Can the Universal Concept of Community Policing be applied in Different Jurisdictions? A Cross-comparative Analysis of Policing in Sydney, Bosnia and New York.

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Abstract: The concept of community policing is community partnership with the police to improve the quality of life, decreasing the fear of crime and cleaning up the neighbourhoods. In theory tackling the quality of life issues and improving informal social control should eventually lead to a decrease in crime. Community policing is seen as a strategy predominantly successfully applied in the industrialised democracies. It is perceived as an Anglo-American model of policing, presumed to be developed in the U.K. and the USA in the 1960s and 1970s. This policing strategy is presented by the academics and practitioners as the answer to crime and disorder problems and police-community conflict. This research investigates the effectiveness of the application of the concept of community policing across three separate geographic locations, which have different social setting. New York has been selected as the cradle of the paradigm of community policing, Sydney Australia as an adopter of the New York model and finally Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) which is classed as a post-conflict transitional society. The research explores whether community policing can be universally applied as a policing model. This research reviews a sizable body of academic literature that has investigated the implementation and the evolution of community policing in NY and Sydney. That knowledge then serves as a reference for comparison of measures in place in Sarajevo. The research exploration led to some curious findings.

The Community Alternative

Over the years numerous studies have been conducted to evaluate the implementation of Community Policing (CP), a philosophy of policing that is based on the concept of police officers and private citizens working together in creative ways to solve contemporary community problems related to crime, social order and neighbourhood decay. It focuses on the police engagement with the community through restructuring of police organisations, as well as through altering the daily activities of operational police officers (Sgrave & Ratcliffe 2004 as cited in Casey 2010: 61). Some studies have examined empirical data demonstrating the changes in the levels of crimes in areas where aspects of CP were applied. The most positive aspect of CP is seen as the focus of police work from handling random calls to solving community problems (Trojanowicz, 1990).

A large body of literature is in one way or another linked with the New York policing model. Kelling and Coles in their book ‘Fixing Broken Windows’ published in 1996 show how the ‘broken windows theory’ on policing evolved from a zero tolerance policing approach into a community policing model, and how the same was embraced and applied in New York, presenting it as the cradle of the community policing concept.

Dixon & Maher (2005) addressed the application of the New York model in Sydney. They outlined the success achieved in the case of the previously troubled Sydney suburb of Cabramatta. There also exists a body of literature about implementation of CP concept in developing, post-conflict and transitional societies such as that in Sarajevo the capital of Bosnia. Jackson and Lyon (2001) address the common obstacles related to successful implementation of the democratic policing, such as “[t]he revolutionary climate, terrorism, a militarized public, dissidents protesting for equal rights, organised crime, vigilantism, and political pressure are all environmental obstacles to routine policing efforts” (Kowalewski, 1991, Woods 1993 as cited in Jackson & Lyon 2001). Deljkic and Lucic-Catic (2010) discuss the problems associated with the transfer of community policing concept to Bosnia.

This research reviews the academic literature that has investigated the implementation and the evolution of community policing in NY and Sydney. That knowledge then serves as a reference for comparison of measures in place in Sarajevo. The research exploration led to some interesting findings.

In this research explores whether the community policing as a strategy worked in afore mentioned three geographic locations. The methods of data collection are therefore those of ‘evaluation research’(O’Leary 2004). More specifically it is a formative evaluation of the change initiative.
The idea behind this research project is to assess the positive aspects, the implementation and distinguished positive or negative outcomes in order to further modify or develop the strategies of community policing. These ‘transferable findings’ or ‘lessons learned’ will provide enough information to other organizations in future application of these strategies (O’Leary 2004:136).

The methods used are equivalent to those of ‘comparative study of policing’, which can range from case studies to statistical analysis (Hague and Harrop 2007, Mawby 2003 as cited in Casey 2009). This particular study will focus on a comparison of community policing evolution and implementation in the three locations.

The research content is from a number of sources, including international research journals, case studies, news articles, internet publications, policy documents and texts. Also included are contemporaneous notes from diary entries deriving from conversations and interviews with former and current professionals in the field who are ‘key informants’. The notes provide an overview of the evolution of policing in Bosnia pre and post the period of transition from communist to a democratic policing system, and post war policing reform efforts.

