SECURITY THROUGH SUSTAINABLE PEACE:

AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING

JOHN LANGMORE, TANIA MILETIC, ARAN MARTIN AND BOB BREEN
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Senator the Hon Marise Payne
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister for Women

MC19-002843

Professor John Langmore
Walter Boas Building
The University of Melbourne
MELBOURNE VIC 3010

Dear Professor Langmore


I am pleased my Department was able to support this important research on its capacity and experiences in conflict prevention and peace building.

Looking back, Australia has a strong record of accomplishment in supporting peace processes in our immediate region. Looking forward, as you emphasise in your report, conflict prevention and mediation are essential diplomatic tools for promoting a regional and global environment conducive to Australia's prosperity, security, border security and the safety of our citizens.

Congratulations on completing the full length report. It contains recommendations too numerous to address in this letter, other than to highlight that a number of these recommendations strongly accord with current government priorities.

In particular, your recommendation that government invest in the Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda is very welcome. WPS is a strong priority for me in my dual roles as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Women. Australia’s second National Action Plan (NAP) on WPS for 2019-29 is due to be launched in October with four key objectives:

- reducing sexual and gender based violence (prevention and response);
- supporting women and girls' meaningful participation and needs in peace processes;
- supporting resilience, crisis and security, law and justice sector efforts to meet the needs and rights of women and girls; and
- demonstrating leadership and accountability for the WPS agenda.
Your recommendation that DFAT officers be encouraged and given opportunity to train in conflict prevention and mediation is also an important suggestion. I understand that a Conflict Prevention course, run for the first time in the Diplomatic Academy on 9 May, was well attended and will be repeated going forward to ensure more DFAT officers are training in this important area of the Department’s work.

I trust you will find opportunity to discuss the many other recommendations in your report with the relevant officers in the Department, and wish you all the best with the launch of this report.

Yours sincerely

[Signature]

MARISE PAYNE

19 AUG 2019
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

There is a globalised imperative towards security through increasing efforts to prevent violent conflicts and support positive peace; and recognition that this is achieved through political rather than military means.

One of the essential conditions for global security and wellbeing is achievement of relative peace. Peace is pursued through the prevention and transformation of violent conflicts and the conditions that give rise to these, and support for the attitudes, institutions and structures that can sustain peaceful societies. From the highest global systems of governance, there is much talk of preventing conflict and sustaining peace (UN & WB, Pathways for Peace, 2018). This challenge is increasingly complex because we live in a time of global turbulence and uncertainty, with shifting geopolitical arrangements and increasing transnationalism and interconnectedness of global challenges.

It is well established that violent conflict is one of the most serious impediments to human, social and economic development and environmental wellbeing. After a period of relative decline in international conflict, we have seen a rise in its incidence and extent of casualties during the past decade. It is well understood that these challenges require political solutions. Yet despite increases in military and security spending in Australia and other countries, there has been no concurrent improvement in the level of resourcing and prioritisation of diplomatic contributions to the prevention and transformation of violent conflict.

The UN Secretary-General António Guterres advocates making conflict prevention central to current UN priorities, building on important reviews of the UN’s peace and security architecture in 2015 on peace operations, peacebuilding, and women, peace and security. He urges the UN to reorient beyond the reactive stance of merely responding to conflicts. He notes, however, that the primary work of conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts lies with Member States.

Australia is amongst many states examining such an enhancement of foreign policy. The focus of this report is to consider what Australia has and can be doing to contribute to international efforts towards conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and to longer-term peacebuilding approaches required to support sustainable peace.

To build a research and relational foundation for working with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) on this, the Australian International Conflict Resolution Project (AICRP) first completed an initial study to learn about how other states support peace processes and possible considerations for Australia to improve its capacity to engage. The book titled State Support to Peace Processes: A Multi-Country Review (Langmore et al, 2017), examined the experiences of seven countries: Canada, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. This varied sample of countries, some of which have a strong track record of supporting peacemaking activities, was chosen in consultation with DFAT to increase the knowledge of lessons learnt and review their applicability to the Australian context.

Examples of effectively established peace-support processes were found in Norway, the UK, and Canada, but even the Norwegian and UK case studies indicated the need for increased attention to recording experience in peacemaking, reviewing and deriving lessons learnt from that experience, recording and retaining this knowledge and integrating it back into policy and practice. Canada has systematically done so. Professor Peter Jones’ 2011 review of Canada’s international peacemaking experiences over 25 years was a relatively small state funded project with a significant impact (Jones, 2013). The Canadian review provided part of the platform for its peace and security policies developed under the current government and had specific recommendations that were low-cost and easily implemented, such as the creation of a mediation support unit within the renamed Global Affairs Department.

A large amount of research has been undertaken in these areas recently. The issues of how to achieve peaceful conflict resolution are of such central importance to achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that UNSG António Guterres, and Jim Yong Kim, President of the World Bank, commissioned a comprehensive review which has been published as Pathways For Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict (UN&WB, 2018). This outstanding book is mentioned because it indicates the volume of intellectual and political effort which is going into conflict prevention and peacebuilding at present – at a time when global affairs seem to have moved in the reverse direction. This intellectual struggle generates hope that foundations are being laid for more committed, active and sustained political movement towards peaceful conflict resolution.

The time of researching and writing of this report preceded the global pandemic COVID-19. The subsequent crisis has only further accentuated the trends we describe and the imperatives to increase efforts in support of its recommendations. Concurrently we witness entrenched responses, alongside innovations in online approaches to conflicts and crises. Australia’s announcement of further cuts to diplomacy are devastating and coexist with the felt realities of the implications of diminishing at-post personnel and presence in our region. From UN calls for global ceasefires to local groups engaging in the provision of health services under the global pandemic, we need to better understand the role and potential of all arms of government and increase the value, engagement and support required for diplomacy and aid towards meeting Australia’s national interests and global challenges.

1 Other examples include the recently published: Securing and Sustaining Elite Bargains that Reduce Violent Conflict (Cheng, Goodhand and Meehan, 2018) This report aimed to inform UK and international policy and practice aimed at reducing levels of armed conflict and supporting sustainable post-war transitions. The report synthesized the findings of 23 case studies. Another remarkable book on the subject was published in 2018 by John Braithwaite and Bina D’Costa, entitled Cascades of Violence: War, Crime and Peacebuilding Across Asia (ANU Press).
The purpose of this report on Security Through Sustainable Peace is to review Australian experience of peace processes and suggest possible approaches for strengthening them. The goal has been to increase the potential effectiveness, credibility and feasibility of Australian peacebuilding efforts principally by drawing on the experience of over 120 current and retired Australian diplomats, and a few defence personnel,2 police, and academic and INGO staff who have worked in often complex, threatening and entrenched conflict situations. Their experiences and comments were transcribed, organised and distilled into the conclusions and recommendations of this report.

The major themes of this report relate to: First, the necessity for political leadership to prioritise diplomatic engagement and therefore development of strategy and policy. Second, how to re-establish and develop DFAT's functions, capacity and structure to support conflict prevention and peacebuilding in foreign policy. Third, the imperative for guiding the Commonwealth's rationale and resourcing for diplomacy, to ensure that political solutions are afforded the primacy they require in whole-of-government approaches to addressing global challenges.

CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

Commitment to conflict prevention and peacebuilding is vital to Australian safety, security and the common good.

OVERVIEW

To prevent conflict and sustain peace, we must seek answers to questions such as: what can be done about today's challenges; what will tomorrow's conflicts be like; where could they occur; what might be their main drivers, and why? Addressing these is a challenging task that requires the work of many people in government, civil society, universities and corporations. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres writes that “conflict prevention should permeate everything we do. It should cut across all pillars of the United Nations work and unite us for more effective delivery”. (UN & WB, Pathways for Peace, 2018: xi)

The UN Charter requires in Article 2.2 that 'All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.' The Charter goes further, though, than just instructing Member States about the goals expected of them, by describing mechanisms for seeking a solution to any dispute which endangers international peace and security including 'negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice'. (Article 33.1)

These principles have been reiterated many times through succeeding decades, including most recently in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2015, of which Goal 16 was to ‘Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development’; and the first target was to ‘Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere.’

Yet despite these strong commitments, violent conflict continues to be one of the most powerful impediments to achieving the SDGs, which aim to eradicate poverty, advance economic and human development and sustain ecological diversity and harmony by 2030 (UN, 2015). DFAT has acknowledged that preventing violence, through early intervention and investment, is more cost effective than intervening after violence has erupted or escalated (DFAT 2018a).

In the 2016-17 DFAT Annual Report the Secretary, Francis Adamson, drew attention to “the conclusion of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), recognised internationally as a leading example of a successful stabilization intervention” (p13). In 2018 the Australian Government reported that it is working to reduce the risk of conflict by providing aid, building security and economic partnerships with developing countries, deploying peacebuilding expertise and ‘offering support to inclusive peace processes’ (DFAT 2018a).

CURRENT CONFLICTS

In recent years the global scale of violent conflict, the number of displaced people and the intensity of political turbulence have dramatically increased. The international political, legal and normative structures which have developed since 1945 are being challenged. Global survival is being undermined by climate change; erosion of biodiversity; accelerating conventional, nuclear and space weapons research; growing economic inequality; and continuing poverty. Since the research and report were completed, every aspect of international relations as well as domestic society has been transformed by the global COVID-19 pandemic. While this report does not directly address issues specific to the pandemic, it is highly likely that conflict will continue, and though its causes are likely to evolve in the new COVID-normal, the search for means of preventing violence and of enhancing peacebuilding will continue to be a high priority.

Many of today’s violent conflicts relate to group-based grievances arising from inequality, exclusion, and feelings of injustice (UN&WB, 2018: 108). When a group comes to believe that the state or other groups can be blamed for their exclusion, those grievances may become sufficiently intense to motivate violence. Emotions, collective memories, frustration over unmet expectations, and a narrative that rouses a group to violence can all play a role in mobilisation of violent protest.

2 Regrettably the Australian Civil-Military Centre was not in a position to support the research in 2017 so it was not possible to extend the scope to interviews with a significant number of police and defence personnel.
But there is more involved than just evidence of exclusion and enormous inequality of income and wealth. More national conflicts are being internationalised and global disruptions are contributing to the surge of violence. Disruptions such as the movements of large groups of people, rapid expansion of information technology, the spread of extremist ideologies, and climate change are all exacerbating existing tensions and increasing the intensity of conflicts. In addition, non-state actors are increasingly engaging in warfare, making it much more difficult for states to intervene diplomatically. Even development itself can lead to conflict as benefits are difficult to distribute equitably.

During the first decade of the twenty-first century the total number of fatalities in the world due to organised violence averaged 35,000 a year, but between 2011 and 2014 this dramatically increased to 131,000 (Allanson et al., 2017: 574). This increase was driven principally by Daesh and the internationalised civil war in Syria, where there has been a total of over 500,000 deaths since 2011 (The Economist, 5 September 2019). The number of conflicts occurring globally since 2014 have been characterized by the highest number of [state-based] armed conflict since 1946. For the fourth consecutive year UCDP [Uppsala Conflict Data Program] registered more than 50 ongoing conflicts (Smith et al., 2019). In 2018 ‘the number of fatalities due to organized violence decreased for the fourth consecutive year, to reach the lowest level since 2012’, Pettersson, Högbladh and 2019: 127, 129).

As well as the sudden eruption of civil war in Syria and of Daesh-led aggression in 2011, conflicts causing more than 25 battle deaths a year continued in 23 other countries, including Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Colombia, Congo, Mali, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. While interstate conflict remains rare, 20 of these conflicts became internationalized by troops from external states supporting one or both sides of a conflict. External troop involvement tends to increase lethality and the duration of the conflict. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) reports that in 2017 the USA was involved in more such conflicts than any other country (UCDP, 2017: 537; Pettersson et al., 2019).

These conflicts have been protracted and some are likely to continue to be so. Risks of new outbreaks remain high. Armed groups have increased in both number and diversity. Much of the recent violence has been in urban areas. Between 2010 and 2016 the number of civilian deaths in violent conflict doubled (Allanson et al., 2017). Many civilian deaths have been due to destruction of hospitals, killing of medical staff, food shortages, destruction of houses, contaminated water and the spread of disease. UNHCR estimates that 71million people are currently displaced globally (UNHCR, 2019). The number of internally displaced people multiplied by five times between 2005 and 2016. The largest numbers of refugees come from Afghanistan, South Sudan and Syria, half of them children.

The damage to development can be enormous. The World Bank found that countries affected by violent conflict from 1981 to 2005 had a poverty rate 21 per cent higher than equivalent countries without violent conflict (WDR 2011: 60). Young men, the main fighters in these conflicts, are often killed, disappear or are imprisoned after violent conflict. Poorly trained fighters in civil wars frequently target civilians with great brutality. Gender-based violence often follows the breakdown of the social and moral order and is extensive. Roughly 80 percent of refugees and internally displaced people are women and children. Organised violence is a far more severe economic problem than an occasional economic crisis.

Violent conflicts sometimes spill over into adjacent states, but whether or not that happens, neighbouring countries commonly become a refuge for people driven from their homes. Adjacent countries often suffer from disrupted trade, environmental damage, lost tourism and sharply increased security costs. This can massively increase their need for financial assistance; food, accommodation and other supplies; technical assistance; and assisting with emergency support for refugees and their absorption. The substantial international assistance packages for Jordan and Lebanon are cases in point.

The response of some strategists to the upsurge in violent conflict, most notably in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, and of terrorism between 2011 and 2014, was to advocate a general increase in military spending, and this has been happening (Smith et al, SIPRI, 2019). In 2018 global military expenditure was estimated to be US $1822 billion, which is 2.1 per cent of global GDP; $239 per person. US military spending in 2018 was $649 billion, 36% of global military expenditure. The other four biggest military spenders in 2018 were China at $250 billion; Russia, Saudi Arabia and India. So military expenditure by the US was 2.6 times larger than that of China. Australia’s defence expenditure is also increasing discussed in Chapter 3.

These trends further compel a globalised imperative towards security through increasing efforts to prevent violent conflicts and support positive peace. This is best achieved through political rather than military means. Accordingly, there is a great need to understand how to best build on the diplomatic capacity of states to contribute to the prevention, mitigation and transformation of conflicts.
A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMATIC EXPERIENCES IN PEACEMAKING AND PEACEBUILDING

Australia is among the UN Member States currently grappling with how to respond to this challenge and enhance policies and programs in support of conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

Since its important contribution to Cambodia’s negotiated settlement in the early 1990’s, Australia has provided various types of support to a range of peace processes in the Indo-Pacific region (Breen, 2016; Martin, Shea & Langmore, 2017). Respected Australian international relations leaders, such as former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans (2016), who led Australian peacemaking efforts in Cambodia, see Australia as having capacity and credibility to draw on in this area, but that it has often lacked political will to do as much as it could and should. Professor John Braithwaite (2017: 6) echoes this view, that Australia has instructive recent regional experience, for example in Cambodia, Solomon Islands and Bougainville and that this gives Australia enough credibility to be a bigger contributor internationally and build its credibility further (Braithwaite, 2017:6). However, ascertaining what role Australia can play - and its capacity to do so - could usefully be informed by knowledge of what that practice has been in the past.

Cambodia is an example where Australia had a clear and important role in support of the peace process. Australia was heavily involved in the deal brokered between the many factions in Cambodia and negotiated and signed in Paris in 1991. Gareth Evans advocated and collaborated to develop a proposal that suggested a substantially enhanced UN role in the transition period. For people involved like then-Foreign Minister Evans, it remains a clear example of what Australia can do in this area (Evans, 2016).

The Australian Government continued its support of Cambodia’s democratic aspirations, following up diplomatic encouragement with military support to the United Nations missions: first as part of the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), then the larger United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), whose role was to supervise the ceasefire and the subsequent general election. Australian General John Sanderson led the military component that was integral to the success of UNTAC’s mission (Horner & Connor, 2014).

For General Sanderson, Cambodia was an opportunity for Australia to become engaged in South East Asia in a way that would lay a future foundation for its role in Asia. Reflecting on Australia’s motivation to engage in the peace process in Cambodia, Sanderson says, “Now you could only engage on the basis that you were going to deliver something constructive to the Cambodian people that would endure.” (Miletic, 2016) John Sanderson also sees the value in reflecting on the Cambodian experience, and in using its experiences for re-visioning how Australia can improve its relations in a vastly different global arena.

To date, while there have been some authoritative descriptions of concrete examples of Australian peacekeeping and peace operations, there has been no systematic review documenting, monitoring or developing the Australian experience of support for conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

METHODOLOGY

The Australian International Conflict Resolution Project (AICRP) at the University of Melbourne undertook an analysis of Australian diplomatic experiences in conflict contexts in the years since 1990. Interviews were conducted principally with current and former Australian diplomats, and a few defence personnel, Australian Federal Police and other public servants, and academics and INGO staff who have also engaged in situations of conflict. Any experience relating to conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding through negotiation, mediation or conciliation, formal or informal, official or unofficial, or any other form of peacebuilding, was regarded as relevant.

The aim of the project has been to provide a sound basis for advancing pragmatic, evidence-based policy proposals to DFAT to develop its conflict prevention and peacebuilding programs. Central to achieving this goal has been the conduct of an empirically grounded analysis of the engagement of Australian diplomatic personnel in peace processes since 1990. The study tries to expand knowledge of the range of Australian diplomatic experiences; to articulate those experiences in such a way that they can be the basis for enhanced knowledge, policy and practices. It is not an evaluation of these efforts or their impacts, which are multi-faceted and the matter of multiple and varied studies. It is not an examination of the experiences and perspectives of other states, parties, actors, agencies and organisations who offer different perspectives in relation to other conflict contexts. And, while we recognise the importance of how peacemaking and peacebuilding missions are received in conflict-affected contexts, this has been covered well by other researchers, and is mostly beyond the scope of the study.

The Project benefited from the past work of Project team member Associate Professor Bob Breen, Australia’s preeminent researcher and historian of official histories of contemporary Australian peacekeeping operations in the Pacific Islands (1980-2006) and Africa (Somalia and Rwanda 1993-95). With the project aims in mind, Bob has revisited existing data, interviews, analysis and publications to provide context and nuance to what have been the major regional contributions to peace processes. Included here as Chapter 2, this work helps build a foundation for increased attention to the unique and varied diplomatic contributions to these missions and others.
This is a qualitative study focused on in-depth interviews with mostly current and former government personnel who can provide insight into the nature and extent of Australian engagement in international conflicts. The intention was to understand how Australian officials who have been involved in conflict resolution activities reflect on their experience in terms of possible professional, bureaucratic and institutional ‘lessons learned’, to assist the Government in making this field a more prominent aspect of Australian foreign policy. The project aimed to document, describe and analyse the nature and extent of Australian diplomats’ experience in conflict resolution, how this is institutionally supported and implemented, and how persons with experience in conflict resolution see challenges and opportunities for developing capabilities at the personnel, organisational and strategic levels.

The interviewees were not asked to comment on theoretical debates on the role, nature or effectiveness of conflict prevention, peacemaking or peacebuilding approaches. These may be elicited to some extent through subjective descriptions given but were not the focus of the questions. Through interview discussions, the research team hoped to analyse and identify areas for improvements in Australia’s preparation and potential for playing a more active conflict prevention and peacebuilding role. Experiences were discussed with emphasis on the institutional arrangements, methodologies and professional capacities in the Department.

The Project has been undertaken in several stages. After the preliminary literature review, the researchers conducted test interviews and then consulted with DFAT officers about the proposed design, methods and details of the interview program, and to identify staff with whom to begin interviewing. The central part of the research was the identification and interviewing of key Australian government personnel who had worked or are working in DFAT and who have been engaged in any activities relating to conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding since 1990. Through identifying an initial list of people to contact, it was envisaged that some would be known and contactable (such as current employees and people who have moved on to other departments or who are still contactable), whilst others would be identified through word of mouth. In this way, a snowball approach was used to further the reach and ensure that past staff and personnel were included. The qualitative interviews were conducted in person where feasible, or by Skype or teleconference. With permission, interviews were often recorded for research accuracy and transcribed for analysis.

The interview guide focused on six main areas of participant enquiry:

1. What was the interviewees’ experience of peacebuilding, prevention or peacemaking?
2. What background, preparation or training shaped that experience?
3. What support mechanisms did they draw on within their institution or from other agencies?
4. What policies, procedures or planning processes guided or limited engagement?
5. Based on their experience, what are their reflections on the role of prevention/peacebuilding in Australian foreign policy?
6. What opportunities to prevent conflict has Australia missed and what are the opportunities to do more?

For each of these six guiding questions, a series of sub-questions were mentioned to guide researchers to detail worth pursuing. These included such issues as: the reasons for their engagement; their tasking and briefing; the nature of their contact; the extent of their authorised involvement; the length and breadth of their contact; and the nature of their relationships with participants in the conflict.

