



Australia's Maritime Strategy in the 21st century

The end of the Cold War in 1991 brought about a major strategic shift to the world's maritime frontiers. The US Navy became the undisputed superpower and thus secured the world's oceans for the allies that sailed in its shadow. These changes enabled the ideas of national security to become broader and more complex than just military security. Questions of transnational crime, of the unregulated movement of people across borders, and of environmental threats became recognised as valid security concerns for the nations of the world. As the concept of security broadened, so too did the need for security strategies that included these broader concerns. Consequently, maritime strategy needs to consider those non-military aspects of national power that govern and influence those broader security concerns at sea and on the lands which the seas influence.

This brief was originally prepared for the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Enquiry into Australia's Maritime Strategy 2003–04 under the title 'A Foundation Paper on Australia's Maritime Strategy'. This version aims to provide a basis for discussion of the issues in question as well as to put the debate surrounding Australia's maritime strategy within a coherent context.

Alex Tewes, Laura Rayner and Kelly Kavanaugh
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Section

Contents

Introduction	4
Section I: Historical summary of Australian strategic policy.	6
Introduction: enduring themes	6
From the founding of the colonies to Federation	7
From Federation to the Singapore Strategy	8
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902	8
Imperial Defence: ‘One fleet one Empire’	9
World War One	9
The interwar years	10
The Singapore Strategy	10
World War II	11
Post-World War II	11
The era of forward defence (mid 1950s to mid 1970s).	12
Self-reliance.	13
Section II: The Development of an Australian Maritime Strategy.	14
Defence of Australia and the emerging Maritime Strategy	14
The Dibb report – Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities.	14
The Defence of Australia 1987: Self-Reliance Within an Alliance Framework . . .	16
Australia’s Maritime Strategy 1987–1994.	17
Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994	17
Australia’s Strategic Policy 1997.	18
Defence 2000: A Maritime Strategy at last?	19
Section III: Maritime Strategy a decade after the end of the Cold War	20
The Nature of the Question	21
The Modern Context for Maritime Strategy	22
The Littoral in Modern Warfare (Projecting power ashore in a complex environment)..	22
National Power.	23
Asymmetric Warfare and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)	23
Maritime Strategy after 9/11	24
‘ <i>Plus ça change, plus c’est la meme chose.</i> ’ (The more things change, the more they stay the same).	25
A ‘small s’ maritime strategy.	25
Diplomatic.	26
Constabulary	29

Warfighting	30
The ‘Big S’ Maritime Strategy	32
Broad Security	32
Expeditionary Strategies: The United States and United Kingdom	35
The US Navy Doctrine ‘Forward ... From the Sea’	35
The UK’s 1998 Strategic Review – Rebirth of Middle-Power Expeditionary Warfare	36
Anti-Access Warfare: The response to Expeditionary Maritime Strategies	37
Section IV: Current and Future Issues for Australia’s Maritime Strategy	38
Sea Power	39
The Role of Land Forces in A Maritime Strategy	41
The Role of Air Forces in A Maritime Strategy	43
Information Capability	44
The Role of Defence Industry in a Maritime Strategy	46
The Move to a Mature Maritime Strategy	47
Conclusion	48
Issues for Consideration	48
Appendix 1: Australian/NZ Strategy : A regional contrast—a view from the West Island	50
Endnotes	55

List of Figures

Figure 1: Australia’s regional security interests and Australia’s direct area of military interest	16
Figure 2: The Nature of the Question	22
Figure 3: Extent of the Australian Ship Reporting Area, and Search and Rescue responsibilities (Source: Australian Maritime Safety Authority)	34
Figure 4: The Royal Australian Navy’s Three Fleet Navy.	40
Figure 5: Operations in the littoral environment	42

Introduction

If our nature is characterised by our myths and legends, then Australia is not a maritime nation. As a people, we are happy to lie at the beach and toss pebbles at the waves, or turn our back upon it and fix our gaze on the dusty enormity of our island continent. Our myths and legends, of both peace and war, celebrate the land and our impression upon it. We know all about the wartime heroism of the 'Rats of Tobruk' but few know of the 'Scrap Iron Flotilla' that fiercely contested Hitler's reach upon the Mediterranean Sea.¹ We celebrate Gallipoli but ignore submarine AE-1. We remember Kokoda but forget about the Leyte Gulf. This may be partly because we never had a 'Grand Fleet' that sailed off to do battle with its enemy equivalent. In land and sea we provided components that plugged and merged into other forces and fleets. One side effect of this approach is that we supported the strategies of others rather than give power to our own.

The term 'strategy' is derived from the ancient Greek word 'strategia' meaning 'generalship'. Originally reserved for the direction of military forces, the term came to be used more broadly through the idea of 'total war' as demonstrated through World War I and World War II. As the term implies, in such wars the total efforts of the state, through conscription and national mobilisation, were devoted to the defeat, not only of the adversary's armed forces, but of its nation as a whole. This idea of national security being limited to the concept of military security flourished during the Cold War as the prospect of strategic nuclear war influenced all interactions between states. Much of what has been written on maritime strategies emerged from this era of Total War. Conflict for the unimpeded use of the world's oceans between the UK and Germany, and later the US and the USSR was a constant feature of the strategic environment.

The end of the Cold War in 1991 brought about a major strategic rearrangement to the world's maritime frontiers. The US Navy became the undisputed superpower and thus secured the world's oceans for the allies that sailed in its shadow. These changes enabled the ideas of national security to become broader and more complex than just military security. Questions of transnational crime, of the unregulated movement of people across borders, and of environmental threats became recognised as valid security concerns for the nations of the world. As the concept of security broadened, so too did the need for security strategies that included these broader concerns. Consequently, maritime strategy needs to consider those non-military aspects of national power that govern and influence those broader security concerns at sea and on the lands which the seas influence.

This paper was originally developed under the title 'A Foundation Paper on Australia's Maritime Strategy' as an aid to the deliberations of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade for the enquiry into Australia's Maritime Strategy, which published its final report in June 2004. This enquiry provided an opportunity for the questioning of some of the fundamental tenets underpinning Australia's security thinking. This Foundation Paper is now released as a standalone document to inform public discussion

in the lead-up to the development of the government's next Defence White Paper, or National Security White Paper.

This document aims to put the debate surrounding Australia's maritime strategy within a coherent context. Readers should note that this document gives no answers but aims solely to provide the foundations upon which meaningful questions may be asked. In Section I, this document provides an historical summary of strategic developments in Australia up to the development of the concept of self-reliance. Section II covers the development of Australia's maritime strategy from the Dibb Report until the Defence 2000 White Paper. Section III looks at the current situation, and focuses on the issues affecting the future development of Australia's Maritime Strategy. The paper includes an appendix which reviews New Zealand's approach to its own maritime strategy.

Section I: Historical summary of Australian strategic policy.

'The ultimate source of strategy lies in the values of the people of a nation.'

Admiral Henry E. Eccles USN²

Introduction: enduring themes

The development of Australia's maritime strategy possibly has had more to do with its relationships with its larger allies than as a **direct** response to its strategic circumstances, that is, to a greater or lesser extent, Australia has traditionally responded to its strategic circumstances through its relationships with great and powerful friends. To a large measure, this has been an understandable and practical response. Australia's size, its isolation, sparse population and limited financial resources have made security difficult to even contemplate achieving alone, 'however, although reducing the feeling of vulnerability, this reliance on allies has tended to inhibit the development of strategic independence'.³

The themes running through the history of Australia's security policy and defence strategies have been identified as including: 'the evolving nature of relationships with major power allies, the development of greater confidence in Australia's capacity to provide for its own security in its local region, the types of defence contingencies that have driven defence planning, the development of Australia's economic capacity' which enabled it to sustain a defence development program 'impressive by regional standards', and 'the evolution of close consultative and cooperative defence relations with most of Australia's neighbours in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific'.⁴

Australia's relationship with its maritime environment can also be explained in terms of its strategic culture. It has been argued that despite being 'an island continent dependent on sea communications and trade', Australia is not culturally a maritime nation, rather 'Australians are a costal people with a continental outlook, an island-nation with an inward focus'.⁵ In the 20th century at least, this led to a division in Australian military thinking between continentalism and navalism (that is, land defence proponents struggling for supremacy over those who argued for the greater importance of maritime defence).⁶

Australia's strategic culture has also been described as idiosyncratic with seemingly conflicting elements of 'predilection to alliances' juxtaposed with 'an almost equally strong disposition towards self-reliance'. Other enduring elements of Australia's strategic culture include: 'a highly possessive approach' to islands in the immediate neighbourhood; 'an acute sense of vulnerability' in relation to the sparse population in the north and west of the continent, manifesting as an 'persistent anxiety about invasion'; and 'an endemic ambivalence towards Indonesia'.⁷

From the founding of the colonies to Federation

It could be argued that the history of maritime strategy as it affected Australia from the founding of the colony to the fall of Singapore in 1942, and perhaps beyond, can be summed up in three words: 'The Royal Navy'. While it is quite true that until the fall of Singapore Australian maritime strategy was dictated by British and Imperial strategy and Australia's security was dependent on the Royal Navy, there are some milestones in the slow development of an independent Australian maritime strategy that should be acknowledged.

It can be argued that the founding of the new colony was an expression of Great Britain's maritime strategy, especially as a means of denying expansion to imperial rivals, such as the French. The British Empire's control of the sea was no less important to the colonists. The colony was not viable without outside assistance in its early years, and the survival of the settlements depended on the safe arrival of supplies by sea.

In second half of the 19th century, the self governing colonies developed an increasing concern for the safety of their settlements. Australia's dependence on safe sea routes for trade increased with the discovery of gold and the opening up of more land for primary production for export. However, Australia's ability to influence events affecting its maritime security (that is, the security of its trade and passenger vessels) remained minimal in the littoral or coastal waters, and non-existent in blue water terms, despite colonial attempts to acquire warships and naval forces, and despite the Queensland naval force's expedition to acquire a colony, Papua, on behalf of, but without reference to, the British authorities. Essentially, the maritime strategy of the Australian self-governing colonies was to depend on the Royal Navy for protection from a succession of possible threats from France, Germany, Russia and the United States. This dependence came at a price in the second half of the 19th century when through a series of arrangements the colonies began to subsidise the Royal Navy's presence and protection.

The Jervois Report of 1877, which surveyed the condition of the Australian colonies' defences, assessed that the greatest danger to Australia would be 'small scale naval raids' launched from the French port of Saigon or from Russian or American Pacific bases attacking the major Australian ports and capturing merchant trade and gold shipments.⁸ During the 1870s and 1880s, 'the notion of the interdependence of the empire and the need to protect the empire's lines of communication became accepted as the basis of imperial defence'.⁹ However, the colonies had a broader view of imperial security than their focus on protection from raiders would suggest. During the late 1880s, the Australian colonial troops assisted Britain in maintaining imperial discipline in the Sudan, the Boer War and 1900 Boxer Rebellion in China. Support for reliance on Britain was not universal, however, with 'republican antecedents of the Labor Party' arguing for 'a more self-reliant and independent defence posture'.¹⁰

From Federation to the Singapore Strategy

At Federation, Australia's maritime defence was still subject to the 1887 Agreements between the United Kingdom and each Australian colony (whereby the colonies paid a subsidy towards the cost of naval defence) and dependent on the Royal Navy. Prior to 1909, the focus of the Commonwealth's new naval forces was local defence, such as port fortifications, with 'little consideration of "blue-water" strategy'.¹¹ The primary threat to Australia was still considered to be 'small scale raids by enemy cruisers, rather than large scale invasion'.¹² The naval defence of Australia was three-tiered: the Royal Navy provided an imperial squadron as the first line of defence; the second tier comprised an auxiliary squadron of third-class vessels which had been subsidised by the colonies and were not supposed to be used outside Australian waters; and the third tier comprised the colonial fleets used mainly for harbour protection.¹³ The Colonial Defence Committee considered that 'the maintenance of British supremacy at sea is the first condition of the security of Australian territory and trade in war' and 'the Barton government initially lacked any firm or considered policy on naval defence'.¹⁴

However, even if the new Commonwealth had the financial means to establish a proper navy and develop a blue water strategy, its ability to do so would have been limited as Australian warships were prohibited from operating outside territorial waters without being under the control and orders of the Royal Navy. Despite Federation, 'the Commonwealth was still not a sovereign state and thus under international law (and in the eyes of foreign powers) her warships were not recognised as distinctly "Australian"'.¹⁵ This situation eased after Australia adopted the Naval Discipline Act (UK), but Australian warships were still restricted to the Australia Station 'unless under the orders of a British admiral'.¹⁶

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902

In 1902, Britain made an alliance with Japan which was renewed in 1905 and 1911. Britain wanted to contain Russian ambitions in the Far East to protect its own interests in China and Korea. The alliance received initial popular support in Australia as being beneficial to Australia's security and commercial interests as it decreased the likelihood that an expansionist Japan would threaten British or Australian interests in the Asia-Pacific region. However, Australians in general were very wary of Japan, and by 1905 with the rise of Japan, its defeat of the Russian fleet, and the growth of its military capability, it was Britain's new ally in the Pacific which was generally seen in Australia as a greater threat to the Commonwealth than Germany, which was increasingly seen by Britain as posing the greatest threat to it. In 1908, the United States, also wary of Japan's intentions, sent its fleet on a warmly welcomed goodwill visit to Australia to gauge Australian sentiment and military strength in advance of the possibility that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance might see Australia and the US on opposite sides in a US-Japanese conflict.

Imperial Defence: 'One fleet one Empire'

Under the Naval Agreement of 1903 (which was strongly criticised during debates in the Australian Parliament), the Commonwealth still had neither ownership nor control of naval forces, despite paying an increased subsidy, albeit less than half the actual cost of the service.¹⁷ In addition, those British warships assigned to the Australia Station could be removed from Australian waters without the approval of the Commonwealth.

Captain W. R. Creswell, appointed to the new position of Director of Naval Forces in March 1904 was a proponent of an independent Australian naval force. Creswell disagreed with the London-based Committee of Imperial Defence's theory 'that as an attack on Australia by raiders would be met by a preponderating (sic) force sent in pursuit', there was no 'strategic justification' for an expanded Australian navy. Creswell saw benefit in having suitable forces on the spot. This was especially important given Australia's lack of internal communications, as 'the sea provided the only means of communication with Western Australia and Tasmania, and Queensland depended totally on sea transport for contact with its northern districts'. Creswell was concerned that interstate and overseas trade valued at over 170 million pounds had been left out of consideration in Australian defence plans and he feared that the imperial squadron would be removed in war, 'leaving local commerce unprotected and forced to seek refuge'.¹⁸

In 1909 during a special imperial naval conference the British Admiralty, under Admiral Fisher suggested the creation of dominion fleet units (the fleet unit concept) based on squadrons which would serve the Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa stations and combine to form a Pacific Fleet. Britain could then leave the naval defence of the Pacific almost entirely to the dominions.¹⁹ Unfortunately the Admiralty did not keep its commitments and by 1913 the agreement had been breached. Britain had changed its priorities and was now focussing on home waters. In the meantime, in 1911, the Permanent Naval Forces of the Commonwealth had become the Royal Australian Navy

In 1915 the Australian War Staff's position paper noted that in 1914 the Admiralty had rejected the 1909 plan for a Pacific squadron. The paper expressed concern that, as the current war was almost purely an Atlantic affair, Pacific problems would continue to be secondary to the British authorities and Australia could not safely leave it to Britain to establish the protective fleet necessary for Australia's defence, or even to contribute to the bulk of it. Britain might never provide the necessary assets or might change its mind as had happened in 1909 and 1914 and withdraw its ships 'at an awkward moment'.²⁰

World War One

At the outbreak of war, the Royal Australian Navy (the RAN comprised one battle cruiser, three six inch gun cruisers, three destroyers, two submarines, and some survey, harbour and repair ships) was put under the control of the British Admiralty under which arrangement RAN ships saw action in Australian waters and abroad. The RAN was able to use its assets to remove German control of New Guinea, but Australian troopships on their way to the Middle

East/Europe were protected not only by RAN and RN ships, but also by the Japanese Navy under the Anglo Japanese Alliance of 1902.

