
Marc Kurs  Director, Visitors Center, Beth Hatefutsoth, Tel Aviv, 4 June 2007.
Malay Mishra  Joint Secretary (Diaspora Services), Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, New Delhi, 4 June 2007.
Professor C. Raja Mohan  Strategic Affairs Editor, The Indian Express, New Delhi, 2 November 2006.
Professor Sari Nusseibeh  Rector, Al-Quds University, Jerusalem, 31 May 2007.
Hon. Mitchell B. Reiss  Former Special Envoy of the President and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Department of State, by email, 19 February 2007.
Rachael Risby-Raz  Diaspora Affairs Adviser, Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem, 3 June 2007.
Beppe Severgnini  Columnist, Corriere della Sera, by telephone, 22 September 2006.

Shmuel Ben Shmuel  Head of World Jewish and Inter-Religious Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, 30 May 2007.
Mehmet Sertaç Sönmezay  Deputy Director General for Expatriate Turks, Migration, Asylum and Property Issues, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ankara, 7 June 2007.
Moshe Vigdor  Director General, Jewish Agency for Israel, Jerusalem, 3 June 2007.
Associate Professor Hakan Yilmaz  Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, 6 June 2007.

A number of other interviews are not listed for reasons of confidentiality.
Notes


3 Many argue that the Jewish diaspora is unique, whether because the relationship between Israel and the Jews is biblically mandated or because of the centrality of Israel in the Jewish consciousness. However, it is now relatively rare for objections to be raised by Jewish communities about the application of the term to other national groups: see, for example, David Zax, Whose diaspora is it anyway? Moment, October/November, 2007: www.momentmag.com/Exclusive/2007/2007-10/200710-JewishWord.html. On the other hand, some scholars are unconvinced by the ‘stretching’ of the concept in this and other ways: see William Safran, Comparing diasporas: A review essay, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 8 (3) 1999, pp 255-291 and Rogers Brubaker, The ‘diaspora’ diaspora, Ethnic and Racial Studies 28 (1) 2005, pp 1-19.


5 This is adapted from a useful definition provided by Steven Vertovec, except that the community is defined as cultural rather than ethnic, and the reference to a global dispersion is set aside as unnecessary: see Steven


There are, of course, degrees of connectedness. Sheffer suggests diaspora members be categorised as ‘core members’, ‘marginal members’, ‘members by choice’ or ‘dormant members’: Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora politics: At home abroad. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p 100.


A note on terminology: throughout this paper I use what seems to be the most common term to describe each individual diasporic community, even though this leads to inconsistent constructions. Thus Salvadorans in the US are ‘Salvadoran-Americans’, but Turks in Germany are ‘German-Turks’.


On news, the Institute for Public Policy Research notes the consumption of British news by British expats in Mediterranean countries: Dhananjayan Srisakandarajah and Catherine Drew, Brits abroad: Mapping the scale and nature of British emigration. London, Institute for Public Policy Research, 2006, p 48. On Mexico’s football matches in LA, see Huntington, Who are we?, p 5. In a June 2007 friendly match staged in Dortmund, Turkey kept Brazil to a nil-all draw with the assistance of a sizeable and vocal pro-Turkey crowd.


Equal Opportunity, 2000, pp 11-23. See also Chapter 3.3 below. Levitt notes that the results achieved by hometown associations have been variable: Peggy Levitt, Transnational migration: taking stock and future directions. Global Networks 1 (3) 2001, pp 195-216, pp 208-209.


One example of this phenomenon is Dr Bruce Jackson’s Roots Project at the University of Massachusetts Lowell. The Project is creating a database of DNA from African-American families and from the six West African nations from which most African-Americans are believed to originate: www.uml.edu/roots/roots_project.htm. See also Paul Harris, The genes that build America. The Observer Magazine, 15 July 2007, p 22. On the genealogy craze in general, see Steven Pinker, Strangled by roots. The New Republic, 6 August 2007, pp 32-35.


Helen Southcott, With a British eye: Great expectations of a world language. Sunday’s Zaman, 10 June 2007, p 2.

These figures are set out in Chapter 3.2 below.


High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora. Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, Ministry of External Affairs 2001: www.indiandiaspora.nic.in/contents.htm; Interview with Dr Sanjaya Baru, Media
Adviser to the Prime Minister, New Delhi, 3 November 2006; Fullilove and Flutter, *Diaspora*, p 47. On the PIO card scheme, see: www.indianembassy.org/policy/PIO/IntroductionPIO.html. On the two awards, see Shashi Tharoor gets Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award. *Hindustan Times*, 9 May 2007 and Achievers of the year. *The Times of India*, 25 December 2006. In September 2007, India held a ‘mini-Pravasi’ in New York called ‘Incredible India@60’; see India@60 vies for all the attention in US. *Indian Express*, 23 September 2007.

On the Cuban-American diaspora, see Chapter 2.1 below. On the Iranians of Los Angeles, see, for example, Kay Biouki and Colin Freeman, Iranians at odds over talks with ‘the Great Satan’. *The Sunday Telegraph*, 4 June 2007, p 27.