Centrally important were their observations, reflections and opinions about the opportunities they were given, their preparation, training and briefing; the impediments and difficulties they experienced in attempting conflict prevention, conciliation, mediation and so on; and what they would, in retrospect, have done differently and what lessons they felt they had learned through their involvement.

Other questions aimed to elicit whether they believed that Australia should make conflict prevention through to peacebuilding a more significant part of its foreign policy and what practical advice they had on how it might do so; and what policy and personnel changes should be considered to facilitate and encourage greater Australian involvement in support of peace processes.
The research team at the University of Melbourne has overall responsibility for the management of data and records, but given the collaborative nature of the research, an initial phase included clarification and documentation of ownership of research data with DFAT; and where data involved sensitive or confidential matters, arrangements were agreed between the University and DFAT, in line with the University’s policies. The primary data consisted of notes and transcripts from over 120 interviews. Informed consent for all interviewees and consent to record interviews for transcription purposes only was obtained. The researchers ensured that all data collected as part of the research was accurate, complete, authentic and reliable and was stored securely on password protected university computers and enterprise servers.

NVivo12 software was used for the data management, coding and analysis. The researchers ensured that only de-identified data was entered into the program. Anonymised summaries of research cases are stored on central University servers and following publication or public release of the Project’s analytic research, retained centrally on University of Melbourne servers.

The following chapter is a case study by Associate Professor Bob Breen, who was asked to join the research team because he had both personal experience of several Australian peacekeeping missions and knowledge from his work Breen (2016), *The Good Neighbour: The Official History of Australian peace support operations in the Pacific Islands 1980-2006*. The chapter provides a thorough discussion of the two most recent major peacebuilding missions in which Australia has been involved – in Bougainville and Solomon Islands. His chapter for this Report focuses on seven lessons of the past that should inform Australia’s peace building in the Pacific Islands in the future, especially in light of increasing Chinese strategic interest in developing soft power in Australia’s near region. He proposes a new Australian humanitarian policy towards the Pacific Islands. It draws on the lessons from a decade of Australian intervention in the mid-1990s to mid-2000s when Australia restored its reputation as a reliable, preferred and valued partner for peace and community development.
CHAPTER 2: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHERE TO GO: LESSONS FROM PARTNERING FOR PEACE IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR BOB BREEN OAM

Future military challenges cannot be overcome by military means alone, and they extend well beyond the traditional domain of any single government agency or department. They require our government to operate with unity, agility, and creativity, and will require devoting considerably more resources to non-military instruments of national power.

US Secretary of Defence Robert M Gates, 26 January 2008

This chapter provides an analysis of Australia’s support of peace in the Pacific Islands between 1980 and 2006. The chapter draws on the author’s extensive research and extant literature and provides a strong framework to view the current qualitative study of Australian diplomatic experiences in conflict prevention and peacebuilding between 1990 and 2018. The aim is to draw lessons to assist the Australian Government and its departments and agencies to identify and respond to the causes of conflict and to develop new policy and programming tools for early action in response to emerging risks of conflict and instability. The emphasis is on conflict prevention, conflict resolution (negotiation, mediation, conciliation as well as formal or informal, and official or unofficial, interventions), peacebuilding before and after conflict (rather than the history of the circumstances leading to), conduct of military/police interventions that are adequately covered in the literature and a volume of official history. Drawing on these lessons, the paper concludes with an option for policy enhancement for conflict prevention in the Pacific Islands. In the later chapters, these are considered alongside the project findings and recommendations.

Partnering for peace in the Pacific Islands from the 1980s to 2006 was a 26-year journey of discovery and trial and error, with frustrations and failures before success. There are many lessons from this journey for meeting threats to peace in the future. The referendums in New Caledonia in November 2018, and in Bougainville in November-December 2019, continuing internal law and order problems in PNG, the fragility of the Solomon Islands polity, the impact of climate change on micro-states in the region and the increasing presence of Chinese commercial interests and government-sponsored development programs suggest that these lessons may need to be applied sooner rather than later.

STRATEGIC RAISON D’ETRE FOR PARTNERING FOR PEACE

Australia’s strategic imperatives for partnering for peace have their roots in the Pacific War when Japanese military forces threatened the Australian homeland. Every Defence White Paper since 1976 has nominated the security of Australia’s regional neighbourhood as the second strategic priority after the defence of Australian territorial sovereignty. This high defence priority is primarily about protecting trade routes. The location of Melanesia astride trade routes and the proximity of other Pacific Islands nations to them has and will continue to oblige Australian engagement to ensure stability and to maintain influence.

Australia has never sought hegemony in the Pacific Islands. The nature of Australia’s support for peace was and continues to be geopolitical neighbourly engagement rather than any aspirations for or to enforce hegemony. It was ‘neighbourly’ because humanitarianism with both religious and secular origins has shaped Australian efforts in the Pacific Islands from colonial times. Christian missionaries emanating from Europe and Australia in the 19th and 20th centuries established a religious humanitarian tradition of outreach. Australia’s secular humanitarian obligations originated in the League of Nations and then in UN expectations on behalf of the international community that Australia would safeguard the well-being of Pacific Islanders, especially in trust territories, such as Papua and New Guinea. There is no better contemporary example of this enduring humanitarian characteristic than Australia’s responses to regional natural disasters. Until recent concerns about growing Chinese influence, no nation with military power projection has been interested in the Pacific Islands. Threats to stability have come from internal developmental challenges after decolonisation rather than from inimical international intrusion. Drawing on an Australian Strategic Policy Institute report, the Official History of Australia’s peace support operations in the Pacific Islands observes:

Despite Australia’s efforts to assist its Pacific Island neighbours meet the challenges of nationhood, political, social and economic conditions in the region deteriorated [after decolonisation] (Breen, 2016: 4). Bestowed Westminster systems in PNG, Fiji and Solomon Islands proved to be ‘an ill-fitting overlay of state institutions’ that competed with chiefly systems, clans and traditional custom for the allegiances of civil society and struggled to manage ethnic diversity (Breen, 2016: 43 – 55).

5 The 2014 visit to Fiji by Chinese President Xi Jinping confirmed publicly the growing Chinese strategic intentions in the Pacific Islands. Until then, there were no powers encroaching on or competing for strategic influence in the Pacific Islands since the Japanese invasion of 1942.
POST CONFLICT RESOLUTION – BOUGAINVILLE AND SOLOMON ISLANDS

This chapter’s focus will be on Bougainville, PNG’s easternmost province, and Solomon Islands. Though geographically close, the nature and purpose of these neighbourhood interventions were quite different. Both would transition from peacekeeping operations back to development programs. Just over 6,500 Australian military peacekeepers and peace enforcers, as well as around 700 civilian peace monitors served in Bougainville and Solomon Islands, and participated in evacuation contingency operations in the waters off Fiji and Solomon Islands until 2006. Since then there has been no serious instability in the region, possibly a testament to successful intervention, enduring partnerships and better aid programs.

There was an overlap. While regional intervention into Solomon Islands escalated in the early 2000s, intervention into Bougainville de-escalated and ceased after the deployment of a small civilian peace monitoring team for six months until December 2003. As the peace process to resolve the Bougainville Crisis began in earnest in 1997 and early 1998, after the deployment of the 250-strong New Zealand-led regional Truce Monitoring Group (TMG), followed by a 260-strong Australian-led Peace Monitoring Group (PMG), ethnic tensions and violence in Solomon Islands increased, exacerbating systemic problems with governance, economic exploitation, and the maintenance of law and order. Australia brokered a Solomon Islands peace agreement in Townsville in late 2000 and sponsored the deployment of a small regional contingent of unarmed civilian and police peacekeepers in 2001-2002, called the International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) that failed to facilitate any meaningful disarmament of competing ethnic militias and semi-criminal elements.

Continuing threats of violence against an elected Solomon Islands government prompted the Pacific Islands’ largest peace enforcement operation, the Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in July 2003, following an invitation from the Solomon Islands Prime Minister. The coercive phase of this intervention wound down to a garrison force in 2004 and the much more challenging work of institutional capacity building continued for another 13 years until final withdrawal in 2017.

It is a credit to those who led interventions into Bougainville and Solomon Islands for nearly ten years that only four Australian servicemen and one Australian Protective Service officer died during their time in Melanesia and a few score more service personnel, Australian Federal Police (AFP), Australian Protective Service Officers and civil servants suffered physical and mental harm. Much of the credit for keeping most Australian and regional peacekeepers and peace enforcers safe goes to the peoples of Bougainville, Solomon Islands and Tonga in 2006 who recognised that those who came did so to keep, or to enforce peace.

It is also a credit to the mindsets and ethos of hundreds of Australian armed peace enforcers in Bougainville in 1994, in Solomon Islands in 2003-2006 and a 50-strong ADF contingent in Tonga in 2006 that not one shot was fired to achieve their missions of restoring law and order and disarming militia groups, a rare and outstanding achievement in the history of international peace support operations. Though most of them had little experience of the Pacific Islands, they came with a neighbourly approach and an intention to do no harm.

The next sections of this chapter will draw upon Australia’s Official History of peace support operations in the Pacific Islands and will direct readers to parts of this history that contain more detailed information.

NATURE OF AUSTRALIA’S PARTNERING FOR PEACE IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

The story begins in the 1970s when colonial powers, Britain, and less comprehensively, France, withdrew from the Pacific Islands. Australia facilitated the independence of its trust territories in Papua and New Guinea (PNG) in 1975. Australia adopted a policy of diplomatic advice and encouragement as well as development aid as its contribution to the political and economic stability of PNG and other Pacific Island states.

It was unrealistic to have expected Australian aid programs to stop political and economic decline without re-colonisation. However, military coups in Fiji in 1987, the Bougainville crisis in the 1990s that included periodic instability in Port Moresby, PNG’s capital, and instability in Solomon Islands in the 2000s prompted the deployment of Australia’s armed services and police into the region. These interventions were characterised by restraint and, over time, more respectful collaboration with Pacific Island neighbours.

A pertinent question is whether more could have been done to ameliorate political instability before dissatisfaction with the status quo erupted into violence against persons and property. Australian diplomats and development aid officials serving in posts in Port Moresby, Honiara and Nuku’alofa were not expected to extend their activities beyond generic advice to Pacific Island politicians and civil society on the merits of political stability for economic prosperity, societal cohesion and maintaining the rule of law. Unlike the United States, Australia did not have the equivalent of the Central intelligence Agency (CIA) with a mandate to discover, monitor and, when required, neutralise political threats that were deemed not to be in Australia’s national interests.
Australian efforts to support peace in the Pacific Islands until 2006 did include consideration by diplomats in the region about the origins, nature and progress of political stability, but according to official histories, adherence to principles of sovereignty and democratic ideals constrained diplomatic or military intervention until regional governments extended invitations for intervention. The lesson from this period is that policies of providing advice and waiting and hoping for resolution of political differences and better behaviour by political elites, key stakeholders and dissidents before they became crises did not prevent conflict. Pre-emptive intervention was politically unsustainable, but history shows that there were proactive policy options that would not have breached sovereignty or suggested hegemonic ambition. The future can draw on these lessons to enhance Australian policies for conflict prevention.

EVALUATIVE LESSONS

There were seven evaluative lessons from Australian approaches to supporting peace from 1980 to 2006 that ushered in just over a decade of peace that is only now being reassessed in response to increasing Chinese influence in the Pacific Islands and the Bougainville Referendum. Within each of these educative and progressive evolutions were foregone opportunities for earlier identification of causes, negotiation, mediation, conciliation as well as formal or informal and official or unofficial initiatives for peace.

LESSON 1 - AUSTRALIA’S DISPOSITION TO INTERVENE

Initially, Australian governments were reluctant to intervene in the Pacific Islands in response to increasing political and civil unrest or worsening political, economic and social problems. In the 1980s Australian governments did not appear to know what was going on in the Pacific islands aside from routine diplomatic reporting from its posts. There is no publicly available evidence that Australian governments collected intelligence in the Pacific Islands or conducted covert operations targeting disruptive individuals or groups with intentions to persuade them to cease violent political dissent. As mentioned above, Australia did not have the equivalent of the CIA protecting its national interests beyond its borders and the Australian Security and Intelligence Service had no CIA-like mandate.

The secessionist rebellion in the days-old state of Vanuatu, formerly the British-French territories called New Hebrides, in 1980 confirmed this laissez faire approach to regional instability. The Fraser Government was caught unawares and was neither prepared nor disposed to intervene. The Cabinet was not overly interested in acting except to lobby Vanuatu’s former colonial masters, Britain and France, to hang back from complete withdrawal after granting independence to quell the rebellion. PNG surprised Australia by conducting the Pacific Islands’ first peace enforcement operation. Reluctantly and hurriedly, the Australian Cabinet authorised the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to support the PNG Defence Force operation with advisors, air transport, communications, logistics and a radio-intercept aircraft. A change of government in 1983 did not result in a more informed and proactive approach to supporting peace in the Pacific Islands until growing instability erupted into violence. The Hawke and Keating Governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s were selectively disposed to intervention. Though the Hawke Government was both prepared and committed to sending troops to Vanuatu in 1988 after an outbreak of civil unrest in the capital, Port Vila, there was limited interest for intervening militarily in Fiji or in the PNG province of Bougainville at the prospect of civil unrest in 1987 or 1989 respectively, except to evacuate Australian citizens and other approved nationals if they were endangered. Contrary to the tenets of its own policy slogan of ‘constructive commitment’ to collaboration with South Pacific neighbours, the Hawke Government did not assume the role of regional peace maker. Prime Minister Hawke did offer to lead a Pacific Islands delegation from the Commonwealth Secretariat to negotiate for the resolution of the Fijian constitutional crisis in 1987 but his offer was rebuffed.

No conflict prevention action was contemplated when resentments due to the extreme inequities in the Bougainville copper agreement and the profound environmental damage caused by the mine generated strong resentment and hostility. There was no initiative seeking South Pacific Forum or Commonwealth mediation, or a regional peacekeeping intervention into the central region of Bougainville in 1989 in response to the sabotage of a mine and a subsequent outbreak of separatism. The policy at the time was that the Bougainville crisis was an internal problem for the PNG Government to solve. This position over-estimated the capacity and capability of an inexperienced PNG national government and its security forces to manage a Bougainvillean insurgency, partly provoked and intensified by the behaviour of its security forces. The brutal ‘bash and burn’ tactics of internal security operations in the Highlands of mainland PNG did not work in Bougainville. Bougainville rebels proved to be better organised and more committed to resisting PNG’s security forces.

Australia’s policy of supporting the sovereignty of the PNG state obligated Australian opposition to Bougainvillean secessionism. That opposition did not extend to assisting PNG security forces to quell secessionism by deploying Australian troops to Bougainville. The Hawke Government intervened through supplying the PNGDF with arms and ammunition, allowing helicopters donated for western border protection to be employed further east in Bougainville and ordering the ADF to train PNGDF personnel for operations in Bougainville.

6 See The Good Neighbour Chapter 2.
7 See ibid, Chapter 3 for more detail on Fiji coups in 1987.
8 See ibid, Chapter 4 for more detail on initial Australian Government responses to the emerging Bougainville Crisis.
This type of indirect, pseudo-intervention did not meet anyone’s expectations and had negative consequences. On one hand the PNGDF expected the deployment of Australian combat troops, as well as logistic, communications and transport support. Indirect Australian military support was never enough for the PNGDF. The lack of cooperation for military diplomatic visits to Bougainville in the early 1990s, as well as for the regional intervention into Arawa to protect a peace conference in 1994, and the snub of a senior officer visit in 1997 demonstrated that millions of dollars of aid from Australia’s Department of Defence did not necessarily translate into influence and respect.9

By supporting PNG’s security forces, the Hawke and Keating Governments were left in the uncomfortable position of supporting a deleterious military campaign culpable for increasingly well-publicised human rights abuses. This was a contradiction of Australia’s contemporary neighbourhood humanitarian impulses towards its Pacific Islands neighbours and removed any possibility in the early 1990s that Australia would be a neutral third party to convene negotiations between the PNG Government and Bougainvillean secessionists.10

The Howard Government was elected just before a teachable moment in Pacific Islands’ history. Though just as cautious as the Keating Government about signalling any support for secessionism in PNG, it was the Chan Government’s employment of South African mercenaries with unsavoury reputations to fight in Bougainville that gave Prime Minister John Howard and his Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, sufficient political justification for more assertive peacekeeping, promises of aid delivery directly to Bougainville and to exert political pressure for a peacekeeping intervention.11

Concurrently, initiatives from New Zealand Foreign Minister, Don McKinnon, that resulted in talks in Burnham Army Camp in 1997, brought to fruition seeds that had been sown by Australia and Pacific Islands allies in 1994 about protecting a peace conference in Arawa and during peace talks in Cairns in 1995. The RAAF and RNZAF cooperated well to move delegations that helped strengthen Australia and New Zealand’s military-to-military partnership for peace in the Pacific Islands. After the initial New Zealand-led intervention into Bougainville in late 1997, the Howard Government collaborated generously with New Zealand and regional allies, Fiji and Vanuatu, in Bougainville for the next six years.12 Comfortable with the success of regional collaboration in Bougainville, the Howard Government turned to New Zealand and its other regional neighbours to participate in the IPMT in Solomon Islands 2000-2002. That was followed by the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in 2003 which evolved into a long term ‘whole-of-region’ capacity building intervention from 2004 until 2017.13

Unfortunately, the requirement to respond rapidly to breakdowns in law and order did not disappear after the Howard Government and regional allies intervened in Melanesia in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Short notice peace enforcement operations into Solomon Islands in April and Tonga in November 2006 to restore law and order in capital cities, as well as a contingency deployment of a maritime task force with embarked troops to the waters off Fiji (in anticipation of another coup precipitating civil unrest in Suva), consolidated Australia’s enduring enforcement role in public safety emergencies in the Pacific Islands.14 By 2006 Australian Governments had evolved from reluctance to intervene, except to protect and evacuate Australian citizens, to automatic intervention in emergencies with Pacific Islands government permission to protect the lives and property of Pacific Islanders. Within this increasing disposition and confidence to intervene, the nature of Australia’s efforts to support peace in the Pacific Islands changed. The new dimensions that evolved over time were the concurrent developments of a ‘whole-of-government’ ethos and a ‘whole-of-region’ approach, as well as deepening a partnership with New Zealand.

**LESSON 2 - EVOLUTION OF A ‘WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT’ ETHOS**

The second evolutionary lesson from Australia’s 25 years of regional partnering for peace was the development of a ‘whole-of-government’ ethos. A Defence-DFAT partnership within the Australian Government for supporting peace in the Pacific Islands was a ‘bottom-up’ rather than a ‘top-down’ evolutionary process, well-illustrated in 1997 during the planning for Australia’s participation in the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG), and its successor Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) for deployment to Bougainville. While planning in Canberra and later in Wellington between DFAT and Defence representatives, as well as between New Zealand diplomatic and NZDF representatives, and some senior Australian Defence officials and ADF officers, was inharmonious at times, lower-level partnerships formed quickly between Australian diplomats and ADF officers out of necessity and with a sense of common purpose.15 Fortunately, DFAT was able to deploy officials with extensive experience in the Pacific Islands to Bougainville and Solomon Islands to compensate for the paucity of Pacific Islands experience among ADF PMG commanders and senior military staff in Bougainville, as well as among ADF officers and AFP federal agents deployed in support of peacekeeping and policing operations in Solomon Islands.

9 See ibid, Chapters 4 for more detail on policy making at this time.
10 See ibid, Chapters 5-6 for more detail on initiatives to solve the Bougainville Crisis until the election of the Howard Government in 1996.
11 See ibid, Chapters 7-16 for more detail on the Australian intervention into Bougainville.
12 See ibid, Chapters 17-21 for more detail on the Australian intervention into Solomon Islands.
13 See ibid, Chapters 22 and 24 for more detail on Australian responses to breakdowns in law and order in Solomon Islands and Tonga in 2006.
14 See ibid, Chapter 8 for more detail on these tensions and difficulties.
The partnership of ADF commanders and Australian diplomats, as well as the introduction of civilian peace monitors that included AFP and regional police in Bougainville established precedents for interventions to Solomon Islands in 2000 and 2003. By 2003, the Howard Government was confident enough to field a triumvirate diplomat-police-military leadership team for Australian peace support operations in the Pacific Islands - a senior diplomat commanded RAMSI, an AFP Assistant Commissioner coordinated the operation and a large ADF task force, commanded by a lieutenant colonel supported policing operations. The partnership of ADF commanders and Australian diplomats, as well as the introduction of civilian peace monitors that included AFP and regional police in Bougainville established precedents for interventions to Solomon Islands in 2000 and 2003. By 2003, the Howard Government was confident enough to field a triumvirate diplomat-police-military leadership team for Australian peace support operations in the Pacific Islands - a senior diplomat commanded RAMSI, an AFP Assistant Commissioner coordinated the operation and a large ADF task force, commanded by a lieutenant colonel supported policing operations.15

The development of a ‘whole-of-government’ ethos included employing an increasing array of military assets to support peace processes, rather than only employ the ADF to protect unarmed peacekeepers or to enforce peace. Military involvement began with the employment of New Zealand and later Australian naval vessels as neutral and safe venues for peace talks in the 1990s and early 2000s. Subsequently, RAN vessels also became platforms for providing logistic support, including medical facilities, and accommodating evacuees on one occasion. The most prominent vessel during 26 years of supporting peace in the Pacific Islands from 1980 to 2006 was HMAS Tobruk, often supported by HMAS Success for initial deployments. HMAS Konirniblo and sister ship, HMAS Manoora, added significant capability to maritime support for peace support operations in the early 2000s. The commissioning of HMAS Canberra in 2014 and HMAS Adelaide in 2015 has given Australia ample maritime capabilities to support peace in the Pacific Islands over the coming decades.