The interwar years

Despite having secured a seat at the Peace Conference Australia was still bound to Imperial naval strategy and, as part of the British Empire's quota to decrease its navy, the RAN had to scuttle HMAS Australia. In this period Australia abandoned any pretence of a blue water strategy and returned to local naval defence,²¹ remaining in a dependent relationship with the Royal Navy for the inter-war period. Two reports commissioned in this period identified Japan as the main potential threat to Australia's security. Both saw the need for a large British naval presence in the region and one, by General Chauvel, recognised that in the event of an attack on Australia, Australia would have to rely on its own resources 'for an appreciable and anxious period.'²² However, in 1925 the Committee for Imperial Defence, looking ten years ahead, dismissed any 'aggressive action on the part of Japan' as 'not a contingency to seriously to be considered.'²³ Naval defence planning was difficult in pre war years because of this uncertainty. The revoking of Britain's ten year no-threat assessment in 1932 prompted a reassessment in Australia and recognition, by some at least, of the possibility that Australia would have to rely solely on its own resources for its defence.²⁴

The Singapore Strategy

The Singapore Strategy which dominated Australian defence planning in the inter-war years had two components: the construction of a major secure naval base at Singapore and the speedy dispatch (within six weeks, extended to 90 days by 1939) of a large Royal Navy fleet to deter and defend British and dominion territories and interests in the Asia Pacific from hostile forces. The strategy was a reaffirmation of the imperial defence doctrine that had dominated the previous century – a blue-water strategy which asserted that if the Royal Navy dominated the seas, the outlying areas of the empire would be secure against a major invasion, with local forces dealing with local defence.²⁵ However, even in the same year as the 1923 Imperial Conference, the Australian Government was being warned by General Chauvel, the Inspector-General of Australian Military Forces, against having 'a blind faith in the powers of the British Navy'.²⁶ In succeeding reports Chauvel continued to warn that a threat to Britain in Europe would delay the arrival of the promised fleet in Singapore. However, the RAN's arguments for a blue-water imperial defence strategy won out over the Australian Army's pursuit of continental defence.²⁷

The 1924 British announcement that it would not proceed with the Singapore strategy (supposedly as a matter of principle not for questions of economy) prompted the Australian Government to 'institute a long-term naval expansion program in Australia's own interests, including the building of two cruisers to Washington Treaty limits'.²⁸ However, Australia continued to request and receive assurances from Britain that a fleet would be forthcoming. Although Britain warned that it was impossible to predict what might happen, at the 1937 Imperial Conference it was still assuring Australia that the basis of its strategy was to establish as early as possible after the outbreak of hostilities with Japan, a fleet with enough

strength to defend against, or deter, any threat to British interests in the Far East. Australia, lacking an independent military intelligence capability, 'had little choice but to accept British assurances'.²⁹

However, at the same time, the British Chiefs of Staff were advising their government that they could not foresee a time when their defences would be strong enough to defend their territory, trade and vital interests against simultaneous threats from Germany, Italy and Japan.³⁰ Although Singapore was widely regarded as 'central to Australian and British defence planning in the Asia-Pacific in the inter-war years', cuts in British defence spending in the 1920s and 1930s meant that it was not until the mid-1930s that 'serious attention was devoted to the task of completing the base'.³¹

The Singapore strategy 'at one level ... rested on an element of bluff' that a naval base, as both a symbol and a tangible indication of British determination to protect its interests, would deter Japanese aggression. The bluff could not survive the dramatically changed strategic circumstances of a world war, that is, war against more than one aggressor and in more than one theatre.³²

World War II

As with World War I, the Second Australian Imperial Force's (2nd AIF's) expeditionary role was made possible by 'the maritime supremacy of the alliances in which Australia operated' (that is, transport of troops and equipment and sustainment of operations). It was when this maritime supremacy was under threat, as in 1941-42, that 'Australia was most in peril'.³³

The RAN's primary tasks during World War II were the protection of shipping and support of land operations, that is, supply of the besieged fortress of Tobruk and support of Australian troops in South West Pacific Area. As Captain James Goldrick puts it: 'A navy created and trained in the form of the RAN was always more about what it enabled others to do than what it appeared to achieve in its own right'.³⁴ By late 1940 the strategic challenge for Australia was to establish exactly what British Far East Strategy would be and how it would relate and depend on American strategy, and where Australia's naval effort fitted in with British plans.³⁵

Post-World War II

World War II demonstrated the overwhelming importance of sea power. The Australian 1947 five-year defence plan included provision of two light fleet carriers reflecting the RAN's desire to possess an independent regional capability and the capability to make substantial contributions to allied operations. However, as the US and UK were so pre-eminent, 'any Australian attempts at "independence" at sea seemed unnecessary', and given the limited funds available 'the question of relevance was an acute one'.³⁶

The 1946 Chiefs of Staff's appreciation, or formal assessment, of Australia's strategic position argued that Australia's defence would continue to be based on empire cooperation because 'the size of the country demanded more for its defence, armed forces and an

industrial potential quite beyond [its] present capacity'.³⁷ Thus Australia's focus remained 'the possible contribution to the global strategies of our major allies'. The naval author Commodore Hector Donohue has remarked that it was less than two years later that, with the recognition that the British Empire was beginning to break up, the 'first flicker of a new theme appeared in the Chiefs' 1947 appreciation which saw the necessity for Australia to "make greater efforts for self-sufficiency".³⁸

Australia was very apprehensive that Japan would again pose a threat to its security. Despite this Australia had again committed itself, under the empire defence regime, to supporting Britain in the Middle East with ground forces should war break out with the Soviet Union, with Australian naval forces remaining in the ANZAM [the term stands for Australia, New Zealand And Malaya] area³⁹ and the air force being deployed to Malaya. Commentators have argued that, given the events of 1942, Australia and New Zealand 'were less sanguine about leaving the defence [of their countries] to chance, and sought security guarantees from the United States'.⁴⁰ At a meeting between the British and American chiefs of staff in Washington in October 1950, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff made a secret undertaking that the US would counter seaborne threats to either Australia or New Zealand, allowing them to plan Middle East deployments. It was fortunate for Australian maritime strategy that during this period the greatest threat to the security of the United States was considered to be a Soviet submarine offensive in the Far East. Therefore the United States recognised the value of 'some form of cooperation with British and Commonwealth forces for the contingent defence of the ANZAM and CINCPAC [Commander-in-Chief Pacific] areas'.⁴¹

Indeed, the threat of the expansion of communism, with the communist victory in China and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 along with communist insurgency in Malaya and the conflict in Indo China, replaced the threat of Japan in Australian strategic perceptions and ANZUS [the Australia New Zealand and United States Alliance] proved flexible enough to accommodate the change. It has been argued that Australia's support for the US position on Korea earned the gratitude of the Truman administration leading to the eventual tripartite alliance with the US and New Zealand.⁴² The ANZUS alliance was a continuation of the tradition of collective defence practised by necessity by both Australia and New Zealand, and, while this policy arguably limited external policy choices, it was relatively inexpensive and enabled government to direct resources to economic development.⁴³

In 1951, Australia, New Zealand and the United States also negotiated an agreement—the Radford-Collins Agreement—to provide for the protection and control of shipping in wartime in the ANZAM area, and regular peacetime surveillance, that is, tracking potentially hostile vessels and submarines in the area.

The era of forward defence (mid 1950s to mid 1970s)

In considering the development of the naval dimension of national strategy in this period we are to some extent talking about things that did not happen. Apart from its role in the defence of military shipping en route to operational areas in Southeast Asia, and despite an era of 'moderately high military activity ... the RAN was in general denied the opportunity to

discharge any of its major functions' as identified in a Defence Committee minute in 1962. These functions were to provide an effective and sustained naval contribution to allied forces maintaining command of the seas in our areas of strategic interest; to contribute to and defend military shipping en route to areas of operations in Southeast Asia; to protect within the Australia station shipping carrying essential imports and exports; and to cooperate with sister services in the defence of Australia.⁴⁴

The US focus on the threat of expanding communism in the Asia Pacific facilitated the development of Australia's policy of forward defence. Forward defence had actually been the basis of Australian defence policy since Federation, but in this instance, it referred to Australia's attempts to ensure that the gap between itself and the 'southward flow of communism' did not narrow. To this end, Australia contributed to the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (Far East) (FESR) and became involved in the US-initiated Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). For Australia, this was an insurance policy which, like the later Vietnam War, was seen as the means of keeping the US interested and engaged in the region. Underlying all this was the Australian government's growing fear of China and suspicions of its intentions which were seen as menacing and expansionist, despite the fact that by 1964, China had become Australia's fifth largest trading market.⁴⁵

The British announcement in 1967 that it would withdraw half of its forces from Malaysia and Singapore by 1971, with the rest being withdrawn by 1976, and President Nixon's Guam Doctrine of 1969 which required US allies to provide the main forces for their own defence, caused Australia to reassess its forward defence policy. Without major allies actively engaged in the region, forward defence became impractical for a defence force the size of Australia's, and Australia had been put on notice that a degree of self-reliance was going to be necessary in conflicts other than with the Soviet Union.

Self-reliance

In 1968, following the Britain's east of Suez announcement, the Australian Minister of Defence argued for greater independence in defence planning. In the next few years the Liberal Country Party government moved away from the overtly hostile view of Communist China and the Soviet Union. The Gorton and McMahon governments began to examine alternatives to forward defence and the Gorton government made statements 'to the effect that Australia faced no immediate or obvious threat'.⁴⁶

In 1971 *The Strategic Basis for Australian Defence* paper broke free of tradition in stating 'a uniquely Australian strategic perspective, eschewing traditional notions of dependence on allies and down playing Australia's global security role'. The 1971 paper recognised the Asia-Pacific region as of vital importance to Australia's security. It identified the sea-air gap between Australia and Indonesia as being the most likely route of any military threat to Australia. It also proposed greater emphasis on continental defence without ruling out overseas deployments in support of regional security.⁴⁷

In the early 1970s, the recognition that Australia could no longer rely on the military assistance of allies forced a rethink of the threats Australia was likely to face. In a conceptual turnaround Australia's geography and isolation (long seen as a liability and the reasons for the need for great and powerful friends) was now recognised as an asset, as it made Australia a difficult target to attack. Only the two superpowers had the capability to invade Australia. Regional nations would need to develop such capabilities over many years, giving Australia time to expand its defences.⁴⁸

The focus of Australian strategy from 1972 was the defence of Australia which 'emphasised the importance of the capabilities of strike and interdiction based on naval and air forces rather than land forces.'⁴⁹ The 1972 Australian Defence Review 'proposed that the concept of self-reliance become a 'central feature in the future development of Australia's defence policy''.⁵⁰ Self-reliance did not, however, mean that Australia no longer valued its major ally as 'the move towards self-reliance [was] accompanied by Canberra's desire to strengthen alliance ties with the US'.⁵¹

Section II: The Development of an Australian Maritime Strategy

Defence of Australia and the emerging Maritime Strategy

This new era in Australian defence policy, largely driven by the United States' Guam Doctrine and the British withdrawal from Suez was formalised in the 1976 Defence White Paper, *Australian Defence*. The shift in defence policy that this represented was significant, as for the first time in history Australia attempted to develop a uniquely Australian military strategy that was not dependent on allies. This represented a difficult period in Australia's military history as previously Australia's military strategy, doctrine, training, equipment, command structure, and importantly culture was structured around, or dictated by our powerful allies.⁵² However, with hindsight it can be seen that the 1976 White Paper was an immature statement of Defence policy that did not adequately address the significant shift from 'forward defence' to 'defence of Australia', and from coalition operations to joint operations. The White Paper did not detail how a strategy of defence of Australia might be achieved. It lacked force structure implications and strategic guidance, resulting in a protracted debate between Defence planners over how to achieve a defence of Australia policy. The lack of guidance in a period that was also marked by strategic uncertainty over the expansion of the Soviet Union's power within the region, resulted in a strategy of 'defence of Australia' and self-reliance not being realised.⁵³

The Dobb report – Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities

By 1985, the protracted debate over military strategy had reached an impasse.⁵⁴ As a result, the then Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley, commissioned Paul Dobb, a former member of the Department of Defence, to examine the rationale of defence forward planning and to advise on capabilities appropriate for Australia's defence requirements.⁵⁵

The Dobb report was a detailed analysis of Australia's Defence strategy. It reiterated that defence of Australia was Defence's priority task and proposed a strategy of denial, which was to be achieved through a layered defence within our area of direct military interest (see figure 1).⁵⁶ The direct area of military interest extended between 1000 and 1500 nautical miles from our shores and it is within this area, Dobb argued, that Australia must be able to project independent and comprehensive military power in order to ensure the defence of Australia from a military attack.⁵⁷

'Our most important concern is to ensure that an enemy would have substantial difficulty in crossing the sea and air gap.'
Dobb 1986

Dobb argued that there was no apparent threat to Australia, large scale invasion was unlikely and therefore forces should be structured around credible low level conflict scenarios such as incursions, harassment and raids in northern Australia. The strategy of denial was to be achieved through a layered approach that focused on defending the sea-air gap to Australia's north, presenting the enemy with a series of interlocking barriers to an attack on Australia. The layers are as follows:

- the first layer included comprehensive **intelligence and surveillance**, giving priority to real time surveillance out to 1500 nautical miles using over the horizon radar and long range maritime patrol aircraft to track and detect hostile intruders in the sea-air gap, whilst maintaining comprehensive intelligence about military developments in the region⁵⁸
- the second layer was comprised of capable **air and naval forces**, including air strike capabilities to counter threat forces attempting to cross the sea-air gap once detected
- the third layer focused on **defensive capabilities** closer to the shoreline to prevent the enemy operations in Australia's focal areas or shipping lanes including mine counter measures, air defence assets, and surface ships, while
- the final layer of defence was **mobile ground forces** to combat a threat force if it was successful at crossing the sea-air gap, denying the adversary access to vital assets and population centres.

Dobb's strategy was largely continental, with force structure determined solely on the capability to defend the sea-air gap. A strategy of denial gave little emphasis to promoting regional security, alliances and force projection in order to assist in shaping the regional and global security environment, specifically Dobb placed less emphasis on ANZUS and the Radford-Collins agreement than previous policies.⁵⁹ Critics of the Dobb report argued that it was too defensive and was isolationist, specifically the report raised some concerns internationally about Australia's commitment to the region and its alliances.⁶⁰




Figure 1: Australia's regional security interests and Australia's direct area of military interest

The Defence of Australia 1987: Self-Reliance Within an Alliance Framework

The 1987 White Paper, *The Defence of Australia*, largely reflected the line of thought identified in the 1976 White Paper, however it was significant as it marked the first clear articulation of Australia's military strategy. The Dobb report formed the basis of the White Paper. However it overcame some of the criticism of the Dobb report by increasing the emphasis on developing closer security ties within the region and by reiterating the importance of alliances.⁶¹

The White Paper focused on defence of Australia, emphasising the need to defend our northern maritime approaches through a strategy of defence in depth. This strategy was a revamped version of Dobb's strategy of denial with a greater emphasis on offensive strike. Defence in depth gave priority to operations within Australia's direct area of military interest, emphasising the need for:

- a comprehensive surveillance and intelligence network to target and track threats at a distance from our shore
- capable maritime forces (air and naval) to mount air and maritime operations, including offensive strike and interdiction missions in the sea-air gap
- a comprehensive range of defensive capabilities, including air defence, mine countermeasures and protection of coastal trade, and
- land forces to protect vital civil and military infrastructure and to provide a mobile offensive capability against low level incursions from an adversary whom had crossed the sea-air gap.

Similar to the Dibb report, land forces were largely confined to the Australian continent.

The 1987 White Paper shaped to a large extent the current Australian Defence Force's (ADF's) force structure as it commenced the move of the Army to the north of Australia, the establishment of bare aircraft bases and a squadron of F/A-18 aircraft in northern Australia, as well as the establishment of a second RAN fleet base to be located in Western Australia. Despite the increased focus on regional security ties compared to Dibb, force structure priorities were still based solely on capabilities that contributed to a strategy of defence in depth.

Australia's Maritime Strategy 1987–1994

The defence of Australia focus was quick to be tested after the release of the 1987 White Paper, as changing regional and global dynamics saw Australia's military commitments focused far outside our area of direct military interest, emphasising that Australia's national interests were not confined by our geography.⁶² The apparent disconnection between Australia's declared military strategy versus the operational reality raised questions about the appropriateness of our force structure priorities. However in 1989 the then Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister, Gareth Evans, stated that while the ADF was designed for a defensive role, its capabilities 'provide a foundation for our capacity to contribute to a positive security environment through the exercise of what might be described as military diplomacy'.⁶³ He proposed that in light of fundamental changes that were taking place in the wake of the end of the Cold War, there was a need for a strategy of 'constructive commitment' towards the South Pacific. He suggested that Australia would be prepared to use its military forces in the South Pacific in 'pursuit of security interests not directly affecting the defence of Australia'.⁶⁴

The end of the Cold War in 1991 led to a considerable change in the global strategic environment. The Department of Defence however, argued that the strategic changes were of 'little direct relevance to the formulation of Australia's defence policy and force structure development' and therefore Australia's military strategy remained focused on sea-denial operations in northern Australia.⁶⁵ Leading up to the release of the 1994 White Paper, it was evident that the Department of Defence had finally recognised that the end of the Cold War had a significant impact globally and that Australia's military strategy needed to account for the changes in the regional security environment that had resulted.

Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994

At the tabling of the 1994 White Paper, the Minister of Defence, Robert Ray, stated that the end of the Cold War had 'fundamentally changed the global security environment', that no part of the globe was unaffected, and that strategic circumstances have changed in the region and worldwide.⁶⁶ The end of the Cold War ended the threat of global war but also ended the stability which it imposed on the Asia-Pacific region. The increased economic growth within the region was predicted to continue and with it the expansion of military capabilities. This expansion of military capabilities within the region created a potentially destabilising effect which resulted in Australia's strategic environment being more demanding than before.⁶⁷

Despite the significance of events in the global and regional security environment between 1987 and 1994, this change was not reflected in the White Paper. It continued to focus on defence of Australia and operations in the sea-air gap through a strategy of depth in defence which was similar to the 1987 strategy of defence in depth. The 1994 White Paper gave increasing priority to regional engagement but placed less emphasis on ties with the United States compared to previous White Papers. Despite the slight shift in emphasis to regional engagement, defence of Australia still was given primacy, and force structure determinants were solely based on defence of Australia roles.

Australia's Strategic Policy 1997

In 1996, the new Liberal-National coalition government was faced with growing tensions between the need for self-reliance and regional engagement. The release of the Australia's Strategic Policy (ASP97) in 1997 saw Australia's strategic interests broadened from previous policies to encompass the Asia-Pacific region⁶⁸ and it also saw a return in emphasis on the US alliance.

Defence of Australia was renamed Defeating Attacks on Australia and remained the ADF's priority task. However ASP97 argued that 'we need to recognise that regional conflicts—which may well relate directly to our security, or at least have a knock-on effect—are more likely than direct attacks on Australia'.⁶⁹ ASP97 recognised the importance of regional security on a defence of Australia policy, gave more emphasis to Australian operations within the region and to contributing to peace operations. ASP97 concluded that because of Australia's unique geography, a maritime rather than a continental strategy is best suited to our geo-strategic situation. However, the declared maritime strategy did not represent a significant shift in focus from previous White Papers as force structure was still centred on defeating aggressors in our maritime approaches though capable intelligence, surveillance, command and control, air superiority, maritime interdiction and strike. However, ASP97 did recognise that greater consideration needs to be given to the capabilities needed to defend our regional interests and that it cannot be assumed that forces developed for defence of Australia would be adequate for defending Australia's regional interests.

ASP97 represented a shift towards a maritime strategy. However defence of the sea-air gap is only one element of classic maritime strategy, the strategy of sea denial, which seeks to deny an adversary freedom to operate within the sea-air gap, but not assuring freedom of action for your own forces.⁷⁰ ASP97 could be best described as continental strategy, however it is primarily navalist in orientation, albeit with a significant air component.⁷¹

Michael Evans, Head of the Australian Army's Land Warfare Studies Centre, has made the observation that ASP97 'upholds the narrow primacy of defending the sea-air gap between Australia and the northern archipelagos rather than the sea-land-air gap that reflects the reality of littoral battlespace'.⁷² Evans also notes that a credible maritime strategy needs to take account of the requirement for land forces to secure forward operating bases for sea and air assets, emphasising the need for force projection capabilities and amphibious operations.⁷³

Defence 2000: A Maritime Strategy at last?

In June 2000, the government released *Defence Review 2000: Our Future Defence Force – A Public Discussion Paper*, which sought input from the public on national security issues to inform the White Paper. The discussion paper came at a time when Australia was at a level of operation commitment not experienced since the Vietnam War. The paper sought to gain public support for an increase in defence funding as the ADF faced the prospect of the block obsolescence of some of its most important capabilities.⁷⁴

The Prime Minister, John Howard, presented Defence 2000 as ‘the most comprehensive reappraisal of Australian defence capability for decades’.⁷⁵ The significance of the White Paper, however, is possibly more along the lines of (as described by Dibb) an ‘evolutionary rather than a revolutionary’ change.⁷⁶ It was evolutionary in that it further matured the concept of defence of Australia and marked a shift towards the development of a maritime strategy, however it was not a significant change from previous defence policies.

Defence 2000 continued along the same lines as ASP97 emphasising that ‘the key to defending Australia is to control the air and sea approaches to our continent, so as to deny them to hostile ships and aircraft, and provide maximum freedom of action for our forces’ and concluding that this requires a fundamentally maritime strategy.⁷⁷ Defence 2000 however, was the first White Paper to recognise that controlling our sea and air approaches was a joint operation and that maritime forces included all three services. Compared to previous policies, the White Paper clearly recognised the role of maritime forces in maritime security of the wider region, the protection of Australian ports from sea mines, support of civil law enforcement and coastal surveillance operations. However Australia’s maritime strategy was then narrowly described as a strategy of sea denial across the sea-air gap and hence only represents a small tenet of a true maritime strategy.

The shift to a more considered joint maritime strategy was evident in the White Paper as it highlighted that land forces had a ‘vital and central’ role in a maritime strategy.⁷⁸ Despite this welcomed statement, the White Paper then described role of land forces primarily in the same vein as Dibb: defending vital assets and conducting offensive operations against threat forces that land on Australian territory. It can be argued, however, that while the ADF has considerably matured in its ability to conduct joint operations, the declaratory policy of defence of Australia lacks detailed consideration of joint operations, which is essential for medium powers to be truly effective and for the development of a mature maritime strategy. The White Paper highlights the requirement for maritime forces to achieve sea control stating that ‘the ability to operate freely in our surrounding oceans, and deny them to others is critical to the defence of Australia, and to our capacity to contribute effectively to the security of our immediate neighbourhood’. However the ADF’s ability to achieve sea control in the sea-air gap—which implies denying freedom of action to the enemy while maintaining your own freedom of action—except in confined areas for short periods of time, is questionable given the current and planned force structure. In particular the limited air defence capabilities of our surface ships until the air warfare capable ships come into service would mean that the

ADF is reliant on land-based aircraft for air defence. Such aircraft characteristically lack permanence and to some extent 'reach' even with air-to-air refuelling.

The White Paper emphasised that the ADF may be deployed on operations within the region and beyond, and importantly that operations in the region will be considered in force structure development. However, defence of Australia still has primacy. The White Paper details a need for a high level of preparedness to respond to short notice crises in the region, giving priority for the Army to sustain a brigade deployed on operations for extended periods whilst maintaining a battalion group available for deployment elsewhere. ADF operations in support of East Timor's independence highlighted the importance of air and sea lift which was reflected in the White Paper. However, importantly, the White Paper only planned to upgrade and replace the current amphibious lift capabilities,⁷⁹ not to increase the capability of these platforms, and therefore highlighting that there is no priority to structure the ADF for expeditionary operations in any level of conflict that may involve an opposed landing. This means that, primarily, they will be used for sea transport rather than force projection.

We are only at the beginning of fundamental changes that will be required in the early twenty-first century to move towards a truly joint maritime concept of strategy.

M. Evans, 'Towards and Australian Way of Warfare', *Quadrant*, July–August 2002, p. 14.

Section III: Maritime Strategy a decade after the end of the Cold War

In 1815, the world changed in ways similar to the end of the Cold War in 1991. Napoleon was defeated and France rendered prostrate before British power. The end of the Napoleonic Wars shattered the basis for Britain's military strategy and made obsolete the roles, tasks and intimate knowledge that generations of naval officers had developed in response to Napoleonic expansionism. As a result, the British maritime strategy of confining French freedom of action by close blockade of the French ports became obsolete. This strategic discontinuity was so total that it took the British almost a century to come to terms with the new circumstances.⁸⁰

We are currently in the aftermath of a change of similar scope to that of 1815. However, the evidence suggests that many commentators have failed to grasp what the new environment means, and thus cling to anachronistic ideas about the utility and power of conventional thinking about sea power and maritime strategy.

Western military thinking on expeditionary warfare and power projection has undergone significant changes since the end of the Cold War. This has been precipitated by the new strategic realities and by the changes in military doctrine, organisation and equipment that together come under the rubric of the Revolution in Military Affairs.⁸¹ The result has been a growing difference between the US approach and that of other Western middle powers. This

dichotomy is evident in the different strands of Western thinking regarding expeditionary warfare and power projection.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has assumed the ability to exert its power globally and unhindered by any real competition. It does not have to fight for the strategic space to reach across the world's oceans. It just assumes that capacity and focuses instead on the application of national power from the sea to influence events ashore in the littoral regions of the world across the operational spectrum of peace, crisis and war.⁸²

This assumed capability means that the United States is therefore able to use the sea to wield power over land. This is reflected in its 1994 Maritime Doctrine White Paper '*Forward ... From the Sea*'.⁸³ That paper outlines a concept for the use of maritime expeditionary forces to project the power and influence of the United States to foreign waters and shores in both peace and war. The White Paper notes that the country's economic, political and military interests are truly global in nature and scope. This will be discussed in more detail further in this Research Paper. To promote and protect those interests, the US requires military forces able to operate globally across the full spectrum of conflict, from peacetime through to crisis intervention, through to regional wars and beyond. The US approach in this regard will be explored in a later section of this document.

The assumption of command of the seas that is inherent in the current United States maritime strategy also applies to other Western middle powers⁸⁴ if operating in concert with the US (but not if using maritime capacity to achieve their own strategic ends). The distinguished naval author Rear Admiral J. R. Hill makes the point that as medium powers existing in the shadows of greater powers (such as the United States), the chief distinguishing characteristic of their middle power status is autonomy.⁸⁵ In other words, medium (or middle) powers such as Australia are defined as such by their capacity to create and keep under national control enough means of power to initiate and sustain coercive actions (upon both sea and land) whose outcome will be the preservation of their vital interests. Consequently, their maritime strategy must bring together the elements of such power in such a way as to maintain their ability to use the sea to achieve their national interests. It should be noted that the term 'means of power' refers to the full spectrum of national power, though military power is their ultimate guarantor.

The Nature of the Question

A fundamental question in any discussion of maritime strategy is whether the topic is considered as a subset of a broader national military strategy (shown below as a 'small s' maritime strategy), or whether the discussion is one of the bias within a national security strategy (a 'big S' maritime strategy). In the former case, the question is one strictly of the application of military power across a narrow range of security sectors. In the latter case, the term encompasses a national approach to its security that is either continentalist or maritime-focused and considers responsibilities, not only for military forces, across a wide spectrum of security sectors.




Figure 2: The Nature of the Question

The Modern Context for Maritime Strategy

As noted above, the end of the Cold War gave to the US and its allies an almost unprecedented⁸⁶ ability to use the oceans without serious challenge. Consequently, the focus of maritime strategies moved away from overcoming such challenges towards the manner in which this new freedom could be exercised to apply power to areas of interest on the world's coastlines and inland. These areas are known as the littoral.

The Littoral in Modern Warfare (Projecting power ashore in a complex environment).

The littoral is defined as the areas seaward of the coast which is susceptible to influence or support from the land and the areas inland from the coast which are susceptible to influence from the sea.⁸⁷ At the turn of 21st Century, the littoral accommodates over three quarters of the world's population, hosts over 80 per cent of the world's capital cities and nearly all of the marketplaces for international trade. Following the end of the Cold War, the littoral's aggregation of trade and people make it the most likely arena for important conflicts. Such conflict is likely to challenge not just regional military security, but all other sectors. That is, such conflict will have implications for political, environmental, societal and economic security.

For the United States, the expected 'chaos in the littorals'⁸⁸ is seen as requiring the ability to project military power ashore against all forms of obstacles, ranging from devastated infrastructure to disaster relief and the full spectrum of armed threats. This may mean non-state actors such as terrorists, hostile regional powers, or a newly emerged rival super-power.

For medium powers, the challenges presented by the littoral are made more complex by the lower level of resources that can be applied to the issue. Australia is a good example as our littoral concerns include enforcement of sanctions in the Persian Gulf, protection of fisheries in the Southern Ocean, criminal activity across the Torres Strait and enforcement of migration legislation across the northern edges of our continent.

National Power

National security is no longer merely military security. Similarly, national power is not merely military power but the sum total of a nation's efforts to achieve its goals. It is both directed (such as through its government domestic policies, foreign relations, and military capabilities) and emergent (such as its international reputation, image, attractiveness and success in economic, sporting, scientific and artistic domains). Government policy may directly affect some elements of national power but affect others only indirectly. For example, a nation's foreign and security policies may address the challenges of the unregulated flow of people across borders, whilst a culture of self-reliance and environmental consciousness may address challenges across the economic and environmental sectors of national security. National power is translated into national security when it addresses successfully the challenges facing the country across the various security sectors.

As national power is harnessed through a broad national security policy to achieve the vital national interests, so must all elements of the nation's maritime power be harnessed through a broad maritime strategy to achieve its vital national interests in the seas and its environs.

The corollary of the above is that military power (and military strategy) should have a role to play across all security sectors. As noted by the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade:

Government [must] develop and maintain a national security policy. This policy should, amongst other things, guide the Defence Forces on their role in an integrated national concept for promoting and achieving international prosperity, peace, and security.⁸⁹

As national power is harnessed through a broad national security policy to achieve the vital national interests, so must all elements of the nation's maritime power be harnessed through a broad maritime strategy to achieve its vital national interests in the seas and its environs.

Asymmetric Warfare and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

In military and national security terms, 'asymmetric warfare' can be defined as:

Acting, organizing and thinking differently from opponents to maximize relative strengths, exploit opponents' weaknesses or gain greater freedom of action.⁹⁰

Naval history abounds with examples of asymmetric strategies, such as:

- during World War II the Germans attempted to use submarine warfare to counterbalance the British advantage in capital ships,
- if the Cold War spilled over into military conflict, the Soviet Navy intended to use massive salvos of missiles and decoys to overcome the defences of US carrier battle groups, and
- today, illegal fishing vessels in the Southern Ocean use their numbers to frustrate the efforts of national patrol vessels.

Our small population, our western culture and predilection for high-technology solutions limit Australia's strategic options. Asymmetric responses to our strategies may include anti-access strategies,⁹¹ dispersed approaches that stress our numerically inferior forces, and protracted tensions that consume scarce resources in ongoing operations.

A key concept that has pervaded Western military debate over the past decade is that of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). At its heart, the concept articulates a belief that innovations in information sciences and related computing advances have created a discontinuous shift in the level of knowledge and precision that can be applied to the battlespace. Changes created by the RMA extend to military doctrine, organisation and equipment. Whilst evolution in military hardware such as Global Hawk—a robotic reconnaissance aircraft—is the most visible example of these changes, evolution in doctrine and organisation may have the more reaching of impacts.

In the maritime sphere, the impact of the RMA is already apparent in terms of broad area surveillance and similar tasks. Over the next decades the cumulative effect of stresses associated with the RMA are expected to reduce the flexibility of maritime forces by making them easier to find and hit. Other changes only now being presaged relate to the application of the same technologies that make uninhabited air vehicles (UAV) like the Global Hawk possible in maritime applications. This could result in a significant reduction in the number of people engaged in maritime activities in both peace and war and bring significant benefits to an environment that is both stressful and intensely dangerous.

Maritime Strategy after 9/11

The terrorist attacks upon the United States on 11 September 2001 have been claimed by various commentators as a trigger for a reassessment of Australia's security strategies.⁹² The argument for this is that it highlighted the capacity of non-state actors to inflict damages on a nation-state which previously could only be inflicted by another nation-state. So, if a non-state actor can inflict such damage, then they need to be considered alongside nation-states in considerations of national security and strategy.

It must be said that terrorists have long held the potential for catastrophic strikes, but until the end of the Cold War such actions were likely to have been perceived through the ideological prism of East-West conflict. In the past decade, the global security agenda has been extraordinarily fluid, and thus open to influence by non-state actors using terrorism as a political tool. Many writers warned of the dangers that non-state actors posed, but they were largely dismissed in favour of the more traditional preoccupations with regional states and their capacity for traditional warfare.⁹³ In other words, nothing changed for national security and maritime strategy in 2001. The changes arose in 1991 with the end of the Cold War, but we failed to give them due regard.

'Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.' (The more things change, the more they stay the same).

Whilst significant, the changes in the strategic environment that were brought sharply into focus by the events of 11 September 2001 did not invalidate the continuing requirements for a comprehensive maritime strategy that addresses both the new security concerns and the old defence concerns. The sections below outline the two conceptual approaches to a maritime strategy in terms of concepts, roles and responsibilities.