I use ‘globalisation’ in a broad sense. The lawyer and historian Philip C. Bobbitt defined the term in a personal communication with the author as: ‘a growing interconnectedness reflected in the expanded flow of information, technology, capital, services and people throughout the world?’ Martin Wolf’s definition is also helpful, though a little narrower: ‘the process of integration, across frontiers, of liberalizing market economies at a time of rapidly falling costs of transport and communications’: *Why globalization works*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 2004, p 10, also p 14.

For a refutation of the assertion that we live in an age of unprecedented migration, see, for example, Hein de Haas, *International migration, remittances and development: Myths and fact*. Global Migration Perspectives No. 30. Geneva, Global Commission on International Migration, 2005, pp 2-4.


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See: www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=2204670458 [requires account to access].

A world wide web of terror. The Economist, 14 July 2007, p 25. See also Chapters 4.3 and 6.2 below.


DeParle, Western Union empire.

Asu Aksoy and Kevin Robins, Banal transnationalism: The difference that television makes. Transnational Communities Program Working Paper WPTC-02-08, University of Oxford: www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/WPTC-02-08%20Robins.pdf, pp 6-7, 9.

Interview with Associate Professor Hakan Yilmaz, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, 6 June 2007.


Huntington, Who are we?, pp 13-14, 144. See also Robin Cohen, Diasporas and the nation-state: From victims to challengers. International Affairs 72 (3) 1996, pp 507-520, p 512.


Joyce Wadler, The journey home: Making a new life in the old country.


Interview with Associate Professor Hakan Yilmaz, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, 6 June 2007.


Vertovec, Diasporas good? Diasporas bad?

Tanja Sejersen, ‘I vow to thee my countries’: The expansion of dual citizenship in the 21st century. Forthcoming in International Migration Review, Table 1. The number of states allowing dual citizenship under special circumstances (for example, under the terms of a bilateral treaty or for children or adolescents) is even larger. More generally, see D. Khusmeyer, Introduction, in Citizenship today, edited by D. Khusmeyer and A. Aleinikoff. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2001. On the US, see, for example, Peter J. Sprio, Dual nationality and the meaning of citizenship. Emory Law Journal 46 (4) 1997, pp 1411-1486, pp 1413-1415; Huntington, Who are we?, pp 210-220.

Charles S. Maier, Consigning the twentieth century to history: Alternative narratives for the modern era. American Historical Review 105 (3) 2000, pp 807-831, see especially pp 815, 819-820, 823, 829.

On the Australian citizenship test for immigrants, see Chapter 4.3 below. Regarding emigrants, in July 2007 the Australian Government legislated to make it easier for people with an Australian parent to claim Australian citizenship by descent, and for people to regain their Australian citizenship having lost it: see Australian Citizenship Act 2007. Canberra, Attorney-General’s Department, 2007; Anne Davies, Welcome back… you’re an Aussie again. The Age, 30 June 2007, p 10.

Eva Østergaard-Nielsen refers to the ‘democratic deficit of diaspora politics’, asking: ‘How representative are the diaspora transnational networks of the wider groups of migrants and refugees that they claim to represent?’ Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, Diasporas and conflict resolution – Part of the problem or part of the solution? Copenhagen, Danish Institute for
NOTES

66 See Chapter 4.3 below, including the academic debate on transnationalism and integration.


69 My co-author Chloë Flutter and I used the term ‘world wide web’ to refer to the Australian diaspora in the Lowy Institute Paper *Diaspora: the world wide web of Australians*. However the first person to use the term in this way seems to have been the historian James Belich, in relation to the New Zealand diaspora: James Belich, *Paradise reforged: A history of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the year 2000*. Auckland, NZ, Allen Lane, 2001, p 548; James Belich, *Presenting a past*. Paper presented to the Catching the Knowledge Wave conference, Auckland, 1-3 August 2001.

70 For example, Australia’s foreign ministry reports that it is able to obtain good estimates of the number of Australians residing in countries such as Japan and the US using census and immigration data; however for countries such as the UK and most EU countries there is less reliable immigration information available: see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Submission No. 646 to the Inquiry by the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee into Australian Expatriates*, 2004: www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/legcon_ctte/expats03/submissions/sub646.doc.

71 On both data problems and data politics, see Sheffer, *Diaspora politics*, pp 99-103.

72 Interview with Associate Professor Hakan Yilmaz, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, 6 June 2007.

73 Brubaker notes perceptively the contradiction between defining diasporas on the basis of connectedness and then providing estimates of their membership: The ‘diaspora’ diaspora, pp 10-11.

Sheffer suggests that more than 300 million people could be regarded as ethno-national diasporas: *Diaspora politics*, pp 104-105; if anything, this seems like a conservative number.


Some of this terminology is sensitive: see, for example, Adam McKeown, Chinese diaspora in *Encyclopedia of diasporas*, edited by Ember et al, pp 65-76, p 74.

Given that Chinese divide along lines of home county, dialect, village, family links, occupation, generation and the like, some analysts prefer to think of the population as ‘a conglomeramation of mini-diasporas’, though the singular term will be used here for consistency. An explanation of this point as well as a good short history of Chinese emigration is provided in McKeown, Chinese diaspora, especially pp 66 and 74.


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India’s global ambitions, p 1. The regional breakdown is provided in Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, pp xii-xxiv. The Committee’s national breakdown is provided at: http://indianidiaspora.nic.in/diasporapdf/part1-est.pdf.