The RAAF joined the RAN in support of Australian and New Zealand peacemaking in the 1990s. The work horses for flying delegates to and from talks and later providing air resupply for peace support operations in Bougainville and Solomon Islands were C130 Hercules aircraft as well as DHC-4 Caribou transport aircraft. The Army’s UHIIH Iroquois and S-70A-9 Black Hawk helicopters provided close air support for peacekeepers onshore, and were useful for ferrying local leaders from around Bougainville Island to the series of meetings that were ultimately critical to the success of the peace process.

The Australian Army came of age as a versatile Pacific Islands intervention force in Solomon Islands in 2000 for evacuation operations and for peace enforcement in 2003 and 2006. The command and control transition for these operations was for DFAT and the AFP to direct the ADF rather than the ADF set priorities and direct activities. This was best illustrated by the 3rd Brigade task force group supporting RAMSI in 2003. In 1994 Brigadier Peter Abigail, who commanded Operation Lagoon, had been accompanied by one diplomat, but no other government officials. In 2003 Nick Warner, a diplomat, had been accompanied by a staff of government officials, a large AFP contingent and an even larger ADF joint and combined task force.

However, the need for a flood of heavily armed troops into the streets of a Melanesian capital city intent on protecting life and property had not ended. Next time Australian troops deployed to Honiara from Australia in an emergency in 2006, the AFP contingent and regional police were under pressure and a strong show of military force was required. This emphasised that within the ‘whole-of-government’ ethos, the ADF must still be a strong and agile peace enforcer, but one that quickly establishes sufficient deterrent presence and hands back control to DFAT and the AFP as soon as possible.17

**LESSON 3 - EVOLUTION OF A ‘WHOLE OF REGION’ APPROACH**

The third evolutionary lesson for partnering for peace in the Pacific Islands was the maturing of a ‘whole-of-region’ approach. Australian Governments were not interested in or considered feasible the involvement of regional neighbours, except for New Zealand, for interventions in the Pacific Islands in the 1980s. The evacuation contingency operation to the waters off Fiji in 1987, the stand-by operation to intervene in Port Vila in 1988 and Operation Deference, the stand-by contingency operation for the evacuation of Australian nationals and other approved persons from Bougainville in 1989/90 did not include regional contingents.

For the intervention to protect the Arawa peace conference in 1994, it was the PNG Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan, who persuaded regional neighbours Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu to participate. Like the intervention into Espiritu Santo in Vanuatu in 1980, it was PNG that took the initiative.18 Even for the intervention into Bougainville in 1997 it was New Zealand that sought Fijian and Ni Vanuatu participation. Australian Foreign Ministers, Gareth Evans and Alexander Downer warmly supported the development of a ‘whole-of-region’ approach in Bougainville in 1994 and 1997 respectively but were not the initiators.

It was the successful and beneficial participation of Pacific Islands neighbours in Bougainville in 1994 and 1997, and Australian leadership of the multi-national intervention into East Timor in 1999 that gave the Howard Government the confidence to involve representatives from Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) countries with the PIF’s imprimatur in the IPMT and RAMSI in Solomon Islands. Indeed, RAMSI became the exemplar of a ‘whole-of-region’ approach because every member of the PIF participated. This was a unanimous affirmation of the Howard Government’s evolving inclusive neighbourhood approach.19

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15 See ibid, Chapters 19-20 for more detail on setting up unique command and control arrangements for regional intervention into Solomon Islands.
16 See ibid, Chapter 6 for more detail on Operation Lagoon, the brief military intervention into Bougainville in 1994.
17 See ibid, Chapter 22 for more detail on emergency interventions into Solomon Islands in 2006.
18 See Chapter 6 Coalition Building for more detail on forming the regional coalition for intervention into Bougainville in 1994.
19 See ibid, Chapter 22 - ‘The journey so far and Conclusion’ for more analysis of the Howard Government’s ‘whole-of-region’ approach.
The other important evolution in achieving a ‘whole-of-region’ approach was the Howard Government’s initiative in brokering of the Biketawa Declaration in 2000. In 1980 there were no agreements or protocols for peace-making, peacekeeping or peace enforcement in the Pacific Islands. After several ad hoc peace-making efforts by New Zealand, and then the Commonwealth Secretariat in the early 1990s, followed by Australian and New Zealand-led peacekeeping operations during the Bougainville Crisis in the late 1990s, PIF leaders agreed to the Biketawa Declaration. This was a protocol for coordinating responses to regional security emergencies, at the annual PIF leaders’ meeting in Tarawa, Republic of Kiribati in October 2000. It proved to be timely when Australia and regional allies intervened into Solomon Islands with an unprecedented show of military force to support a substantial deployment of Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Islands police in 2003.20

Australia’s evolution towards a ‘whole-of-region’ approach circumvented the UN, because China would have vetoed authorization of a peacekeeping mission to the Solomons which had recognised Taiwan’s autonomy. However, all other Security Council members were supportive of the mission. Australia succeeded in effectively marshalling Pacific Islands nation support for this peacebuilding mission in their region. Human rights abuses in Bougainville attracted UN interest. Indeed, it was UN condemnation of continuing human rights abuses there in the early 1990s, prompted in part by Amnesty International reports, that aroused the Australian trade union movement to put pressure on the Hawke Government to intervene with a Parliamentary fact-finding visit to Bougainville in April 1994.21 Australia sponsored a brief but significant regional peacekeeping operation to protect delegates attending a peace conference in Arava in October 1994. If Australia had not responded with a Parliamentary delegation visit, it could have been a UN fact-finding mission acting under the aegis of the new UN (1992) ‘Agenda for Peace’ performing the same task. International attention and peacemaking might have followed.

The PNG Government was always sensitive to UN involvement in the resolution of the Bougainville crisis. A UN intervention, however small, internationalised what the PNG and Australian governments had hitherto maintained was an internal security problem that could be solved through the application of military pressure to create a strong negotiating position for the restoration of PNG sovereignty over Bougainville. In the end it was the failure of PNGDF military operations in 1997 and the PNG Government’s subsequent employment of mercenaries that created a stronger negotiating position for Bougainvillean secessionists to insist on UN involvement, checkmating PNG and Australian policy at the time. The PNG Government compromised on the deployment of a UN political office to Bougainville as part of implementing the Lincoln Agreement in 1998 in exchange for a concession from secessionists to postpone discussions on the conduct of a referendum on independence.

By 2006, the precedent was well established for Australia to include the PIF under the Biketawa Declaration when contemplating intervention. The Howard Government paid millions of dollars to implement its ‘whole-of-region’ approach, but evidence suggests that it was a wise investment in police-to-police and military-to-military relationships that would become useful for ongoing peace building for regional security. The absence of interventions after the year of turmoil in 2006 suggest that the ‘whole-of-region’ approach may have been working better for Australia’s national interests, as well as Pacific Islands stability than for Australia to only intervene unilaterally or only with New Zealand as a regional policeman in emergencies.

LESSON 4 - DEEPENING OF AN AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND PARTNERSHIP

The fourth evolutionary lesson for partnering for peace was the deepening of the Australian-New Zealand collaboration, which was forged to end the Bougainville crisis and brought together the two countries’ complementary attributes. In 1990 and 1991 New Zealand, a more acceptable peace maker for Bougainvillean secessionists than Australia, supported and facilitated peace talks but did not have sufficient resources to conduct long-term peacekeeping operations in support of ceasefires and agreements. In late 1997 after New Zealand convened two rounds of successful talks at Burnham Army camp and provided the leadership and resources for the initial four months of TMG peacekeeping, Australia then assumed the lead and provided resources for the subsequent five years of PMG peacekeeping support to the Bougainville peace process.

While there had been good cooperation between Australian and New Zealand diplomats, as well as Australian ministerial encouragement for New Zealand peacemaking efforts in the early 1990s, there were teething problems when it came to deploying the TMG to Bougainville in 1997. The Australian Department of Defence was wary of New Zealand committing Australian military resources in 1997. New Zealand command of the unarmed TMG did not sit comfortably with the ADF either. This led to friction and intermperate communications at times, though there was a shared understanding that something had to be done in Bougainville.22 The Australian and New Zealand Governments were at one in this endeavour. The momentum for deepening the partnership to meet challenges in Bougainville and Solomon Islands was inexorable. The longer-term involvement in RAMSI contributed to closer police-to-police and military-to-military partnerships. By 2006, Australia and New Zealand routinely combined their military and police resources in support of peace, while continuing close bilateral diplomatic consultations, as well as conferring with other regional neighbours, often in unison.

20 See ibid, Chapter 19 and Conclusion for more information on the Biketawa Declaration.
21 See ibid, Chapter 6 for factors leading to the 1994 intervention into Bougainville.
22 See Breen, The Good Neighbour, Chapter 8, for initial Australia-New Zealand relations for collaborating for intervening in Bougainville.
LESSON 5 – ROLE OF THE AFP

The fifth evolutionary lesson was the usefulness and evolution of the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Australian operational paradigms for responding with coercive force to instability in the Pacific Islands changed slowly. In 1988 Defence Minister, Kim Beazley and the CDF, General Peter Gration, were 15 years ahead of their time. Beazley was perceptive when he called for a more agile constabulary approach to responding to breakdowns in law and order in the Pacific Islands. The ADF could deploy heavily-armed troops to win a contest with armed hostile groups but was neither trained with the right mindset nor physically equipped for riot control and had no powers of arrest or detention. While troops could occupy a Pacific Islands capital, they were not trained or rehearsed for the restoration of law and order at community level, except through deterrent presence in support of local and regional police. Gration rightly recommended that the AFP ‘muscle up’ rather than the ADF ‘muscle down’.21

In the late 1980s when there were signs of instability there was little interest in Canberra for forming paramilitary or tactical policing units to standby for intervention to protect endangered Australian citizens or assist local security forces to restore law and order after outbreaks of civil unrest. The AFP did become involved in Pacific Islands law enforcement to counter transnational crime. The AFP also became involved in peacekeeping in a low-key way by sending pairs of police officers to Bougainville on three-month rotations, beginning in late 1997. In 2000, AFP officers participated in the IPMT in Solomon Islands but there was still no expectation that the AFP would be the lead agency for peace enforcement interventions in the Pacific Islands.

While all the contributing factors are difficult to discern, the formation of the AFP International Deployment Group (IDG) in 2004 was prompted by the Howard Government’s successful sponsorship of RAMSI and marked the beginning of the transition from military-led peacekeeping and peace enforcement to police-led operations. Contributing factors were increasing the number of AFP advisers and trainers deploying to work with Pacific Islands police forces, as well as the need to bolster efforts to counter transnational crime and the illicit international drug trade that were using Pacific Islands countries as conduits for drug shipments, as well as tax havens and places for laundering money. The Brahimi Report (UN, 2000) on the future of UN peacekeeping highlighted a new international role of police in future peacekeeping. As well, ad hoc arrangements for preparing and deploying AFP personnel to an increasing number of UN missions, in addition to peacekeeping missions in East Timor, Bougainville and Solomon Islands in the early 2000s, justified a more systematic approach to preparing, deploying, employing and sustaining AFP peacekeeping contingents.

The Operational Response Group (ORG) with riot control capabilities developed and grew in response to outbreaks of civil unrest in Solomon Islands and concerns that such events might occur elsewhere in Australia’s near region. The year of turmoil in Solomon Islands, Tonga and Fiji in 2006 resulted in the establishment of a 450-strong ORG in 2011, comprised of a deployable Tactical Response Team for responding to and resolving dangerous incidents and a Stability Response Team for responding to and quelling civil unrest.24

The AFP became prominent partners with their military compatriots in supporting peace in the Pacific Islands after 2000, and this relationship matured through necessity for interventions into Solomon Islands in 2000, 2003 and 2006. The Howard Government’s establishment of the IDG in 2004, that included special operations police capable of rapid deployment, to complement an increasing number of police and public service personnel assigned to peacekeeping missions in the Pacific Islands and elsewhere, was the single most important stimulus for the ascendency of the AFP for supporting peace in the Pacific Islands.

The choice to replace frontline enforcement with police rather than combat soldiers suited the law and order challenges in Melanesia and gave the AFP both opportunity to cooperate and set examples of professional behaviour for Melanesian police to quell civil unrest. The rehabilitation of the Solomon Islands police force would not have been possible without the AFP and the deployment of regional police.

There may have been a downside to the ascendency of the AFP. The use of Western policing, judicial and penal systems in the Solomon Islands and the virtual absence of these systems in Bougainville pose some interesting questions about partnering for peace in the Pacific Islands. Peace monitors in Bougainville facilitated traditional reconciliation processes in response to criminal behaviour. Admissions of guilt did not result in monitors up in court and then in prison. Justice was dispensed during reconciliation ceremonies and after compensation was paid. Victims forgave perpetrators and community wounds were healed without the need for courts and prisons. 25

The introduction of hundreds of police, scores of lawyers, hundreds of para-legal staff and several judges, as well as renovations to court houses, legal offices and prisons, under RAMSI was estimated to have cost the Australian Government $2.2 billion dollars over 10 years, some 83 percent of the total RAMSI outlay. (This had grown to close to $3.0 billion by the time RAMSI withdrew in 2017) Of the $2.2 billion, the AFP spent nearly $1.5 billion, Defence spent $406 million and AusAID spent $303 million. Only eight percent of RAMSI’s funds was spent on economic governance and four percent on the machinery of government pillars of RAMSI. (Hayward-Jones, 2014)

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23 See ibid, Chapter 4 Australian Intervention options for more detail on policy advice about developing a para-military capability in the late 1980s.
24 See Breen, The Good Neighbour, Chapter 22 for more detail on establishment of AFP capabilities.
25 See Breen, The Good Neighbour - Conclusion for discussion about impact of Western policing on Melanesian society.
The expense began in the first three months of the RAMSI intervention when the AFP and regional police arrested more than 3,000 persons. This unprecedented number of alleged offenders had to be processed through a judicial and penal system that lacked capability and capacity. 26 A similar approach in Bougainville would have produced the same result and potentially cost the same or more. It may be that this significant amount of money may not have healed community wounds and may, in some instances, have exacerbated them. The riots at Rove prison and resentments created among Solomon Islanders at the slow pace of the judicial process in 2004-2005 are cases in point. The collection and use of evidence from some Solomon Islanders to imprison other Solomon Islanders suggest the possibility of enduring animosities between families, clans and ethnic groups.

Significantly, the AFP’s IDG and ORG capabilities were pared back after 2010 as policing development programs seemed to be enough for maintaining stability in the Pacific Islands. Rapid response policing capabilities did not appear to be justified. These capabilities and the lessons from their deployment into the region in the 2000s should not be forgotten if there are signs that the referendum in Bougainville and continuing fragility in Solomon Islands increase risks of instability that may warrant a regional policing intervention.

LESSONS 6 AND 7 - ENGAGEMENT WITH MELANESIAN COMMUNITIES FOR ‘LIGHT’ AND ‘HEAVY’ INTERVENTIONS

The sixth and seventh evolutionary lessons are intertwined. The sixth was engagement with Melanesian communities as the common factor within the seventh lesson, differentiation of interventions into ‘light’ and ‘heavy’. 27 One of the most significant features of Australia’s engagement for peace in the Pacific Islands was the interaction of Australian and regional peacekeepers and peace enforcers with communities and civil society in Bougainville and Solomon Islands. 28 The Hawke, Keating and Howard governments, as well as governments in Fiji, New Zealand, PNG, Tonga and Vanuatu and other Pacific Islands nations deployed thousands of men and women in small and occasionally larger scale groupings to Bougainville and the Solomon Islands during the late 1990s to the mid-2000s. Between 1997 and 2006 about a thousand Australian police and civilian peacekeepers lived in villages and towns in small groups, supported by several thousand military compatriots over time who had either intermittent or sometimes frequent contact with locals, either employed in bases and accommodation areas, or encountered on the road or during visits to towns and villages.

Most Australian military and civilian peacekeepers had no personal experience of Melanesia. They left their homes, families, friends and comfortable workplaces for periods of 3, 4 or 6 months to live in austere conditions, in demanding climates and exposed to tropical diseases, and occasionally some danger. They had to come to terms with an unfamiliar Melanesian culture and to work and build relationships with troubled but largely welcoming peoples with very different life experiences and living circumstances to peacekeepers. Members of those societies, especially young men, were potential threats, so peacekeepers had to be wary as well as encouraging. The unarmed peacekeepers living in team sites in Bougainville and Solomon Islands had especially challenging times as they extended hospitality to everyone, knowing that some of their guests had violent backgrounds.

The impacts of peacekeepers on local people and civil society were important. Ordinary people had to accept and make truces, cease fires and peace agreements work. Civil society could have organised communities to encourage, adopt, ignore or protest agreements politicians and negotiators made. There were several features that influenced the positive and negative effects of the engagement of peacekeepers with communities and civil society in Bougainville and Solomon Islands.

The community engagement ethos in Bougainville originated in principled ADF regulations governing peacekeeper behaviour. From the beginning of the TMG intervention, the ADF forbade the consumption of alcohol, sexual relations between peacekeepers as well as between peacekeepers and Bougainvillians, and private use or display of pornography or body images deemed offensive. These measures were an exception rather than the rule for peacekeeping operations elsewhere in the world. These prohibitions, as well as deployment of monitoring teams into austere accommodation amid communities rather than into specially-fortified compounds, assisted peace monitors to establish closer and more mutually-respectful relations with Bougainvillan civil society, such as women’s groups, clergy, church congregations and traditional leaders who were becoming involved in the peace process in the late 1990s.

Prohibiting the consumption of alcohol and fraternisation among peace monitors or with locals influenced peacekeeper mindsets as well as the effectiveness of their relationships and entitlement to respect in Bougainville. Combined with the ‘drop in centre’ and open hospitality approach at monitoring team sites these prohibitions facilitated effective peacekeeping, contributed to protection of peacekeepers and helped build closer relationships between peacekeepers and civil society.

26 See, Breen, The Good Neighbour, Chapter 21 for evidence of initial RAMSI approach to restoring law and order.


28 Civil society is the formal and informal organizations that are not part of the state apparatus but operate in public. It is composed of organizations that are voluntary and autonomous self-governing groups created to advance their own causes. Civil society is composed of groups that bring together people with common interests in social, charitable, religious, community, sport or political concerns to articulate and advance their own causes or enjoy company and shared activities with like-minded people.
Due to the different mandate and ethos of AFP peacekeepers in Solomon Islands, the Bougainville peacekeeping ethos to community engagement was not applied. The AFP had decades of experience sending small contingents to Cyprus to work with the UN mission there (over 700 since 1979). Further experience has been gained in Cambodia, Mozambique, Haiti and East Timor. There was no prohibition on consumption of alcohol or fraternisation on most of those operations, though heavy consumption of alcohol and fraternisation with locals attracted disapproval. Most patrols were conducted in air-conditioned vehicles, following overseas and Australian community policing precedents, rather than on foot. These practices were expected and there is no evidence to suggest that they were ineffective, even though they were resented by local people and NGO staff. It is just that the experience in Bougainville suggested that they may have been less effective in a Melanesian setting.

As a result, the relationship between police peacekeepers and Solomon Islanders was different and followed overseas precedents and practices more closely. There is evidence to suggest that the imposition of stricter codes of personal conduct on peacekeepers could have contributed to the development of closer relationships between RAMSI peacekeepers, the community and civil society. Though difficult to measure or prove, the consumption of alcohol by peacekeeping police and contracted civilian capacity builders, as well as some instances of fraternisation between some of them and their colleagues, as well as with Solomon Islanders probably worked against the RAMSI mission. While RAMSI’s law enforcement mission mitigated against achieving the depth of friendships that could be developed more easily in Bougainville, there were many instances of solid friendships between peacekeepers and members of civil society in Solomon Islands. However, the general response of ordinary Solomon Islanders to Australian police and civilian peacekeeper socialising, often in comfortable hotel settings, and consuming alcohol was negative.29

One of the masterstrokes of the engagement for peace in Bougainville and Solomon Islands was encouraging church solidarity and women’s social activism to support peace processes. During the initial months of the TMG in Bougainville an inspired approach of mobilising civil society, especially church and women’s groups, assisted communities to regain the confidence to return to their homes, create safe places and spaces, resume their lives in harmony with neighbours, and return their children to school.30 Though implemented on a smaller scale for the civilian-police IPMT deployment in Solomon Islands 2000-2002, mobilising civil society was a strong and effective feature of community engagement for RAMSI. In Bougainville and the Solomon Islands churches and women’s groups provided comfort and support to intimidated and displaced people. Sunday services continued throughout periods of unrest and uncertainty. People prayed together for deliverance from the troubles in their society. Women’s groups formed in adversity to provide comfort and protection to women, especially those who were pregnant and those younger women at risk of sexual assault. The solidarity and activism of women was important for peacekeepers and peace processes over time.

