WORKSHOP
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Professor Paul Dibb is Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at The Australian National University. He was previously Deputy Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence in the Australian Department of Defence and Director of the Joint Intelligence Organisation. His earlier positions included: Ministerial Consultant to the Minister for Defence, Senior Assistant Secretary for Strategic Policy and Head of the National Assessments Staff of the National Intelligence Committee. As Deputy Secretary, Paul Dibb was responsible for managing the Australian Department of Defence’s intelligence programs, strategic policy, and force structure decisions, as well as programming new equipment bids.


Professor Dibb is a member of the Australian Foreign Minister’s foreign policy advisory council and has been nominated as an Australian representative on the ASEAN Regional Forum register of experts and eminent persons.
Australia’s Alliance with America

Professor Paul Dibb

Australia is America’s closest ally in the Asia-Pacific region and the second most important US ally in the world now after the United Kingdom. After the collapse of the Soviet Union there was a sense of drift in Australia’s relationship with the United States throughout most of the 1990s.1 Australia did not seem to be as important to the US as it was in the Cold War. But since the tragic events of September 11 2001 and the so-called war on terror the relationship has become extremely close once again—and arguably even closer than in the Cold War.

This review is being undertaken at a time, unprecedented since the Vietnam War, of a vigorous domestic political debate in Australia about the alliance and the issue of the commitment of Australian troops to a U.S.-led war with Iraq. There has always been a strong majority in support of the alliance in Australia. Now, the question is being asked whether Australia has become an overly-compliant ally of the US and whether Australia’s commitment of forces to military action in Iraq will damage our diplomatic relations in Asia. Others reject this and point to our shared values with America in fighting the war on terror and ridding the world of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue regimes.

What are the benefits and costs to Australia’s defence interests in the contemporary era of the alliance, which is now over 50 years old? And what are the implications for Australia’s foreign policy relationships in Asia?

This is not a partisan paper. Rather, it examines—in as dispassionate a way as possible—the pros and cons of the alliance and its impact on our Asian relationships.

The Nature of US Power

The United States is a power without parallel in world history. The demise of the Soviet Union and the continuing military weakness of China mean that the US is unlikely to face a peer competitor, or even a combination of hostile powers, in the foreseeable future.

The US accounts for 32 percent of world gross domestic product and more than 43 percent of world military expenditures. America now spends $US 1 billion a day on defence. It accounts for more than half of worldwide military production and almost 60 percent of world military R&D spending (and America’s allies
account for another 25 percent). The US and its allies also dominate the world arms trade, accounting for 75 percent of the trade in major conventional armaments.2 Over the next decade, America’s lead in military power and technological innovation will continue to grow relative to other powers. It has become what the French term a “hyper power.”

Since the events of 11 September 2001, the international system has had to adjust to an America that is more unilateralist, more interventionist and more inclined to use military force—and, indeed, more demanding of what it expects from its allies. The longer-term question is: will bandwagoning with the US in a coalition of like-minded states (or a “coalition of the willing” in the case of Iraq) become the defining global security architecture of the future? Or will there be an increase in strains and tensions between an increasingly demanding US and the growing resentment of other major powers? These are important questions for Australia’s alliance with the US and our future relations with Asia and Europe.

The question of going to war with Iraq has strained the NATO alliance. The United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and a number of East European states support the US position. But France, Germany and Russia have resisted US demands for what they see as a too hasty resort to arms. China too has declined to support the US position. Only the United Kingdom and Australia have remained rock-solid with the US.

The US is now the indispensable superpower. Its current and foreseeable political, economic, military and technological dominance adds great weight to the alliance.

**Australia’s Alliance with the US**

It is crucial to understand the unique nature of the alliance for Australia. The media and the general public tend to view the importance of the alliance very much in traditional terms—that is, whether or not it provides a US security guarantee in the event of an attack on Australia.3 But its real value is the access it provides to US intelligence, defence science and advanced weapons systems. The US alliance system comprises an inner group that exchanges highly classified intelligence and defence science and has access to weapons technology in a way that is not shared with other allies. This inner circle consists of the US, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. Since the late 1980s it no longer includes New Zealand, which, because of its anti-nuclear stance, is classified as a friend of the US but not an ally. Other major allies of the US, including Japan, Germany, France and Italy, are not members of the inner alliance. Neither are such Asian treaty partners of the US as South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines or Thailand.
Australia’s defence and intelligence relationship with the US is unique in the Asia-Pacific region. Not even Japan shares this closeness with Washington. The US is Australia’s ultimate guarantor of security, including by providing extended nuclear deterrence. The intelligence and defence aspects of the relationship provide Australia with a clear technical advantage over any potential regional adversary. If Australia did not have access to US intelligence and high-technology weapons systems we would have to spend very much more on defence. And even then we would not have a credible defence capability—unless, of course, we decided to go down the New Zealand path of having little more than a lightly armed army.