Interview with Malay Mishra, Joint Secretary (Diaspora Services), Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, New Delhi, 2 November 2006.

In his elegant account of the Indian Ocean in the age of empire, for instance, Sugata Bose notes that in the late nineteenth century, Indians were important players in ‘the rice frontiers of Burma, Thailand and Vietnam… the rubber plantations of Malaya; the sugar industries of Natal and Mauritius… the slave trade and cloves economy of Zanzibar; the ivory trade and the coconut and cashews economy in Mozambique; the pearl economy of the Gulf and the Red Sea; the coffee economy of Yemen; and the bazaars of southern Iran.’: Bose, A hundred horizons, p 27.

This summary is taken from Malik and Venkataraman, The Indian diaspora catalyzes India’s global ambitions, pp 2-4.


See Cohen, Global diasporas, pp 190-191; Rogers Brubaker, Accidental diasporas and external ‘homelands’ in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and present. Cited in Kosmarskaya, Post-Soviet Russian diaspora, p 267. Cohen argues that stranded minorities should not be regarded as diasporas, however the Russians living in the Soviet Union’s successor states satisfy the definition set out in Chapter 1.1 of this paper.

See, for example, Timothy Heleniak, Russia beckons, but diaspora wary. Migration Information Source, October 2002: www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?dtime = 1&ID = 56; Adisa Banjanovic, Russia’s new immigration policy will boost the population. Euromonitor, 14 June 2007: www.euromonitor.com/Russias_new_immigration_policy_will_boost_the_population. On Russia’s demographic crisis, see National Intelligence Council, Mapping the global future, pp 10, 74.


Robert V. Kemper, Mexicans in the United States, in Encyclopedia of diasporas, edited by Ember et al, pp 1027-1037, p 1027; Leiken, The melting border, p 7. The Mexican diaspora is also unusual in another respect: it is able to assert a historical claim to American territory, given that almost all of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada and Utah was part of Mexico until the Texan War of Independence in 1835-1836 and the Mexican-American War of 1846-1847: see Huntington, Who are we?, pp 229-230, and Kemper, Mexicans in the United States, p 1027.


Commission on Filipinos Overseas, Stock estimate of overseas Filipinos. 2006: www.cfo.gov.ph/Stock%202006.pdf. This number includes both permanent migrants and OFWs or contract workers. See also Robert
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95 Sriskandarajah and Drew, Brits abroad, pp viii, 8-9, 17. By contrast, Eric Richards estimates there are 140 million British descendants living overseas: British diaspora, in Encyclopedia of diasporas, edited by Ember et al, pp 47-56, p 47.
100 Cohen, Global diasporas, pp xi-xii and passim.
103 See, for example, Docquier and Marfouk, Measuring the international mobility of skilled workers, p 3.
106 Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) estimates that around 1 million Australians reside overseas on a permanent or long-term basis: Personal communication from Paul Wilson, Consular Policy Branch, DFAT, 21 November 2007. In 2001, DFAT separately estimated the number of Australians temporarily offshore (who cannot therefore be classed as diaspora members) at approximately 265,000: see: www.southern-cross-group.org/archives/Statistics/Numbers_of_Australians_Overseas_in_2001_Feb_2002.pdf. For a sceptical view of the 1 million person estimate, see Bob Birrell, Virginia Rapson and T. Fred Smith, Australia’s net gains from international skilled movement: Skilled movements in 2004-05 and earlier years. Melbourne, Centre for Population and Urban Research, Monash University, May 2006, p 24. On the demographic features of the Australian diaspora, including survey evidence that
Australians abroad still call Australia home, see Fullilove and Flutter, *Diaspora*, Chapter 2.


108 For an excellent synopsis of this topic, see Ghosh, *Economic effects of international migration*.


120 Docquier and Marfouk, *Measuring the international mobility of skilled workers*, pp 1, 29, 32.


122 See, for example, National Intelligence Council, *Mapping the global future*, p 58, and Chapter 2.1 above.

123 DeParle, A good provider is one who leaves, p 56.

124 For the IOM quote, see: www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/539.


127 See also Roberts, Open up, pp S10-12.

International Fund for Agricultural Development, Sending money home: Worldwide remittance flows to developing countries. Rome, International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2007, pp 2-3. Although the headline figure out of this study is consistent with the World Bank’s estimate for total remittances, the two studies’ estimates for remittances by country varied widely: see Jason DeParle, Migrant money flow: A $300 billion current. The New York Times, 18 November 2007, p 3.

These figures are from the World Bank’s Dilip Ratha: Leveraging remittances for development [Policy Brief], pp 1-3 and a personal communication from Dilip Ratha and Zhimei Xu to the author, 28 July 2007. Ratha’s estimates for 2006 are: recorded remittances to developing countries US$206 billion; FDI to developing countries US$325 billion; ODA to developing countries US$100 billion. UNCTAD’s 2006 estimate of FDI flows to developing countries was US$368 billion: FDI flows in 2006: The global and regional pictures: www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=4160&lang=1. The OECD’s 2006 estimate for gross ODA was US$116 billion: Development aid from OECD countries fell 5.1% in 2006: www.oecd.org/document/17/0,2340,en_2649_201185_38341265_1_1_1_1,00.html.