A 'small s' maritime strategy

In this version, maritime strategy is a subset of a broader military strategy aimed at meeting the requirements of a government's security policy. The current Australian policy was outlined as a listing of strategic interests in the Defence 2000 White Paper. In order of priority, these enduring strategic interests are:

- ensure the Defence of Australia and its direct approaches
- foster the security of our immediate neighbourhood
- support strategic stability in the wider Asia-Pacific region, and
- support Global Security.⁹⁴

These strategic interests are to be achieved through an Australian Military Strategy. The aim of this strategy is to shape the strategic environment, conduct military support operations, and provide combat ready forces to accomplish five major strategic tasks. These tasks are:

- defeat of attacks on Australia (DAA)
- defence of Regional Interests (DRI)
- defence of Global Interests (DGI)
- protection of National Interests (PNI), and
- shaping the Strategic Environment (SSE).⁹⁵

It is worth making two points about the above. First, the maritime component of DAA is one of the denial of the sea-air gap to our north to any potential aggressor wishing to launch attacks upon our soil. This is a very limited aim and will be discussed further below when addressing the difference between sea control and sea denial.

Second, the order of these strategic tasks also reflects their importance as a basis for acquiring new equipment, or force-structure development. Until recently, only DAA was a valid force-structure determinant. Since the attacks on 11 September 2001 this has been relaxed somewhat but it is still the case that most acquisitions are justified by their contribution to the DAA task. The danger with this approach is that, because military capabilities in the region are low, there is little pressure to develop capabilities that can operate successfully in high-threat environments. This constrains government options in terms of what capabilities it can contribute to coalitions operating in high-threat environments such as the Persian Gulf.

A 'small s' maritime strategy contributes to the achievement of the strategic tasks outlined above through military diplomacy, through constabulary tasks in the enforcement of national sovereignty, and through combat operations. These three roles are addressed in more detail below.

Diplomatic

A Man-o-War makes the best ambassador

Oliver Cromwell

Maritime forces are visible, mobile, and potent symbols of the nation-state and as such are useful instruments of foreign policy.⁹⁶ This role can be as part of the shaping of the strategic environment through their sheer presence and port visits, or as more direct enforcers of national power in the defence of regional or global interests.

Deterrence

In its simplest form, deterrence means discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective gain.⁹⁷ Deterrence is an exercise of national power which, like coercion or seduction, uses elements of national power, more likely the military, to prevent an adversary from undertaking a course of action that the nation regards as undesirable, by threatening to inflict unacceptable costs upon the adversary in the event that the action is taken.⁹⁸ Deterrence strategies may be divided into two sets. The first relies on denial; conventional land, sea and air forces deter by their effect on the aggressor's estimate of the probability of gaining his or her objective. The second relies on the potential for punishment and the associated costs to the aggressor.⁹⁹

The effectiveness of deterrence can rely either on denial capabilities, typically conventional land, naval and air forces, which deter by their effect on the aggressors estimate of the probability of gaining his objective; or on 'punishment' capabilities which deter by acting on the aggressor's estimate of possible costs.¹⁰⁰ During the Cold War, the effect of both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons relied on this latter aspect of deterrence. In an Australian context, the speed, range and payload of the F-111 strike aircraft fulfilled this same role within the region.

The deterrent aspect of maritime strategy is based on three related ideas. These are reach, presence and power. In other words, the ability to carry out and sustain operations in the area of interest which may be a significant distance away from Australia to reassure allies or deter adversaries; the recognised capacity to inflict damage on an opponent; and finally the ability to graduate the response as circumstances evolve. In other words, maritime strategy sets the parameters within which maritime forces can deter an adversary by demonstrating sufficient power to deny him his objective, or by sustaining operations from where punishment can be inflicted upon him. Of course, this capacity is dependent on the specific capabilities of the maritime forces available.

Deterrence is central to maritime strategy because of the capacity of maritime forces to influence events on land, both upon one's homeland, but also on the homeland of a potential aggressor. Furthermore, the level of deterrence, particularly through punishment, can be adjusted

'Another military blinding glimpse of the obvious is the utility of sea power in the East Timor operation. The persuasive, intimidatory or deterrent nature of major warships was not to me as the combined joint force commander an incidental, nice to have 'add on' but an important indicator of national and international resolve and most reassuring to all of us who relied on sea lifelines'

Major General Peter Cosgrove AC MC

with exquisite precision. The noted American author Norman Friedman suggests that maritime forces can project force to influence events on land in four main ways:

- control of offshore shipping through embargo (such as that imposed upon Iraq between 1991 and 2003). Australian maritime forces were significant participants in those operations.
- punishment through discrete strikes upon particular targets ashore (for example, the air attacks on Tripoli in 1986 and against a terrorist camp in Afghanistan in 1998).
- sustained air attacks in support of other operations, such as was the case in the Persian Gulf in 1991, and
- actual or threatened landing of ground forces. This can be in the form of raids as are conducted by the Commando Regiment, or in amphibious operations as was the case in

Normandy and the Pacific in World War II, and as was threatened during the 1991 Gulf War. In Australia's case this includes our experiences in New Guinea in 1942.

An appropriate balance of capability and strategy enables the use of maritime forces in the deterrent role either to dissuade a potential aggressor (such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq) or to modify their behaviour through the graduated and flexible application of force to their homelands. However, such maritime strategy can only succeed if the maritime forces giving it effect enjoy appropriate reach, power and presence.

Unfortunately, there is no way of determining in advance if inaction on the part of the adversary is due to successful efforts at deterrence (with all its attendant costs in terms of equipment and manpower) or is due to an absence of hostile intent on the part of a putative adversary. This uncertainty helps to explain why critics argue that deterrence institutionalises worst-case thinking about the adversary's intentions and ignores all other constraints upon their decision making, which may be so compelling that they render deterrence superfluous.¹⁰¹

Coercion

Coercion can be defined as the open application of power where one party secures another's compliance by a threat of sanctions.¹⁰² Maybe the clearest example of the role of coercion as part of a maritime strategy involved the American naval squadron under the command of Commodore Perry, who on July 8, 1853, anchored his four ships, including the powerful steam frigates MISSISSIPPI and SUSQUEHANNA, in lower Tokyo (then Edo) Bay. The Japanese ordered him to go to Nagasaki, the only port open to foreigners, but Perry firmly declined. He presented his papers to the Japanese emperor, requesting protection for shipwrecked American seamen, the right to buy coal, and the opening of one or more ports to trade. The expedition then retired to the China coast. He returned in February 1854 with a larger fleet at which time a treaty was concluded that acceded to American requests, opening the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate to US trade.¹⁰³ Commodore Perry's actions carried the unmistakably coercive message that the United States was a technologically-advanced country, willing to use military force to achieve its foreign policy objectives. The Japanese Government correctly understood this and acceded to Commodore Perry's requests.

It should be noted that to be effective as a strategic tool, coercion has to be believable. This requires not just actual or perceived military capability, but also the belief that the government will use its power if compliance with its wishes is not forthcoming. Therefore, coercion is not only a military strategic issue, but a national strategic issue.

Seduction

Seduction can be seen as the flip-side of coercion. In this case one party secures the compliance of another because of the expected benefits that the second party expects to receive. This can be preferential access to technology, security guarantees or other strategic

benefits. Examples of such power relationships may include alliances between partners of different strategic standing, such as ANZUS or the US-Japan alliance.¹⁰⁴ In this latter case, the security guarantees contained in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security ensure Japan's compliance with the US desire to curb nuclear proliferation in the Asia-Pacific region.

Constabulary

The extension of sovereign rights associated with the Law of the Sea Convention have greatly complicated the responsibilities of governments.¹⁰⁵ In Australia's case, the declaration of a 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 1994 brought with it the responsibility to watch over and manage an area of 8 148 250 square kilometres. This area is larger than the sum total of the land area of Australia. Keeping in mind the number of vessels patrolling that huge area, it is equivalent to only fifty police cars in the whole of Australia.

Sovereignty

In its simplest definition, sovereignty means self-government. It is a claim by the state to supreme authority both within its territory and over its citizens.¹⁰⁶ However, the concept itself is not uncontested due to the leaching away of classical sovereignty from the nation state upwards into supra-national bodies, and downwards into regional or provincial jurisdictions. Similarly, questions remain as to whether sovereignty is an inherent right or a concept that exists only when exercised. Under this latter reading it behoves a nation-state to maintain forces capable of exercising its sovereignty to the full extent of its claimed borders.

Under the Law of the Sea Convention, Australia has claimed a territorial sea over which it claims full sovereignty out to 12 nautical miles from its coasts.¹⁰⁷ Beyond that, Australia claims a Contiguous Zone out to 24 nautical miles over which it enforces customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws.¹⁰⁸ One of the requirements of a maritime strategy with respect to sovereignty is the ability to exercise such sovereignty throughout the nation's territorial sea and contiguous zone.

Natural Resources

The Law of the Sea Convention also gave effect to a system of EEZ under which nation states have sovereign rights over natural resources out to 200 nautical miles from its coasts (but not sovereignty). Australia claimed such rights in 1994 under the *Maritime Legislation Amendment Act 1994*. The convention also allows states to claim sovereign rights over seabed resources where the continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles.

The actual definition of this extended continental shelf is a geological problem, and information to support it must be submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf by 16 November 2004.¹⁰⁹ In Australia's case there are a number of areas that extend significant distances beyond the limits of the EEZ and this will extend further the

requirements of our maritime patrol capabilities to enforce Australian jurisdiction over the resources found in such areas.

Good Order at Sea

As stated above, Australian sovereignty extends out to 12 nautical miles from the coastline whilst laws governing customs, immigration, fiscal and sanitary matters extend out to 24 nautical miles. However, Australian jurisdiction also extends to vessels of Australian nationality or registry (known as Flag State jurisdiction) wherever they may be. Furthermore, some offences such as piracy are subject to universal jurisdiction when they occur on the high seas.

If we accept that sovereignty only exists when enforced, then also sovereign rights exist only when enforced. The legal regime delineated by the Law of the Sea Convention therefore creates certain expectations that states which take advantage of the provisions contained in the convention will also ensure that its provisions are adhered to.

Warfighting

Despite the central place that warfighting has had in the development of maritime affairs, there was until the nineteenth century a dearth of writing on the subject. This was of course due to several factors, not the least that such things were not necessary as they were all perfectly obvious. During the battle of Camperdown in 1797, one of Admiral Duncan's commanders was so bewildered by the stream of signals made to him by his admiral that he swore soundly, threw the signals book to the deck in disgust and simply ordered his quartermaster to steer into the middle of the enemy's fleet. This was exactly what was needed, and required no strategic or doctrinal guidance. It just required a professional officer with a good measure of commonsense to see what needed to be done.¹¹⁰

This belief in the 'school of experience' as the best source on maritime strategic affairs changed in 1890 with the publication of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783*. The book became immensely popular and remains in print to this day. Both Mahan and later writers such as Sir Julian Corbett¹¹¹ wrote in time when various nations could and did contest for supremacy on the world's oceans. Consequently, both writers emphasised on the requirement to wrest either command or control of the sea from adversaries. Where these two writers differed was that Mahan advocated naval supremacy as an enabling end in itself, whereas Corbett saw maritime strategy as merely one component of an overall national strategy aimed at the pursuit of national political goals. Despite the differing viewpoints, their ideas are not mutually exclusive, and are detailed further below.

Command of the Sea

This has been defined as the possession of such a degree of superiority that one's own operations are unchallenged by an adversary, while the latter is incapable of using the sea to

any degree.¹¹² This is an unqualified concept, achievable only through the destruction or neutralisation of the adversary's fleet. The end of the Cold War brought the US to this position without having to face what Mahan called the 'decisive battle'. This unchallenged supremacy on the world's oceans has allowed the US and its allies to concentrate their focus on the projection of power ashore.

Sea Control

Julian Corbett understood that it was not command of the oceans that mattered, but the ability to use them. Consequently, he distilled the idea of command of the sea to a much more limited concept of sea control, which entails the ability to use an area of ocean for one's purposes. This control is often limited in both time and space. This task is sometimes achievable by the maritime forces of a medium power. The duration and extent of such sea control is a function of the resources available to enforce it, and the requirements of the task to be performed.

It should be noted that sea control is an active role, requiring the elements of presence, reach and power which characterise maritime forces. Furthermore, sea control is not merely an idea exercised in wartime. Recent examples of sea control include the RAN's operations in the Persian Gulf, and Operation RELEX. In this latter example, maritime patrol aircraft, surface combatants and minor war vessels combined to exercise sea control over an area of ocean to the north of Australia to deal with the unregulated movement of people towards Australia.

Sea Denial

This can be defined simply as the ability to prevent an adversary from making use of a particular area of the world's oceans. It can take many forms ranging from blockade to the submarine and air operations by the Argentine military in the 1982 Falklands War.

In Australia's case, recent Defence White Papers have pursued a strategy of denial of the sea-air gap to our north as the primary focus of our defence effort. Such denial strategies can be pursued through the combination of effective surveillance and strike capabilities, that is, to find and destroy any putative adversary before it reaches our shores. As can be seen in Operation RELEX, ongoing sea control operations are demanding of both people and platforms.¹¹³ Sea denial in the littoral environment can be pursued over wide areas on an ongoing basis with much lower resource implications.

Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC)

It was Julian Corbett who pointed out that maritime conflict was about control of communications.¹¹⁴ The protection of the 'Sea Lines of Communications' (SLOC) is, in fact, a misnomer as there are no physical highways or lines to protect; what matters are the ships that use various routes. In the protection of our national interests, the protection of SLOC takes on a particular importance for two main reasons. First, the majority of our sea-borne

traffic passes through numerous straits and other chokepoints as it moves to and from our trading partners in Asia. Second, shipping in the Indian and Pacific Oceans can be identified from some distance away as being bound only for Australia or New Zealand. The protection of such SLOC is not only a wartime role. Piracy and the danger of terrorist action since 11 September 2001 have increased the security requirements for vessels whose cargo is seen as environmentally sensitive, attractive or strategically-significant. Maritime strategy needs to consider the role of maritime forces in the protection of SLOC in other than wartime tasking.

Power Projection Ashore

With the end of the Cold War, it has become the orthodoxy that the purpose of maritime power is to directly influence events on land. After all, that is where people live. The reach, poise and flexibility of maritime forces enable such forces to strike at the land from unexpected and/or advantageous directions, making them, in the words of one of Great Britain's most famous strategists Liddell Hart 'the greatest strategic asset that a maritime nation can possess'.¹¹⁵ However, in the 1970s serious doubts emerged about the effectiveness of contested amphibious operations in high threat scenarios. Such doubts were heightened by the casualty rates during the 1975 MAYAGUEZ imbroglio in which the US attempted to rescue that ship's crew by means of a helicopter-borne amphibious assault.¹¹⁶

No significant amphibious operations have taken place since then,¹¹⁷ but significant doctrinal advances have taken place, such as the US Marine Corps 'Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea' concept which focuses on the ability to move directly from the ship to the objective on land by taking advantage of high-speed capabilities such as the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) and the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor. Such capabilities allow the US to maintain the capacity to perform forcible entry operations in high threat environments. Australia is not capable of performing such operations, and its much more modest doctrinal approach is encapsulated in the Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment (MOLE) Concept document.¹¹⁸ Nevertheless, the capacity to influence events on land in areas such as the South Pacific, as well as maintaining the capability to, for example, evacuate Australian civilians from a conflict situation, are important parts of Australia's maritime strategy.

The 'Big S' Maritime Strategy

This reading eschews the narrow definition of security as strictly military security and thus opens the door to an integrated security strategy able to bring together relevant elements of national power across all aspects (or sectors) of security.

Several naval strategic concepts, such as power projection and sea control are similar under both readings and will not be discussed further.

Broad Security

A shift occurred in Western strategic thinking at the end of the Cold War in 1991. From the advent of total war, and during the decades when strategic nuclear war was a probability, all

aspects of security were subjugated to the idea of military security. With the threat of strategic nuclear war extinguished,¹¹⁹ national security was properly recognised as being broader than just military security. It also encompasses economic, environmental, societal and political security.¹²⁰ Whether it is unregulated movement of peoples, transnational crime or unlawful exploitation of resources, threats to Australia's national interests are multi-dimensional. A comprehensive maritime strategy must consider the implication for national security of the full gamut of security sectors.

Environmental Security

This security sector concerns the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. The environmental security aspect of a maritime strategy has relevance not only for security policy but also for oceans policy and related topics.