**Policing in New York**

United States is a very large country with a population of 300 million people of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds (Eterno and Das 2010). Over time Community Policing has become the leading concept within the policing agencies of United States (Eterno and Das 2010). It is believed that “community policing represents what is progressive and forward-looking” (Skolnick and Bayley 1988, p. 1). Despite the popularity of the CP concept, many concerns had been raised, and the implementation had to be experimented. This led to implementation of the foot patrol in the 72nd precinct of Brooklyn in 1984. The officers were to become familiar with the community within their patrol area and identify crimes and order-maintenance problems (McElroy, Cosgrove, and Sadd 1993).

In 1990 the New York Police Department (NYPD) made a decision to implement the CP strategies throughout the city. This led to an experimental implementation in the 72nd precinct in Brooklyn, where a fully staffed policing model would “allow a test of all operational aspects of community policing under real-life conditions” (Pate and Shtull 1994).

Pate and Shtull (1994) have provided an inside view of the model precinct. According to their report there were ten Special Operations Unit (SOU) officers assigned to community policing in the precinct. Certain specialist functions such as street narcotics enforcement, anticrime, warrants, fingerprints, crime prevention and highway safety were disbanded as the SOU officers were responsible for performing those tasks. There are a number of problem solving strategies that the SOU had employed to perform their functions. ‘Beat Books’ were introduced which were kept up to date by both the SOU and patrol officers. Those were binders that contained a significant amount of information about each beat. The information was to be used in the planning and problem solving. ‘Team meetings’ were put in place to involve patrol officers in the problem identification and resolution strategies as well as to maintain a good working relationship between the SOU’s and other staff. Computer-assisted ‘information system’ was introduced. It contributed to the identification of community problems and allowed for evaluation of a strategic response to address those problems through utilisation of hot sheets, calls for service analysis, on-line complaint preparation, administrative support systems, support for the warrant function and crime mapping. ‘Precinct management team meetings’ were held once a month, where the precinct commander met with representatives from patrol, detectives, narcotics, special operations, and community to identify the top five problems which were to be addressed by the command.

It was found that the model precinct functioned well. Better relationship between the police and the community allowed for impressive identification of community problems and effective solution strategies for them. There was a failure in the attempt to involve other units in effective problem solving. Patrol officers were limited due to a large number of calls they were to respond to. Other units such as detectives, narcotics, and organised crimes also had a limited involvement in problem solving. This was explained by the fact that “their modes of operations and goals have not yet been fully integrated into the community policing model” (Pate and Shtull 1994 40: 409). Pate and Shtull also suggest that the attempt to make the SOU officers perform many different tasks was not a great idea. Whilst the SOU problem solving methods were generally successful, the anticrime functions would
have been better performed by a separate group of specialists. Furthermore, significant differences in goals, methods and working conditions created a division between the SOU and patrol officers, which was seen as a negative aspect within the model. Like in the rest of the country, the police have attempted to control crime through various methods such as CP, however, the “American police tend to use formal social control such as arrest and/or summons to handle problems so that the numbers can be reflected in the agency’s statistics” (Eterno and Das 2010: 8).

Conclusively, there appeared to be a lack of involvement in CP of other government and non-government organisations. The implementation of the community policing approach was not adequately administered. This policing approach was derived from the ‘broken windows theory’, and for that reason should have involved all of the policing sectors along with other stakeholders of crime control.

**Policing in Sydney**

In the Australian case, Dixon and Maher 2005 argued there are three key differences between New York and Sydney. First one is the difference in crime patterns, especially in relation to gun crime and gun culture. Second big difference is related to the police powers. For example, Australian police have never experienced the legal restrictions such as those complained about in New York. And the third difference is in the ‘zero tolerance policing’ model itself, which “implies use of criminal justice as a frontline weapon against social and economic problems” (Dixon 2005 as cited in Dixon and Maher 2005 5: 122).

In contrast, the Australian political system still maintains the elements of a ‘welfare state’, where for example “goal is not considered to be an approved method to deal with mental health problems” (Dixon 2005 as cited in Dixon and Maher 2005 5: 122). They said that improving quality of life was regarded as a significant aim of policing (Dixon & Maher 2005 5: 129), thus Sydney took the targeted, intensive and intelligence led policing aspects of the New York CP model, in a battle to restore quality of life and reduce crime. Cabramatta was one of the Sydney suburbs where these strategies were implemented and had a positive impact (Dixon & Maher 2005 5: 138).

In the past 25 years, policing organisations in Australia have emphasised the importance of adopting and promoting the community policing concept as a central focus of their activity (Fleming 2010). There are many examples of community policing initiatives across the country, and it is not overly important that the police activities do not match what the broad definition of community policing prescribes, for example the holistic approach, more importantly it is crucial that the community is satisfied with the police in general. That satisfaction could be related to how the police interact with the community through mutual engagement in research projects and similar activities (Fleming 2010: 5).