Personal communication from Dilip Ratha and Zhimei Xu to the author, 28 July 2007.

2001 data from World Bank, Global economic prospects 2006, p 89.


Ratha, Leveraging remittances for development [Policy Brief], p 2; Personal communication from Dilip Ratha and Zhimei Xu to the author, 28 July 2007.

Ratha, Leveraging remittances for development [Policy Brief], p 2; Ratha, Leveraging remittances for development [Plenary Meeting], p 3.

DeParle, A good provider is one who leaves, p 52. The Philippines’ GDP in 2006 was US$116.9 billion: World Bank, Philippines data profile from the World Development Indicators Database: www.devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=PHL.


World Bank president Bob Zoellick has urged Australia to follow New Zealand’s lead in exploring guestworker programs for workers from the island states of the Pacific: see Peter Hartcher, Open your gates to migrants: Bank chief. The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 August 2007, p 1; Matthew Franklin and Siobhain Ryan, Foot in door for Pacific Island migrant workers. The Australian, 30 August 2007, p 5.


Ratha, Leveraging remittances into development [Policy Brief], pp 8-9, 12-13; Richard Lapper, Cross-border banking extends new credit lines to the poor. Financial Times, 29 August 2007, p 9; World Bank, Global economic prospects 2007, p 150.
145 Savage and Harvey, Remittances during crises, p 13.
146 World Bank, Global economic prospects 2006, p 70.
147 Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters, The brain drain: Curse or boon?, p 1.
148 Ghosh, Economic effects of international migration, p 173.
149 A recent work on diaspora networks is Yevgeny Kuznetsov (ed.), Diaspora networks and the international migration of skills: How countries can draw on their talent abroad. Washington, DC, World Bank, 2006.
156 See, for example, Saritha Rai, Indians find they can, indeed, go home again. The New York Times, 26 December 2005, p 1; Britain keen to prevent reverse brain drain to India: McNulty, Press Trust of India, 29 January 2006.
158 Ghosh, Economic effects of international migration, p 177.
159 On the mixed record of return migration programs, see World Bank, Global economic prospects 2006, pp 70-71.
160 Individuals and groups are also trying to generate diaspora network benefits. For example, some scientific networks are encouraging scientists from the developing world who work in developed countries to share knowledge with their colleagues in their countries of origin: Béatrice Séguin, Peter A. Singer, Abdallah S. Daar. Scientific diasporas. Science 312 2006, pp 1602-1603.
164 I am obliged to Sir Jeremy Greenstock for the idea of ‘switching on’ different identities. Gabriel Sheffer’s different categories of diaspora affiliation, mentioned above, are relevant here: Diaspora politics, p 100.
165 Maalouf, On identity, p 5.
166 These two examples, and the quote from the then president of Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo, are from Huntington, Who are we?, p 279.
170 Fullilove and Flutter, Diaspora, p x. See also Hugo et al, Australia’s diaspora.
NOTES

171 Fullilove and Flutter, Diaspora, pp 38-39.


174 Vertovec, Diasporas good? Diasporas bad?


177 Vertovec, Diasporas good? Diasporas bad?

178 For example, many scholars argue that transnational involvement does not necessarily impede immigration: see, for example, Erik Snel, Godfried Engbersen and Arjen Leerkes, Transnational involvement and social integration. Global Networks 6 (3) 2006, pp 285-308, and Alejandro Portes, William J. Haller and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo, Transnational entrepreneurs: An alternative form of immigrant economic adaption. American Sociological Review 67 2002, pp 278-298. However, other research indicates that the two phenomena may not mix: see, for example, Dan Hiebert and David Ley, Does transnationalism trump social integration? Presentation to 12th International Metropolis Conference, Melbourne, Australia, October 2007. I am grateful to Alan Gamlen for his insights on this debate.

179 See: Mr Straw has raised a valid issue, but reached the wrong conclusion. The Independent, 7 October 2006, p 42. A survey of European developments is provided in: Muslim Europe. The Guardian, 21 October 2006, p 13.

180 In Australia, for instance, both the right and the left have moved away from the word ‘multiculturalism’: see Cath Hart, Multiculturalism is a dirty word. The Australian, 4 November 2006.

181 For example, the former Australian government introduced a citizenship test with the support of the then Labor opposition: see, for example, Citizen tests approved. Melbourne Herald-Sun, 11 September 2007, p 14 and Daniella Miletic, Test over and no bloody worries for new Aussies. The Age, 2 October 2007, p 2. Indeed, Labor briefly proposed requiring all visitors to Australia (including short-term ones) to sign an ‘Australian values’ pledge as a condition of entry: Phillip Coorey, Beazley’s pledge of allegiance. The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 September 2006, p 10. On Gordon Brown’s suggestion, see Peter Wilson, Brown toughens stand on citizens. The Australian, 1 March 2007, p 10.


183 Philip Stephens, A way to win young Muslim minds. Financial Times, 15 November 2005, p 19; see also: Sophie Pedder, The art of the impossible: A


199 *Contra* a June 2007 poll which indicated that 54% of Jewish Israelis reject the right of diaspora Jews to criticize Israeli policies: Haviv Rettig, Most say Diaspora has no right to publicly criticize Israel. *The Jerusalem Post*, 14 June 2007, p 7.