Ecological security threats can damage the physical base of the nation state and its institutions.¹²¹ Whilst some threats are global and thus beyond the scope of any sole nation's strategy, others are caused, for example, by transborder pollution. In Australia's case such pollution may arise from commercial enterprises such as poorly controlled mining activity in PNG¹²² or clearance-burning for agriculture in Indonesia and Malaysia.

Economic Security

Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance, and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. In the main, economic threats are part of the normal discourse of nations and do not often stray into the realm of national security. Such leakage can occur however through the relationship between economic capability on the one hand, and military capability, power and socio-political stability on the other.¹²³

The links between maritime strategy and economic security are based on the importance of seaborne trade and of the exploitation of the ocean spaces (and of the seabed). Basic policy work in understanding the overlapping nature of many maritime control regimes would be a useful tool in enhancing this aspect of maritime security.¹²⁴

A more immediate threat to economic security arises from the growth of transnational crime, including people and drug smuggling. Such threats have the dual effect of draining economically significant amounts from the national economy, but also create expensive social and health related concerns in the target population.

In Australia's case, the absence of land borders with any other country makes such security threats a valid focus for a national maritime strategy.¹²⁵ Such threats bring together law enforcement and military capabilities in ways which are uncomfortable for the culture of both areas and which create difficulties in terms of surveillance and intelligence cooperation and coordination.

Political Security

Political threats to security are aimed at the organisational stability of the state. Their purpose may range from pressuring the government on a particular policy, through to overthrowing the government or inciting secessionism.¹²⁶ Terrorism is one aspect of political security that has taken on a new importance after the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. The possibility of terrorists using ocean spaces to pursue their political or ideological agenda (for example, through acts of ecological destruction) could have significant impacts on national security as a whole.

In Australia's case, examples of such acts could include the deliberate introduction of diseases into the country or the break-up of an oil tanker upon sensitive areas of the Great Barrier Reef. Either of these two events would have significant impacts on our national interests.




Figure 3: Extent of the Australian Ship Reporting Area, and Search and Rescue responsibilities (Source: Australian Maritime Safety Authority)

Societal Security

Threats to national security at the social level amount to attacks on the national identity. At the higher end of the threat spectrum, they are often part of a broader package of military and political threats, such as that faced by the Israelis from the Arabs.¹²⁷ In Australia's immediate region, a lower level of threat exists, largely associated with nation-states suppressing, or at least homogenising, sub-state social identities. Examples include the Javanese and others transmigration into less heavily populated areas of Indonesia, tensions between ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians, and the conflict between Malaitans and the Guadalcanese in the Solomon Islands.¹²⁸ While such threats are overwhelmingly internal to the respective nation states, they do raise security concerns for Australia in its engagement with the region.

Military Security

The use of military force can wreak major undesired changes very swiftly and can even threaten the very existence of the nation-state itself. Consequently military security concerns are granted the highest priority in the national security considerations by the government of any nation state. The strategic response to military threats has long been the skeleton of any maritime strategy. However, as the spectre of global annihilation through strategic nuclear war receded with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it opened the door to a more comprehensive treatment of all sectors of security and their treatment through integrated strategies, such as a national maritime strategy.

Expeditionary Strategies: The United States and United Kingdom

As stated above, the end of strategic competition upon the high seas has brought about a new focus on the role of maritime forces in projecting power into the littoral areas of the world. Both the US and the UK have outlined their approaches in this matter. Their primary guiding documents are summarised below as examples for consideration.

The US Navy Doctrine 'Forward ... From the Sea'

This 1994 Doctrine is the second maritime strategic concept arising from the US in the aftermath of the Cold War. Like its 1992 predecessor 'From the Sea', this document articulates the idea that the primary purpose of forward-deployed naval forces is to project national power from the sea to influence events ashore in the littoral regions of the world. This, however, is an evolution from the previous strategic concept in that it addresses specifically the unique contributions of naval expeditionary forces in peacetime operations, in responding to crises and in regional conflicts.

Peacetime Forward Presence Operations

Forward presence is intended to demonstrate the United States commitment to its allies and partners, to underwrite regional stability, gain familiarity with overseas operation environments and promote combined training among the forces of friendly nations. It

provides the United States with timely initial response capabilities. Furthermore, as the threat of ballistic missiles becomes more widely spread, maritime forces equipped with theatre ballistic missile defence capabilities can play an important role in conventional deterrence by extending credible defences to friendly and allied countries.

Crisis Response

The timely initial response capabilities provided by the forward presence of maritime forces assists in deterring aggressors. Building on such normally deployed forces the US can mass, if the situation requires, multiple aircraft carrier battle groups, amphibious ready groups with embarked Marine Expeditionary Units and project expeditionary forces ashore using the afloat Maritime Prepositioning Force.¹²⁹

Regional Conflict

As a situation moves beyond immediate crisis towards regional conflict, this strategic concept sees forward-deployed maritime forces as the transition force whilst land-based forces are brought forward into theatre (either from continental USA or from another regional command). Such maritime forces would also be called upon to protect vital sealift capabilities and points of entry into the theatre or conflict. It is worth noting that 'Forward ... From the Sea' identifies sealift capabilities as the key to force sustainment for joint operations, and highlights the US commitment to it as a strong national capability. The same requirement for sea-borne sustainment would apply to middle powers. In Australia's case, it is worth noting the crucial role played by HMAS JERVIS BAY during the INTERFET operations in East Timor.

Sealift is a crucial capability for joint operations in the littoral

The UK's 1998 Strategic Review – Rebirth of Middle-Power Expeditionary Warfare

The 1998 UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR) represents a fundamental rethink of the UK's defence requirements in the post-Cold War period. In short, it accepts that in the new century, middle powers such as the UK must be prepared to 'go to the crisis, rather than wait for the crisis to come to us'.¹³⁰ The SDR is also a useful reminder that it is possible for western voters to accept the need for defence spending without solely invoking a threat to the nation's sovereignty and homeland. In the UK's case spending in new capabilities includes two new aircraft carriers as well as transport aircraft and other capabilities intended to move people and equipment quickly to troublespots beyond the immediate region.

The missions and tasks delineated in this new framework of expeditionary warfare are as follow:

- **Peacetime Security.** The 1998 Strategic Defence Review noted that support against terrorism of all kinds would remain of the highest priority for the foreseeable future.¹³¹

This was tragically reinforced by the events of 11 September 2001. This role also includes elements similar to Australia's roles of Defence Support to the Civil Community (DACC).

- **Security of the Overseas Territories.** Whilst the SDR recognises there is no significant military threat to the UK overseas territories, it highlights the ongoing threats to the security of those territories across all security sectors and the defence forces role in their amelioration.
- **Defence Diplomacy.** This new mission covers arms control, non-proliferation and related security building measures, an outreach programme in Eastern Europe, and wider military assistance and training for overseas countries.
- **Support to Wider British Interests.** This includes support to security arrangements such as the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA).
- **Peace Support and Humanitarian Operations.** The SDR highlights that the United Kingdom will continue to play its full part in such international efforts. At one end of the spectrum, this might involve logistic or medical support to a disaster relief operation. At the other, it might involve major combat operations such as the United Kingdom was prepared to undertake when NATO's Intervention Force (IFOR) was first deployed to Bosnia.
- **Regional Conflict outside the NATO area.**
- **Regional Conflict inside the NATO area.**
- **Strategic Attack on NATO.** The SDR emphasises that no threat on this scale is in prospect. It does, however, caution that it would be unwise to conclude that one could never reappear but that the conventional forces needed to threaten such an attack would take many years to create. This mission therefore provides the UK with longer term insurance through a credible nuclear deterrent and the retention of the essential military capabilities on which the UK could rebuild larger forces over a long period, if circumstances were radically to worsen.

Overall, the SDR represents a well-articulated response to the strategic changes the UK faced in the aftermath of the Cold War. It proposes an approach to security that marries expeditionary warfare capabilities with acknowledged responsibility across a number of security sectors. Fundamentally, it represents an emphatic choice by the UK government to pursue a global security role through the maintenance of capable expeditionary maritime forces.

Anti-Access Warfare: The response to Expeditionary Maritime Strategies

Anti-access warfare is the asymmetrical response to expeditionary strategies. Its basis is that the only way to disrupt the massive capacity for expeditionary warfare wielded by the US and

its Western allies is by attacking the ports and air-bases that such forces require to depart its territory and to enter the area of conflict. The US Chief of Naval Operations put the challenge in these terms:

Over the past ten years, it has become evident that proliferating weapon and information technologies will enable our foes to attack the ports and airfields needed for the forward deployment of our land-based forces.

I anticipate that the next century will see those foes striving to target concentrations of troops and materiel ashore and attack our forces at sea and in the air. This is more than a sea-denial threat or a Navy problem. It is an area-denial threat whose defeat or negation will become the single most crucial element in projecting and sustaining U.S. military power where it is needed.¹³²

The same concerns apply to Australia's maritime strategy. Our limited maritime capabilities are concentrated in, and dependent on, a very small number of ports and airfields. Interference with such infrastructure, whether through mining, sabotage, or the use of WMDs, makes for an easy and cheap counter to Australia's maritime capabilities.

Section IV: Current and Future Issues for Australia's Maritime Strategy

'The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is moving towards developing a maritime concept of strategy that integrates manoeuvre operations in a littoral environment, amphibious capability and the integration of sea control with a broader appreciation of naval and air [and land] power in maritime strategy.'¹³³

While the above is true, the situation is more complex. The operating environment is becoming more uncertain with a combination of state and non-state actors, an increase in asymmetric and non-conventional threats, and the proliferation of highly capable missiles and other capabilities within our region. The revolution in military affairs and the rapid developments in Command Control Computers Communications Intelligence and Surveillance (C4IS) capabilities has changed the conduct of conflict at all levels, and can result in greatly improved situational awareness resulting in the more effective employment of combat forces. Australia's desire to exploit these new technological developments is evident in the White Paper as technological developments in C4IS enable a small force to be used to maximum effect.

The last decade has seen a shift in defence operations from platform centric warfare to network-centric or network-enabled warfare as well as an increasing emphasis on effects based operations.¹³⁴ Further in June 2002, the Minister for Defence, Robert Hill, highlighted the need for the ADF to be capability-based rather than threat-based, in order to be equipped to meet the unexpected.¹³⁵ This move increases the importance of an integrated, highly interoperable and flexible joint force supported by superior intelligence and integrated command support systems in a maritime strategy. Further, as the line between civilian and military national security agencies blur, the ADF's maritime forces will need to become

interoperable with other government agencies responsible for national security in the maritime environment.

This changing environment affects the way in which the sea, land, air and information components of a maritime strategy are, and will be employed in the future.

Sea Power

Over the past 20 years, the changing strategic situation and the move towards a maritime strategy have forced the RAN to re-evaluate its operational concepts and doctrine.¹³⁶ Blue water navies are less relevant and the focus of sea power has moved to operations in the littoral, where increasingly there is not only the blurring of the air, land and maritime environments but also the relationship between civil security and national defence (as demonstrated by Operation RELEX, the ADF's interception operations of unauthorised boat arrivals to Australia's north). This blurring has increased the importance for Australia to develop a national maritime strategy to gain synergistic effects in both the traditional and non-traditional military and civil security domains.

While the post-Cold War period has seen an overwhelming focus on littoral operations, the key tenets of sea power still remain relevant.

Control of the sea will require capabilities in submarine, surface and air warfare, as well as in mine warfare. Power projection requires the ability to put forces ashore, and to provide fire support and strike. All these missions require sophisticated C3I [Command Control Communications and Intelligence] support from ashore and afloat if their potential is to be maximised.¹³⁷

Hence sea control and sea denial will remain crucial for keeping the sea lines of communication open, for expeditionary operations, for the projection of power ashore, land-attack and providing support to operations on land. The importance of a limited amphibious capability to project maritime forces was demonstrated by the ADF's deployment to East Timor in 1999.

Technological developments in anti-ship missiles and the proliferation of ballistic missiles has led to a focus on littoral operations and an increasing emphasis on medium navies having a land-attack capability, which in turn has a significant impact on the conduct of joint operations.¹³⁸ The ADF has looked into land-attack capabilities for a number of years for the submarines. Now, as part of the maritime air warfare capability ship project, a number of concepts are being covered including land-attack. However, the shape of this new capability is a number of years away from maturity (see figure 5 for information on the RAN's current, enhanced and future fleet). Until this new capability enters service in 2013, our surface combatant force will become more vulnerable as it possesses a limited air warfare capability and therefore in a conflict scenario they are dependent on land based air cover which restricts the range of potential operations that can be conducted. A limited air warfare capability is particularly problematic with the apparent shift to conducting expeditionary operations in the region.



FORCE ELEMENT GROUPS	FLEET IN BEING 2005	ENHANCED FLEET 2015	FUTURE FLEET 2025
Surface Combatants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 Upgraded ADELAIDE-Class Frigates (FFG) • 2 FFG in mothballs • 1 ANZAC-Class Frigate (FFH) upgraded • 5 FFH 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 Air Warfare Destroyers • 8 Upgraded ANZAC-Class FFH 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 Air Warfare Destroyers • A mix of New Surface Combatants and upgraded Anzac FFH
Submarines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 Upgraded Collins Class • 2 Collins Class 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 Upgraded Collins Class • 2 Collins Class 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A mix of Next Generation Submarines and upgraded Collins Class
Amphibious Lift	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 Landing Ship Heavy (LSH) • 2 Landing Platform Amphibious (LPA) • 6 Landing Craft Heavy (LCH) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 Large Amphibious Platforms and supporting watercraft 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 Large Amphibious Platforms and supporting watercraft
Afloat Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 Auxiliary Oiler • 1 Fleet Replenishment Ship 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 Fleet Replenishment Ships 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 Fleet Replenishment Ships
Mine Warfare	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 Huon Class Coastal Minehunters • 2 Auxiliary Minesweepers • 2 Clearance Diving Teams 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 Huon Class Coastal Minehunters • 2 Clearance Diving Teams 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Next Generation Minehunting Platforms • 2 Clearance Diving teams
Aviation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 16 Seahawks • 11 Seasprites • 7 Seakings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 16 Seahawks • 11 Seasprites • Utility Helicopters • Possibly UAVs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Common type Warfare/Utility Helicopter • UAVs
Hydrographic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 Leeuwin Class • 4 Paluma Class • LADS (Laser Airborne Depth Sounder) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 Hydrographic Ships • Next Generation LADs type capability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 Replacement Hydrographic Platforms • Future Airborne System
Patrol Boats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 13 Fremantle Class • 3 ARMIDALE-Class Patrol Boats 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 12 ARMIDALE - Class Patrol Boats 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Next Generation Patrol Platforms

Figure 4: The Royal Australian Navy's Three Fleet Navy¹³⁹

The previous points have largely focused on operations at the higher end of the conflict spectrum. However, with the focus still on the defence of Australia, there will be an increasing role for sea power in non-conventional military tasks including constabulary, diplomatic and humanitarian assistance operations. The ADF will continue to support Coastwatch and the ADF's role in civil surveillance may increase as threats to our maritime resources, immigration and customs operations are becoming increasingly sophisticated. In addition to the traditional military and civil threats, emerging asymmetric threats and increasing transnational crime will drain ADF resources in the future. Seapower is essential in our current and future operating environment. The ADF is likely to be employed on a greater range of tasks from homeland defence to regional and coalition operations, and therefore the ADF's capabilities and doctrine need to be inherently flexible to cope with these new tasks while still maintaining a capability for traditional military tasks.

The Role of Land Forces in A Maritime Strategy

Following the release of the Dobb Report, Australia's continentalist strategy caused the Army to experience 'a level of strategic ambiguity between its specified strategic role in Defence of Australia and its historical employment in offshore peace enforcement and humanitarian operations'.¹⁴⁰

Operations in East Timor highlighted the need for the ADF to be structured for short notice contingencies within our region and the importance of airlift and sealift capabilities. The 2000 Defence White Paper recognised this change and called for a force that is balanced 'between the demands of operations on Australian territory and the demands of deployments offshore', however it did not adequately address the ambiguity as force structure determinants were still stated to be focused on the defence of Australia. In an attempt to balance the demands between the defence of Australia and operations in the region, the White Paper reinforced the importance of an amphibious lift capability by committing the government to the retention and eventually replacement of the amphibious support ships, HMAS MANOORA and HMAS KANIMBLA, and also HMAS TOBRUK. This, combined with an additional squadron of troop lift helicopters to operate from the amphibious support ships provides the ADF with a limited amphibious lift capability.