Another important feature of this engagement for peace at the community level was ensuring that Bougainvillans and Solomon Islanders owned peace processes. The belief that Bougainvillans and Solomon Islanders owned their peace and reconciliation processes and ought to be the drivers of it, or what Jim Rolfe, a New Zealand academic, has called peacekeeping the ‘Pacific way’, was a defining feature of the TMG/PMG and shaped how peacekeepers conducted themselves with locals.31 The fact that peacekeepers were unarmed, even in the face of violence, helped support this by sending the message that peace would not be imposed - talking and listening would be the peacekeepers’ way. It also showed that a lot of trust was being placed in Bougainvillans to keep the peacekeepers safe.32 This approach was not insignificant. There were armed ‘spoilers’ waiting for the community to tire of the TMG and PMG. For the duration of the intervention in Bougainville, rebel leader, Francis Ona, and his followers remained armed, maintained a so-called ‘No-Go Zone’ in central Bougainville, opposed the peace process and at times publicly threatened peacekeepers - especially Australians – but the community, as well as better armed BRA and Resistance fighters contained Ona’s ambitions.33

Peacekeepers and Bougainvillans interacted socially in traditional as well as Western ways. In Bougainvillean culture a visit was not complete or polite if people did not share a meal. DFAT officer Andrew Martin, who served in 1997 and 1998, attended one of these meals and thought it more a feast as there was ‘loads of kau-kau [a type of Bougainvillian sweet potato], bananas in coconut milk, pork dishes and fresh pineapple.’34 This traditional hospitality was reciprocated by monitors who frequently hosted Bougainvillans at team sites. Sometimes this was for celebration, but at some team sites it was a regular weekly event with an ‘open-door’ policy.35

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29 See The Good Neighbour, Appendix 1, for discussion about peacekeeper and local community relations in Bougainville and Solomon Islands.
30 See ibid, Chapter 9 for the discovery and implementation of community engagement techniques for supporting the Bougainville Peace Process.
The Melanesian customs of inclusive and extended discussion (tok tok) as well as traditional reconciliation and compensation shaped the Bougainville peacekeeping ethos significantly. Combined with the TMG and PMG’s facilitative peacemaking approach, Melanesian custom led to the development of an ethos among peacekeepers of patience rather than pressure, as well as respect for traditional conflict resolution, reconciliation, restorative justice and social rehabilitation.

Community engagement identified those who shaped peace processes positively and those who were attempting to spoil them. The encouragement of ‘shapers’ and the discouragement of ‘spoilers’ were features of peacekeeping in Bougainville. The initiatives taken in 1999 during Brigadier Roger Powell’s period of command to divide Bougainvillean society into three tiers of influence on the peace process was innovative and effective. Powell and his staff began the process of turning the PMG from a friendly accompaniment and facilitative influence on the peace process to both fulfilling a ‘ears, eyes and mouth’ function for the process and being an active agent for supporting shapers with transport and other resources and subtly denying spoilers the same amenities. The arrival and departure at meetings of shapers in PMG helicopters alone gave them great status and importance in the eyes of villagers and townspeople.

The encouragement peacekeepers gave to ‘shapers’ in the community and civil society wishing to reconcile in customary ways and support the peace process added momentum to the resolution of conflict and negotiation of peace agreements and weapons containment. The focus on reconciliation helped the healing process in communities, and to repair the emotional, and some would say spiritual damage, of conflict and open hearts to peace and community unity in the common purpose of securing a peaceful future for coming generations.

From the mid-1990s interventions evolved to have ‘light’ and ‘heavy’ characteristics that resembled the differentiation of contemporary peacekeeping and police enforcement operations around the world but had features peculiar to partnering for peace in the Pacific Islands. Within the context of regional efforts to support peace, ‘light’ intervention is defined as a peace support operation that is unarmed, combined (police, military and civilian) or just civilian that has the support of all or most antagonists under the terms of an agreement, truce or ceasefire. A ‘light’ intervention is neutral and impartial and has a modus operandi of engaging with communities and civil society in the common purpose of achieving peaceful resolution to conflict.

A ‘heavy’ intervention may occur responsively in an emergency or pre-emptively to stabilise a situation in anticipation of an imminent or unacceptable threat to the rule of law or life and property. A ‘heavy’ intervention is neutral and impartial and has a modus operandi of engaging with communities and civil society in the common purpose of achieving peaceful resolution to conflict.

‘Light’ intervention in Bougainville worked well. The antagonists in Bougainville were prepared to accept a ‘light’ intervention of unarmed regional peacekeepers and were also more comfortable with unarmed rather than armed Australian military participation. Antagonists were ready for negotiation after what combatants on both sides regarded as the last battle at Aropa beach in 1997. Indeed, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) thought that they had won the civil war, while the PNGDF realised that they could not win it and had suffered another setback in a futile campaign. Armed peacekeepers, especially Australians bearing arms, would have aroused the suspicions and ire of the BRA and possibly given hope to the PNGDF and local Bougainvillean Resistance groups that armed peacekeepers would give them some respite to regroup before possibly resuming operations against the BRA.

A ‘heavy’ intervention into Solomon Islands was considered to be necessary because the ‘light’ IPMT intervention had failed in 2000-2002. The armed militias were not ready to disarm then and rogue elements in the Solomon Islands police had no interest in losing influence by disarming either. In 2003-2004 all armed elements surrendered most of their arms for destruction under pressure from local Solomon Islands peacemakers backed by Australian and regional police, as well as combat troops and a new heavily armed Australian police Operational Response Group (ORG) that was also capable of coercive crowd control. This suggests that the size and nature of RAMSI after 2004 could have been substantially reduced much earlier, saving substantial portions of the continuing cost of the intervention.

An important characteristic of both ‘light’ and ‘heavy’ interventions that is distinctive to Pacific Islands peace support operations was close cooperation with political moderates as well as local civil society peacemakers – the shapers. Here lies the major lesson. Interventions of either type were patient but temporary and depended on their immediate and longer-term impact on early and sustained cooperation with political moderates, civil society and communities. Aloof peacekeepers with little intention to engage with locals, are less effective than peacekeepers intent from ‘Day One’ to engage with ordinary people and offer them the best of their humanity rather than the business-like inspectional demeanour of unarmed peacekeepers or firm demeanour of armed rescuers and enforcers. The most effective demeanour and mindsets for ‘light’ and ‘heavy’ intervention comes from carefully crafted mandates and well-designed pre-deployment training and rehearsal.
The mandates for peacekeeping in Bougainville and peace enforcement in Solomon Islands were different and shaped the mindsets of Australian and regional peacekeepers. The mandate in Bougainville specified that peacekeepers were there to monitor compliance to a truce and then a ceasefire agreement and were to do so unarmed and whilst living and working in monitoring teams located in district centres. For RAMSI, the initial mandate in 2003-2004 was to enforce law and order, collect and destroy weapons and investigate, arrest and bring those alleged to have committed crimes to justice. To do so, the largest military force deployed to the Pacific Islands since the end of the Second World War backed up Australian and regional police.

Neither the Bougainville nor the Solomon Islands mandates precluded local engagement, but neither obligated it explicitly. The lesson for ensuring local engagement is to make community engagement for peace more explicit rather than implicit in mandates. Mandates determine the structure and pre-deployment training of peacekeepers and peace enforcers. If mandates do not obligate community engagement as an explicit task, then structures may not include capabilities to do so and training programs may not include cross-cultural and language learning and practical rehearsal that correlates to and facilitates local engagement.

There are lessons from the ‘light’ Bougainville and ‘heavy’ Solomon Islands interventions in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The first is to incorporate personnel and other resources within peace support operations who facilitate positive local interaction and communication of the right narrative to encourage community and civil society support for conflict resolution. This was never done for interventions into the Pacific Islands between 1980 and 2006 but should be a ‘Golden Rule’ for interventions. There is no better case study of the importance of this lesson than the brief ‘heavy’ intervention to Tonga in 2006 where the commander tried to stop the deployment of a Public Relations officer to allow one more rifleman to deploy in compliance with a numbers cap.

A WAY FORWARD FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

There were reasons for optimism for the future of Australian partnering for peace in the Pacific Islands. Australia’s more sophisticated and inclusive approach was summarised by the terms ‘whole-of-government’ and ‘whole-of-region’. Defence, DFAT and AFP began working together more effectively because of partnerships of necessity in the 1990s and 2000s. Combat troops became an instrument of last resort, rather than the only option available to Australian governments for deploying coercive force into the Pacific Islands. In 2000, the Biketaw Declaration formalised Australia’s success in marshalling regional neighbours to support peace in the neighbourhood.

In the 2000s Australia matured as a ‘good neighbour’. In 2018 and onwards, 11 years after the beginning of the ‘peaceful decade’, Australia has the choice of moving a step further in its engagement for peace by taking a deeper ‘whole-of-region’ approach to improving the poor living conditions and meagre employment opportunities of many Pacific islanders that have the potential to spawn instability and conflict. There was consideration of the formation of an Oceania Community modelled on the European Union. Steps in this direction began with a Pacific Islands Forum Special Retreat in 2014 that yielded a commitment to recast the extant Pacific Plan into a Framework for Pacific Regionalism. This framework rested on beliefs that deeper regionalism will help increase socio-economic and development prospects, expand market opportunities, improve service delivery, and contribute to security and good governance for Pacific people and for the region as a whole; and that to drive deeper regionalism the Pacific Islands needed good processes and clear political direction.

The way forward may be to apply the lessons from the Howard Government’s decade of intervention 1997-2006 and permanently engage with Melanesian communities for the mutual benefit of preventing conflict as the Morrison Government is attempting to do. Australia’s policies should not depend solely on swift reactive military and policing capacity in times of crisis. The focus would be on creating secure and prosperous communities. The aim of the evolving policies should be to continue to encourage a democratic, prosperous neighbourhood supported by contented communities. Concurrently, the whole-of-region challenge is to lift Pacific Islands communities from poverty and revitalise civil society. Impoverished, unemployed and divided communities are less likely to participate in or insist on democratic governance.

The use of peace monitors in Bougainville from 1997 until 2003 is a useful model for both mobilising community pressure on political elites and ex-combatants as well as encouraging communities to reconcile, re-establish civil society and capitalise on aid programs. The time may have come for including and adapting the Bougainville peace monitor model into Australia’s current impulse for more community-focused regional aid programs. There should be broader community involvement through research and encouraging links between Australian community-based organisations, professional bodies, businesses, local governments and schools and equivalent entities in the Pacific Islands.

36 This closing section of the paper is taken from a chapter of a Special ASPI Report written by the author in 2008, Engaging our neighbours: towards a new relationship between Australia and the Pacific Islands, Special Report 13, March, ASPI, Canberra.
None of Australia’s recent programs and initiatives for the Pacific islands appear to include establishing permanent teams, made up of representatives from neighbouring countries, in towns and villages to engage in and encourage community development. Peace monitors from regional neighbours living, working and building relationships on the ground in communities proved to be a useful and influential accompaniment to higher level engagement with political elites, peace processes and institutional reform programs in Bougainville. More particularly, monitors encouraged democratic processes at grassroots level and community confidence in the future. Monitors also enabled communities to capitalise on aid programs through assistance with paperwork, justifications, mediation and good offices.

Future community-level engagement should be a regional effort to solve neighbourhood problems. Contributions and participation would be voluntary. This engagement would be another way to address social and economic problems. It would be a means for neighbours to invest goodwill as well as money in regional security and stability. While the level of financial assistance from neighbours would vary, the quality of people that will make the difference, as was the case in Bougainville and, until recently, in RAMSI in Solomon Islands could be excellent.

A WAY FORWARD - REGIONAL NEIGHBOURHOOD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

The next short term evolution of Australia’s policies towards the Pacific Islands should be the inclusion of a Regional Neighbourhood Development Program. This program would be the second tier of the regional policy framework. In the first tier, diplomats would engage political and business elites and government bureaucracies. DFAT officials and officials from the UNDP, World Bank and/or other international organisations could advise rehabilitation programs at central government and district levels. In the second tier, Neighbourhood Development Teams (NDT) would engage with communities and encourage self-help, civil society, effective aid delivery and confidence in the future. Members of NDT would mentor indigenous administrative staff, police, community groups and local leaders.

The Pacific Islands Forum should be the mechanism for overseeing and/or developing this neighbourhood program as well as conducting planning, recruitment, training and implementation. NDT would be made up of military, police and civilian representatives from members from the Pacific Islands Forum. Members of NDT could be recruited from the vocational education and training sectors of contributing countries who would have skills to assist with vocational training in communities. Some monitors might come from local government sectors with the skills to mentor and advise local government officials. Unemployed local youths could be incorporated into teams. The reintegration of unemployed young men back into civil society and useful work is one of the region’s major challenges. Membership of NDT in their local areas would give them status, enable them to learn new skills as well as encourage positive contribution to community development.

From an Australian perspective, time and money spent supporting a Regional Neighbourhood Development Program might prove to be a less expensive and a more effective investment in regional stability than time and resources spent on garrisons and reactive capacities in times of crisis. Based on five 25-strong monitoring teams employed successfully among 180,000 Bougainvilleans for the period of the peace process (1997-2001), 12 NDT might be enough in Solomon Islands and 30 NDT in PNG.

The future for partnering for peace in the Pacific islands should not be just about neighbourhood garrison troops and police riot squads sallying forth from fortified compounds in armoured vehicles, Range Rovers and lock-up vans in response to violence, looting and arson. More troops, more police, more money and more consultants will not be enough. These measures are reactions to symptoms that do not attend to the deeper causes of regional neighbourhood problems. Sustained higher level ‘heavy’ intervention is futile unless there is enduring and effective improvement at the community level, i.e. light intervention. Secure and confident communities are the foundations for democratic governance and economic progress. Communities cannot be built or rebuilt unless there is a shared sense of security and optimism.
CHAPTER 3: AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMATIC EXPERIENCE

Systematic analysis of Departmental experiences can be valuable in reviewing effectiveness, and instructive in organisational learning and planning and for developing policies and practices for use in the future. This chapter summarises the findings from interviews with current and former diplomats and by other professionals who have worked with DFAT staff on a range of activities relating to conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding. It describes the organisational structures as well as the strategic and policy frameworks and the range of DFAT staff experiences in preparing for, undertaking and reviewing conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It seeks to reflect the emergent themes and issues, the strengths, challenges and complexities that characterise DFAT’s diplomatic experiences in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Monitoring and documenting past conflict resolution and peacebuilding experiences can also be helpful in identifying areas where capacities for such engagement could be enhanced. The data does not reflect a complete capture or review of all cases in which Australia has contributed. It reflects those experiences shared by the sample of participants interviewed in this study. The findings reflect both the analytic framework of the research study and the emergent themes and issues that were derived from the data.

REFLECTED EXPERIENCES

Since 1990 several conflicts have involved substantial numbers of Australian diplomats, military personnel, police, aid and development administrators and other professional staff, and therefore substantial financial expenditure. Cambodia, East Timor, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands stand out as conflicts in which Australia played a leading or major role (as Breen’s chapter illustrates). Others, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, involved major personnel and financial contributions to a multilateral engagement led by the United States. There has also been significant diplomatic and developmental involvement in a range of other conflict-affected countries, including Sri Lanka, Myanmar, the Philippines and the Papua and West Papua provinces of Indonesia.

Interviewees at times identified other conflict situations about which Australia might have been concerned but in which, for various reasons, at points in time, no substantial action was taken. These included the conflicts in Aceh, Papua and West Papua and several other Provinces of Indonesia, Myanmar and Bangladesh, Nepal, former Yugoslavia and the South China Sea.

VARIOUS FORMS OF ENGAGEMENT

Given the unique and diverse conflict contexts in which DFAT officers have been involved, Australian diplomatic interventions have ranged from the large coordinated missions described by Breen to more piecemeal efforts involving little more than normal diplomatic dialogue in contexts where tensions with a neighbour have been increasing. This latter category also includes occasions when conflicts were placed on the agenda of the UN and other multilateral agencies of which Australia was a member. In these instances, Australian diplomats commonly had the opportunity to take an active part in discussions and to make constructive proposals, and in some cases were required to take positions when there was a vote. Nevertheless, all examples selected by interviewees are of relevance to this survey because they illustrate the diversity of experience, expectations, and demands and therefore of skills required for effective diplomatic engagement.

The focus of the present study is on Australian diplomatic contributions in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, with less focus on peacekeeping and military interventions, which are well covered in existing literature. However, since these are directly relevant peace processes, it is important to recognise the extent of Australia’s engagement.

Australians have participated in 42 peacekeeping missions since 1990, and also in several Australian-led interventions aiming to not only end violence but also to ease tensions and mitigate the causes of conflict. It is appropriate to recall both of those categories of action. So many of the experiences Australian officials have had of conflict prevention and peacebuilding have been through participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions.

In general, interviewees viewed Australia’s role and contribution in various peacekeeping missions as valuable and constructive, particularly those in the Pacific neighbourhood. There was a strong sense of pride and belief in the value of this contribution by some staff, especially those who had worked in the field. Whilst Australia is not seen in international forums as a major ‘peace actor’ in the way some of the Nordic countries, Switzerland, the United Kingdom or Canada are, there was a strong sense among interviewees of the importance of engaging in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The following findings reflect the authors’ analysis and recommendations around five key themes that emerged. These are summarised below under the headings:

- Political Leadership and Foreign Policy Strategy;
- Departmental Structure and Functions;
- Conflict Interventions and Engagement in Peacebuilding;
- Mobilising Public Support; and
- Foreign Affairs and Aid Funding.
1. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY

It became clear from the survey of the experiences of Australian diplomats that the key determinant of whether Australia plays an effective role in international conflict prevention and peacebuilding is whether the government of the day decides to do so. Political timeliness and motivation, the strength of engagement with a situation or issue, the degree of political attention to a conflict, the level of knowledge of the situation and the people involved, availability of funding and personnel resources, and the personalities of leaders are all influential. But each of those depends on the key issue which is the strength of the commitments by the Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister for Defence and other members of Cabinet’s National Security Committee and other members of Parliament to attempting to address a given conflict. Peace processes will not become a significant focus of Australian foreign policy unless they become political issues.

Departmental heads and officers also have significant leverage. They are likely to be acutely aware that a particular conflict is or may become damaging to a country or region where it is occurring. They are also likely to be concerned about whether there is potential for Australia to play a constructive role. It is part of the Department’s responsibility to increase the minister’s awareness of potential actions which Australia could take. Norms exist now which encourage that to happen.

Several factors could contribute to making engagement with conflict prevention or peace processes of greater political concern. The most obvious is clarifying the potential benefits of reducing death and destruction by minimising violence and the costs of violence, and the availability of appropriate and viable options for supporting peace processes. Articulation of a strategy which focuses attention on conflict prevention and peacebuilding while continuing to recognise the importance and benefit of adequate defence and intelligence capacity is vital. The title that expresses such a strategy is for ‘Security through sustainable peace’. Australians want governments to aim for security: strategic foreign policy without military action is the optimal and most efficient way to achieve this.

Australian engagement in conflict prevention and peacebuilding as part of foreign policy is in Australia’s national interests. National interest can be distinguished between the ‘national interest’ singular, and ‘national interests’ plural (Wong, 2017: 4). Security is central to the national interest, but security is more than a strategic concept in the lives of most people and communities. Security has economic, financial, social and environmental dimensions.

‘Realist theorists’ of international relations argue that the national interest is in maximizing military power (Morgenthau, 1954: 5, 10), but this is empirically naïve. In democracies governments give high priorities to the policies which will enable them to be re-elected and these will often be those which contribute most to the wellbeing of voters, their living standards, employment opportunities, standards of education and health services and so on – that is, to the quality of government. Many governments do want international influence, but in the current era this is derived more from economic than military power, and the quality of diplomacy is often more effective as an expression of national power.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs holds overall responsibility for setting the level of commitment given to conflict prevention and peacebuilding and can raise its priority in Australian foreign policy.