200 Interview with Shmuel Ben Shmuel, Head of World Jewish and Inter-Religious Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, 30 May 2007.
201 See: www.nbn.org.il.

202 Interview with Moshe Vigdor, Director General, Jewish Agency for Israel, Jerusalem, 3 June 2007; Interview with Marty Davis, Head, Zionist Activities Department, World Zionist Organization, Jerusalem, 3 June 2007; www.birthrightisrael.com/bin/en.jsp?enPage=HomePage; Second thoughts about the Promised Land – Israel and the Jews. The Economist, 13 January 2007, pp 53-55; www.masa.israel.org/Masa/English/About + MASA. There are other similar programs, the common denominator being free air travel for Jews of a certain age for their first Israel visits.

203 88% of Jewish Israelis support the spending of tax money on these programs: Rettig, Most say Diaspora has no right to publicly criticize Israel, p 7. On the effect of the programs, see, for example, Steven M. Cohen and Laurence Kotler-Berkowitz, The impact of childhood Jewish education upon adults’ Jewish identity: Schooling, Israel travel, camping and youth groups. United Jewish Communities Report Series on the National Jewish Population Survey, Report 3, New York, United Jewish Communities, July 2004, pp 10-11, 17-18, and Cohen and Kelman, Beyond distancing, pp 16-18.

204 Israel’s Ministry of Immigrant Absorption was quoted most recently estimating the size at 650,000: see Shlomo Shamir, Absorption Min: Without draft, more Israelis abroad would return. Ha’aretz, 25 Oct 2006; an earlier ministry estimate was 600,000: see Yaakov Katz, IDF: Yordim will return in time of war. The Jerusalem Post, 28 February 2006. One scholar makes a 'cautious estimate' of 500,000 to 600,000: Rina Cohen, Israeli diaspora, in Encyclopedia of diasporas, edited by Ember et al, pp 136-143, 137, 142. On the other hand, an Israeli official told me the figure might be as high as one million. A useful general work is Steven J. Gold, The Israeli diaspora. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2002.


208 Ibid, p 88.


211 Cohen, Israeli diaspora, p 139; Lahav and Arian, Israelis in a Jewish diaspora, p 90.

212 Safran, The end of ‘normality’, p 396.

213 Interview with Moshe Vigdor, Director General, Jewish Agency for Israel, Jerusalem, 3 June 2007; Interview with Shmuel Ben Shmuel, Head of World Jewish and Inter-Religious Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, 30 May 2007.

214 Lahav and Arian, Israelis in a Jewish diaspora, pp 90-91. For example, see the comments of Ze’ev Boim in Stacey Palevsky, Israel encourages citizens to return to homeland. J, 14 November 2006.

215 See, for example: www.moia.gov.il/Moia_en/ReturningCitizens/Assistance.htm.


219 Cohen, Israeli diaspora, p 142; Sue Fishkoff, Don’t call us ‘yordim’! The Jerusalem Post, 4 March 1994.

220 See, for example, Rina Cohen, From ethnonational enclaves to diasporic community: The mainstreaming of Israeli Jewish migrants in Toronto. Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 8 (2) 1999, pp 121-137.

222 Ratha and Xu, Migration and remittances: Top 10, p 3. This ranking excludes movements within the former Soviet Union.

223 International Crisis Group, Islam and identity in Germany, pp 1, 4, 19.

224 Interview with Associate Professor Hakan Yılmaz, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, 6 June 2007.

225 Interview with Associate Professor Hayriye Erbas, Ankara University, Ankara, 7 June 2007.

226 DeParle, A good provider is one who leaves, p 53.

227 Werner Schiffauer, Turks in Germany, in Encyclopedia of diasporas, edited by Ember et al, pp 1130-1140, p 1131; Interview with Professor Ahmet Içduygu, Koç University, Istanbul, 8 June 2007.


229 Fukuyama, Identity, immigration, and liberal democracy, p 14.

230 International Crisis Group describes Germany’s integration of its Turks as ‘a relative success story’ compared to other European examples: Islam and identity in Germany, pp 19-21. However serious challenges remain: see, for example, The integration dilemma. The Economist, 21 July 2007, p 29. International Crisis Group notes that the prospects for mass Turkish integration remain grim, and the opening up of citizenship has been accompanied by increasingly stringent conditions for full participation.

231 Interview with Associate Professor Hakan Yılmaz, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, 6 June 2007.

232 Kaya, Recoding Europeanness, pp 87-117, p 93.


234 Østergaard-Nielsen, Transnational politics, pp 107, 111, 122; Interview with Mehmet Sertaç Sönmezay, Deputy Director General for Expatriate Turks, Migration, Asylum and Property Issues, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ankara, 7 June 2007. Østergaard-Nielsen and other authors note that the Turkish security services also use the diaspora to counter anti-Turkish activities, through counter-demonstrations over the Kurdish situation and the Armenian genocide.


236 Katherine Pratt Ewing, Living Islam in the diaspora: Between Turkey and Germany. South Atlantic Quarterly 102 (2-3) 2003, pp 423-425; Interview with Professor Ahmet Içduygu, Koç University, Istanbul, 8 June 2007.