Although the application of community policing initiatives is evident in the NSW police organisational plans and procedures, it is very difficult to evaluate whether the initiatives were actually what they are presented to be. According to Bayley (1994) “[t]he success of community policing will never be evaluated. The reason is simple. Community policing means too many things to different people. Its practices are so varied that any evaluation will be partial and challengeable as not authentic ‘community policing’” (Bayley 1994 as cited in Ratcliffe 2008: 68).

Ratcliffe (2008) suggested that it would be possible to measure community policing by conducting surveys. For example if the aim is to look at the police legitimacy, then the surveys indicating the changes in the community satisfaction with the police would be an appropriate measurement (Ratcliffe 2008: 69). Unfortunately, since most community policing implementation attempts have been without clear set of aims and objectives, they result in failure (Ratcliffe 2008: 69). Some argued that police were not able to adequately involve the community in the community policing strategies and “the shift in executive discourse toward intelligence-led policing was an outcome of irreconcilable failures perceived during adoption of community policing” (Deukmedjian 2006: 536 as cited in Ratcliffe 2008: 69).

In order to get a better picture about the community policing projects in Sydney, the authors on a number of occasions engaged into conversations a number of policing professionals informally. On one occasion the authors spoke to N.P., who is a serving constable with the New South Wales police, stationed in Sydney. The authors inquired about his involvement in the community policing initiatives
and his personal opinion about the same. He said that since the beginning of his policing career there was a large emphasis on the community policing approach.

"I remember when I was a probationary constable, I spent some time in what was known as a community policing branch within our LAC [Local Area Command]. During that period I was involved in a number of initiatives with local schools, PCYC's [Police and Citizen's Youth Clubs], and other local community organisations. Occasionally, we held presentations on different matters of concern, such as school bullying, community safety, and crime prevention, but also on matters such as the promotion of sport and leisure activities in the local PCYC's encouraging good relations between the police and the youth within the community" (N.P. constable).

The authors also spoke to another currently serving officer, who is a detective in one of the Sydney’s ‘busy’ Local Area Commands, Senior Constable M.K., who has been a serving officer for over 16 years. He discussed the ways in which he as a detective is involved in community policing. He also expressed his opinion on what the community policing approach was. Most of that conversation was noted down. An extract of the same is quoted below:

"I haven’t personally been involved in any community policing strategies, and I have not done much study on community policing at the academy either, as I have left academy fifteen or sixteen years ago, before such training was implemented there.

However, I am aware of the community policing initiatives and we do many different things to stay in touch with the community. For example in recent time we have started using the social networking sites, such as Facebook for example, in order to be able to reach out quicker into the community, reach out to a large number of people in a shortest period of time."

"Well, for example we have the liaison officers for many different groups within the community, some of those are roles filled by civilians from the community and not necessarily accredited police officers. Some examples include the Aboriginal liaison or the Ethnic-Community Liaison Officers, or the Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officers, or officers who specialise in dealing with particular issues such as the Domestic Violence Liaison Officers etc.

The function of the liaison officers is to become familiar with the communities, to build a level of mutual understanding and a level of trust. As I said we have liaison officers for many different community groups. So when we have certain issues or matters to discuss with particular community groups out there, we use the liaison officer for that group as a first point of contact to see if he/she knows something about the particular person or a matter at hand."

What we learnt about the Australian implementation of the community policing approach is that it was modelled on the New York example. Just like in New York, not all of the police are directly involved in community policing, only a few officers in every local area command perform these duties. Unfortunately, the transfer of the community policing approach to Sydney had resulted in intelligence-led policing strategies, rather than a holistic approach to crime prevention.

