The Indonesian military appears to be taking advantage of a weak president and unpopular police to try and regain some of the internal security functions that it lost as part of the country’s democratisation process.

Introduction

Since Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) took office in October 2014, the actions of the police have triggered widespread public condemnation, with much less attention to the role of the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI). Both institutions seem to be testing the political waters to see how far they can push their authority in the face of a weak president with little experience in security affairs. The TNI, in particular, seems to be having some success, with its commander, Gen. Moeldoko, as the driving force.

The imbroglio beginning in January 2015 surrounding Jokowi’s nomination of a police chief known for his unusual wealth led public confidence in the police as an institution to sink to new lows. Police efforts to weaken the respected Anti-Corruption Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) sank them further in public esteem. As daily revelations made the police look worse and worse, some voices in civil society and the local media began raising concerns that the military was exploiting both the poor image of the police and the president’s need for a reliable ally to press forward with its own interests. In particular, the TNI was interested in regaining some of the internal security functions ceded to police as part of the democratisation process that began following former President Soeharto’s resignation in 1998.

The actions that triggered concerns included:

• Signing many Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) between civilian agencies (ministries and state enterprises) and the TNI for the provision of security services;
• Involvement of the TNI in government development programs, such as food self-sufficiency, especially in remote areas;
• Demand by the military for a greater role in counter-terrorism operations, especially in Poso;
• Perceived efforts to exclude the police from national security policy-making;
• Dubious military arrests of criminal suspects in a manner designed to embarrass or intimidate police;
• Pushing for a contentious national security bill to be reinserted on the legislative agenda;
• Delaying the clarification of “grey areas” between the military and police; and
• Expanding military commands.

There is no suggestion that the TNI is intent on returning to the centre of the political stage. While often contemptuous of civilian leaders, senior TNI officers know that their legitimacy depends on full commitment to the democratic system. But there does seem to be a sense that various political factors have combined to give the TNI a new opening to address many accumulated frustrations and resentments.

Many of these resentments are directed against the police, whom the army in particular sees as having not only usurped some of its functions but also its opportunities for rent-seeking. Some are related to the army trying to preserve its position under a presidency that is focused on maritime issues, and the priority that implies for the navy and the air force. All are occurring under a president who shares the military’s “can do” mentality but who relies heavily on military rather than civilian advisers on security matters and appears to see little danger in allowing the TNI to regain some of the powers it lost in Indonesia’s reform process.