238 Interview with Sadi Arslan, President, DİTİB, Cologne, 11 June 2007.

239 International Crisis Group, Islam and identity in Germany, p 2; Interview with Professor Ali Bardakoğlu, President, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Ankara, 7 June 2007.

240 International Crisis Group, Islam and identity in Germany, pp 7-8; Interview with Bekir Alboğa, Dialogue Commissioner, DİTİB, Cologne, 11 June 2007; Interview with Professor Sencer Ayata, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 7 June 2007.

241 International Crisis Group, Islam and identity in Germany, pp 9-11; Schiffauer, Turks in Germany, pp 1136-1137; Kemal Kirişçi, ‘Three way
approach’ to meeting the challenges of migrant incorporation in the European Union: Reflections from a Turkish perspective. Paper prepared for CARIM, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 21 December 2007, pp 17-18. There are, of course, many other non-religious Turkish diaspora organisations.


DeConde, Ethnicity, race, and American foreign policy, pp 188-200, especially p 200.


Shain and Barth, Diasporas and international relations theory, pp 449-479, p 454.

Huntington, Who are we?, p 286.


Huntington, Who are we?, pp 289-290.

Shain, Diasporas and US foreign policy, p 829.


The diplomatic historian Melvyn P. Leffler has argued that values are often asserted by American policymakers at times of heightened threat perception, which can help to mobilise public support for the Administration’s policies but also tempt it to overreach beyond a careful calculation of interests: 9/11 and American foreign policy. Diplomatic

Diasporas: A world of exiles, p 41. Whether this development is truly new is a moot point: see, for example, Foner, *From Ellis Island to JFK*, p 175. Yossi Shain addresses the impact of diasporas on homeland foreign policies in *Kinship and diasporas in international affairs*. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2007, pp 127-153.

Diasporas: A world of exiles, p 41.


Rania Abouzeid, Megan Saunders and Ean Higgins, Obeid’s man gets home in election. *The Australian*, 1 June 2004, p 3


Diasporas: A world of exiles, p 43. Huntington provides other examples of the phenomenon: *Who are we?*, p 284.


Interview with Dr S. Jaishankar, Joint Secretary (Americas), Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 3 November 2006.

*Global unease with major world powers: 47-nation Pew Global Attitudes survey*. Pew Research Center 27 June 2007: www.pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256. In fact, the high-water mark of Indian pro-American feelings (set out on p 13 of the same report) was 2005: 71% of Indians expressed favourable views of the US, which was the highest percentage of all countries surveyed.


Interview with Dr Sanjaya Baru, Media Adviser to the Prime Minister, New Delhi, 3 November 2006.


Interview with Cons. Amb. Antonella Cavallari, Chief of Staff to Senator Franco Danieli, Italian Deputy Foreign Minister, Rome, 23 October 2006.

Bryan Appleyard, The great Australian invasion. *The Times Online*, 14
March 2004. It must be admitted that in 2004, The Times was both owned and edited by Australians!

I certainly found this in my interviews in Istanbul and Ankara. Østergaard-Nielsen reports a similar impression: Transnational politics, pp 113-114.

The managing director of Gallup Europe, Robert Manchin, has made a slightly different point: countries on the geographical fringes of Europe (such as Ireland, Britain, Portugal and Spain) generally favour Turkish EU membership, whereas opinion has turned most negative in the heartlands of the EU, in regions that already have large Muslim populations and which would be likely destinations for future Turkish immigration: see Graham Bowley, Turkey offers a test of EU multiculturalism: Wary public may hurt Ankara’s dream. International Herald Tribune, 15 December 2004, p 1.


The report from the London forum, which was held in December 2006, is available at: www.africanrecruit.com/kenyaevent/downloads/KDIFReport.pdf. The Atlanta conference was held in March 2007: see Mwende Mwinzi, Making use of the diaspora to catalyse development. Daily Nation, 1 April 2007.

See, for example, Huntington, Who are we?, pp 281-282.

Interview with Cons. Amb. Antonella Cavallari, Chief of Staff to Senator Franco Danieli, Italian Deputy Foreign Minister, Rome, 23 October 2006.


De Haas, Between courting and controlling., pp 27-28, p 46.


The report from the London forum, which was held in December 2006, is available at: www.africanrecruit.com/kenyaevent/downloads/KDIFReport.pdf. The Atlanta conference was held in March 2007: see Mwende Mwinzi, Making use of the diaspora to catalyse development. Daily Nation, 1 April 2007.

See, for example, Huntington, Who are we?, pp 281-282.

Interview with Cons. Amb. Antonella Cavallari, Chief of Staff to Senator Franco Danieli, Italian Deputy Foreign Minister, Rome, 23 October 2006.


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See, for example, Huntington, Who are we?, pp 281-282.
On the frustration that can stem from diasporas’ involvement with their homelands, see, for example, Yevgeny Kuznetsov, Leveraging diasporas of talent: Toward a new policy agenda, in Diaspora networks and the international migration of skills: How countries can draw on their talent abroad, edited by Yevgeny Kuznetsov. Washington, DC, World Bank, 2006, p 221.

Østergaard-Nielsen, Transnational politics, p 122.