The alliance helps to ensure a strong US presence in the Western Pacific. Australia is the southern anchor of US engagement in the region and Japan and South Korea are the northern anchors. The United States is not a power located in Asia and it does not have a multilateral alliance like NATO to underpin its regional military presence. It is through its close bilateral alliances that its commitment to regional security is legitimised.

What are the costs of this close relationship? It has involved us fighting alongside the Americans in every major conflict they have been in since the Second World War. In the cases of the Korean War and the Vietnam War Australia’s national interests in the Asian region were directly engaged. In the 1991 Gulf War, and in the 2003 conflict with Iraq, Australia’s direct regional interests are not at stake. The issues involved now are the broader ones of terrorism and containing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Alliances are not merely the product of rational calculations of national interest. They involve shared values and belief systems and a shared history of doing things together. They also involve domestic politics, as we have seen recently in Australia. In the past, public support for the alliance in Australia has been remarkably resilient, even though there have been enormous strategic changes over the half-century of its existence.

Small powers such as Australia have always relied on external aid for the accomplishment of the basic goal of all states: survival. Neutrality and nonalignment have appealed to some small powers. But these alternatives have never appealed to Australians because they could mean our withdrawal from much of world affairs. And international organisations such as the United Nations have not proven themselves able to protect state sovereignty. The policy of a protective alliance “has always been the most obvious weapon for the small power, and the one most employed.” But borrowing someone else’s strength has disadvantages as well as advantages.
Australia is not accustomed to being a frank ally. Although there are very extensive bilateral mechanisms for consultation and deliberation on a wide range of policy issues, Australia does not have a record of speaking up in the way that the United Kingdom does. It has been suggested that Australia should speak up and the United States should listen more. Australia should prod the United States where it thinks it is coming up short. More plainly, some argue that the alliance should offer Australia ways to dampen current US tendencies to unilateralism. As allies, we should use the alliance to good effect so as to influence the US to broaden its international security agenda. As the British Prime Minister Tony Blair has said: 

The problem people have with the US — not the rabid anti-Americans but the average middle ground — is not that, for example, they oppose them on WMD or international terrorism. People listen to the US on these issues and may well agree with them; but they want the US to listen back.

Blair went on to say the price of British influence is not, as some would have it, that the UK has obediently to do what the US asks: “Where we disagree, as over Kyoto, we disagree.” The new Australian foreign-policy White Paper of 2003 also takes up this theme when it states that: “Even when US actions do not suit our interests, our strong ties mean that we are better placed to put our views to Washington and that the United States will listen to them.” But it is not clear whether the majority of Australians now believe this.

**Australia’s Defence Policy**

Since the end of our involvement in the Vietnam War over 30 years ago, Australia has developed a more self-reliant defence policy based on the defence of Australia and the capacity to operate independently in our region of primary strategic interest in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. This was judged to conform to President Nixon’s 1968 Guam doctrine, which called for US allies to be more self-reliant. As the 1976 Defence White paper observed: “An alliance does not free a nation from the responsibility to make adequate provision for its own security, or to help support stability and security in its own neighbourhood…” At the same time, it was always recognised, as the 1987 Defence White Paper observed, that Australia should be “capable of reacting positively to calls for military support elsewhere, should we judge that our interests require it.”