**Policing in Sarajevo**

With the fall of communism in former Yugoslavia, Socialist republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was one of the countries that declared independence and separated from the Federation of Socialist Federal Republics of [former] Yugoslavia. Democratic elections were held where 66% of the population voted for independence. The transition from the communist regime led to the rise of the national political parties, the most prominent ones being the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije) SDA, the Serb Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka) SDS and the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica) HDZ. These parties were representing the three constituent ethnic groups, the Bosnian-Muslim, the Bosnian-Serb (Orthodox) and the Bosnian-Croat (Catholic). Following the elections in 1991, there was no consensus between the parties and this led to political tensions, followed by aggression, first from the Serb and later followed by Croat extremist paramilitary groups. Serbian and Croatian nationalist-orientated governments saw the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an opportunity to try and claim part of Bosnian territory for their newly formed states. The war started in 1992 and went for almost four years (Moreau 2011).
The war ended with the UN/US imposed Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. It is argued that Dayton was negotiated by the nationalist parties, whose leaders caused the war in the first place, and that therefore secured the power of these ethnically-based parties (e.g. Kaldor, 1997: 28, 30). This means that the Dayton peace agreement had stopped the shooting, but the war continued by other means (Ashdown, 2004).

Although Bosnia formally was a sovereign state recognised by the United Nations, the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement replaced the traditional sovereignty, and put in place a kind of ‘informal trusteeship’ or ‘shared sovereignty’ between the Bosnian government, its people and external overseers (Chandler 2006). This created a weak central government which divided Bosnia into two entities, the Federation of Bosnian Muslims and Croats and the Republic of Srpska.

That division of the country implies very fragmented law enforcement. According to Masleša (2001) the two entities have created their own police forces under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The police in the Federation are even further fragmented, due to its division into ten cantons. Each canton has its own Ministry of Internal Affairs. In addition to these divisions, city of Brčko was provided with a separate police force for District Brčko, which has its own structure, arbitration and statue (Masleša 2001). Furthermore, there are a number of state-level agencies established under the Ministry of Security, which are responsible for “combating organized crime, human trafficking, international terrorism, controlling international borders and pursuing all border related crimes throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Deljkić & Lučić – Ćatić 2010).

What is distinctive for the policing in war-torn countries such as Bosnia is that it is usually characterised by lack of trust between the general community and the police, since it is the police that usually have the task of crushing political dissent during conflict. Therefore, police reform is required in post-war. The police war function in Sarajevo was no different to the military one, and it was believed that “demilitarisation, de-politicization and democratisation of BiH police will win public trust in the police” (Vejnović & Lalić 2006: 368).

**Police in Bosnia: An Insider’s View**

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country with a long history of communist-orientated policing, characterised by an emphasis on the security of the state. Some argue that the term ‘Community Policing’ was alien to both the police and the public in Bosnia until the end of the war in Bosnia in 1996 (Deljkić & Lučić-Ćatić 2011: 176). It is believed that the police were “the extended hand of the Communist Party” (Dziedzic & Bair, 1998). In that period “the main form of interaction with citizens was through incident based responses, roadblocks and checkpoints” (Dziedzic and Bair, 1998). That view however may not be accurate. The following section discusses traces of community policing type activities and initiatives in the socialist/comunist times.

From a conversation with (E. S.) a former Inspector of the State Security Service (‘Sluzba Drzavne Bezbjednosti’ - SDB) Sarajevo, it was discovered that contrary to the statement made by Dziedzic and Bair, who maintained that “the main form of interaction with citizens was through incident based responses, roadblocks and checkpoints” (Dziedzic and Bair, 1998), and that the term Community Policing was alien in that country until 1996, (E.S.) suggested that community policing was an integral part of the policing effort in the former Yugoslavia:

“Since the early fifties of the last century the police department’s name had been changed, and the police structures were divided in two sectors that of State-UDB (Directorate of State Security) and Public-UJB (Directorate of Public Security). The State sector worked to preserve the state order affairs (political crime, intelligence activities, immigration, terrorism etc.,) and the Public sector as the name suggests, dealt with general crime, public order offences (theft, burglary, robbery, traffic, violations, rape, and so on).

The main task of the Public sector was preventive action, the methods utilized included the foot patrols by two-uniformed policemen, who performed regular patrols in their areas, or villages just to be seen around. As a result of that police presence it was very rare that people dared to commit a criminal offence” (E.S. 2012, Diary entry).

In conversation, E.S. further suggested that there were other aspects of community policing present for many years:
“In the mid-sixties the Federal Minister of Internal Affairs-Rankovic was sacked, and then police force underwent another name change to the SJB (Service of Public Security) and SDB (Service of State Security), the scope of work remained the same, additionally, both sectors worked on widening the ‘collaborative networks’, so the informant network was very strong. In general, mentality of our people is such (to an extent influenced by the regime) that a man will report everything that doesn’t comply with the law or something that is directed against the State” (E.S. 2012, Diary Entry).