In order to better define the Army's role in a maritime strategy two key documents have been released since the Defence 2000 White Paper: the *Fundamentals of Land Warfare* (the Army's strategic doctrine) and the concept document *Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment*. Both documents emphasise the importance of the littoral environment – that area where the operational domains of sea, land and air merge - in a maritime strategy and highlight that 'by their nature, littoral areas require the effective conduct of joint operations' (see figure 5).¹⁴¹ Further they highlight that the maritime approaches to our territory are littoral in nature and therefore the capability to conduct joint operations in the littoral is essential to an effective maritime strategy. The concept document, *Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment (MOLE)*, is a classified document. However some comments on the document have been made in the public domain.¹⁴² The Army defines littoral manoeuvre 'as integrated sea-land-air operations involving forced entry from the sea and air undertaken in

the littoral region'.¹⁴³ The MOLE concept emphasises the importance of concentrating overwhelming effects at a particular place and time, and emphasises the need for the ADF to be capable of conducting operations in the inner-arc to seize, deny or protect forward operating bases.¹⁴⁴



Figure 5: Operations in the littoral environment¹⁴⁵

The ability to conduct manoeuvre operations in the littoral to project force, to seize and hold points of entry and to deny or protect forward operating bases, emphasises the current trend in US and UK, but significantly extends the White Papers pretence of a 'limited amphibious capability'. 'Forced entry from the sea and air' implies a conflict scenario. However the ADF's limited force projection, sea control and surface air warfare capability, combined with the lack of endurance associated with air power, raises questions about how the ADF might be able to effect this operation with the current and planned capital investments.¹⁴⁶

MOLE is a significant shift from the White Paper in both policy and force structure implications. However, it is a move towards a more considered maritime strategy and it could be argued is more congruent with likely future operations. MOLE is perhaps a confirmation that Australia's declared defence policy, despite being a move forward, is still lagging behind current defence thinking and current defence operations. For a MOLE-type concept to be truly effective it needs to be developed as a joint concept and needs to gain force structure priorities. The current White Paper does not express a planned capability to conduct manoeuvre operations in any threat-based scenario.

The Role of Air Forces in A Maritime Strategy

Air Combat is the most important single capability for the defence of Australia¹⁴⁷

Since the Dibb report, the role of the air power has remained largely unchanged. Aerospace power is not confined to the Air Force but incorporates air arms of both the Navy and the Army. In a complete maritime strategy, it also includes civil assets as well as the civil and military infrastructure from which aerospace power can be projected. Aerospace power is defined as 'the ability to project military force in the third dimension, by or from a platform above the surface of the earth'.¹⁴⁸

The White Paper describes air combat as the most important capability because control of the air over our territory and maritime approaches is critical to a maritime strategy. Further, Australia needs to be capable of supporting a regional coalition and providing air-defence and support for deployed forces in our immediate region. The *Fundamentals of Aerospace Power 2002*—the Air Force's strategic doctrine—highlights the fact that given Australia's geographic isolation, the ability of aerospace power to strike at 'the enemy's ability to project military power over substantial distance, provides a fundamental component of national security'.¹⁴⁹

The role of the air power has not changed substantially since the end of the Gulf War and in a maritime strategy effective air power includes the ability to:

- conduct both maritime strike and land attack
- gain air superiority
- conduct aerial mining
- conduct air to air refuelling
- provide airlift
- conduct offensive air support operations in both the land and maritime environments, such as close air support and undersea warfare
- conduct information operations (missions include surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence), and
- provide early warning and control.

In a maritime strategy, the importance of deterrence that lies essentially within our F-111 fleet should not be overlooked. In addition to the above roles of aerospace power, aerospace power also has a role in non-conventional warfare including civil surveillance, search and rescue operations, logistics support to natural disasters or humanitarian operations, and aeromedical evacuations.

Recent important developments in air power include precision-guided munitions and stealth technologies, both of which the ADF considers important, as demonstrated by Australia signing up as a level-three partner in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) project. Precision guided and stand-off weapons allow the ADF to strike at specific targets to gain a desired effect. These weapons are generally employed for strategic missions such as land strike and maritime strike on high value targets. Stealth technology provides protection against air defence systems.

As the ADF moves to joint operations in the littoral, it is important that the role of aerospace power is not overlooked. Littoral operations are not mentioned in *Fundamentals of Aerospace Power*, nor was the role of aerospace power mentioned in the RAN's definition of littoral operations in the RAN's strategic guidance document *Australia's Navy for the 21st Century*. Aerospace power has a significant role when conducting joint operations in the littoral. In particular aerospace power can be used to:

- gain air superiority
- conduct maritime and land strike
- provide effective surveillance and reconnaissance, and
- provide an airlift capability.

Aerospace power is generally revolutionary in nature. Specifically the development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) will have a significant impact on a joint maritime strategy in the short to medium term.

At the strategic level, aerospace power can be used to achieve synergistic effects through the use of 'aerospace power's superior reach, responsiveness and precision to exploit the uncertainty of asymmetric response, and to strike directly at vital points, achieving strategic surprise and shock and confound the enemy's situational awareness'.¹⁵⁰ When combined with sea and land power, the synergistic effects of air power will be further exploited to achieve maximum effect in a maritime strategy.

Information Capability

The revolution of military affairs has significantly affected the conduct of operations with defence forces exploiting the information environment to achieve disproportionate effects across the entire spectrum of war. Information capability can be broken into intelligence, surveillance, and command and control.

Intelligence – Intelligence is an essential component of Australia's maritime strategy. Intelligence can provide commanders with increased situational awareness and enable them to achieve 'decision superiority' (typically defined as 'making better decisions sooner') across the spectrum of conflict. Intelligence is essential in both war and peacetime situations

and is becoming increasingly important as Australia's strategic environment is becoming increasingly complex.

In spite of the fact that Australia has very capable intelligence agencies both within and outside of the Department of Defence, the coordination between these agencies is not exploited to achieve optimal effect. This lack of coordination will increasingly become problematic as military and civil security operations merge and as threats to Australia's national security are increasingly non-state based and asymmetrical. Effective intelligence is essential to all countries, however, it is particularly important to Australia given the small size of our military and the vastness of the land which they are tasked to defend. Effective intelligence means that commanders can make the most efficient and effective response at the right time.

A mature national maritime strategy, which would contribute to a more effective national security response to both civil and military threats, would require increased collaboration and information-sharing not only between Australia's national security intelligence agencies:

- Australian Secret Intelligence Service
- Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
- Defence Intelligence Organisation
- Defence Signals Directorate
- Defence Imagery and Geo-spatial Organisation, and
- Office of National Assessments

but also between other Australian agencies that have an intelligence function. Some of these agencies include:

- Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
- Australian Customs Service, including Coastwatch
- Australian Federal Police, as well as state police agencies
- Australian Fisheries Management Authority, and
- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Surveillance – surveillance is defined as ‘the systematic observation of aerospace, surface or sub-surface area, places, persons or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means’.¹⁵¹ Surveillance is fundamental to Australia's maritime strategy as it provides the ‘capability to detect air and sea activity in and beyond Australia's sovereign air and sea space

and to integrate that information with other agencies'. Importantly, surveillance information needs to be processed in a timely fashion by intelligence staff in order for the intelligence staff to provide decision makers with timely information about a potential adversary's capabilities and intentions.¹⁵²

Australia's maritime strategy places a large emphasis on surveillance provided by the Jindalee Over-the Horizon Radar Network (JORN) and the trial of high frequency surface wave radar which provides the potential for 24-hour surveillance of our northern approaches, combined with the surveillance capability embedded in the Orion maritime patrol aircraft and the Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft (when they enter service). These capabilities create a detailed surveillance network to provide extensive coverage of Australia's maritime approaches. Importantly Australia's surveillance effort is primarily focused on northern Australia. In contrast, Australia has only a limited focus on, or capability to conduct, surveillance operation to Australia's south as has been highlighted by the increased incidence of illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean.

Command and Control - Headquarters Australian Theatre is the primary operational command for the ADF and holds the responsibility of commanding joint operations. In addition to Headquarters Australian Theatre, the ADF currently has a single deployable joint task force headquarters. A second deployable joint task force headquarters is being developed under project JP 8001—the second deployable joint task force headquarters project—which will comprise an afloat capability aboard HMAS KANIMBLA. Having two deployable joint task force headquarters allows the ADF to command two concurrent operations simultaneously, providing increased flexibility.

Despite moves for more flexible command arrangements, the Army is still structured to carry out conventional warfare operating in brigade-sized formations. Similarly the ADF is primarily structured and commanded along single service lines. As Australia moves to a joint maritime strategy, and as the likelihood for large-scale conventional operations decreases and smaller joint non-conventional operations increases, the ADF will need to move to a more flexible command structure.

The Role of Defence Industry in a Maritime Strategy

Since the early 1970s, defence planning has focused on 'self-reliance'. The effectiveness of a self-reliant posture in times of both peace and conflict is closely linked to the capability of our defence industries to meet strategic needs. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a significant decrease in defence industries worldwide, primarily due to the decreased demand for military equipment in an era of relative peace and wide-scale consequent rationalisation.

The Department of Defence has recognised that there is over-capacity in Australia's defence industrial base and has encouraged the defence industry to rationalise in order to sustain an effective defence industrial base. In order to assist defence industry rationalise, the Department of Defence has developed a strategic alliance approach to defence industry and has identified four key defence industry sectors that have strategic significance to Australia,

namely naval shipbuilding and repair, electronic systems, aerospace and land, and weapon systems. Of primary importance to a maritime strategy is the naval shipbuilding and repair sector plan, still under development, which will articulate how local shipyards will fit within the Australian Government's naval capability developments over the coming three decades.¹⁵³

Not directly linked to the Australian shipbuilding industry is the issue of Australian-flagged ships and Australia's merchant marine industry, both of which have reduced significantly over a number of years and now only represent a very small capability. For example, the ADF chartered 19 ships for their deployment to East Timor, all of which were foreign flagged. Availability and capacity are obvious factors in the selection of chartering ships, however the limits involved do emphasise the question of how important is it for a maritime nation that is so dependent on its sea trade to maintain a credible Australian flagged fleet and merchant marine? Closely linked to this is strategic civil infrastructure such as ports and airports. In the case of port access, there is no strategic plan for ADF port access as the ADF is largely reliant on the *Defence Act 1903* to gain access to port facilities that are now largely privatised. A clear policy for defence industries, Australian flagged ships, our maritime marine and our strategic civil infrastructure, needs to be developed as part of a broader maritime strategy.

The Move to a Mature Maritime Strategy

Defence 2000 was the first step towards developing a maritime strategy. There is however a significant way to go before Australia has a mature and integrated maritime strategy. Importantly, the ADF needs to develop joint operational concepts and have a clearer understanding of the potential operations that the ADF may be tasked to support both in the region and abroad. As the civil and military security domains increasingly overlap and with an increased emphasis on homeland defence, it is increasingly important for a national security strategy to be developed, incorporating all aspects of national power at sea not just military. A more mature maritime strategy would see an integrated approach to national surveillance and intelligence, a greater understanding of the role of industry and civil infrastructure, as well as greater coordination between all agencies responsible for Australia's security.

Defence 2000 highlights the importance of defending the sea-air gap and regional engagement. However, since the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, have these priorities changed? Is it still appropriate for the ADF to be primarily structured around defending the sea-air gap? At the Defence and Industry Conference in June 2002, the Minister for Defence, Robert Hill, emphasised that the emerging trends identified in the White Paper, such as increasing non-military threats to Australia, are likely to continue and, since 11 September 2001, they have proved to be more substantial than originally thought.¹⁵⁴ Recent ADF operations have included border protection operations against people smugglers, fisheries patrols in the Southern Ocean, peacekeeping in East Timor, the continuing deployment to Bougainville, Australia's contribution to the War on Terror and most recently support to the Bali bombings. These illustrate the range of operations that the ADF must be prepared to conduct and, increasingly, these operations are both military and non-military in nature and will be carried out alongside civilian organisations.

Australia is faced with an increase in non-military and non-state based threats, a region that lacks stability and the rapid advancement of information technology, intelligence, surveillance and precision weapons capabilities. More than ever the ADF needs to be flexible to adapt to the widest range of operations in joint and coalition forces, as well as along side civilian organisations. The ADF needs to be capable to lead multinational peacekeeping operations in our region, similar to INTERFET, and have the capability to be interoperable with our allies. A maritime strategy encompassing all aspects of national power at sea should be inherently flexible to adapt to current and emerging threats. It has been argued that 'in the peculiar conditions of the post-September 11 world, Australia needs, more than ever before, a multi-faceted security outlook—one that is simultaneously globally attuned, regionally focused and alliance-orientated'.¹⁵⁵

Conclusion

Issues for Consideration

- The extent to which defence against conventional military attacks on Australia should remain as the highest priority for the development of maritime strategy, and consequently the ADF's force structure.
- Whether sea denial is an appropriate strategic posture to protect our national interests in the maritime environment.
- The extent to which current and planned capability development priorities reflect operational requirements under a maritime strategy.
- Whether the ADF is adequately trained and structured to meet likely operational requirements in a maritime strategy.
- The extent to which the ADF needs to be capable of leading multinational operations within our region and remaining interoperable with our allies.
- The extent to which the increased overlap between civil and military security domains calls for the development of a detailed national security strategy, incorporating all aspects of national power at sea.
- The extent to which lower-order security challenges, such as piracy or the unlawful movement of people into Australia, should be considered as driving factors for Australia's maritime strategy, and consequently the ADF's force structure priorities.
- The extent to which a more integrated approach to national surveillance and intelligence is required and the extent to which greater coordination between all agencies responsible for Australia's security is necessary.
- The implications of our Southern Ocean and Antarctic EEZ claims for the development of maritime strategy and consequently for the ADF's force structure.

- The implications of a broadly focused maritime strategy for inter-departmental or inter-governmental control and reporting arrangements.
- The role of defence industries, Australian flagged ships, our maritime marine and strategic civil infrastructure as in a maritime strategy.
- The impact of the commercialisation of maritime infrastructure, such as ports, on Australia's national security and defence requirements.

As stated in the introduction to this paper, Australia is not culturally a maritime nation. The feel for the rhythm and use of the oceans is not part of the myths and legends that define us as a nation. From the founding of the colonies, we were lulled into a false sense of security by being born of the most powerful maritime nation of its day. The Royal Navy secured our backs as we set out to conquer the wide, brown land.

Australia's contribution to the two world wars that blighted the 20th Century was overwhelmingly focussed on land campaigns. Our ships may have played important local roles, but maritime strategy was set and implemented by the Royal Navy, and later by the US Navy. Our contribution to those conflicts was tactical or operational, but never strategic.

The decades since the end of World War II have seen a maturation process take place. Both in law and in practice we have moved to recognise and enforce the privileges and responsibilities that come from being an island continent which is utterly dependent on seaborne trade. Nevertheless, there remains a tension between our claims, and the military, economic and cultural resources that we devote to enforce those claims.

The end of the Cold War and the rise of non-state actors have made our security context much more complex and even more demanding. An effective and coherent maritime strategy will assist in the management of these complex challenges by properly integrating defence initiatives into a broadly focused, national security strategy.

Appendix 1: Australian/NZ Strategy : A regional contrast—a view from the West Island

Introduction: Similarities and differences

There are obvious similarities between Australia and New Zealand, politically and historically. They have also been economic and military allies under the Closer Economic Relations and Closer Defence Relations agreements. Both Australia and New Zealand depend on secure sea lines of communication for the bulk of their trade. More than 70 per cent of Australia's exports and imports go by sea in terms of value and well over 95 per cent by bulk. For New Zealand it is 90% by value and 95% by volume. Geo-strategically, however, the similarity between the two has sometimes been overstated. The strategic divergence between the two nations has increased since the election of a Labour-Alliance coalition government in New Zealand in 1999 when the new Prime Minister, Helen Clark, made it clear that she did not regard New Zealand and Australia as a 'single strategic entity'.¹⁵⁶ This is not surprising, as despite being neighbours in the south Asia/Pacific region, they face different security environments.¹⁵⁷ Australia is 'on the door step of Asia, and dramatically influenced by what goes on there', while, in contrast, New Zealand is and sees itself as more a South Pacific nation.¹⁵⁸

The self-imposed exile of New Zealand from ANZUS also inevitably led to a growing divergence in strategic outlook. ANZUS remains Australia's most important alliance, while New Zealand has learned to live without it. Authors such as Robert Patman have argued that 'Australia has tended to view its security in terms of a calculation of specific threats' whereas 'New Zealand believed its regional priority was in the South Pacific and tends to see security in a more comprehensive fashion centred on collective security and the United Nations'.¹⁵⁹ It should also be said that New Zealand can afford to do this because it is in the happy position of having a huge land mass to its west providing protection through what amounts to an extensive sea-air-land-sea-air gap.