The December 2000 Defence White Paper identified five priorities for Australia’s strategic interests. Highest priority was accorded to the defence of Australia. The second objective was to foster the security of our immediate neighbourhood and to contribute to that in a major way. The third was to work with others to promote stability
and cooperation elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The fourth objective was to contribute in appropriate ways to maintaining stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region. And the fifth strategic objective was to contribute to the efforts of the international community, especially the United Nations, to uphold global security.\textsuperscript{12}

The Government’s \textit{Defence Update}, which was released to the public in February 2003, stated that the principles set out in the 2000 Defence White Paper remain sound.\textsuperscript{13} The Defence Minister, Senator Robert Hill, confirmed that the defence of Australia is a primary responsibility of Government and “and always will be.”\textsuperscript{14} And he also confirmed the key importance of our immediate neighbourhood—or what he calls “a troubled region”—and the implications for increased calls on the Australian Defence Force.\textsuperscript{15}

But the \textit{Defence Update} does make some adjustments to take account of coalition operations further afield from Australia being “somewhat more likely than in the recent past.”\textsuperscript{16} Even so, this “will not fundamentally alter the size, structure and roles of the Defence Force.”\textsuperscript{17} Instead, Australia’s involvement in coalition operations is likely to be “limited to the provision of important niche capabilities.”\textsuperscript{18} A compelling reason for this is that expeditionary forces are expensive. The United Kingdom has one but it spends 2.8 percent of GDP on defence compared with Australia’s 1.9 percent.

If Australia were to pull its weight more seriously as an ally and spend the same proportion of its economic wealth on defence as the United Kingdom that would involve a $7 billion, or a 47 percent, increase in the defence budget. Instead, we will probably continue to talk loudly and carry a small stick.\textsuperscript{19} A former Chief of the Defence Force, General John Baker, has argued that Australia’s defence spending should be progressively increased to at least 2.5 percent of GDP.\textsuperscript{20} There seems to be little prospect of this happening.

Equally, however, there is no prospect of any Australian government taking us down the path of New Zealand, which spends scarcely 1.1 percent of GDP on defence. If Australia did the same, we could save the national budget $5.6 billion a year, which would cut our defence budget by almost 40 percent and leave us with essentially a peace-keeping/peace enforcement force.

The bottom line is that Australia will continue to have a modest but professionally capable and high-technology Defence Force. It will be capable of the self-reliant defence of Australia and undertaking major operations in our own region. But the US will be our ultimate guarantor against attack or invasion by a major power.

\textbf{The War on Terror and the Alliance}

Australia was one of the very first countries to offer military support to the US after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The Australian Government invoked the ANZUS Treaty for the first time in its history. This effectively stood previous
Australian defence planning on its head. It had generally been supposed that it would be Australia who would call on ANZUS in its own defence. Australia’s actions were paralleled by NATO, which invoked the NATO treaty, for the first time, because of the terrorist threat to the US. In military terms, it has been the UK and Australia that have offered the most prompt and valuable combat assistance to the US in both the Afghanistan and Iraq theatres.

Australia’s political stocks in Washington are now at an all-time high. It has even been suggested by the US Ambassador in Canberra that Washington’s support for a free trade agreement with Australia is based on the perception that we are one of only two reliable American allies (Ambassador Scheiffer has described Australia as “the United Kingdom of the Pacific”). This is a remarkable shift in US policy. In the Cold War the high politics of defence were always kept separate from the low politics of trade. If Canberra is indeed now seen this way in Washington it is symptomatic of a greatly changed world view.

By February 2003 it was presumed that Australia’s military forces, pre-deployed to the Persian Gulf, would be committed to combat in the event of a US decision to attack Iraq. The size of the Australian contribution is not the issue — indeed, the troops being pre-deployed were somewhat larger than might have been expected. What mattered in Washington was that Australia would probably be the only country in the entire Asia-Pacific region to make any sort of combat contribution to a war in Iraq. Other regional allies may well facilitate intelligence, logistic, port access and over-flight rights for the US but none was likely to offer combat troops.

There can be no doubt that Australia’s participation in the destruction of the Taliban in Afghanistan and our strong support, along with the United Kingdom, for Washington’s policy towards Iraq have indeed strengthened the alliance in the eyes of the Bush Administration.

At the same time, Australia has to focus on what looks like an increasingly dangerous terrorist threat from Southeast Asia, especially since the terrorist attacks in Bali on 12 October 2002. As Australia’s foreign policy White Paper observes, the threat of terrorism to Australians is global but its impact on Australia is most acute in our immediate region. There is increasing evidence of a well-entrenched terrorist network in some parts of Southeast Asia — not least in Indonesia.