Leaders of various parts of Australian society frequently speak as if Australia’s national interests are clear and all that is required is patriotic loyalty to them. Politicians sometimes argue that because their preferred policy is in the national interest any disagreement is disloyal. But they rarely describe what they mean by the national interest. Like other countries, Australia is composed of groups with widely different interests based on characteristics such as their occupations, incomes, organisational affiliations, location, beliefs and world views and there is often competition between these interests and international commitments and imperatives. Foreign policy decision-makers have a complex task to strike a balance, ‘between domestic demands and international imperatives, between principle and pragmatism, between idealistic values and material interests, between what is expedient and what is the right thing to do, between the national constituency and the international community, and between the immediate, medium and long terms’ (OHMD, 2013: 21).

At a time of global turbulence, it is vital that greater effort be put into imaginatively identifying what international strategy will most fully express Australia’s national interests. Opportunities to revise Australia’s foreign policy exist and a more independent, sophisticated and nuanced view about Australia’s national interests is warranted. This was a goal of the Australian Foreign Affairs White Paper tabled by former Foreign Minister Julie Bishop in late 2017.

KEY FINDINGS
At present, when the international rule of law is being challenged by a few major countries, strengthening alliances with like-minded countries which continue to be committed to maintaining the rules-based international order is vital (The Economist, 4Aug18: 42-44). A framework of regular multilateral and regional meetings is crucially important for addressing many of the security, economic, social and environmental issues which are global and/or regional in nature. So too is sustaining friendships with leaders in the US who continue to support the rule of law. Strengthening bilateral relations with countries with which Australia has particularly crucial economic, strategic, environmental and social interdependencies is crucial.

For example, seeking to implement comprehensively the planned annual Prime Ministerial and focused ministerial meetings with China, India and Indonesia would be a clear expression of a wish to attempt harmonious agreements on as many issues of shared interest as possible. Building regional cooperative arrangements is a beneficial mechanism for enhanced security. The sustained effectiveness of such a strategy and range of cooperative arrangements depends in large part on the professionalism of departmental staff work. Former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans argues eloquently for this approach, which he summarises as:

Less America. More Asia, more self-reliance. Which means not walking away from the US alliance... but being more circumspect about over-reliance upon it for security... and acting as genuine diplomatic free agent – creative, proactive and not constantly looking over our shoulder to Washington. And strengthening relationships at all levels with key regional neighbours like India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Japan and South Korea – and trying to develop a more multidimensional relationship with China, especially by working with it in multilateral forums on global and regional public goods like the environment, development, peacekeeping and arms control. [...] Every state’s security, prosperity and quality of life is best advanced by cooperation rather than confrontation, and that Australia should be a relentless campaigner for just that (Evans, AFR, 22 June 18).

The findings from this study indicated that there has generally been low public profiling of Australia’s varied and positive diplomatic contributions to international peacemaking and peacebuilding. The public has limited knowledge of Australian support for peace processes. There hasn’t yet been an opinion poll of Australian attitudes to peacebuilding, but a survey was conducted in the UK, US and Germany in 2017 (Conciliation Resources, 2017). This showed that around two-thirds of respondents in both the UK and US understood the concept of peacebuilding (79% in Northern Ireland) and 62% in Germany. One key question asked was: “Do you agree with the statement that “In the [UK/US/Germany] we should be investing more resources in peacebuilding?”

In the UK 60% said yes and 10% no; in Germany 70% said yes and 7% said no; and in the US 74% said yes and 8% no. In each country between 62% and 65% of respondents supported their governments engaging in negotiations with armed groups to further peace; and between 74% and 80% supported international organisations engaging with armed groups. An Australian opinion poll would probably indicate a generally positive response to peacebuilding support. If support for peace processes is similar to that in the UK, there would be electoral as well national interest reasons for substantially enhancing national peace processes.

To transform the political attention given to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Australia there would have to be a significant organisational change to ensure that this decision was expressed in the machinery of government. A few countries have established a cabinet position of Minister for Peace, sometimes supported by a Department for Peace. In a version of this approach, the New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern re-created the position of Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control and allocated the responsibility to Winston Peters, who is also Deputy Prime Minister. He is supported by the Division for International Security and Disarmament in the NZ Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade. This is not essential as long as the Minister for Foreign Affairs has explicit responsibility for Australian conflict prevention and peacebuilding. However, there would be great value in the appointment of a Parliamentary Secretary on Peace Processes. It is positive that the recommendation contained in an earlier draft of this report for the appointment of an ambassador for disarmament was implemented by Foreign Minister Marise Payne through the appointment of senior DFAT officer Amanda Gorely as Ambassador for Arms Control and Counter Proliferation in December 2019.

Renewed commitment to conflict prevention and peacebuilding is vital to Australian safety, prosperity and the common good. The Minister for Foreign Affairs must have principal political responsibility for articulating, planning and implementing that goal and in leading the departmental attention to conflict situations and peace processes.

Encouraging members of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade and the Australian Parliament to join in early warning, conflict analysis and fact-finding functions would draw parliament into discussion of government responses to conflict on a bipartisan basis.
RENEWING THE POLICY BASE

International interventions require a strong policy base. A political, institutional and financial framework that would allow the government to contribute to regional and international prevention and peace efforts in a strategic way is essential. The Conflict and Fragility Framework (2011) and associated Guidance Notes provide direction and legitimacy for staff on the ground, though they are not comprehensive or up-to-date reflections of existing policy and programming. There is a need to renew and develop the policy base from which DFAT can guide its role, interests, program decisions and resourcing. To build on this foundation, it would be appropriate to consider:

Preparation of high-level policy leading to a Ministerial statement on conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding would be particularly valuable, and would conceptually unite the framework for ‘Sustaining Peace’ as a cross cutting whole-of-government policy priority. Designing the objectives and plans for implementation of the policy for coordination across government would be a whole-of-government national action plan. Regular reporting cycles on progress with implementation could be led by the Foreign Minister.

A vital dimension of organisational reform is that expertise and capacity for organising conflict prevention and peacebuilding be represented in the Cabinet’s National Security Committee (of which the Foreign Minister has always been a member) and also in the Secretaries’ Committee on National Security. A recent addition to the Secretaries committee has been the head of the newly established Office of National Intelligence which is being established to upgrade the previous Office of National Assessments. This is essential for ensuring that possibilities for easing the intensity of conflict and seeking to prevent violence are explicitly considered early in discussion of how to attempt to prevent or limit violent conflict. An essential condition for such organisational reform has to include establishment of enhanced capacity within DFAT for advising, providing and mobilising professional peace-making personnel. This is the organisational approach used by the UK Government which includes the Minister for International Development amongst the members of the British National Security Council, which allocates half of the generous national ODA program to supporting peacebuilding programs in unstable and fragile states.

Various approaches for strengthening this capacity are possible in Australia. One way to ensure a more coordinated whole-of-government approach to conflict and disaster management overseas could be to relocate the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) from the Department of Defence to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, mandate the Centre with proper policy development and coordination roles, and significantly upgrade its staffing. This could demonstrate commitment to a whole of government approach to peace processes, including peacekeeping. There would have to be careful identification of the respective responsibilities of DFAT and ACMC. However, based on research and interviews, it is recognised that departments with established policy and implementation systems are required to coordinate directly in any response. DFAT has established a role in playing that coordination role on overseas natural disasters and, to a lesser extent, stabilisation contingencies. Expanding that role might be difficult but would seem to offer greater potential for effective cooperation.

Whatever the outcome of that proposal, DFAT’s focus and engagement with peace processes must be strengthened. The organisational dimension of that must include major strengthening of the resources on which the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Departmental Secretary can reliably draw as the source of advice for their contributions to the discussions about conflict prevention and peacebuilding of the National Security Committees.

When the authors raised the possibility of establishing a specialised unit for work on peace processes support, there were mixed opinions that connect to a longer-standing debate about the degree of specialisation or generalist training that diplomats require. The DFAT tradition is for diplomats to be generalists. Many interviewees, though, supported the idea of a special section with professional capacity to lead policy and strategy in relation to responding to conflict and peacebuilding, though some were opposed. There are advantages and disadvantages of both a specialist unit and of the alternative of experienced peacebuilders spread through the department. A specialist peacebuilding unit or a reformulation of the sections that currently relate to engagement in conflict into a more coherent division could hold several diplomats with professional training in peace processes. The unit could also routinely gather experiences from others who are working in countries where there is conflict. It could be a point of reference for comment and advice on mechanisms for handling conflict. Since every conflict is different and there are no panaceas that will automatically translate from one situation to another, accumulating experience is an essential means of strengthening possibilities and even imagination about what might work.
Foreign affairs departments in other countries are organised and structured in various ways (Langmore, et al. 2017). Some countries, like the UK, tend to use specialisation, though this also reflects the different resourcing of DFID compared to DFAT. DFAT recognises that specialisation is valuable and so has engaged in bringing in consultants. Staff were positive about the engagement of consultants, especially those few who were regularly engaged as peace and conflict specialists, (though due to funding and other limitations) these particular consultants are no longer available to DFAT. Specialisation would require greater recognition and clearer pathways within the system. There would be value in establishing a specialised unit within DFAT with experts trained in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The Department should not have to make a choice between generalists and specialists. The researchers concluded that both are essential and the requirement is that DFAT become sufficiently well-funded to make adequate employment of both possible. There is a need for the fostering of high-level expertise through the creation of specialised roles and for the continuing engagement of specialised advisors in peace and conflict.

This report recommends that both a section of the Department specialising in peace processes be established; and that diplomatic staff with expertise in conflict prevention and peacebuilding also be included within the functional branches working on particular countries and geographic areas.

Ministerial visits and senior leader engagement with staff and programming in fragile and conflict affected areas has served a vitally important support function and should be further encouraged. Visits by Prime Ministers, Ministers and senior leaders provide a key sense of support for staff on the ground, and opportunities to “convey what was happening directly to a senior level” to get feedback, and to establish a rapport and a common understanding. Strengthening the engagement of Parliament with the issues of conflict prevention and peace is also vitally important.

The potentially high value, benefits and effectiveness of diplomatic engagement in conflict prevention, dialogue, negotiation and mediation to reduce the intensity of conflict and the risk of violence, and dramatically saving resources must be more actively explained and demonstrated to Ministers and the broader public. The researchers conclude that ministerial reaffirmation of the centrality of lively and mature diplomacy to national security and peace is vital.

2. DEPARTMENTAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS

DEPARTMENTAL FUNCTIONS

DFAT’s diplomats are Australia’s official representatives to the world. They are centrally important and potentially strongly influential international advocates for Australia’s goals, values and interests. The number of annual applicants for employment in DFAT shows clearly the high regard in which the Department is held by thousands of international relations and other students. The qualities and skills required of contemporary diplomats are aspirationally high and complex. One of the principal consequences of this survey has been the recognition of the extent to which a high proportion of Australia’s diplomats have such diverse and demanding capacities. Repeated expression of such confidence by political and other public leaders would contribute to enhancing the national respect for the Department.

Enhancing and building the government architecture for conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding is central to effective Australian action. A lack of appropriate resourcing, structures and policies would prevent the establishment of the type of authentic relationships with local actors required to affect change and hamper prospects for mission success from the outset. Conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding do not lie neatly or coherently within a ‘development’ or ‘humanitarian’ conceptual or operational framework. This is reflected on the ground in the efficient systems of ad hoc whole of government cooperation that Australian government personnel have developed over several decades. Departmental and agency structures will be more effective if they evolve to reflect this operational reality.

Encouraging greater collaboration and shared understanding between personnel working on political, development and humanitarian issues and programming through periodic strategy meetings engaging internal and external actors, and through joint analysis is vital. Existing mechanisms within the Department such as the fragility and conflict network and the informal policy coordination ‘troika’ section meetings or the Senior Community of Practice on Fragility and Conflict are examples that could be formalised or expanded. Whilst interviewees noted the significant resourcing differences between the UK and Australia, the UK model does indicate how collaboration between diplomacy and peacebuilding happened actively even though the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development (DFID) were, until recently, separate ministries. It is striking that DFID has about 50 conflict specialists amongst their staff. The integration of DFAT and AusAID offers the benefit of such close collaboration in Australia and past attempts of having thematic Peace and Conflict Advisors and programs suggest further consideration is required to encourage collaboration and coherence in relation to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

37 An earlier report (Langmore et al., 2017) details UK’s approach which has a successful model in the Stabilisation Unit incorporating FCO, DFID, Defence and Police personnel. It encompasses a range of functions akin to ACMC and Australia Assists in the Australian context.
IN-HOUSE ANALYSIS
It is vital to encourage deeper historical, political, economic and sociological analysis within DFAT. The Department’s full effectiveness depends on staff having the time and capacity for rigorous analysis and to gather a substantial understanding of the background to the issues with which they have to deal.

The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper flagged that ‘A complex world requires a multidisciplinary approach to policy development and systemic ways of thinking about alternate futures. The Government will strengthen its advanced analytical techniques capability to test policies against possible shifts in our environment’ (p.18). The necessity for this was reiterated by many respondents in the survey. It is therefore vital to enhance the work of relevant DFAT branches (such as DFAT’s Strategic Futures and Contestability Branch) for forward projection and planning capability through increasing the number of dedicated and seconded staff. It is critical to this effort that staff tasked with long term planning and forecasting should be provided the time and space to do so outside of regular duties entailed in country or Canberra desk posts.

There is a strong case for enhancing the analytical and contingency planning capabilities within DFAT over the full range of foreign policy issues, in line with the intention described in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper and as the Secretary has done by establishing a new team within DFAT specialising in structured, analytical forward thinking.

Resourcing DFAT to take that role would be consistent with its position as leader in the preparation of all aspects of foreign policy. This must be undertaken in close consultation with departments with technical competence in the area being addressed, but DFAT should chair and facilitate such collaboration.

Expansion of DFAT’s capacity to take policy leadership so that it can more effectively respond to requests for collaboration in ensuring consistent and coherent foreign policy must be prioritised. DFAT’s role is vital because it has lead policy responsibility for many of the global responsibilities relating to peace processes, humanitarian action and rights, development and so on.

There is a need for greater comfort with perceived risks that come from challenging policy orthodoxies, and encouraging creativity. It is vital to encourage creative, innovative and imaginative thinking amongst staff. Motivation for this is strengthened when it is welcomed by political leaders and senior officers.

The context for such successful encouragement of innovation depends on officers sometimes having sufficient time to do creative reading, discussion and writing. Leadership, including ministers, departmental leaders and heads of missions can encourage a culture rewarding creativity by welcoming thoughtful and imaginative proposals. Staff commitment to departmental goals and purposes has to be sufficiently strong to motivate challenges to conventional policy when it has become inadequate for achieving departmental goals. The researchers concluded that the Department needs to be adequately resourced to allow time to prepare and provide independent advice in the national interest and to provide adequate career support and security to facilitate this independence.

TRAINING AND PREPARATION
Establishing training programs within the Department and opportunities for postgraduate study of conflict analysis, conflict prevention, peacebuilding and the many related professional skills is essential. A few of those interviewed emphasised that the natural purpose of diplomacy is dialogue and negotiation, and didn’t think that further training was necessary, but the majority thought that it would be useful. The few respondents who had taken undergraduate or postgraduate conflict and peace studies emphasised the great value they had found in such training and recommended that such opportunities be made far more readily available.

Past and current departmental training opportunities in Canberra and at post relating to conflict, crises, gender and humanitarian emergencies are well regarded by staff. Training in and guidance notes for DFAT frameworks on working in fragile and conflict affected states and ‘do no harm’ principles receive particular mention and should be developed and maintained. The establishment of the Diplomatic Academy was universally welcomed by staff and regarded as critical to the potential for increased professionalisation and institutionalisation of skill sets required for context-appropriate conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding interventions.
It is vital that training on conflict analysis, conflict prevention and peacebuilding be embedded in the curriculum of the Diplomatic Academy. It should also expand and deepen dedicated pre-deployment training opportunities on the history and culture of posting destinations, including a focus on culturally appropriate negotiation skills and approaches. Systematic training in strategic analysis and negotiation should also be developed for DFAT staff.

It is vital to increase provision of training opportunities on conflict prevention, peacebuilding and the whole range of techniques available for strengthening engagement and support to peace processes.

Ongoing professional development opportunities can be enhanced by providing opportunities for outside study leave for longer term training and education delivered by external providers.

Such expansion of the functions of the Diplomatic Academy will require a significant increase in the Academy’s full-time staff. The Academy must be able to expand the range of courses offered and to extend their frameworks and deepen their analytical strength.

The Diplomatic Academy can strengthen the quality of the Academy’s teaching if interested staff are encouraged to undertake research relevant to the training they are engaged in offering.

Expansion in the number of assisted study schemes available to established diplomats could gradually increase the number trained in conflict analysis and peacebuilding processes and strengthen the Department’s expertise in this area.

The Federal Government should increase grant opportunities for Australian university centres and programs that offer courses relating to diplomacy, conflict analysis, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding and through introducing Field of Research (FOR) codes that specifically address Peace and Conflict Studies.

Several Australian universities offer masters courses in peace and conflict studies. Sadly, some major Australian universities still do not, despite the interest from students whenever they are available and the popularity of the discipline and courses internationally. There are rich opportunities overseas for undertaking studies about analysis of conflict and the great range of available peace processes. During the survey about six current staff were identified who had completed such a course. There would be great value in expanding the number. The obvious mechanisms would be to provide paid leave and/or to pay fees in return for guarantees from recipients to return to DFAT for a specified number of years. DFAT also has several alumni of the Rotary Peace Fellowship program, who have undertaken international studies in peace and conflict resolution.

The number of peace and conflict studies courses are increasing at Australian universities. Ideally, though, opportunities to study in these courses should be encouraged by offering financial support to staff who seek to expand their capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. More recruitment of people with these degrees would obviously also be valuable. An effective means to do this could be by establishing a peace studies centre in partnership with an overseas peace institute such as the Asia region Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, or from Sweden, Finland, Norway, Switzerland (the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces) and establishing an international sector advisory team to oversee it.

The other basis for training at present is to learn through on the ground experience. One interviewee noted that ‘The UN Association of Australia (UNAA) has recently become the Australian civil society member of the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations (Challenges Forum). The ACMC is the Government partner. The Challenges Secretariat is run from the FolkeBernadotte Academy in Sweden, and has published many useful papers. There are many other great research centres on UN peace and security matters - including IPI, CIC at New York University, the Stimson Center amongst many others in Europe.’

In relation to Security Sector Reform (SSR), the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) a component part of which is the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISATT) have both extended their work into the Indo-Pacific recently. There could be great value in Australia seeking to join these organisations, perhaps by nominating for their membership of their Governing Boards.
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

The following recommendations reflect a broader and deeper need to look at how best to retain individual and organisational knowledge as well as opportunities for learning and reflection to continue to build knowledge and skills.

It is vital to build on the current conflict and fragility network within DFAT and within other departments required to work in conflict situations so as to be a source of shared information and advice.

Keeping up to date with the rapidly growing number of high quality global and national studies of lessons from addressing other conflicts is vital.

Building on relations with Australian academics and NGOs working in the area is a cost-effective approach to strengthening effectiveness. Lessons learned can evolve more dynamically in conjunction with other professionals working on the state of the art of peacebuilding in the field. Request for input into policy issues is also a way to enhance information exchange.

Whole-of-Government joint conflict analysis at an early stage of identifying an evolving situation and at regular intervals is vital for effective consideration and planning of intervention. This would help develop shared understanding and point to areas where more information is needed and articulation of lessons learned in engagements with previous conflicts.

Joining and sustaining effective communication with similar units in other countries and with multilateral professional peace process networks would be a cost-effective mechanism for strengthening analytical depth. Links with Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, Canada, the UK, Switzerland, Finland, Norway and Sweden are obvious potential examples.

With a highly adaptive and mobile workplace model for posted staff, local staff and outside advisers often act as the organisation’s and post’s institutional memory. An earlier approach in South East Asia to hold regional meetings bringing together staff from posts in the region was a good example of a way to share and reflect on contexts and create comparative learnings across contexts. Recognising, rewarding and encouraging the retention and integration into policy formation of local staff and outside advisers can be effective elements in performing this function.

It could be valuable to review whether conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding should be incorporated into the existing DFAT Career Anchor system to help identify staff who have experience in these areas.

Building internal processes would be valuable, such as ad hoc consultations, to invite staff who self-identify as experienced in particular conflict prevention, peacemaking or peacebuilding fields of expertise or geographic regions to input into broader policy discussions on these areas and be contactable to staff currently posted to those areas.

These mechanisms could make organisational memory and transmission of knowledge a living, breathing system which transmits knowledge through the individuals who have delivered Australia’s engagement in peace processes. In this way documentation systems, archival records and reports of lessons learnt would become a natural outgrowth of the systems of learning and teaching outlined above.