Interview with Malay Mishra, Joint Secretary (Diaspora Services), Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, New Delhi, 2 November 2006; Personal communication from Shri. S.P. Tripathi, Deputy Secretary (Management Services), Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 31 October 2007.


Leibler, A think-tank, first and foremost; Isi Leibler, Now make it a full-time job, with real resources. The Jerusalem Post, 7 March 2007, p 15; Gil Hoffman, Herzog also set to take on diaspora affairs portfolio. The Jerusalem Post, 23 February 2007, p 3; Haviv Rettig, Herzog is ‘right man’ for tough job: diaspora affairs. The Jerusalem Post, 26 February 2007, p 6.


Gamlen hypothesises that states ‘economize’, extending no more political rights to their diasporas than they have to in order to appease them or cause them to perform the desired transnational activities: Diaspora engagement policies, pp 10-11. However, it is hard to square this notion of capitals jealously hoarding their prerogatives with, say, the trend towards allowing external voting in very diverse national contexts, let alone a move in some cases towards dedicated expatriate representation. As an example, see the motivations behind the Italian electoral innovation, set out below in Chapter 5.7.

Interview with Mehmet Sertaç Sönmezay, Deputy Director General for Expatriate Turks, Migration, Asylum and Property Issues, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ankara, 7 June 2007.


International IDEA, Voting from abroad, pp 30-34, 217-225.

Marquand, Poles flood Britain, take new ideas back home; Dejevsky, Poles show the power of home thoughts from abroad; Amelia Hill, Polls fever arrives for thousands in Warsaw-on-Thames. The Observer, 21 October 2007, p 38; Polling Poles away from home. Irish Times, 20 October 2007, p 3; Peter Wilson, Britain’s young Poles could tip the balance of power in Warsaw. The Australian, 20 October 2007, p 16.

Edmund Tadros, Kevin’s above, he’s even big in Hong Kong. The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 November 2007, p 5.

An important attempt at describing the normative challenge posed by external voting is Rainer Bauböck, Toward a political theory of migrant transnationalism. International Migration Review 37 (3) 2003, pp 700-723, especially pp 711-715. Bauböck argues that the two principal objections to external political participation – that external citizens have insufficient involvement with the political process, and no future stake in the polity – are largely overcome by new technologies and the idea of transnational networks. However, he proposes that external voting rights should not continue beyond the first generation.

Fullilove and Flutter, Diaspora, pp 22, 65.

International IDEA, Voting from abroad, pp 73, 158-162.

International IDEA, Voting from abroad, pp 28-30; Diasporas: A world of exiles, p 41.


Donna R. Gabaccia, Italy’s many diasporas. Seattle, University of


329 Professor Stefano Silvestri, President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, 25 October 2006.

330 Interview with Dr Simone Battiston and Dr Bruno Mascitelli, Swinburne University of Technology, Sydney, 20 September 2007; Gabaccia, Italian diaspora, pp 144, 151.

331 Battiston and Mascitelli, Full voting rights for Italian citizens overseas; Interview with Beppe Severgnini, columnist, Corriere della Sera, by telephone, 22 September 2006.


335 Alastair Davidson, Enter the world citizen. The Sydney Morning Herald, 28 October 2006, p 29.

336 Persichilli, Italian envoy upset with Ottawa’s handling of foreign election issue; Interview with On. Gino Bucchino, Member, Camera dei Deputati, Rome, 23 October 2006.

337 Interview with Cons. Amb. Antonella Cavallari, Chief of Staff to Senator Franco Danieli, Italian Deputy Foreign Minister, Rome, 23 October 2006.

338 Desmond O’Grady, Italian vote-claim furore. The Age, 13 July 2007, p 5; Natasha Bita, Aussies in Italian beer-for-ballots vote scandal. The Australian, 12 July 2007, p 8; Desmond O’Grady and Orietta Guerrero, Video claims local Italian vote was corrupted. The Age, 12 July 2007, p 3. Davidson, Enter the world citizen.

339 Desmond O’Grady, Australian vote to affect Italy’s election. The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 April 2006, p 8; Interview with Beppe Severgnini, columnist, Corriere della Sera, by telephone, 22 September 2006.

340 Interview with On. Franco Narducci, Member, Camera dei Deputati, Rome, 23 October 2006.


343 Persichilli, Italian envoy upset with Ottawa’s handling of foreign election issue. On the provision of such consular assistance, see Chapter 6.4 below. Patrick Luciani, Why I didn’t vote. The Globe and Mail, 13 April 2006, p A23.

344 Gabaccia, Italian diaspora, pp 150-151.

345 On Italy’s citizenship requirements for immigrants, see Battiston and Mascitelli, Full voting rights for Italian citizens overseas.


348 National Intelligence Council, Mapping the global future, p 96.

349 Fiona B. Adamson, Crossing borders: International migration and national

Adamson, Displacement, diaspora mobilization, p 53.

James Cockayne, *Transnational organized crime: Multilateral responses to a rising threat*. Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy, April 2007, p 4; Personal communication from James Cockayne, 21 November 2007. Of course, there are many criminal organisations without an ethnic element. Furthermore, ethnically based criminal organisations operate pragmatically, sometimes forming alliances of convenience with rival organisations of other ethnicity (or none).