If there are further terrorist attacks on Australians in the region, or if a major terrorist attack is successful in Australia itself, there will be strong political demands on the Government to focus more on our own region and on homeland security. This would demand careful balancing of priorities by the Government between distant operations in support of our US ally and threats closer to home.
The Alliance and Australia’s Relations with Asia
Traditionally, Australia’s close alliance with the US has given us greater weight and influence in Asia. Along with Japan and South Korea, Australia has been one of the few key US allies in the region. The fact that there is no region-wide alliance organisation like NATO, and little in the way of useful military confidence-building measures, has lent greater weight to bilateral security arrangements. Australia has (with US encouragement) supported a stable Southeast Asia — not least through the Five Power Defence Arrangements with Malaysia and Singapore and our strong bilateral military co-operation with almost all ASEAN countries. And Australia has long supported a confident (but not nuclear armed) and regionally engaged Japan, under the secure bilateral alliance umbrella with the United States.

In the Cold War we co-operated with the US to contain the Soviet Union and, since then, we have been part of the common endeavour to encourage the spread of democracy and free enterprise in Asia. This has been a remarkably successful endeavour.

The United States is not an Asian power but Asia without the United States would be a much more dangerous place for Australia’s strategic interests. Most Asian countries welcome a strong US presence in the region as a check against potential hegemony by China or India or the emergence of a resurgent Japan. Crucially, America’s alliance with Japan has ensured that that country has not become a nuclear power. This accords with Australia’s key national interests. And the fact that the US is by far the world’s dominant power and now sees Australia as its second most important ally in the world can only increase Australia’s weight in regional affairs.

But Australia’s very closeness to the US now threatens to greatly complicate, if not challenge, some of our key relations in Asia. The initial outpouring of sympathy towards the US after September 11 2001 has been replaced in some parts of the region by a growing sense of unease that America is a unilateral power dismissive of the norms of international behaviour, except on its terms. There is a perception in Southeast Asia that the US sees Islamic terrorists — and by extension the Muslim faith — as the only threat. This perception (however incorrect it may be) was greatly exacerbated by the recognition that the US was prepared to lead an attack on Iraq without a supporting United Nations resolution. In this context, the repercussions for some of our regional relations could be serious.

The perception in some parts of the region that Australia is America’s deputy sheriff has stuck. We are having no success, as the foreign-policy White Paper observes, in our efforts to be included in formal regional groupings, such as ASEAN plus 3 or wider regional free trade arrangements. Not all of this, of course, can be laid at the door of our alliance with the US. But at least in some respects the alliance now
threatens to divide us from the region. The United States-United Nations dynamic will
be a crucial element influencing how Australia is perceived in our region.

The alliance is becoming more contentious in our relations with our neighbours in Southeast Asia than it is in Northeast Asia with countries such as China and Japan. China opposes any US unilateral use of force in Iraq because of what this might imply for its own sovereignty, as well as its interests in Taiwan and North Korea. China has aligned itself with France, Germany and Russia in opposition to US policy on Iraq and the role of the United Nations. This seems to put Australia at odds with China. Yet, in the end Beijing will not wish to sacrifice its important relationship with Washington over Iraq.

Washington’s preoccupation with what it calls “the axis of evil” means that Taiwan is not a current priority for Washington and this suits China well. A crucial policy issue for Australia and its alliance with the US would arise in the event of war between the United States and China over Taiwan. An Australian refusal to support the United States militarily in such a conflict could cause serious damage to the alliance.

Japan perceives Australia’s alliance with the US as complementary to its own alliance with that country. For example, Australia’s policies towards the visit of US nuclear warships to its ports serve to support Japan’s policies in this regard. And our strong support for the war on terror has encouraged Tokyo to provide naval deployments in the Indian Ocean that are unprecedented since the Second World War. Japan is uneasy about the direction of US policies in the Middle East but it is much more concerned about recent developments in North Korea and its fears of a nuclear-armed Pyongyang than it is about the threat from Iraq. It is seriously concerned about alliance politics in Northeast Asia and how the US intends to handle North Korea’s military intransigence.

It is in Southeast Asia where Australia’s alliance with the US promises most to complicate some of our key regional relations. This is particularly the case with Indonesia, which publicly opposes a war on Iraq. The Indonesian Foreign Minister has suggested that it is “very easy for the masses in the Islamic world to conclude that this war against Iraq is in the end a war against Muslims.” President Megawati Soekarnoputri, however, has contradicted this statement.