ENGAGEMENT WITH ACADEMIA, NGOS AND INTEREST GROUPS

Since the first Ministry for External Relations was founded there have been many examples of effective external communication, between DFAT and parliament, media, academia, development organisations, the AIIA, UNAA, civil society – faith groups, service clubs, trade unions, professional organisations – companies, trade groups, schools and so on, and this should be continued and expanded. One difficulty is simply finding time for such contact. There is also a risk of ill-defined boundaries relating to sharing of information and ideas, but the tendency is often to be overprotective of material learnt through official circles, even though much of that is publicly available to anyone who searches online with reasonable thoughtfulness. Building public knowledge and respect for DFAT is vital to strengthening support for its perspectives and activities. Generosity with communication is a relatively low cost means of generating understanding and sympathy not only for the Department but also for government policies and perspectives.

The approaches mentioned above can be cost-effective ways to strengthen public support and discussion, and/or to draw on expert opinion available from academic, business and civil society while doing so.
In various areas of DFAT responsibility there have been advisory committees or regular forums for discussion. At various times these have included, for example: human rights; nuclear weapons; Australia’s role as an elected member of the Security Council; development policy; and groups focusing on relations between Australia and particular other countries. They take significant organisation time, a diversion which may not be welcomed, but they not only provide opportunities for democratic reporting but also generate comment and ideas which can stretch possibilities and even imagination about possible initiatives.

Numbers of respondents spoke of the benefits of drawing on such scholarly, cultural and other professional expertise. There could also be significant usefulness in appointing more advisory groups of academics and civil society leaders for swift advice, provision of expert comments and preparation of reports. This is still happening but the practice could be significantly expanded with net benefits. Such advisory groups facilitate the formation of professional networks which can be called on for swift comment. Networking is a vital and cost-effective skill. An expert group could also be assigned small funds for sponsoring public discussion; creating opportunities for generating public discussion; and being ready to undertake tasks for the minister and department. Organisation of such groups takes time and modest cost (provided they don’t meet too frequently) but their value can be substantial to both the Department and to strengthening public understanding.

The use of multitrack and in particular Track II diplomacy has increased in recent times as diversity of international relations issues has increased and the number and quality of people with expertise in universities, think tanks, INGOs, and retired diplomats has grown. Track II meetings can be a productive way of enabling dialogue, widening debate and of injecting additional possibilities into a jammed negotiation. For example, when there were limited opportunities for official bilateral contact between Australia and Myanmar, Track II and III initiatives presented an opportunity for communication and dialogue.

In conflict situations, community-led and community-based engagement are of great importance, for which civil society can often contribute most. There can be great organisational value in appointing highly experienced people from other fields such as development organisations, academia, business and so on to appropriate positions where their experience will diversify the range of skills and knowledge available to the Department.

DFAT and individual diplomats could usefully join the international networks engaged with peace processes. Various international peace organisations run conferences and training programs with which it would be imperative for a conflict prevention and peacebuilding unit within DFAT to establish and keep in close contact. Encouraging staff engagement in professional networks, forums and learning exchanges internationally will enhance Australian diplomatic capacity, networking communication and specialisation.

LENGTH OF POSTINGS

Many factors influence decisions about the length of postings including personal and family choice, the value of continuity in particular situations, equity in sharing attractive or dangerous locations, the importance of the relevant language and so on. In situations of conflict, the importance of trust and established relationships can scarcely be over-estimated. Experience in addressing conflict, along with established relationships can come with longer posting durations. Whereas, shorter posting durations could result in repetitious cycles of problem solving and attempted solutions with limited impact, rather than iterative processes resulting in incremental steps affecting change. Effective conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding require methodological knowledge and training, detailed conflict analysis, and established relationships and systems of trust. Therefore, short term postings may increase the length and cost of missions overall.

Given the diversity of these and many other factors, suggesting rules for the duration of postings is impossible. However, it could be that the need for fixed rules has been exaggerated, and that consultation between Canberra, the Mission and the officer concerned might normally be appropriate, and that old conventional factors needing to prevent too close association with country of residence may have been given too much weight. Certainly, in situations where there is conflict, careful consideration should be given to whether the officer has significant potential continuing contributions to reducing tensions or peacebuilding.

Track II diplomacy depends on the existence of trusted and admired professionals who could widen the knowledge and imagination of policy practitioners identifying possible mechanisms for improving communication and breaking log jams. It requires willingness to innovate and take risks. Greater use of Track II methodology is recommended. Establishment of an Australian Institute for Peace would provide an ideal centre for organisation of such Track II meetings.

Increasing the duration of postings in conflict affected settings should always be considered together with the possibility of arranging increased staff support. It is important to recognise, though, that increased posting duration could incorporate higher risk to the welfare of posted individuals.
Therefore, increasing the duration of postings in conflict affected settings should always be considered as a possibility. The reality is that conflict reduction let alone resolution is normally a prolonged process, often far beyond the capacity of a single diplomat to remain engaged. However, such processes normally pass through various stages, and there could well be stages of the process in which a trusted advisor could make a significant contribution, which would be enabled by prolonging a posting. Providing increased support could include decompression leave, travel allowances, and sufficient workforce flexibility to assign relief staff to enable individuals to increase posting durations in conflict affected or hardship environments. Postings are not equal either in terms of the demands they place on staff or the value that staff longevity in those posts brings to Australian national interests. At a time when the supply of staff with training and experience in conflict affected settings is limited, careful management of those skilled personnel is important. Highly mobile staff can self-identify and remain part of internal communities of practice on peace and conflict.

In sum, individual staff preferences, career goals and family life may be incompatible with longer posting durations in fragile and conflict affected settings. Staff willing to undertake longer postings will self-select for these positions. Reward and recognition of staff who do self-select in this way could be by providing them with preferential posting options after conclusion of long term postings, and possibly faster promotions.

HANDOVER PROCEDURES
The quality of handovers can be vital for the effectiveness of the succeeding posting. Posted staff develop relationships and systems which are not easily conveyed and maintained through handover notes. The final two weeks of postings are periods of increased time pressures on staff dealing with professional and personal administrative issues, so it is important to gear expectations of what will be achieved during in-country handovers.

Increased resourcing to enable person-to-person in-country handovers or personal predeployment headquarter-based handovers between departing and incoming posted staff in conflict affected settings would be warranted to supplement handover notes. This would be a challenge to workforce planning, including leave cycles, time pressures on incoming and outgoing staff and the use of appropriate relief staff.

These pressures will differ based on the posting environment and degree of structured accommodation and other support provided. Larger missions host institutional mechanisms for knowledge retention and transmission of knowledge, including within local staff, teams of posted staff, heads of missions, outside consultants and written hand over notes that are viewed as essential to, but not replacements for, effective in-person handover procedures in line with practices in other organisations.

Recognition of the critical role DFAT corporate management plays and of the complexity of this planning in enabling and troubleshooting issues arising from workforce management is important. These staff must be included within planning processes for mission success and training programs for working in conflict affected settings.

One new incentive introduced by the Secretary, called the ‘Secretary’s Fellowship’, was described as the opportunity for an officer returning from post to be able to write a reflective policy issue paper on the lessons and policy implications from a posting on return. Opportunities for reflection and for sharing knowledge can be a highly cost-effective means of gathering and sharing experiences in Canberra.

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**Recognising, institutionalising and supporting the strong informal culture of in-person hand over arrangements between incoming and outgoing staff must be supported and may need additional resourcing.**

There would be great value in increasing the number of Secretary’s Fellowships for which officers departing post may apply. The fellowship period allows for reflecting on, analysing and writing up policy issue papers and lessons learned from postings. There could be more of these awards offered with increased funding to this excellent initiative.

**SUPPORT MECHANISMS**
The established practice within the Department of senior staff providing informal ongoing support to more junior colleagues posted to conflict affected settings is valued by posted staff extremely highly and must be continued.

The support and advice delivered by the Conflict and Fragility branch to country desks on request was viewed as very valuable when requested. Staff also reported that the range and utility of support from the Conflict and Fragility branch was at times not well understood. The capacity of the Conflict and Fragility Branch will need to be expanded if increased awareness results in greater utilisation of limited staff time.

Experience suggests that DFAT has not always had adequate standardised systems for supporting and compensating staff injured or killed while on duty. Of course it is hoped that such systems never have to be used. But in a world where casual violence and terrorist activity have increased, such systems are essential.
Taking and Compensating for Risks

The diversity of locations and forms of international postings involve varying degrees of risk and therefore various forms of management, support and compensation depending on context. Effective support for conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding may sometimes require a higher degree of political, programing, accountability and personal security risks that need to be incorporated from the beginning of planning processes. It is important to assess risk within the context of the objectives of the mission and of foreseeable contingencies that might result in greater risks to Australian personnel at later points if a conflict escalated.

A larger commitment of resources and expansion in the types of programing may be necessary in such situations. These may have uncertain prospects of accountability and effectiveness where they support broader stabilisation or conflict prevention objectives. There may be political risk from working in conflict affected settings, including from risks of difficulty in achieving accountability and from iterative attempts which include learning from early failure and from diverse conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding toolkits. Communication and public engagement strategies may need to be designed to mitigate these risks.

Provide a mechanism to enable an exemption from the workplace standard health and safety rules to ensure that management is not criminally liable for injury and death resulting from Australian personnel accepting appropriate risks in pursuit of objectives in conflict affected settings.

Convene an interagency legal working group to design the most appropriate mechanism to enable the above mechanism.

Australian workplace-based risk structure and liabilities may not be adequate or suitable for determining compensation payment for work in some conflict-affected settings and certainly would not be in war environments. It is likely to be necessary to modify risk and liability structures to enable a deployed model for staff from DFAT and other agencies.

Multilateral Collaboration

UN Secretary-General António Guterres who took office in January 2017 is giving the highest priority to strengthening the effectiveness of conflict prevention and is engaged in major processes of organisational and strategic reform. The foundations for the concrete policies being developed have been the three major reports on Peace Operations (UNSG, 2015), Peacebuilding (UN, 2015) and Women, Peace and Security (UN, 2015). Australia, together with Angola, facilitated the drafting of resolutions based on these reports for the General Assembly and the Security Council. These resolutions on ‘sustaining peace’ were adopted in April 2016 (Assembly Resolution 70/262 and Council Resolution 2282). A writer for the International Peace Institute, Andy Carl, says that ‘The ambitious and paradigm-shifting ideas included in these resolutions demonstrate that preventing, ending, and transforming violent conflict requires a deliberate alignment of development, humanitarian, diplomatic, and security interventions’ (Carl, IPI, 2018). The Australian Mission has continued to be actively engaged in supporting the consequential reforms and policy initiatives. It is therefore essential that DFAT implement consequential national responsibilities to make the maximum contribution of Australian policy reform and support for the SG’s reforms. During much of the last decade, between $1.25 and $3m a year have been provided by Australia to support the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs which contains the Mediation Support Unit, and about $3.5m a year to the Peacebuilding Fund for aid to post-conflict environments.

On 23 March 2020 the Secretary-General appealed for a global ceasefire:

Our world faces a common enemy: COVID-19. The virus does not care about nationality or ethnicity, faction or faith. It attacks all, relentlessly. Meanwhile, armed conflict rages on around the world. The most vulnerable — women and children, people with disabilities, the marginalized and the displaced — pay the highest price.

They are also at the highest risk of suffering devastating losses from COVID-19. Let’s not forget that in war-ravaged countries, health systems have collapsed. Health professionals, already few in number, have often been targeted. Refugees and others displaced by violent conflict are doubly vulnerable. The fury of the virus illustrates the folly of war. That is why today, I am calling for an immediate global ceasefire in all corners of the world. It is time to put armed conflict on lockdown and focus together on the true fight of our lives.

To warring parties, I say: Pull back from hostilities. Put aside mistrust and animosity. Silence guns; stop the artillery; end the airstrikes. This is crucial... to help create corridors for life-saving aid. To open precious windows for diplomacy. To bring hope to places among the most vulnerable to COVID-19. Let us take inspiration from coalitions and dialogue slowly taking shape among rival parties in some parts to enable joint approaches to COVID-19. But we need much more. End the sickness of war and fight the disease that is ravaging our world. It starts by stopping the fighting everywhere. Now. That is what our human family needs, now more than ever.

This is a timely call to which Australia could give strongly committed and active support.
Swiftly and substantially increasing Australian assistance to UN conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, including those of the new Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Peacebuilding Fund (which began operations in 2006) and, once substantially multiplied, sustain that support at the new level for a predictable period of at least a decade. This would be consistent with current policy, noting the White Paper explicitly affirmed support for the UN’s peace processes.

Immediately adopt a continuing program of major increases in Australian aid funding so that a national program of conflict prevention programs can be established and effectively implemented as a central feature of Australian aid and development cooperation.

Contribute directly and substantially to the Joint Fund for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; and the coordination fund for the establishment of the new UN Resident Coordinator system which became operational on 1 January 2019, and aims to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of management of UN development assistance.

Maintain and strengthen firm and effective links between DFAT and the new UN architecture of the Peace and Security Pillar.

A number of respondents commented on the Security Council. Australia’s experience as an elected member of the Security Council in 2013-14 was that it could have significantly more influence than is commonly believed possible for elected members, and this was a source of substantial pride to a number of respondents. Research on the balance of power between the P5 and elected members within the Council led to the conclusion that:

To a significant degree, the influence of elected members is a product of the strength of their own determination… Though elected members are constrained, they can have a significant influence if they have clear goals; their mission is adequately funded and staffed; they recognize the imperative of choosing priorities, preparing carefully, and engaging actively in dialogue with other member states; and they are lively and unpretentious networkers in partnership with other Council members, elected and permanent (Langmore and Farrall, 2016: 73).

Many lessons were learned during the campaign for election to the Security Council (Langmore, 2013); during membership of the Council; and in relation to reform of the Council (Langmore and Thakur, 2016). It will be important to recall those in preparation for the campaign for membership in 2029 – 30, which then-Foreign Minister Julie Bishop announced shortly after Australia’s last membership was completed. This announcement recognised the most important lesson, which was to plan well ahead for the campaign.

For example, it would be entirely feasible to clarify a strategy for Council reform now, and to play a leading role in advocacy. However, most of the attention on UN reform has focused on the problem of the growing misalignment of the Council’s five permanent members with changing global geopolitical realities.

Policymakers and analysts have also looked at reforming its working methods. Yet two-thirds of its members are elected and the potential utility and role of the ten elected members (E10) in revitalizing the Council as an effective executive body has been relatively neglected. On the one hand, there seems no realistic prospect of structural reform of the existing Security Council permanent membership in the foreseeable future because there is so much opposition from many states but also, in each case, from one or more of the existing permanent members, each of whom holds a veto. On the other hand, there is no realistic substitute in the foreseeable future to the Security Council as a universally validated body which could speak and act in the name of the whole international community.

Caught between these two ‘parameters’, there is merit in considering how the Council’s nonpermanent membership might be reformed, with a view to improving the Council’s representational and performance legitimacy. Improvements in the numbers, terms, and roles of the E10 are quite possible.

This report proposes that DFAT continue considering ways of reforming the Council; and that Australia sponsor and support further discussion on Council reform amongst other member states.

Another means of increasing influence within the UN is to allocate funds directly to parts of the Secretariat or to the Funds, Programs and Agencies which the Department particularly wants to support. It is crucial that many of those contributions which have been severely cut during recent years be restored and enhanced (see below).

Every area of multilateral responsibility involves substantial work. DFAT’s understaffing has caused Australian engagement with these to be quite uneven. The Australian Mission to the UN has often been so understaffed that it has not even been able to always provide adequate national representation, let alone take any role in leadership through developing and advocating innovative policies.

There are also often opportunities for leadership through national membership or even chairing of the executive committees of UN funds, programs and agencies. This may sometimes not be desirable or possible, but it is regrettable when the cause is simply lack of sufficient diplomatic staff with time to either prepare to take responsibility or to consult sufficiently widely with relevant Australian departments, professional NGOs or academics about possibilities. As representative of a privileged, well-endowed and substantial middle power, Australia’s goal should be to be a mature, thoughtful and at least sometimes creative leader of the executive committees of the UN funds, programs and agencies of which it is an automatic member.
Australia’s leverage at the UN would be significantly increased if its financial contributions were at least proportional to its financial capacities. This would involve substantially increasing voluntary financial contributions to selected UN funds, programs and agencies.

In response to the current US shift away from international cooperation, there is talk amongst major countries such as Germany and Japan of forming an Alliance of Multilaterals to defend existing international rules and to develop them further where necessary. Other proposed aims of such a group would be to strengthen international solidarity; enhance international commitment to climate protection; and to assume greater political and financial responsibility for international organisations (Hurst, 2018).

It would be in Australia’s national interest to join a like-minded group of countries committed to defending and developing international rules which contribute to just and peaceful conflict resolution. For example, Secretary-General Guterres is advancing rapidly with implementing reforms to increase efficiency and effectiveness of the UN’s work on development and peace processes. His restructuring to establish a UN Resident Coordinator in countries with a UN presence is regarded by all those concerned to improve coordination within countries. But reorganisations have financial costs; so why not use that opportunity to directly support a reform to strengthen efficiency? It is also essential for donor countries to increase their financial support to UNRRA (the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) because of the withdrawal of support from the US.

There are clear examples of the benefits derived from DFAT personnel being engaged in UN roles through postings and secondments. The most cost-effective manner to do this is by introducing a national policy of supporting high quality Australian personnel for placement into UN posts in conflict affected situations – as already happens occasionally. These personnel properly have primary affiliation with the UN. The rotation of Australian staff through those roles establishes systems of trust and relationship to enable future Australian bilateral assistance to those states, or to alternatively sway an argument for a multilateral response to create effects that may not specifically refer back to Australia in politically sensitive contexts.

Expand Australia’s conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding reach globally through introducing a national policy of supporting strategic, cost-effective postings for Australian staff in UN roles at all levels of seniority, from entrance to professional grades up to senior management and policy positions.

3. CONFLICT INTERVENTIONS AND ENGAGEMENT IN PEACEBUILDING

Australian’s continuing security, peace and prosperity depends, in part, on our neighbours having increasing opportunities to also move towards those goals. It is in Australia’s interests, as well as for our neighbours, for Australia to be a responsible, law abiding and generous global citizen.

A legally sound peacekeeping intervention normally requires either an invitation from a host government and/or a UN mandate. Either way, questions of national sovereignty need to be addressed appropriately before intervening in another nations’ affairs. The adoption by the UN of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm greatly strengthens the rationale for intervention in some conflicts.

There is great diversity of forms of conflict, the situations in which it occurs and the mechanisms for addressing it. Fortunately, Australian diplomats, scholars and NGOs have had many useful experiences on which to draw, many aspects of which were summarized in the previous chapter. There has also recently been a rapid growth in the literature on peace processes. Outstanding examples have already been mentioned: the UN & WB’s Pathways for Peace, and the reports written by groups headed by Professor John Braithwaite, of which the latest is Cascades of Violence: War, Crime and Peacebuilding Across South Asia. The conclusions of a third highly valuable report by Cheng, Goodhand and Meehan (2018) for the Stabilisation Unit of the UK Department for International Development are also of direct relevance to Australia.

Several major types of strategic and policy evolution are required if the Australian government decides to systematically attempt to contribute effectively to prevention of conflict and peacebuilding. First, the foundation of policies must be both empathetic diplomatic observation and comprehensive, rigorous research and analysis of all the countries with which Australia is attempting to offer support.

An example that illustrates the importance of the kind of up-to-date, extensive, analytical overview which DFAT must have the capacity to undertake and of which Australia needed to take careful note for the preparation of new policy was the rapid evolution of external circumstances of Pacific countries undertaken by Professor Stewart Firth for the Lowy Institute (Firth, 2018). This highlighted a universal and significant growth of diplomatic independence in the Pacific relating to trade and climate change. In 2015-16, total Chinese two-way trade with the Pacific was greater than Australian trade with the Pacific. Therefore, the Pacific has options. The UN Small Island Developing State Group is significant for Pacific countries. French annual aid to the Pacific exceeds $4b, more than Australia’s total annual aid budget. Amongst the Pacific nations and territories, New Caledonia has the highest per capita income and its freely associated states are next. The independent states have the lowest average incomes, though Samoa is relatively successful.
There are substantial differences between the monolingual states in the eastern Pacific and those in the west such as PNG, which is hugely multilingual. Fiji is a democracy – by military permission! The Indian population there has declined from half to a third. This picture highlights the kind of complex, multi-dimensional and networked problem sets with which Australian policymaking must grapple.

Australia has global interests in conflict prevention but limited capacity to sustain engagement in all conflict affected areas. Effective conflict prevention planning strategies could range widely, including to situations of potential future concern to Australian and global peace and stability. Since conflict situations and their impact on Australia are unpredictable, and because effective and context-appropriate interventions rely on long term, previously established engagement, relationships and systems, Australia will also need to consider ways to sustain its presence in a broad range of lower priority countries.

Conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding activities can best be pursued most effectively through integrated whole of government frameworks. DFAT has the capabilities to plan for and lead Australian Whole of Government efforts to prevent overseas conflicts, assist communities build peace, and develop the political strategies to respond to armed conflict (as illustrated by Bob Breen in Chapter 2). Within that leadership, investing in and operationalising conflict prevention can only be undertaken effectively through a collaborative whole of government and regionally-coordinated effort. Experience with programs to address complex international and transnational challenges ranging from terrorism to refugee flows reinforce this lesson.