“In the early eighties of the last century systematization of jobs was slightly modified and introduced some new positions, such as the ‘commander of the community’ (until then there were only ‘commanders of local police stations’) and ‘sector leader’ something like a shift supervisor for certain areas of several streets, etc. These officers were permanently kept in the particular areas in order to get to know the community and thus also their efforts to combat crime were much more successful.

Also, each SUP (Secretariat of Internal Affairs) (SUP’s were the main police stations where people could obtain certain personal identification documents, driver’s licenses etc... SUP’s were able to cover one or several municipalities, however later in the 1980’s each municipality had its own SUP) had one or two people who exclusively dealt with social work, which involved dealing with the community issues as well as cooperation with local schools and juvenile correction centers where orphans or juvenile delinquents were kept.

It is important to note that the method of crime prevention using foot patrols had always been maintained, as it was useful and contributed to the community feeling safer in and out of home, with the police presence they felt protected” (E.S. 2012, Diary Entry).

We further discussed the evolvement of community policing during and after the communist regime, E.S further informed:

“There were many examples of community policing strategies being implemented by police both during the communist regime and after. For example, in the Secondary and Primary schools police organized informative classes on road safety, as well as in some large companies. On regular occasions in certain areas (craft centers, such as Bascarsija) we would talk to store owners (who owned shops that were sometimes broken into) and we asked for their opinion on what should be done in the field of security, where they presented their views, and we would give them specific instructions (eg. We suggested that all goldsmiths should keep their jewellery in a large vault, which they had to have, and not on display and easily accessible places, or to simply close the display windows in a way), and thus the number of burglaries was reduced to a minimum. Variety of exercises were often organised which involved a considerable number of public (civilians), to feel and learn something about the security culture” (E.S. 2012, Diary Entry).

Post War Policing in Bosnia

Following the directives of the international community a number of reforms have taken place in the Bosnian policing. The personnel reform consisted of a significant reduction from about 40 000 wartime police officers to under 18000 provisionally authorised following 1996 (Vejnović & Lalić 2006: 365). A law enforcement personnel registry had been established, which was a body responsible for the conduct of background checks on all officers, resulting in 142 officers being permanently excluded from the police in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Vejnović & Lalić 2006).

Other reforms mechanisms administered by the international community included “basic training courses in Human Dignity, Transitional Training, Community Policing, and Traffic Awareness for every currently serving police officer and a Management course for supervisors” (Vejnović & Lalić 2006: 366). They have trained over a thousand officers including hundreds of women in the two new academies that the UN had helped establish in Sarajevo and Banja Luka (Vejnović & Lalić 2006).

Furthermore, multi-ethnic police had been implemented in the Brčko District, and the disciplinary code was introduced to all of the law enforcement agencies. Minority policing recruitment was promoted as well as voluntary redeployment to particular areas, which was a result of an inter-entity agreement on the matter in May 2000, “[a] total of 164 officers voluntarily redeployed to their pre-war locations,
including the first senior Serb as Chief of Police in Drvar and a Bosniac as Deputy Chief of Srebrenica” (Vejnović & Lalić 2006: 366).

Vejnović and Lalić (2006) wrote that the political requirements for the successful implementation of community policing in Bosnia & Herzegovina must involve the process of demilitarisation, de-politicisation and democratisation of police. They argue that “...[i]n order to achieve transparency and accountability of the police, the parliamentary control of the police takes the essential place” (Vejnović & Lalić 2006: 368).

Deljkić and Lučić – Ćatić (2010) said that there was a plan proposed for further restructuring of police in Bosnia in December 2006. The plan was to give the “legislative authority and political oversight to the state-level institutions of BiH: the Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Security” (Deljkić & Lučić 2010: 175).

Unfortunately, according to Muehlmann (2008), the high expectations were not realized. His interpretation of the reform showed that Bosnia was not ready for far-reaching reforms that the High Representative Lord Ashdown envisaged in the policing area (Muehlmann 2008: 20). According to Muehlmann (2008) the main reason for the failure of the restructuring of the police was that it “touched upon the fundamentals of a delicate ethno-political power-sharing model in a post-conflict situation” (Muehlmann 2008: 1).

What Muehlmann has touched upon is directly related to the previously mentioned suggestion by Kaldor (1997) that the Dayton peace accord was negotiated by the nationalist parties and for that reason ensured their leaders to remain in power. After our analysis of a variety of documents and the printed media related to this issue, we cannot stress enough the level of influence that particular political parties have on different arms of government including the police structures.