A New Zealand MP, Derek Quigley, points to identity as an important aspect of difference between Australia and New Zealand's defence strategies. He sees Australia as having established its identity a long time ago, while New Zealand's evolving defence policy is part of a search for national identity and an attempt to develop a more independent international stance, with the recent changes in defence policy being part of an evolutionary process which can be traced back to the 1985 anti-nuclear ship visits policy of the Lange government. The Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Hugh White, explains the differences between Australia's defence policy and those of other nations, including those of New Zealand, as resulting from Australia's distinctive strategic culture. This culture currently features a 'renewed tolerance of the idea of forward defence ... and more support for regular operational deployments of the ADF to theatres near and far'.¹⁶⁰

New Zealand's defence posture

In a series of reviews since 1999, the New Zealand Government has flagged a number of major changes to its view of its defence needs and how these should be met.¹⁶¹ New Zealand's defence posture is predicated on a threat assessment pre-dating 11 September 2001 that New Zealand is not directly threatened by any other country and is not likely to be involved in any widespread armed conflict within a five year period. The *2001 Strategic Assessment*, considered that New Zealand is likely to face low-level security challenges, such as competition for marine resources in the EEZ, the Southern Ocean and Antarctic waters. New Zealand is also likely to be asked to assist with problems arising from 'weak governments in the region', and its strategic environment will be disturbed by challenges to or shifts in the balance of power in the region.¹⁶² The New Zealand Government's defence policy outlined in the *Defence Policy Framework's* statement of New Zealand's security interests, included a set of roles and tasks for the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) which are linked to the broad strategic outcomes identified in the New Zealand parliamentary committee report, *Defence Beyond 2000*.¹⁶³ Briefly these roles are: to defend New Zealand; to meet alliance commitments to Australia; to help maintain South Pacific security; to play an appropriate role in assisting in Asia-Pacific security,¹⁶⁴ and to contribute to global security and peacekeeping.¹⁶⁵

Australian academic Stewart Woodman has been quoted as saying that the New Zealand strategy might not be very different from that set out in the Australian White Paper, because both recognise the threat of direct attack as unlikely. The questions whether 'New Zealand [is] at the end of the slide Australia is starting on'. Woodman makes the point that 'much larger countries than Australia are actually going down this [more selective defence] path'.¹⁶⁶ The director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Hugh White, goes further by suggesting that Australia is an anachronism among industrialised nations, in that it still requires its defence force to be structured primarily to fight major conventional wars, whereas New Zealand has radically changed the balance of its forces since the end of the Cold War.¹⁶⁷

The strategic differences between Australia and New Zealand are also illustrated by the relative importance of each to the other in the declaratory policies of each. The Australian White Paper states that the strategic interests of the two nations are closely aligned, and that each would come to the aid of the other in time of trouble, but Australia does not look specifically to its relationship with New Zealand for its security. 'Defence 2000: our future defence force' describes New Zealand merely as a 'very valued defence partner for Australia'.¹⁶⁸ New Zealand, on the other hand, sees 'a strong strategic relationship with Australia in support of common interests for a secure and peaceful region' as an important strategic outcome, second only to the protection of New Zealand's people and sovereignty.¹⁶⁹ Some of this difference in emphasis can be put down to the difference in size of the two countries. Australia has more capacity than New Zealand 'to influence regional decision-makers through power or the potential to project power'.¹⁷⁰ However, it is also a function of the different overall focus of the two strategies. The ADF is tasked to attack hostile forces as

far from its shores as possible. New Zealand has little or no capacity to do the same, and makes no acknowledgement that such actions would be contemplated.

Depth versus breadth

Unlike Australia's focus on self-reliance, which requires the maintenance and development of a balanced force, the *Government Defence Statement* could envisage no easily foreseeable circumstances in which New Zealand would deploy forces on its own. Instead, the government saw value in contributing to international coalitions, most likely peacekeeping operations, with capabilities developed by concentrating resources in high priority areas (well equipped combat trained land forces) which make the maximum contribution to its defence objectives.¹⁷¹ Reconfiguring the defence force, that is, reducing the range of capabilities, is aimed at making the NZDF sustainable and affordable over the long term.¹⁷²

In focussing on depth rather than breadth, the 8 May 2001 *Government Defence Statement* announced the scrapping of the New Zealand Air Force's combat fighter force, the decision to sell the navy's sealift ship and replace that capability with contingency leasing of commercial ships, and the possible purchase of a smaller patrol vessel instead of a third ANZAC class frigate to replace the ageing Leander-class frigate, HMNZS CANTERBURY. The New Zealand Army will receive the bulk of defence expenditure for new communications equipment and new armoured personnel carriers to enable the NZDF to continue to contribute to international peacekeeping operations. These decisions have been seen as a significant shift away from New Zealand's traditional approach of 'wanting a little bit of most things', and it is also 'a significant shift away from Australia's position'.¹⁷³

Maritime Strategy

The New Zealand Navy's *Strategic Plan 2001-2006* states that New Zealand's 'maritime strategy is fundamentally about control of the sea – to varying degrees'. However, without a current or foreseeable direct threat being identified, New Zealand's maritime strategy has actually less to do with control of the sea against military threats and more to do with threats against its economy and sovereignty in the maritime environment (fisheries, customs and marine safety and environmental protection).¹⁷⁴ New Zealand's responsibilities under various international maritime conventions and its intention to claim, by 2006, continental shelf rights which will extend its maritime boundaries far beyond the EEZ can only increase the resource and sovereignty protection focus of its maritime strategy.¹⁷⁵

The May 2001 *Government Defence Statement* recognised sealift, maritime patrol and hydrographic survey as three areas of importance in New Zealand's maritime strategy. The government decided to meet requirements for sealift by charter arrangements, as had been used for deployments to Bosnia and East Timor, making New Zealand dependent on the availability of commercial shipping to deploy and sustain its forces overseas. In contrast, the Australian defence White Paper states that, given the lessons of the INTERFET deployment, Australia will give a high priority to the ADF's capacity to deploy and sustain forces on

operations and intends to replace its recently expanded amphibious lift capability when the current ships retire.¹⁷⁶

New Zealand has focused on civilian requirements for maritime patrol in the areas of fisheries, resource management, conservation, pollution, immigration, customs, maritime safety, and search and rescue, as well as the need for a military maritime patrol capability. In keeping with the 'whole of government' approach in reviewing both military and civilian needs, the New Zealand Government decided to establish a new Maritime Co-ordination Centre to be co-located with the Joint Force Operational Headquarters at Trentham to integrate the work of all agencies to ensure that there is a comprehensive national strategy for managing maritime risks.

To meet the requirements for maritime patrol, the *Maritime Forces Review* identified the need for a mix of five small inshore patrol vessels for most of the inshore patrol tasks, and at least three capable offshore patrol vessels (OPV), plus a multi role vessel (MRV), for the offshore tasks. The Review considered that some of the P3-K Orion maritime surveillance aircraft could perform both the long distance civilian patrol tasks with commercial equipment as well as providing the RNZAF with an effective contingency capability against surface military targets.¹⁷⁷ The Review found that while 'it would be prudent for the RNZAF to retain some military capacity for detecting a military surface target ... [t]here was no compelling evidence that an anti-submarine capability is required for national security'.¹⁷⁸ 'More distant military requirements were seen as being adequately catered for by the two New Zealand ANZAC frigates and the support ship, HMNZS ENDEAVOUR.' The third frigate, CANTERBURY, will be retired by 2005 to be replaced by a multi role ice-strengthened vessel with helicopter and limited troop and vehicle transport capabilities suitable for peacekeeping, disaster relief in the Pacific, evacuating nationals, protecting New Zealand's exclusive economic zone, undertaking search and rescue, and maintaining a 'presence'.¹⁷⁹

Taking into account the reduction of the frigate force by 33 percent, and the consequent loss of 'critical mass to guarantee a ship on station, and the loss caused by the removal of 800 hours of fighter-frigate training and the synergies this produced', New Zealand academic David Dickens estimates that 'cumulatively the navy has lost about 40 percent of its combat capacity',¹⁸⁰ and this does not include the erosion of New Zealand's sea power over the past 30 years or so.¹⁸¹ Dickens also argues that New Zealand's decision to disband its air combat forces, not to acquire a third frigate or to upgrade its Orions will decrease its contribution to the Five Power Defence Arrangements' Integrated Air Defence System by 55 percent initially, rising to 75 percent as the Orions become inoperable.¹⁸²

Conclusion

In contrast to New Zealand's stance, Australia's *Defence 2000* states that Australia needs 'a fundamentally maritime strategy', because 'the key to defending Australia is to control the air and sea approaches to our continent, so as to deny them to hostile ships and aircraft, and provide maximum freedom of action for our forces'.¹⁸³ The RAN's Maritime doctrine emphasises that it is 'control of the sea [rather than sea denial] which more closely bears

upon [Australia's] national situation', because Australia's location in a sea-dependent region where the significant maritime and air capability of a large number of nations makes the strategic context far from certain. New Zealand has made assumptions that it is probably not necessary to worry about sea control or denial against military threats in its region in the immediate future, and has structured its force to that effect. Australia considers that 'it would be extremely unwise to make the assumption that the preconditions for sea control will exist whatever the strategic situation' and so the RAN considers that 'it will be necessary for Australia to maintain in the immediate future a greater focus on fundamental issues such as sea control—including control of the air'.¹⁸⁴

The New Zealand Government considers it faces a dilemma described by a commentator as being between 'the military imperative to maintain a balanced, conventional force and the strategic imperative to allocate limited resources to priority national tasks'.¹⁸⁵ In opting for the strategic imperative, New Zealand is developing a maritime strategy which has limited military focus and a lot of dependence on allies.¹⁸⁶ Australia however, remains committed to the more ambitious course of maintaining a balanced defence force to meet a broad range of contingencies, including those in the maritime environment.

Endnotes

1. This name was given to HMAS STUART, VOYAGER, VAMPIRE, VENDETTA and WATERHEN by the Germans on the ships' arrival to the Mediterranean. They were so named because they were so old, slow and decrepit that they could only be used as scrap iron. The destroyers saw significant action throughout the Mediterranean campaign. HMAS WATERHEN was eventually sunk, whilst the other four returned to Australian waters and did battle against the Japanese.
2. M. Evans, 'Strategic culture and the Australian way of warfare: perspectives' in D. Stevens and J. Reeve (eds), *Southern trident: strategy, history and the rise of Australian naval power*, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest NSW, 2001, p. 95.
3. H. Donohue, *From empire defence to the long haul: post-war defence policy and its impact on naval force structure planning, 1945-1955*. Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, no.1, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1996, p. 2.
4. R. Babbage, 'Australia's defence strategies' in D. Ball and C. Downes (eds), *Security and defence: Pacific and global perspectives*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1990, p. 208.
5. M. Evans, op. cit., p. 93.
6. *ibid.*
7. H. White, 'Australian defence policy and the possibility of war', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 56 no. 2, 2002, p. 257.
8. A. Dupont, *Australia's threat perceptions: a search for security*, Canberra papers on strategy and defence no. 82, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Canberra, 1991. p. 2-3.
9. J. Grey, *A military history of Australia*, Revised edition, CUP, Cambridge, 1999. p. 44.
10. A. Dupont, op. cit., p. 4.
11. I. Cowman, 'The vision splendid': Australian maritime strategy, 1911-23, D. Stevens (ed.), *In search of maritime strategy: the maritime element in Australian defence planning since 1901*. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 119, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Canberra, 1997 p. 43.
12. J. Mortimer, 'Foundation of the Australian Navy 1901-1914', in *Defence Force Journal* no. 61, December 1986, p. 22.
13. J. Grey, op. cit., p. 69.
14. J. Mortimer, loc. cit.
15. N. A. Lambert, *Australia's naval inheritance: imperial maritime strategy and the Australia Station 1880-1909*, Papers in maritime affairs, no. 6. Maritime Studies Program, Department of Defence, Canberra, December 1998, p. 10.
16. *ibid.*

17. The Australian Government agreed to pay two hundred thousand pounds per year towards the cost of the Australia Squadron which was less than half the whole cost. See N. S. Lambert, op. cit., p. 14.
18. Stevens D. '1091–1913: the genesis of the Royal Australian Navy', in D. Stevens (ed.), *The Royal Australian Navy*, OUP, South Melbourne, 2001, pp. 15–16.
19. I. Cowman, 'The vision splendid': Australian maritime strategy, 1911–23.' in D. Stevens, (ed.). *In search of maritime strategy: the maritime element in Australian defence planning since 1901*, pp. 43–44.
20. ibid., p. 45.
21. ibid., p. 65.
22. A. Dupont, op. cit., p. 23.
23. ibid. pp. 22–24.
24. ibid. pp. 24–26.
25. P. Dennis, *The Oxford companion to Australian military history*, OUP, Sth Melbourne, 1999 pp. 549–550.
26. G. Brown, '[The 1942 Singapore disaster: assessing recent claims](#)', *Background Paper*, no. 1, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 1993.
27. M. Evans, op. cit., p. 93.
28. G. Gill, *The Royal Australian Navy: 1939–1942*. Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1957. pp. 19–20.
29. A. Dupont, op. cit., p. 31.
30. G. Brown, loc. cit..
31. A. Dupont, op. cit., p. 29.
32. P. Dennis, et. al., op. cit., p. 550.
33. Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 34.
34. J. Goldrick, '1941–1945: World War II: the war against Japan', in D. Stevens, (ed.) *The Royal Australian Navy*, op. cit., p. 153.
35. J. Goldrick, '1939–1941: World War II: the war against Germany and Italy', in D. Stevens, (ed.), *The Royal Australian Navy*, op. cit., pp. 114–115.
36. K. Beazley, 'The development of Australian maritime strategy', Speech given to a naval symposium, 26 November 1987.
37. H. Donohue, 'The oceans and Australia's defence', in D. Wilson, and D. Sherwood, *Oceans governance and maritime strategy*, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 2000, p. 49.
38. ibid.
39. ANZAM—Australia New Zealand and Malaya (Arrangement) was firstly a peacetime planning organisation which also allocated to Australia the wartime responsibility for the defence of

- Australia and its territories, together with the direction and control of operations other than those intended for home defence, in an area approximating the ANZAM region. See J. Grey, 'The Royal Australian Navy in the era of forward defence, 1955–1975' in D. Stevens, (ed). *In search of maritime strategy: the maritime element in Australian defence planning since 1901* op. cit., p. 103.
40. J. Grey, 'The Royal Australian Navy in the era of forward defence, 1955–1975' in D. Stevens, (ed.). op cit., p. 105.
 41. T. D. Young, 'Australian, New Zealand, and United States Security Relations 1951–1986' Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1992, pp. 60–61.
 42. A. Dupont, op. cit., pp. 43–44.
 43. T. D. Young, op. cit., p. 191.
 44. J. Grey, op. cit., pp. 100–101.
 45. A. Dupont, op. cit., pp. 57–62.
 46. A. Dupont, op. cit., p. 67.
 47. A. Dupont, op. cit., pp.67–68.
 48. R. Babbage, op. cit., pp. 211–212.
 49. M. Evans, 'From Deakin to Dibb: the Army in the making of Australian strategy in the 20th century', Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Paper no.113, LWSC, Canberra, June 2001, p. 26.
 50. *ibid.*, p. 27.
 51. T. D. Young, op. cit., p. 103, note 19.
 52. S. Woodman, 'Defending the Moat: Maritime Strategy and Self-Reliance', in D. Stevens, (ed.), *In Search of a Maritime Strategy: The maritime element in Australian defence planning since 1901*, op cit., pp. 121–122.
 53. T. Millar, *Australia in Peace and War* (2nd Edition), Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1991, p.349.
 54. E. Andrews, 'The Department of Defence', *The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Volume V*, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2001, p. 249.
 55. P. Dibb, 'Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities', Parliamentary Paper No. 163/1986, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1986.
 56. Dibb identified the area of direct military interest as an area that stretches more than 4000 nautical miles from the Cocos Islands in the west to New Zealand in the east, and more than 3000 nautical miles from the archipelagic chain and Papua New Guinea in the north to the Southern Ocean in the south. This areas accounts for more than 10 per cent of the earth's surface. See P. Dibb, op. cit., p. 50–51.
 57. S. Woodman, 'Strategies and concepts', in J. Malik, *Australia's Security in the 21st Century*, Allen & Unwin, 1999, p. 36.