It is only since the Bali bombing of October 2002 that Jakarta has acknowledged there are Muslim extremist terrorists in its own country. The fragility of domestic politics in Indonesia means that President Megawati Soekarnoputri is in a difficult position on this issue, as well as on the question of Australia’s relations with the US. Australia’s relations with Indonesia were greatly strained by our intervention—with US assistance—in East Timor. This still rankles deeply in Jakarta.
A great deal now depends upon whether there are further terrorist attacks in Indonesia on Australian or American citizens. Indonesia is in a highly unstable and vulnerable situation in its transition to democracy. This milieu provides a potential breeding ground for extreme Islamic philosophies and violence. Australia and the US need to be very careful how they publicly articulate such policies as pre-emption in this regard.

**Implications for Australia**

Until the tragic events of September 11 2001, there was a real sense of drift in the US-Australia alliance relationship. The end of the Cold War meant that for much of the 1990s Canberra was no longer on the radar screen in Washington in the same way. We had lost our importance as one of the key members of the inner alliance in the war against communism. The decade of the 1990s saw a too-optimistic view of the new world order in Washington and of globalisation and democracy as forces for peace. There was a distinct tendency not to pay sufficient attention to the US alliance network.

September 11 changed all that. The US has been attacked in its homeland for the first time since the War of 1812. Sooner or later, it expects terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction. As Paul Kelly has put it: “…the catharsis of September 11 …changed US strategic policy and public opinion enabling Bush to confront Iraq and make this the chief demand the US lodged on its allies.”

As a result, Australia is now America’s second most important friend and ally in the world after the United Kingdom. But the alliance is at a crucial point in Australia. The implications for domestic politics of the new course in which the alliance is headed are potentially divisive. This is not good for Australia’s national interests. The alliance is too important to be the victim of partisan politics.

We need to consider carefully the balance of Australia’s interests and priorities with the United States and with the Asian region—and especially with our close neighbours. As the foreign policy White Paper observes, an advance in any one relationship need not be at the expense of others. Close engagement with the countries of Asia is an abiding policy priority and, at the same time, Australia’s alliance with the United States is fundamental for our security. A nuanced policy needs to be able to handle both. It is not a matter of choosing between the United States and Asia but rather of balancing our alliance with the US with our interests in Asia. In this context, we need to define carefully the extent to which we are different from, or bound up with, US interests.

In particular, Canberra and Washington need not portray every international issue as a test of the alliance relationship and our loyalty towards it. If Canberra builds
a reputation for an independent, and even sometimes dissenting, position we might have a greater capacity to influence and shape US views.

Owen Harries (who for over 20 years was the editor of the conservative US journal *The National Interest*) has pointed out that the understandable reaction of the US to the outrage of September 11 has forced America decisively along a course of action that: emphases its military dominance; requires it to use its vast power conspicuously; makes restraint and moderation virtually impossible; and makes unilateralism an increasing feature of American behaviour. He observes that this is bound to generate widespread and increasing criticism, and perhaps hostility, towards it. Harries concludes that this may turn out to be the real tragedy of September 11. If so, it is a tragedy that Australia needs to do its utmost to avert. It would not be in our interests to see an alignment of powers emerge against the US.

Over the coming years, in addition to the central importance of our alliance with the US the instability in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood will remain a matter of security concern. It is not difficult to develop scenarios concerning Indonesia that are deeply worrying. We need to give priority to these concerns because if a crisis breaks out in our neighbourhood we will not be able to avoid making a major contribution towards its resolution. And we saw in the East Timor crisis in 1999 just how stretched our very limited military resources were.

While still being a close and loyal ally of the US, it is vital that Australia is seen to have an independent capacity when it comes to resolving security challenges in our own region. This is an area where we have very little room for discretion in our national security planning. It is also the case that Washington expects us to take the lead when it comes to such crucial regional issues.

The US itself would profit significantly from a greater Australian role in Asian security and it could learn much from Canberra about trends and tactics in Asia. Australia is in a better position than any other Asia-Pacific nation to insert itself systematically into the Washington policy process “to give frequent council, to point out opportunities, and to warn of impending problems in various US policy options regarding Asia.”