This requires that DFAT ensure that contingency planning is undertaken within or in conjunction with a structure for whole of government planning and forecasting that encompasses diplomatic, humanitarian, defence, and development strategies among others. Such integration is also a key means of drawing effectively on Defence and Intelligence knowledge and capabilities for engagement in conflict prevention.

Conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding require specialised skill sets that the Department will need to cultivate and nurture if it is to draw upon them in a sustained way. Policies worth considering to support the capacity for engagement and accessibility of relevant personnel, many suggested by respondents, include: An introduction of a ‘mediation standby roster’ or other form of roster based around key conflict prevention, peacemaking or peacebuilding skill sets; and the formalisation of peace and conflict specialisations amongst ‘Core-Anchors’ for staff as they develop careers within DFAT. Specifying a ‘Core-Anchor’ around issue areas related to working in conflict affected situations would enable staff to self-identify skill sets in this area and be more readily identified and participate in internal policy dialogues.

These centres and clusters of expertise already exist informally within DFAT, and the challenge is to provide an institutional mechanism to recognise and draw on them. Long cycle Pacific experience will be essential to any future conflict prevention, or peacebuilding programming.

**Longer-term peacebuilding** involves efforts to build institutional and relational capacities for peace and prevention of violent conflicts through non-violent approaches. Interviewees described the value and effectiveness of peacebuilding support. The examples of what constituted peacebuilding activities varied across contexts and time. Strengthening peacebuilding overlaps closely with conflict prevention. A particular lesson from the Bougainville and Solomon Islands experience was the importance of ensuring participation of all parties to a conflict, and of enabling discussions to last as long as the participants wanted. In relation to Bougainville, New Zealand selected the place for the principal peace meeting, outside Christchurch. About 280 people from Bougainville attended, there was no deadline and eventually a peace agreement was reached. This contrasted with the Solomon Islands for which a Peace Monitoring Group was appointed, before there was a peace to keep. Australia didn’t move until someone was killed, despite the fact that the Solomon Islanders wanted intervention before this. At the height of the conflict Australia selected the representatives, the meeting place (Townsville) and forced agreement at a short meeting lasting only a few days. There was no cultural sympathy. Also, observers were disturbed by the condescending style of Australian officials. Australia assumed that there would be instability.

An example of how DFAT was seen to contribute to peacebuilding in South East Asia (for example in Mindanao) was to note: that DFAT provided support across groups involved in peace processes (government and armed groups), understanding the importance of all actors involved in talks; DFAT had shown flexibility within its contracts with partners. Given the dynamic nature of the contexts in which peace processes occur, the ability to adjust and adapt without the need for ‘recontracting’ is immensely valued; DFAT had not been micro-managing, they had shown respect for the knowledge and analysis of partners and how to engage with partners, which is particularly important in Myanmar; DFAT understood the importance of working with key people, not just ‘more people’. Some donors emphasised that their spend of tax dollars often needs to be justified, which is difficult if being spent on the few. In contrast, DFAT understands the importance of working where the most change is possible.

The ability for peacebuilding support to be adaptive and flexible was often seen as a result of several factors that included the discretion of the head of mission, the size of the program (the smaller being more flexible and discretionary) and the relationships that develop with partners in country. Interviewees acknowledged that existing relationships influence the appropriateness and possibility for engagement in peace processes in the future.
Lessons from past Australian interventions also highlight the importance of an engaged third party tailoring the level and nature of their involvement in supporting a peace process by judging the extent of political progress and changing dynamics, rather than prescribed timelines set without reference to local contexts. Past examples include for instance politically driven mission success criteria set for the Bougainville PMG in 1998 (Breen, 2016:236). This requires a great deal of endurance from third parties. Lessons from past interventions similarly indicate that early disengagement or inappropriately timed disengagement can result in negative outcomes (Breen, 2016:267). On the other hand, there is evidence that prescribed timelines can at times generate momentum in peace processes. There is some evidence, for instance, that deadlines established by third parties in the context of support mechanisms can spur action within peace processes. One example is the rapid action of the UN political representative in Bougainville to verify weapons containment following the announcement of the withdrawal of the Australian PMG in 2003 (Breen, 2016:301).

Australia remained engaged in Bougainville and in support of peacebuilding efforts, and ahead of the independence vote held in November 2019. Some commented on the situation in Bougainville, where despite the successes of the intervention, many of the preconditions to the crisis remain and needed ongoing commitment to their transformation. Some interviewees reflect on the ongoing need to commit to sustained support for peace processes, not just at points of crisis. Engaging in an ongoing way, especially in support of locally-led approaches to conflict and peacebuilding, is crucial.

Staff emphasised the need to retain a focus on communities and disputants as best placed to develop interventions into conflict and peacebuilding strategies. The starting point for analysis is to focus on communities and disputants as the agents of their own futures and to support their designing of strategies and programs to influence situations accordingly. Staff identified that development and humanitarian programming with strong peacebuilding elements regarded as successful in places such as Sri Lanka, Bougainville and Solomon Islands were based on a recognition that capacities for local-level peacebuilding already existed. Understanding and mapping these capacities was essential in designing a clear theory of change. Periodically reviewing these theories against changing circumstances and adapting programming accordingly was also essential. Programming could then more effectively harness and assist existing local capacity to produce effects supporting peacebuilding objectives.

The preparation for the national action plan on Women, Peace and Security featured an extensive process of community consultation managed through partner organisations (including INGOs and community groups). This is identified as a successful example of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet engaging, with DFAT support, with the broader Australian community in creating policy and programming. This resulted in significant buy-in and resource efficiency during implementation and through evaluation and renewal cycles, and is suggested as a model which can be more systemically drawn upon by DFAT. Effective consultation within Australia is time consuming, and can be at least as demanding as the work that DFAT officers may be expected to do at post or within an embassy. Where policy bears upon a particular country, one way to enable this type of deep engagement may be for broad based pre-deployment engagement with domestic community groups on a particular country or thematic area to be systemically built into handover and pre-deployment arrangements for posted staff. For staff on country or thematic desks in Canberra, this type of community and outside engagement has become far more common in recent years. Staff reflected positively on the increased openness of the department to such engagement. Challenges in this area primarily relate to more easily connecting time-poor DFAT staff members to trusted sources of advice, and of mechanisms to enable limited pools of outside experts to undertake security clearance processes to allow for DFAT staff to discuss sensitive topics with their advisers within appropriately tailored settings.

From a conflict prevention and gender perspective, increasing support for research and peacebuilding initiatives that focus on understanding and transforming the socially constructed notions of masculinity and associated social norms and structures that play a role in driving conflict and insecurity are important. In the Pacific especially, the focus on gender recognises the importance of looking at masculinities and peacebuilding. This was an area where a couple of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) working with support from DFAT hoped to expand their efforts and contributions.

An area where Australia is seen to be particularly successful is enhancing women’s civil society leadership and meaningful participation in decision-making and peacebuilding. Positive outcomes for women’s leadership can be seen in Sri Lanka with capacity-building for the Association of War Affected Women on conflict resolution, post-conflict peace building and transitional justice. Australia is also supporting women’s voices in decision-making, leadership and peacebuilding in Bougainville and Afghanistan where women’s groups strengthen participation at the village level. Australia also made a noteworthy contribution to peace processes in other parts of the Asia-Pacific region, most notably in Myanmar and the Philippines. In Myanmar, DFAT’s support, over several years was through support to CSOs working with local actors involved in peace efforts.
Media and communications strategies form a core part of successful peacebuilding and peacemaking approaches. The publication of Nuis Bilong Pis and other information dissemination methods (include in person patrols and attendance at events) was critical to the constructive role of the Australian led TMG/PMG and later BTT in support of the peace process in Bougainville (Breen, 2016). Literature reviews commissioned by DFID also find evidence that media-based interventions by third parties are correlated with reductions in rates of armed violence in conflict-affected states (Cramer, 2016). Examples were given of peacebuilding initiatives that focused on media and communications, including initiatives in the Pacific.

The role of diaspora groups to support community-led peacebuilding initiatives, in South Sudan for example, was also mentioned by DFAT officers. Diasporas are already key stakeholders in Australia’s international development assistance program; as development actors and as supporters of Australia’s development assistance in their countries of origin (Miletic, 2018). Yet, as peacebuilding actors, diaspora are an ‘untapped’ resource, reflecting the wider call for better engagement with local actors and diaspora in conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies by state actors (Miletic, 2018).

There is a wide range of ways that diaspora peacebuilders develop roles and activities to contribute to peacebuilding efforts. Their initiatives may be focused on engaging and influencing change in the host country, with a view to positively and directly influencing conditions in their homeland. This process can address both short-term and long-term objectives, from immediate humanitarian needs, through to longer-term developmental, political, economic and social objectives. Diaspora engagement is characterised by deep connections to country of origin, context-specific knowledge and language, long-term commitment and familiarity with the context (Miletic, 2018). The mobility and connectivity of current diasporic groups sets them apart from earlier waves of migrants. With mass media and social media, the sense of common diasporic identity may be mobilised and harnessed despite geographic separation from the homeland and from other members of the diaspora. However, diasporas also have the potential to act as spoilers undermining prospects for peace, so careful analysis is needed to understand individual motivations and their potential impact on a peace process before supporting their engagement.

South Sudan was one particular context where the role of diaspora groups as actors for DFAT to engage with was strongly emphasised. The engagement by South Sudanese Australian diaspora groups in both inwards (domestic) and outwards (international) peacebuilding efforts is consistent with Australia’s national interests and aims to promote peace and security.

Diaspora peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan take place amidst challenging and dynamic political landscapes. Experiences of diplomatic personnel in working in South Sudan has emphasised the opportunity that exists for diasporic person to person relationships of influence and organisational networks that support the ongoing peace process and development goals.

**PEACE OPERATIONS**

UN peacekeeping operations are on the frontlines of our efforts to prevent the emergence of lawless regions where insecurity, transnational crime, and extremism can flourish. They are an investment in global peace, security and prosperity.

António Guterres, 2018

As noted earlier, Australia has had a strong record of engagement with peacekeeping. In the 1990s, ADF peacekeepers were involved in several peacekeeping missions in countries close to Australia. Today, the peacekeeping operations to which Australia is contributing 37 participants are in Africa and the Middle East. Concern was expressed by some interviewees about the decline in Australian engagement in peacekeeping during the 2010s. However, others thought that if the UN were to establish another peacekeeping mission in our region, it would be reasonable to expect that this would result in a larger Australian contribution of defence, police and civilian personnel, provided other major operations were not underway, as they have been during the last decade.

Through his Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative, the Secretary-General called in 2018 on ‘Member States, the Security Council, host countries, troop- and police-contributing countries, regional partners and financial contributors to renew our collective engagement with UN peacekeeping and mutually commit to reach for excellence’. He says that ‘peacekeeping is one of the most effective tools available to the UN in the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security’. Yet there are major challenges. Sometimes there are no apparent political solutions. Mandates lack clarity and focus. Complex threats have led to a rise in fatalities and injuries amongst peacekeepers. Missions have sometimes lacked adequate personnel and equipment. Achieving longterm coherence is extremely difficult. To achieve effective implementation of UN peace operations requires the commitment of sufficient resources including highly professional personnel, modern technology and logistic support. It was therefore essential that the Australian Government endorse the UN Secretary-General’s ‘Action for Peacekeeping (A4P)’ initiative, which it did, albeit as number 126 in the chronological order of endorsing countries towards the end of September 2018.
This call comes after sustained and strongly analytical rethinking about peacekeeping.38 Traditional peacekeeping is now commonly replaced with multi-dimensional/complex peace operations. Conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are commonly melded. The new Department of Peace Operations, which has taken over from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, became functional in January 2019. It combines the strategic, political and operational responsibilities of the former Department and also of the former Department of Political Affairs. It will strengthen the integration of direction, management and support for peacekeeping and special political missions. These are the bases for the Declaration of Shared Commitment which Australia has just signed. They are a firm basis for Australia to upgrade its badly flagging commitment and it is essential that it does so, comprehensively, generously and promptly. If we can do so in ways which also contribute to further improvements in political negotiations, conflict prevention, planning, articulation of mandates, staffing, inclusion of more women, training, equipping, development of tactics, synchronization of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, accountability of UN peacekeepers, and continued enhancement of protection of civilians, so much the better.

One way of expressing a modest goal for Australia’s contribution of staff would be to adopt the minimum of 200 military personnel which was used as a basis in the nineties in a policy endorsed by Robert Ray as Minister of Defence in 1993. Australia could realistically aim to fill senior UN positions as it did excellently in Cambodia and East Timor. Skilled staff who would be able to make especially valuable contributions include logistics, medical and engineering specialists. Australia could also usefully restore its peacekeeping training facilities and invite other contributing countries to send participants. Australia could perhaps specialise itself through preparation for peacekeeping missions by focusing on: protection of civilians; Women, Peace and Security; human rights and R2P; security sector reform (especially since so many civil conflicts are inflamed by crime); and mediation – though that would require a major new emphasis on preparation and training of Australians first. Such a program would require political will and political decisions. Australia should seek renewed opportunities for upgrading engagement with peacekeeping missions through initially offering a minimum of 200 military to peace processes which are judged to be appropriate.39

The AFP regularly reviews its involvement in offshore operations and missions, such as its current commitments in PNG and the Solomon Islands, and seeks approval from Government prior to contributing to new peace operations or development missions. It writes that setting arbitrary police numbers or targets would detract from an efficient use of specialist personnel and resources. Instead the AFP focuses on having a selection of highly trained and prepared personnel with a range of skill sets and experience that are available and able to deploy offshore on a case-by-case basis. However, given Australia’s leadership on the Security Council resolution on expanding membership of police in peace processes in 2014, it is important that Australia be willing and ready to participate in providing police for peacekeeping when requested to do so.

This moment of major reform and upgrading of UN peacekeeping is an ideal time for Australia to renew its engagement with peacekeeping and special political missions.

**Australia should seek opportunities to review, renew and increase its commitment to peacekeeping operations.**

**Australia should maintain its peacekeeper training facilities and continue to offer their use to other countries planning to expand their peacekeeping engagement.**

### WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

Australia has voiced and demonstrated its belief that women must be provided with opportunities to play a role in responding to conflict and instability. Despite the clear benefits and ongoing international calls for change, women continue to be impacted disproportionately in conflict and post-conflict situations. They suffer high levels of gender-based violence in such situations and perpetrators face few consequences for their actions. Women are also often excluded from formal decision-making roles and from full engagement in peace processes.

Australia’s work program, guided by UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions, is seen as supporting women’s full and meaningful participation in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Efforts that increase women’s participation and leadership in decision-making and peace processes is critical to creating durable peace and protecting women from sexual and gender-based violence.

Nationally, there have been demonstrable efforts to integrate and mainstream the WPS agenda into key departmental policy and guidance documents that relate to peace and security. For example, in the 2017 Foreign Policy White paper, gender equality is identified as a top foreign policy priority and a core Australian value. Gender equality is a foundational commitment of Australia’s aid program, reflecting more than 40 years of Australian effort in support of women’s and girls’ empowerment in our region and globally.

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38 Successive Secretary-Generals since the end of the Cold War have taken initiatives: Boutros Boutros Gali with his Agenda for Peace; Kofi Annan through the Brahimi Report; and the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change which was the basis for the 2005 World Summit and contributed to the endorsement of R2P. The members of the Security Council endorsed and promoted work on Protection of Civilians; and Women, Peace and Security. Ban Ki-moon established the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) in 2014 under the chairmanship of Jose Ramos Horta and its report in June 2015 was entitled Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People (A/70/35). The SG’s response on implementation was delivered in September 2015 (A/70/357). This report and Guterres’ rethinking of organisational structure has been debated and is the basis for his call for A4P.

‘Gender inequality undermines global prosperity, stability and security. It contributes to, and often exacerbates a range of challenges, including poverty, weak governance, conflict and violent extremism’ (White Paper, 2017: 93).

The White Paper clearly links Australia’s foreign policy priorities to Australia’s commitments under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. These include Goal 5 on Gender Equality and Goal 16 on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions.

In recent years, Australia has made an effort to extend its influence through situating higher numbers of senior staff in key senior UN decision-making positions, and to train, support and brief them to represent on gender issues. In 2017, DFAT began development of a candidacies strategy to better identify and coordinate support for Australians running for senior UN positions, including those related to peace and security (Progress Report, National Action Plan, 2018). This strategy noted the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres’ System-Wide Strategy on Gender Parity of 2017, which aimed to reach full gender parity across the system before 2030 and aims, in particular, to identify women candidates. This is an area of continued need.

Australia should continue to identify and leverage diplomatic opportunities to ensure the WPS agenda and gender considerations are factored into key multilateral, regional and bilateral fora.

Continue to identify and support Australian women and men for senior UN decision-making positions relating to peace and security, and ensure they are supported with evidence, training, networks and briefing.

Approaches to the WPS agenda are to date insufficiently focused on prevention and need to go beyond meeting quotas, rather focusing more on supporting programs that create environments that enable women to engage in transformative politics. Ongoing support for partners and initiatives to promote understanding and remove the physical, logistical and social barriers that constrain women’s capacity to participate in peace processes is essential. Increased meaningful participation of women, men, girls and boys contributes to the prevention of conflict and to gender equality, which itself also contributes to violence reduction.

Under the WPS Agenda and other resolutions, Australia should support conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives that focus on understanding and transforming the socially constructed notions of masculinity and its associated behaviours and structures that can play a role in driving conflict and insecurity.

Increase support to civil society organisations and women’s organisations seeking to play a prominent role in peace processes.

Increase support to women who are not yet represented in formal decision-making roles and peace processes, but are influential civil society actors. Recognise the importance of longer-term participation of women in peace processes, through working to support capacity-building and dialogue in support of peace processes.

DISARMAMENT

Disarmament is a necessary tool for prevention of armed conflict and to mitigate its impacts when it occurs. Measures for disarmament are pursued for many reasons, including to maintain international peace and security, uphold the principles of humanity, protect civilians, promote sustainable development, reduce unnecessary and wasteful military expenditure and prevent and end armed conflict. (UN, 2018: UN, ix) Yet several respondents expressed concern that DFAT attention to disarmament issues had declined in recent years.

It is impossible to discuss peace processes without addressing disarmament issues. Major aspects of the peace processes in East Timor, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands were the mechanisms planned and implemented for confiscating or withdrawing of weapons.

It is noteworthy that Australia was a leading advocate of the Chemical Weapons Convention and is a signatory of the convention on Cluster Munitions and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

A major initiative of the UN General Assembly in which Australian diplomats played a leading role was the negotiation of the Arms Trade Treaty. Motivation for the Treaty arose from a general concern for human security. The process began in 2006 and was driven by a broad range of states, especially from Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America, and by INGOs whose motivation was to reduce the damage caused by conventional weapons entering unstable states or being transferred to non-state actors. States which were major exporters or importers of conventional weapons were less likely to be involved, although members of the EU, which already had strong selfregulation of arms transfers, were supportive.
Australia’s Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Peter Woolcott, was elected to chair the penultimate conference in Geneva in July 2012 and to preside at the Final UN Conference held in the GA in March 2013. He may well have been elected because while Australia was supporting the Treaty, it also could work cooperatively with the P5, all of whom were major exporting powers.

There were substantial issues in dispute. The Treaty seeks to modify transfers of both large and small weapons. It encourages states to restrain transfers for strategic reasons. ‘It is generally agreed that the availability of weapons contributes to the outbreak, intensity and duration of conflict… At the start of 2013, with weapons from Libya fuelling the conflict in northern Mali and the Syrian conflict continuing, efforts to understand the nexus between the availability of weapons and the mechanics of control are as timely as they will ever be’ (Koorey, 2013). The ATT is concerned not only with destabilization and misuse of conventional weapons but also with human rights and humanitarian issues. It is an attempt at arms transfer management. The Treaty was finally adopted in April 2013, opened for signature in June, and came into force after having been ratified by 52 states at the end of December 2014.

A prominent set of issues in strategic discussions are levels of military spending, the quality of weapons and their modernization, and the scope for disarmament. These issues require greater attention by DFAT. Reduction of military spending is one of the most effective ways of reducing national expenditure, which could increase funding available for provision of more accessible and better-quality human services. Article 26 of the UN Charter emphasizes the importance to the maintenance of international peace and security of minimising the diversion of human and economic resources to purchase of armaments. Excessive military spending not only reduces levels of investment and rates of economic development but can also motivate retaliatory military spending by other countries. The Sustainable Development Goals and their implementation targets refer in a dozen places – Goals 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16 and 17 – to aims and actions to which disarmament and arms regulation can make substantial contributions.