352 Adamson, Displacement, diaspora mobilization, p 53.

353 James Cockayne, *Transnational organized crime: Multilateral responses to a rising threat*. Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy, April 2007, p 4; Personal communication from James Cockayne, 21 November 2007. Of course, there are many criminal organisations without an ethnic element. Furthermore, ethnically based criminal organisations operate pragmatically, sometimes forming alliances of convenience with rival organisations of other ethnicity (or none).


On the use of diasporas by foreign states for the purposes of espionage, paramilitary activities, diplomacy and propaganda against the homeland, see Brian J. Auten, *Political diasporas and exiles as instruments of statecraft*. *Comparative Strategy* 25 2006, pp 329-341.


356 *Huntington, Who are we?*, p 288.


361 A related point is made in Lisa A. Kramer and Richards J. Heuer, Jr, America’s increased vulnerability to insider espionage. *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 20 (1) 2007, pp 50-64, pp 57-58.

362 Cited in Adamson, Crossing borders, p 195.


372 See, for example, Bruce Hoffman, *Radicalization, terrorism, and diasporas*, in *The radicalization of diasporas and terrorism*, edited by Hoffman et al, p 3.


374 Shain, *The role of diasporas in conflict perpetuation or resolution*, p 138.


378 Shain and Barth, *Diasporas and international relations theory*, pp 466-473; *Diasporas: A world of exiles*, p 43.


381 This House believes the Palestinians should give up their full right of return. *Doha Debates*, 28 March 2007: www.thedohadebates.com/output/page100.asp.


383 Shain, *The role of diasporas*, pp 120, 137.


386 Byman and Pollack, *Carriers of conflict*, p 38.


388 UNHCR briefing note: Iraq: Pressure on safe havens inside and outside


394 See, for example, Paul Staniland, Defeating transnational insurgencies: The best offense is a good fence. *The Washington Quarterly* 29 (1) 2005, 21-40, pp 34-35.


Byman, Passive sponsors of terrorism, pp 131-132.

Cochrane, Irish-America, pp 216, 217.


Interview with the Hon. Mitchell B. Reiss, former Special Envoy of the President and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, US Department of State, by email, 19 February 2007. See also Cochrane, Irish-America, p 225; Kevin Cullen, Kennedy’s tough IRA stance symbolic of his roots, clout. The Boston Globe, 13 November 2005, p A28.

Østergaard-Nielsen, Diasporas and conflict resolution, p 1.

See, for example, Maria Koinova, Diasporas and conflict during the post-conflict reconstruction of divided societies. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Chicago, IL, 28 February-3 March 2007. Shain reminds us that during the Oslo period, Jewish Americans acted as unofficial envoys to countries with no official relations with Israel: The role of diasporas, p 126.

In relation to the Sikh diaspora, for example, see Adamson, Displacement, diaspora mobilization, p 48 and the reference work cited there.

On emigrants ‘frozen culture’, see Chapter 5.4 above.


See, for example, James Mackenzie, Ex-hostages face criticism at home. The Seattle Times, 21 August 2003, p A10; Malcolm Brown, Glad we got you out – Now please help fund the rescue. The Sydney Morning Herald, 7 May 2007, p 3.

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White, Looking after Australians overseas, pp 2, 6. White notes at p 6 the
irony that before coming to power, Australian conservatives had been critical of the then Labor government for paying too little attention to the welfare of Australians abroad. ‘Having encouraged the public to expect help from the government if they are in trouble overseas, the Government now finds itself surprised and alarmed at the levels of support that Australians now believe they have a right to expect.’

DeParle, A good provider is one who leaves, pp 53-54.


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Hong Kong daily lauds Beijing’s rescue of overseas Chinese from East Timor. BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 31 May 2006; China has evacuated all citizens wishing to leave Lebanon – official. BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 26 July 2006.

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Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission No. 646 to the Senate Inquiry into Australian expatriates, p 7. Anecdotal evidence indicates that people are reluctant to appear on the register for privacy reasons.

Roger Boyes, Freed hostages face bill for their rescue. The Times, 1 August 2003, p 14; Craig Whitlock and Nora Boustany, German ex-diplomat kidnapped in Yemen. The Washington Post, 29 December 2005, p A14; German hostage family freed in Yemen. Agence France Presse, 1 January 2006; Schönen Urlaub! Financial Times Deutschland, 2 January 2006, p 27. Chrobog offered to reimburse Berlin for part of cost of securing his family’s release: German court rules hostages need not pay for liberation cost. Agence France Presse, 5 April 2006.

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On anti-immigrant feeling in those countries, see, for example, Roberts, Open up, pp S7-8.

Diasporas: A world of exiles, p 41. Since then, as discussed in Chapter 5.6 above, Croatia has changed its electoral system so that the number of seats assigned to diaspora representatives depends on the number of votes cast
abroad: see International IDEA. Voting from abroad, p 29.


A description of what such a policy might look like in the case of Australia is contained in Fullilove and Flutter, Diaspora, pp 43-72.


439 DeParle, A good provider is one who leaves, p 52.

440 The Global Commission on International Migration made a limited attempt at this sort of analysis in Migration in an interconnected world, especially pp 79-82. For a critique of its report, see Jagdish Bhagwati, A deeply flawed report on global migration. Financial Times, 6 October 2005, p 15.


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