This article coincides with the statement from our conversation with former inspector E.S., who also reflected upon the influence of the political parties. Furthermore, we had an informal conversation with M.M., who is currently serving as an inspector in the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), and has been their employee since the start of the war in 1992. Inspector M.M. had elaborated on the implementation of the community policing approach to policing in Sarajevo and generally whole of Bosnia.

“they installed a certification process and made every police officer pass a transitional training course about working with the community. Without that certificate the officer would not be able to continue working in the policing structures. But in reality that is nothing."

“that transition course which they have implemented and made compulsory didn't really teach us anything different to what we already knew and practiced in the field. As I said, we have always cooperated with the community at different levels, and besides it is only a three day course. Would you believe that their three day course is considered more important than all other police education that we had gone through before we ever started working in law enforcement. However, we do have to admit that they have encouraged the local police stations to take the matter a bit more should we say ‘seriously’, since they made it compulsory for each station to have one police man assigned to community policing specifically.”

I believe that policing in cooperation with the community definitely influences the prevention of particular offences, and even sometimes might lead to resolution of particular crimes. However, that is something that would be very hard to show, because it cannot be measured, and sometimes the statistics might show an increase of some type of offences in a particular period of time, when in actual case those offences are reducing. What I am trying to say is that through cooperation with the community some offences appear to be reported more often. For example an officer told us that after some of their presentations at the local schools, he was approached and spoken to by students on numerous occasions about family violence and bullying. When he followed up to the kids concerns, it resulted in a number of charges being laid. When the number of the similarly reported offences in a particular area are counted and presented in a report, they show an increase in the type of crime for that period, however, in reality we know that overall those types of offences are decreasing. Generally, if we want to look at the success of the community policing strategies we would have to look at the community satisfaction with the police, and that is something that is influenced by many other factors such as the political climate in the area and the influence of the media.”
Conclusions

Looking back at the foundation of this research, we acknowledged that Sydney and New York are both part of the Western, developed and economically stable societies, where democracy and the ‘rule of law’ are upheld at a very high, if not desirable level. Economic prosperity has enabled the government’s budgets to contribute and ensure that the social research including that on policing practices is well entrenched in their educational and research organisations. That has resulted in a vast number of academic accounts on crime prevention theories including the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, the Broken Windows Theory, Zero Tolerance Policing, the Community Policing Concept and others.

Sarajevo, the capital of the former Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not so long ago was in the centre of one of the world’s ugliest conflicts since the World War II. The ethnic divisions within the country affect the implementation of any nationally based policing or any other strategies. For that reason, comparing the level and quality of implementation of the community policing strategies in these places may be viewed as comparing oranges with apples. By analysing Sydney and New York models we had identify a potential standard on what steps should be taking for transfer of community policing model to other countries. By analysing the policing efforts in Sarajevo we discovered that there exist a number of problems with the implementation of the community policing approach.

Whilst the problems are not directly related to the methods of implementation we discovered that there are underlying political hurdles that need to be overcome. The foundation of community policing as we define is directly linked to the democratic principles, which prescribe that people should participate in the law enforcement, that police should respond to the needs of the people they police, that police should share information with the community under the freedom of information, that everyone should be equal under the law and most importantly that police should be free of political interference.

However, an important phenomenon we have discovered in the course of our research is that whilst the term ‘community policing’ might have been alien to the Bosnian society, certain practices which markedly resemble those of the community policing approach have been present in former Yugoslavia long before the so called ‘New York Miracle’, or the ‘Broken Windows Theory’ essay written by Wilson and Kelling in the early 1980’s. It is undoubtedly strange that no research had looked back into the history of policing practices in that country past 1992. Undoubtedly, during the conflict the policing structure and practices had changed due to obvious reasons, but the structure and practices of the police in that country prior to the conflict, according to our sources were very closely linked with the community.

In a bid to logically explain the reason for contemporary researchers avoiding studying or promoting the practices of the former Yugoslav police we have to consider the fact that there had always been a significant antipathy toward the communist systems around the world. Writing about any positive aspects of the communist regime is naturally expected to create a great deal of controversy, and no researcher would want to be in the spotlight of such debates.

Conclusively, throughout this research we have focused on the implementation of the community policing, its transfer and practices across the three geographic locations of New York, Sydney and Sarajevo. It is clear that aspects of this approach are applicable across different jurisdictions, and if we consider the fact that aspects of it already existed in former Yugoslavia, then it is beyond doubt that community policing truly is a ‘universal’ concept.

References