Prohibitions and restrictions have been negotiated particularly to protect civilians and applied to particular types of conventional weapons such as landmines and cluster bombs, but there is not yet comprehensive adoption of them. Comprehensive elimination and destruction of particular weapons was necessary to implement agreements to prohibit the use of chemical and biological weapons and will be essential for nuclear disarmament. For each of these to work effectively requires countries with human and national security policies to cooperate through systems of collective security.

This is the context in which the Turnbull Government announced the surprising new Defence Export Strategy on 29 January 2018. It called for a Defence Export Office to be established and a Defence Export Advocate appointed. The Export Finance and Insurance Corporation’s (EFIC) national interest loan facility is to be increased by $3.8 billion to help domestic defence suppliers secure and fulfil large overseas contracts by financing start-up costs that businesses cannot cover themselves. This is highly ambitious for a country whose defence exports SIPRI reported totalled only $127 million in 2016 (McKinnon, 2018: 3), and for which EFIC approved just seven defence contracts in 2016-17 totalling $13.2 million (McKinnon, 2018: 3). Presumably there will be a substantial delay in approving such an enormous increase in EFIC’s defence loans. So far only two loans have been approved under the defence export strategy, during the first two years of its operation.

\[A review by an independent inquiry into all aspects of the Defence Export Strategy should be established.\]

The central questions are: whether these loans can be allocated to projects which fully conform to not only the rules set by the ATT but also by Australian policy; whether sufficient information will be available before subsidies are approved about whether there are limitations on use of the weapons to ensure that they will not be used to inflame or intensify existing violent conflicts; whether all sales will be to principled allies who use the weapons themselves and do not onsell them to states or non-states whose purposes are inconsistent with those of a secure and peace-seeking world; and whether this huge funding allocation is the most cost-effective method of stimulating Australian defence manufacturing industry and employment (which the Government states is the principal reason for the policy), let alone be a cost effective means of contributing to conflict prevention? Comments by the Auditor-General and the Productivity Commission about other Australian military projects suggest that the Department of Defence’s planning and management arrangements may not be robust enough to ensure that they are (Australian National Audit Office, May, 2018: 8-12; Productivity Commission, Trade and Assistance Reviews). There are therefore many major issues which require more detailed assessment.

\[In view of the contemporary global neglect of the importance of seeking disarmament whenever and wherever possible, it would be timely for the Australian Government to commission a rigorous review of current materiel supplies and plans for future manufacturing and purchase; and to take these subjects up with like-minded countries also concerned with the dangers of the renewing arms race.\]
Nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to the survival of humanity. Existing agreements including those limiting nuclear testing, constraining proliferation, prohibiting nuclear weapons in the southern hemisphere, limiting the size of nuclear arsenals and eliminating certain categories of ballistic missiles are vital, but are not universal in membership or implementation.

Australia has taken some leadership in nuclear disarmament through two official inquiries: the Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (1996) and the Report of the international Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (2009) Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers. It is noteworthy that the Melbourne-initiated NGO, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), was successful in generating momentum for the negotiation of the Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in June 2017. ICAN was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017 for this achievement.

Horror and frustration about the paralysis of negotiation about nuclear disarmament and control and hope of progress led to ICAN’s success in sponsoring the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This Treaty formalises the stigmatizing of nuclear weapons. Thirty-five countries had ratified the Treaty by the end of September 2019, moving towards the fifty required for the Treaty’s implementation.

4. MOBILISING PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT

There is a view that an underlying limitation on mobilising public engagement is that ‘there is no domestic constituency for DFAT’. That may be a significant factor but perhaps it overstates the situation. It is true that Australian news media give relatively little attention to international issues compared with European and North American counterparts. Australian politics is predominantly focused on domestic issues, and national governments tend to be more interested in domestic than international affairs. However, 28 per cent of Australians were born overseas, over 50 per cent have parents who were, and a high proportion of all citizens travel overseas regularly. Secondary school teachers report a high level of interest amongst senior students about global issues. University enrolments in international relations have been amongst the fastest areas of growth during the last decade. The thousands of applicants for employment in DFAT every year also show clearly the strength of interest in international relations.

The aid NGOs through which around one and a half million Australians actively contribute to development are by far the largest and strongest organisations engaged with foreign affairs. AIIA and the UNAA are long established, active and respected organisations which both educate their members and provide forums where issues can be debated, and intellectual and political analysis strengthened. Many Australian universities and The Lowy Institute provide similar high-quality opportunities for presenting and provoking discussion, as do community service organisations like Rotary and U3A.

There is a constant need for public education about foreign policy and development issues. The Department is normally willing to participate in these forums, but it could do more to build these networks. It is vital that not only the Minister and any assistant ministers but also senior DFAT staff seize whatever opportunities are available for public presentations about issues and policies. The extent of support for aid, for example, depends on increasing knowledge and understanding about the uses of aid, and of its effectiveness. A recent Australian survey concluded that when shown evidence of an aid project which met need in developing countries, the proportion of those who thought Australia didn’t give enough aid increased (Wood and Hoy, 2018). The strongest motive for giving aid was altruism, and the second most significant reason was enlightened Australian national interest.

When conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities are strengthened, it will be valuable to enhance public engagement strategies. Once the strategies are underway and secure, there may well be substantial interest in methodology and effectiveness, particularly in a world in which most news is about aggression, disruption and death. Public communication strategies must seek to engage media organisations on the complexity of conflict-affected settings, the decision-making processes and the extent of risks in those environments.

Australia’s ability to enhance its resources and reach in this field could be aided through wider governmental and public knowledge of the various ways in which Australia has been making modest but significant contributions internationally. DFAT could, at appropriate times, make more explicit how conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding policy align with national interests, geopolitical risk, regional responsibility and comparative advantage. Suggestions relating to efforts to enhance the articulation and communication of the role of conflict prevention and peacebuilding include making policy statements which aim to ensure a shift in mindset to understand conflict prevention and peacemaking include making policy statements which aim to ensure a shift in mindset to understand conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding as tools that are not only applicable to a development context. The aim would be to increase understanding that these tools have the greatest application in areas of national interest and greatest geopolitical risk to Australia, including great power rivalry and competition in East Asia. Examples of pathways known to increase the relevance of peace processes in all geographic areas may be particularly valuable in communication about issue areas where Australia has comparatively weaker material levers to influence outcomes.

Once additional and focused approaches are adopted and tested, a point should be reached where it would be possible to consider investing greater resources in promoting conflict prevention and peacebuilding practice and exporting Australian expertise internationally.
A requirement would be to increase awareness of DFAT capabilities and functions among international partners. One way to achieve this would be to increase the distribution and promotion of DFAT and government publications in key issue areas relating to conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding to diverse international audiences of practice. Once the Diplomatic Academy has established courses in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, ensuring that diplomats and peacemakers from other countries are invited and supported in participating would obviously be desirable (much like the international exchange program practiced in the DFAT graduate training program). When funds are available there would be great value in supporting the establishment of such centres in other countries.

There is a need to increase public awareness of the experiences and contributions of DFAT and to seek to mobilise public support and engagement.

5. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND AID FUNDING

This study shows that there is a widespread view that DFAT has been seriously underfunded. Reviews such as those by the Lowy Institute (2011) and the Joint Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade (2012) have come to the conclusion that Australia’s diplomatic service is so inadequately funded and staffed that it cannot be fully effective.

Over the years, DFAT has received small boosts in funding. However, these increases do little more than make up for funding deficits from previous years. Government funding of DFAT is not nearly enough to contribute to comprehensive diplomatic representation in all the countries of importance to Australia (Lowy Institute, 2011). Since 2011, Australia’s diplomatic network has grown from 95 to 118 posts, but 12 of these have been just for Austrade. This growth in overseas representation is positive, but still leaves Australia lagging behind the representation of all G20 member states, which have an average of 196 diplomatic posts, and of OECD nations which have an average of 132 (Lowy Diplomatic Index 2019).

It is understandable that countries with a far larger population and higher GDP than Australia would have more overseas posts. Each of the US (273), China (276) and Japan (247) have far more than twice as many diplomatic posts as does Australia. But even countries of comparable size and GDP have a much stronger international presence. Canada with 144 posts has 26 more than Australia, and Chile 128. Australia’s international presence should be increased substantially in both number and size in order to be effectively engaged in this highly interdependent world.

Underfunding of DFAT must be at least one of the reasons for the low level of recruitment at present. Low recruitment means that actual employment is considerably less than the level of approved Full Time Equivalent staff. It means, for example, that taking an upgraded interest in new initiatives such as peacebuilding is discouraged. Understaffing also inevitably causes excessive work pressures.

In 2011, the Lowy Institute reported that DFAT had 37 per cent less Australia-based staff abroad than it did in 1988-89. The report added that staffing in the Federal public sector had grown by 61 per cent since 1997-98, including a growth of almost 40 per cent at the Department of Defence. In contrast, DFAT staffing had essentially flat-lined. Since then, not much has changed.

In contrast to Canada, which has a reputation for effective multilateral initiatives, Australia has not kept up its human skills or capacity to handle economic, social, environmental, security and development issues sufficiently. With flat-lining staffing levels and chronic underfunding, it is no wonder there is little capacity for DFAT staff to specialise. Several respondents said that they have to run just to keep up with day-to-day affairs. Some had even been criticized for being interested in longterm thinking when it was said they should have been focused on short-term items. Add to this the fact that only approximately 23 per cent of (Australian) DFAT staff were based overseas in 2016–17, it is curious how staff are supposed to develop a sound understanding of local context to be able to appropriately monitor and respond to conflicts as they emerge.

A powerful indicator of governmental foreign policy priorities is the structure of budgetary allocations. Since the mid-nineties, DFAT’s inflation-adjusted budget has slowly crept up, by a total of around 50 per cent during the quarter century. Over the same period total real Commonwealth outlays have grown by 360 per cent (C of A, 2018-19, Statement 11, Table 1), so domestic spending has received increased funding seven times larger than diplomacy. This shows the low political priority given to Australian diplomacy during the last quarter century. The proportion of total Commonwealth spending allocated to diplomacy has fallen from 0.38% in 1995-96 to 0.22% in 2018-19. That is, the proportion of Commonwealth funding used for diplomacy has declined during the last quarter century by 42%.

Over the same period Australian aid stagnated for the first decade, was substantially increased from 2007 to 2013, but then, in the current six-year phase, is in the process of being slashed by a third. Since 2013 Australian aid has been cut by a third to 0.22 per cent of gross national income in 2017-18, with plans for further reductions to 0.20 per cent in 2020-21. These reductions place Australia within the group of the least generous OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors, such as most of those in Eastern Europe, Portugal and the United States. In contrast, British Conservative governments allocate 0.7 per cent of their national income to aid, use half of it for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and demonstrate that ODA can contribute greatly to achieving goals such as creating conditions for reconciliation.

Defence spending has fluctuated but over the whole quarter century has more than doubled. In 2018-19 DFAT’s appropriation is $1,476m, compared with that for Defence of $32,471m, so Defence is receiving 22 times the amount allocated for DFAT. Since 2013 aid has already been cut by a quarter and defence spending has been increased by a third.
The last budget included plans for further cuts to aid and increases in the allocation for defence. In 2012-13 the ratio of defence spending to aid was $5 for every dollar of aid (Howes, 2018: 2). In 2017-18 the ratio was $8.6 to $1; and in 2021-22 projections the Coalition Government plans for it to be $11 for defence per dollar of aid. Professor Stephen Howes (2018: 2) comments: ‘In 2012 we were the 11th most committed OECD defence spender (measured in terms of defence-to-GDP) and the 13th most generous aid donor (aid to GNI). We are now the seventh most committed defence spender, but only the 19th most generous aid donor. It’s embarrassing.’

Australia is now spending twice as much in real terms on defence as it did at the height of the Cold War (Howes, 2018: 3). Hugh White, as an advocate for higher military spending, writes that ‘We waste a lot of money on defence in ways large and small, but the biggest drain of all is the billions spent on capabilities we do not need’. Peter Jennings, Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute said at the National Press Club in April 2017 that ‘cutting aid was a mistake’ and that from a national security perspective ‘it should receive more funding’. DFAT’s budget should be increased to make it appropriately proportionate to our spending on Defence.

The comparison between financial support for diplomacy and for the intelligence agencies is also intriguing. The budgets for all five of the Australian intelligence agencies are not published and neither are comprehensive figures available on the increases in their budgets. Yet there has been a view in the departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury and Finance that the intelligence agencies have ‘been more than generously funded since 2001 and that it is time to exert more budget discipline’ (Walters, 2018: 33). This is another situation where proportionality between DFAT and other agencies should be reviewed.

The Foreign Affairs White Paper of 2017 said next to nothing about DFAT’s funding. As Rory Medcalf wrote in his review of the White Paper: ‘There was plenty of mention of improvements in security, intelligence, defence, cyber, education, infrastructure and industry but too little about how to modernise, expand and fund our diplomatic network for the turbulent times ahead’ (Medcalf, APR, 2017: 38).

These comparisons suggest that recent governments have had greater confidence in the value of military preparedness than in the potential benefits and cost effectiveness of diplomacy and aid. There has been negligible discussion comparing the respective roles of diplomatic, development assistance, military and intelligence spending in contributing to Australian security in the most costeffective ways. This is not the place where a comprehensive and rigorous evaluation of their respective roles can be undertaken. However, if there is to be a more serious attempt to facilitate both the cost-effective strengthening of Australian national security and the role of conflict prevention and peacebuilding as part of that broad goal, such an evaluation will have to be an essential component.

Reforming the balance between diplomatic, military, ODA and intelligence expenditure would be a necessary feature of implementing a strategy of security through sustainable peace.

It is essential that DFAT’s funding be substantially and swiftly increased commensurate with demand for services in a globalised threat and opportunity-rich environment. It is essential to enhance funding and staffing for conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding capabilities through integration as a cross cutting policy priority and within whole of government funding architecture.

Implementing systems to fund departmental contributions to stabilisation, conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding under whole of government architecture, could primarily be achieved in partnership with Defence through New Policy Proposals approved by the National Security Committee (NSC).

Conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding functions should be implemented as a cross cutting priority across DFAT operations within existing divisional budgets.

Planning whole of government architecture to further cluster diverse specialised units across agencies is an effective way to achieve multiplication effects through pool funding.

Early, preventive action in fragile and conflict affected settings is more cost effective than later, reactive action, so prioritising accordingly is important.

The substantial Australian Aid Budget Summary 2018-19 had very little to say about either conflict prevention or peacebuilding. If Australia is to become serious about contributing to conflict prevention then it must once again steadily and substantially increase Australia’s aid program. At present it is free riding on the expanding programs of most other DAC donors, but unfortunately it is also, like most of them, failing to allocate significant funding to conflict prevention. The OECD report entitled States of Fragility 2018 (OECD, 2018) concludes that:

After a high point in 2010, financial commitments to conflict prevention and peacebuilding have levelled off and have yet to regain popularity. In fact, in 2016, only 2% of total ODA to fragile contexts went to conflict prevention. Only 10% went to peacebuilding. The international community must now demonstrate that its financial commitments to the prevention and sustaining peace agendas match its rhetoric (p18).

Strengthening the use of aid for conflict prevention and peacebuilding would also strengthen the attractiveness of the aid program to the wider community. A modest step would be to officially adopt the recommended OECD targets. Building up knowledge about the relative size of Australia’s aid and its uses is essential to increasing electoral support. One major lesson from those European countries which implement their commitment to the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNI is about the vitality, imagination and engagement of NGOs in the public education programs (Langmore et al, 2017).
One of the major immeasurable costs of the cuts to aid has been the erosion of official and non-government public education. It is essential that public education about aid and development be renewed, recognised, encouraged and rewarded in a host of ways. It is vital that funding for diplomacy and aid be steadily and very substantially increased. Planning for implementation of such increases has been made more difficult by the cuts of the last half dozen years.

*Maintaining the strong increases in development funding to the Pacific is important and should be supported by additional funding to the overall budget. Adoption of the goal of increasing total aid funding could appropriately be set to at least the previously bipartisan-accepted target of 0.5 percent of GDP, in target-dated steps.*

It is striking that while Australia has reduced aid to the lowest level for four decades, the UK continues to maintain its aid at 0.7 percent of GNI. This is only one lesson Australia could learn from the UK.40 This would enable Australia to meet OECD targets to be a key enabler of conflict prevention, facilitator of achievement of the SDGs, and contributor to international support for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and prevention of further erosion of biodiversity.

There is a clear need to rebuild aid as an asset in Australian diplomacy, trade and security. Australian foreign aid is one way the government plays a part in poverty reduction and addressing the drivers of global challenges like pandemics, humanitarian crises, conflict, terrorism and climate change. It supports Australia’s ability to fulfil its foreign policy priorities and national interests.

40 Other lessons about the UK’s approaches to peace making and keeping are discussed in Langmore et al, 2017, pp 76-89.
What are Australia’s current national foreign policy interests? Though this is a complex question, it must be considered carefully from time to time. After the end of World War 2, there seems to have been no doubt in the minds of most Australians that they wanted to live at peace with other countries. Australians, like citizens of other countries, were weary of war and so were strong supporters of the establishment of the United Nations. The first sentence of the UN Charter expresses the determination ‘to save succeeding generations for the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind…’ There seems no doubt that most Australians would still prefer to live at peace with other countries.

Rather less attention though is now given to how to do that. So there is a question about whether there are feasible ways in which Australia could contribute more effectively to achieving sustainable peace. Since 2011 there has been a renewed international upsurge in the number of wars and casualties, and in the extent of human displacement and physical destruction. This led UN Secretary-General António Guterres to advocate making conflict prevention central to international policy and to urge Member States to prioritise conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts within their foreign policies.

Is that possible for Australia? We clearly have the capacity to recognise that peace is preferable to war, and also to choose to consciously and honourably adopt policies which would contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Such action is vital to Australian safety, security and the common good, and requires political commitment to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. If Australia wants to strengthen sustainable credibility for peaceful and just foreign policy, it is important to ensure that domestic policy provides a consistent basis for a humane and equitable international reputation and legitimacy in assisting overseas communities in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This includes efforts to enhance social cohesion, achieve humane approaches to border security and continuing national reconciliation efforts.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has principal political responsibility for articulating, planning and implementing international peace processes and in leading departmental attention to them.

ACTIVE DIPLOMACY IS THE PRINCIPAL MEANS AVAILABLE TO EVERY COUNTRY FOR AVOIDING VIOLENT CONFLICT. IF YOU WANT TO PREVENT VIOLENCE AND TO ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE CONFLICT, YOU HAVE TO TALK ABOUT ITS CAUSES AND POSSIBLE WAYS OF REDUCING THEM. THAT IS THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF DIPLOMACY. YET THE AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE HAS BEEN STARVED OF FUNDS. THIS HAS CAUSED EXCESSIVELY TIGHT CONSTRAINTS ON DIPLOMATIC STAFFING, FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES.

DFAT has the central role in ensuring coherent foreign policy and in overseeing effective implementation of Australia’s international responsibilities. One of the most compelling objectives is to seek security through sustainable peace. Recognising the diverse and significant ways that Australian personnel have already contributed and learnt from engagement in international conflicts, this report affirms the necessity for diplomatic vitality in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

This report attests to the necessity for the Department to be funded sufficiently to have the fiscal, human and intellectual resources to fulfil the purposes for which it was established and of which it has been denied for the last quarter century. As Australia’s experience demonstrates, interventions in conflict and instability must prioritise diplomatic engagement and seek political solutions. This learning stands in contradiction to increasing trends of militarisation and securitisation.

This report contributes to the maintenance of knowledge and experience of one valuable aspect of diplomatic engagement and proposes multiple pathways for improving conflict prevention and peacebuilding capacity. The emergent recommendations are a part of Australia’s ongoing efforts to enhance its capacity to pursue its national interests and strengthen its role in contributing to global security through sustainable peace.
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The AICRP is located at the University of Melbourne’s School of Social and Political Sciences and was previously located at the Melbourne School of Government (2018-2019).

The Development Policy Division in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2016 commissioned the AICRP team, University of Melbourne to undertake a review of the approaches of seven other countries in supporting overseas peace processes in the first stage of a broader multi-stakeholder research programme. DFAT provided $50,000 in funding for this first phase of the AICR Project. The report of learnings from the experiences of how other countries support peace processes in 2016 (Langmore et al 2017) and involved a high level of engagement with key DFAT senior and program staff (Mr Ewan McGregor, Mr Michael Wilson, Ms Emily Rainey and Mr Rupert Brock) and was launched in June 2017 by Ms Frances Adamson, Secretary of DFAT; and its findings were discussed during a workshop held with over 25 senior DFAT staffers in June 2017.

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PROJECT TEAM

John Langmore AM, Professorial Fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne.

Tania Miletic, PhD, Senior Research Fellow, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne.

Aran Martin, PhD, former Research Fellow, Melbourne School of Government, University of Melbourne.

Bob Breen OAM, Associate Professor of Strategic Studies and Director, Deakin University, Professorial Practice Qualifications, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, Australian Defence College, ACT.