Self-evidently, Australia’s alliance with the US must not be put at risk as have the alliance relationships of France and Germany. We should not encourage any sentiment for what some American commentators have termed a “grand exit strategy” from alliance entanglements. The idea of American strategic disengagement from entangling military obligations worldwide is not new and stems from long-standing non-interventionist American traditions. In its current mood, the US is not at all likely to disengage from Australia. But we should never give some future US administration that excuse.
Conclusions
The importance of the alliance is self-evident. Without it, Australia would be a much more vulnerable country. Given our unique strategic situation and the uncertainties of the future, a non-aligned position, or a policy such as that of New Zealand, would be a hazardous path for Australia. The benefits of the alliance in terms of the engagement of the US with us and with the Asia-Pacific region are clear. The advantages the alliance brings of access to highly important intelligence and defence capabilities, as well as its military deterrence, are of immeasurable value. And it needs to be understood that, once broken, the US-Australia alliance would never be replaced by Washington.

The costs of the alliance are well understood. In the past, they were the containment of communism, which involved us in two wars in our region in Korea and Vietnam. Today, it is the war on terror and weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue regimes. The problem here is not the aims of US policies (including in Iraq) but the way Washington is going about it that has become a divisive issue in the bipartisan support for the alliance in Australia.

In the final analysis, all this is a matter of the appropriate policy emphasis and balance in Canberra:

- weighing our global with our regional interests;
- balancing our vital alliance with the US and our abiding security interests in our own region;
- managing the risks inherent in alliance politics by acknowledging US needs and preferences and at the same time avoiding damage to our regional and, indeed, our domestic political interests;
- identifying areas of difference candidly, as well as making it plain where we agree.

A mature alliance that has lasted for over half a century should have no difficulty in working within these basic principles. It would signal the development of a balanced alliance partnership ready to take on the much more varied security challenges of the twenty-first century.
Notes


5 Desmond Ball, loc cit.


8 Prime Minister Tony Blair, speech to Foreign Office Conference in London, 7 January 2003.


16 ibid.

17 ibid., p. 6.

18 ibid., p. 24.

19 The UK, with three times Australia’s population, has deployed 19 times as many troops to Iraq.


21 Advancing the National Interest, op. cit., p. 36.


24 Advancing the National Interest, op. cit., pp. xv and xvi.


27 Robert D. Blackwill, “An Action Agenda to Strengthen America’s Alliances in the Asia Pacific Region” in Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb (eds), op. cit., p. 118.

28 ibid.

29 Edward A. Olsen, US National Defense for the Twenty-First Century: The Grand Exit Strategy, (London and Portland Oregon: Frank Cass, 2002). Olsen is professor of national security affairs at the US naval postgraduate school. He describes ANZUS as moribund and almost inert as an alliance and concludes that it is an “irresolute alliance of marginal utility.” He believes that the ANZUS alliance would be a very simple one from which to disengage and its absence would barely be noticed. In his view, the US’s readiness to invoke a sunset clause and withdraw would send a tremendously useful signal to the rest of Asia about the US’s resolve to pursue a non-interventionist course. (See pp. 122–124).
MELBOURNE ASIA POLICY PAPERS

An important new initiative of the Melbourne Institute of Asian Languages and Societies, The Asialink Centre, The Asian Law Centre, The Asian Economics Centre and the Australian Centre for International Business at the University of Melbourne, The Melbourne Asia Policy Papers aim to strengthen Australia’s engagement in Asia through the publication and dissemination of a series of non-partisan policy option papers.

Four times a year, leading international scholars are invited to present a closed-door workshop examining different aspects of Australia’s current relations with the Asia Pacific region. At these workshops, a distinguished group of experts are asked to consider and debate a series of draft policy options prepared beforehand for discussion.

Following the workshop, the invited author will produce a concise, 10-page policy paper for publication and distribution among leading government, media, academic, and business officials in Australia.

WORKSHOPS TO DATE

Australia’s Alliance with America
Professor Paul Dibb AM
Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University (6 December 2002)

Enforcing International Humanitarian Law Post-September 11th
Professor Tim McCormack
Foundation Australian Red Cross Professor of International Humanitarian Law and Associate Dean (Research) in the Faculty of Law at The University of Melbourne (6 March 2003)

Australia’s Economic Diplomacy in Asia
Professor Peter Lloyd
Ritchie Professor of Economics, The University of Melbourne (21 May 2003)