58. G. Cheeseman, 'From Forward Defence to Self-Reliance: Changes and Continuities in Australian Defence Policy 1965-90', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 26(3), 1991, pp. 429–445.
59. The Radford Collins Agreement was signed in 1951 and is an agreement with the US and NZ that details each country's responsibility for the naval control of allied shipping in both wartime and peacetime.
60. S. Woodman, op. cit., p. 37.
61. M. O'Connor, 'The Struggle for Maturity: The 1987 Defence White Paper one year later', *Quadrant*, May 1988, pp. 16–18.
62. In 1987 the coup in Fiji led to the deployment of the ADF to assist with a possible evacuation of Australian nationals. In 1988 the ADF was on standby as the political situation in Vanuatu had deteriorated and after 1988 the ADF was sent further afield to Namibia, Somalia, and the Persian Gulf.
63. cited in G. Cheeseman, *The Search for Self Reliance: Australia Since Vietnam*. Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1993.
64. *ibid.*
65. Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, *Hansard*, 1 December 1989, p. 112.
66. Senator Robert Ray, Minister for Defence, 'Ministerial Statements: Defence White Paper', Senate, 30 November 1994, p. 3566.
67. *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994.
68. The Asia-Pacific region is defined in ASP97 as: East Asia, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, the United States, and, perhaps increasingly in the future, South Asia. *Australia's Strategic Policy*, Department of Defence, 1997, p. 9.
69. *ibid.*, p. 36.
70. M. O'Connor, 'The 2000 White Paper—A Personal View', *Australian Defence Force Journal*, 147 March/April, 2001, pp. 37–38.
71. M. Evans, 'Developing Australia's Maritime Concept of Strategy: Lessons from the Ambon Disaster of 1942', Study Paper No. 303, Land Warfare Studies Centre 2000, p. 73.
72. *ibid.*, pp. 25–28.
73. *ibid.*, pp. 72–74.
74. For information on block obsolescence see: D. Woolner, 'Pressures on Defence Policy: The Defence Budget Crisis', *Research Paper* no. 20, Department of the Parliamentary Library, 1999–2000, at <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1999-2000/2000rp20.htm>
75. John Howard, Prime Minister, 'Ministerial Statements: Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force', House of Representatives, *Debates*, 6 December 2000, p. 23 456.

76. P. Dibb, 'Australia's Best Defence White Paper?', *Australian Defence Force Journal*, 147, March /April, 2001, p. 30.
77. *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2000, p. 47.
78. *ibid.*, p. 47.
79. The Department of Defence (as outlined in the *Defence Capability Plan*, 2000) plans to upgrade and replace the capability inherent in its amphibious operations capability, namely Defence aims to replace the RAN's Landing Platform Amphibious (LPA) ships; HMAS MANOORA and HMAS KANIMBLA, the RAN's Landing Ship Heavy; HMAS TOBRUK, the RAN's Landing Craft Heavy and provide the army with a watercraft system that can be used in conjunction with HMAS MANOORA and HMAS KANIMBLA (replacement for the Landing Craft Mechanised LCM8).
80. N. Friedman, *Seapower as Strategy: Navies and National Interests*, Naval Institute Press, 2001, p. 14.
81. The literature on the concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs is extensive. A useful summary can be found at <http://www.comw.org/rma/index.html>.
82. Admiral J. L. Johnson, 'Forward ... From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept'. March 1997, at <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/ffseanoc.html>.
83. *ibid.*
84. In the context of maritime strategy, the British author Admiral J.R. Hill categorises states as either superpowers, medium powers or small powers, according to the extent to which they can protect their vital interests from within their own resources. Superpowers are strategic monoliths capable of protecting all their vital interests from their own resources. Small powers in contrast are characterised by their relative weakness, and are unable to guarantee their vital interests without recourse to some external agency, such as the United Nations or the European Union. Middle powers are what lie in between these two extremes of self-sufficiency and insufficiency. Middle powers are sufficient only in parts and need to think hard about their vital interests and how to secure them. See J. R. Hill, '*Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers*', Croom Helm, Sydney, 1986, pp. 17–21.
85. J. R. Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
86. The only precedents are Rome at the height of its empire, and Great Britain through most of the 19th Century.
87. *Australian Maritime Doctrine*, p. 154.
88. 'United States Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts for the 21st Century', Concepts Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia, 1996, pp. 1–4.
89. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade *From Phantom to Force: Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army*. Parliament of Australia, 4 September 2000, p. 181.
90. S. Metz, 'Military Review: Command and General Staff College' at <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/JulAug01/met.asp>

91. Simply stated, an anti-access strategy seeks to prevent friendly forces from being able to operate within range of the enemy's crucial targets or make those operations so difficult or painful as to force the abandonment of operations or prevent the engagement from being considered. See G. Myers 'Getting to the Fight: Aerospace Power and Anti-Access Strategies', *Air & Space Power Chronicles*, March 2001, at <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/myers01.html>
92. L. Freedman, 'Terrorism and Strategy' at <http://www.stanford.edu/~zlevine/ps138sums/ps138%20freedman%20summary.doc>
93. J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt, (eds), 'Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy', RAND, 2001 <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1382/>
94. Defence 2000 White Paper, Chapter 4, pp. 29–32.
- 95 Australian Maritime Doctrine, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, p. 34.
96. Military vessels are recognised in international law as sovereign territory of the flag state, just like embassies.
97. G. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1961, p. 3.
98. P. Williams, 'Nuclear Deterrence' in K. Booth, et al eds *Contemporary Strategy I: Theories and Concepts* (2nd Edition), Holmes and Meier, New York, 1987, p. 115.
99. G. Snyder, op. cit., p. 15.
100. ibid.
101. Williams, op. cit., p. 115.
- 102 S. Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*. The Macmillan Press, London, 1975, p. 17.
- 103 'Matthew Calbraith Perry', *The Columbia Encyclopaedia*, Sixth Edition, 2001.
104. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and The United States of America, Article V, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html>
105. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982), at <http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/law.of.the.sea.1982.html>
106. B. Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Era*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991, p. 67.
107. Given effect under the *Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973*.
108. *Maritime Legislation Amendment Act 1994*.
109. See http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm
110. G. Till, *Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, The Macmillan Press, New York, 1984, p.6.
111. Biographical details for Sir Julian Corbett at <http://www.defence.gov.au/army/LWD1/pdfs/bios/Corbett.pdf>
112. Australian Maritime Doctrine, p. 38.

113. T. Allard, 'Patrol Duty eroding Navy's war readiness', Sydney Morning Herald, 5 August 2002.
114. *ibid.*, p. 38.
115. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd ed. London, Faber & Faber Ltd., 1967
116. On 12 May 1975, the US merchant ship *Mayaguez* was seized by the Khmer Rouge in the Gulf of Siam about 60 miles from the Cambodian coastline and 8 miles from the Poulo Wai. The ship, owned by Sea-Land Corporation, was en route to Sattahip, Thailand from Hong-Kong, carrying a non-arms cargo for military bases in Thailand. A battalion-sized Marine landing team was airlifted from Okinawa to U Tapao AB in Thailand, some 300 miles from Kho Tang. The destroyer *Holt* was directed to seize the *Mayaguez*, while Marines, airlifted and supported by the Air Force, were to rescue the crew, at least some of whom were believed to be held on Kho Tang. The attack faced sustained resistance which led to 18 Marines and airmen being killed or missing in the assault and withdrawal. Twenty-three others were killed in a helicopter crash en route from Hakhon Phanom to U Tapao, but the objectives of the operation were achieved. The *Mayaguez* and its crew were rescued, though at high cost.
See http://www.afa.org/magazine/valor/0991valor_print.html
117. During the 1991 Gulf War, large elements of the US Marine Corps acted as decoys by threatening an amphibious landing on the Kuwaiti coast. This move tied down significant numbers of Iraqi forces. However, no actual amphibious landing took place. See: 'The US Military and the Persian Gulf War' at <http://www.tim-thompson.com/desert-storm.html>. 2 October 2002.
118. Australian Army, Future Land Warfare Branch, *Concept for Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment* (Draft dated 16 December 1999), cited in M. Evans, *Developing Australia's Maritime Concept of Strategy: Lessons from the Ambon Disaster of 1942*, Study Paper no. 303, Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2000.
119. The threat of regional nuclear war has not, however, been extinguished as can be seen in the ongoing tensions between Pakistan and India. Some commentators such as [Prof Martin Van Creveld](#) argue that, in fact, the proliferation of nuclear weapons lowers the likelihood of interstate conflict.
120. B. Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: the National Security Problem in International Relations*, Wheatsheaf, Brighton 1983 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983).
Military security—'the ... interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states ...'
Political security—'... the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideology that gives them legitimacy.'
Economic security—'... access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power.'
Societal security—'... the sustainability ... of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom.'
Environmental security—'... the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere ...'
All quotes from Buzan, 'People, States and Fear', Second Edition
121. B. Buzan, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
122. <http://www.unescap.org/mced2000/pacific/background/pollution.htm>

123. B. Buzan, op. cit., p. 126.
124. M. Haward, 'Outstanding Issues with Regimes for Oceans Governance. Oceans Governance and Maritime Strategy', in D. Wilson, and D. Sherwood, (eds), Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 2000. pp. 121–128.
125. The Australian Antarctic Territory has land borders with the territories claimed by other nations. However, all Antarctic claims for sovereignty have been in abeyance since the Antarctic Treaty came into force in 1961.
126. B. Buzan, op cit., p. 118.
127. B. Buzan, op cit., p. 122
128. <http://www.cs.org/internships/solomons.htm>.
129. Admiral J. L. Johnson, op. cit., p. 5 <http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020/b014.pdf>.
Maritime Prepositioning Force: <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/tak-3013.htm>.
130. UK SDR, introduction, p. 1 <http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/intro.htm>.
131. UK Strategic Defence Review–Missions <http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/missions.htm>.
132. J. Johnson [Adm., USN], 'Anytime, Anywhere: A Navy for the 21st Century,' U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1997, p. 49.
133. M. Brooke, 'The RAN Plots Course for Fleet Development to 2030' *Asian Defence Journal*, 1 & 2/, 2002, p. 16.
134. A process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or 'effect' on the enemy, through the synergistic, multiplicative and cumulative application of the full range of military and non-military capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
135. Senator Robert Hill, Minister for Defence Keynote address: Defence and Industry Conference 2002, National Convention Centre, Canberra, 24 June 2002.
136. D. Horner, 'Making the Australian Defence Force', *The Australian Centenary History of Defence*, Volume IV, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2001, p. 163.
137. T. Cox (Commodore, RAN), 'Surface Warfare and Surface Combatants – An Australian View', in D. Wilson (ed), *Maritime War in the 21st Century: The Medium and Small Navy Perspective*, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 8, Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, Canberra, 2001, p. 3.
138. *ibid.* p. 1–9.
139. Figure sourced from *Australia's Navy for the 21st Century: 2001–2030*, Royal Australian Navy, July 2001.
140. S. Smith, 'What the White Paper means for the Army'. *Army in Profile*, p. 1, <http://www.defence.gov.au/army/pubs/smith.htm>
141. The Australian Army, *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 1, 2002, p. 52.
142. M. Evans, loc. cit.

143. Australian Army, Future Land Warfare Branch, *Concept for Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment* (Draft dated 16 December 1999), cited in M. Evans, *Developing Australia's Maritime Concept of Strategy: Lessons from the Ambon Disaster of 1942*, op. cit., p. 75.
144. *ibid.*, p. 76.
145. Figure sourced from *Australia's Navy for the 21st Century: 2001–2030*, Royal Australian Navy, July 2001, op cit.
146. For information on current and planned ADF capability refer to, *The Australian Defence Force: Capability Fact Book*, 2000; the *Defence Capability Plan: 2001–2010 (Public Version)*, 2001; and the *Defence Capability Plan: Supplement–2002*.
147. *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*, Department of Defence, 2000, p. 84.
148. Royal Australian Air Force, *Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power*, Aerospace Centre, Canberra, 2002, p. 3.
149. *ibid.*, p.121.
150. *ibid.*, p. 140.
151. *ibid.*, p 193.
152. *ibid.*, p 193.
153. For more information see M. Thompson, *Setting a Course for Australia's Naval Shipbuilding and Repair Industry*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Policy Report, Canberra, 2002 at http://www.aspi.org.au/ASPI_shipbuilding/index.html
154. Senator Robert Hill, loc. cit.
155. M. Evans, 'Towards an Australian Way of Warfare', op. cit., p. 15.
156. R. G. Patman, 'Globalisation and trans-Tasman relations: integration or divergence?', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 55, no. 3, 2001 p. 389.
157. 'Reflections on New Zealand's Defence Policy Framework and Australia's Green Paper' CSS strategic briefing papers, Vol.4,part 1 November 2000.
158. D. Quigley, 'New Zealand and Australia: where are we going in defence?' in B. Brown, (ed.), *New Zealand and Australia: where are we going?* New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 2001, p. 52.
159. R. G. Patman, op. cit., p. 397.
160. H. White, loc. cit.
161. The documents outlining the government's thinking include: the New Zealand Ministry of Defence's [Maritime forces review: key findings](#) (January 2002); the New Zealand [Government Defence Statement](#) (8 May 2001); the New Zealand Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet's [Maritime Patrol Review](#) (February 2001) and its [2001 Strategic Assessment; Defence Policy Framework](#) (June 2000); [New Zealand's Foreign and Security Policy Challenges](#) (June 2000) and the New Zealand Parliament's Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee report, [Defence Beyond 2000](#) (1999).

162. For the purpose of the paper, the *Strategic Assessment 2001* defined the region to comprise the countries of Asia from China south to Indonesia, with Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands. South Asia, Russia, North America and Pacific Latin America all impinge on this region and were included in specific contexts. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, (New Zealand), External Assessments Bureau, [Strategic Assessment 2001](#), 19 April 2001. p. 1, note 1.
163. See <http://www.executive.govt.nz/minister/burton/defence/minister/interests.htm>
164. During the debate on the future role of the NZAF's Orions, Prime Minister Clark commented that the government saw New Zealand's primary area of interest as its EEZ, the South Pacific and the deep southern oceans. As David Dickens argues, this is inconsistent with the *Defence Policy Framework's* goals in relation to New Zealand's commitments to the Five Power Defence Arrangements with Britain, Australia, Malaysia and Singapore. It is also in contrast to the 'considerations of military strategy and deep regional engagement which underpin Australia's white paper'. See: D. Dickens, 'The ANZAC connection: does the Australia-New Zealand strategic relationship have a future?' in B. Brown, (ed.), *New Zealand and Australia: where are we going?*, op. cit., pp. 39–40.
165. These roles are: to defend New Zealand and to protect its people, land, territorial waters, EEZ, natural resources and critical infrastructure; to meet our alliance commitments to Australia by maintaining a close defence partnership in pursuit of common security interests; to assist in the maintenance of security in the South Pacific and to provide assistance to our Pacific neighbours; to play an appropriate role in the maintenance of security in the Asia-Pacific region, including meeting our obligations as a member of the FPDA (the Five Power Defence Arrangements between Singapore, the United Kingdom, Australia, Malaysia and New Zealand); and to contribute to global security and peacekeeping through participation in the full range of UN and other appropriate multilateral peace support and humanitarian relief operations.
166. M. Ware, '[Making peace, not war](#)', *Time Pacific Magazine*, 21 May 2002, no. 20.
167. H. White, op. cit., p. 254.
168. *Defence 2000: our future defence force.*, op. cit., p. 42.
169. New Zealand, *The government's defence policy framework: New Zealand's security interests*. June 2000
170. D. Quigley, loc. cit.
171. *ibid.*, p. 53.
172. New Zealand. *Government Defence Statement: a modern sustainable defence force matched to New Zealand's needs: [Executive Summary](#)*, 8 May 2001.
173. J. Rolfe and A. Grimes, 'Australia-New Zealand defence cooperation: some considerations' *Agenda*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2002, p. 47.
174. New Zealand, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. [Maritime Patrol Review](#). Wellington, [the Department], February 2001, p.10

175. Royal New Zealand Navy. 'What your navy does and why: why does New Zealand have a navy' at <http://www.navy.mil.nz/rnzn/does.cfm>
176. Australia. *Defence 2000: our future defence force*. Canberra, [the Department of Defence], 2000, pp. 83–84.
177. New Zealand, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. [Maritime Patrol Review](#). Wellington, [the Department], February 2001, p1. This Review followed a Cabinet decision in August 2000 not to proceed with the avionics upgrade of the RNZAF's long range maritime patrol aircraft.
178. New Zealand, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. [Maritime Patrol Review](#). Wellington, [the Department], February 2001, p. 1.
179. 'New Zealand's Clark government creates a strategic vacuum in the Pacific' *Defense and foreign affairs strategic policy*. 4–5, 2001 p. 10–11.
180. D. Dickens, 'The ANZAC connection: does the Australia-New Zealand strategic relationship have a future?' in B. Brown, (ed.) *New Zealand and Australia: where are we going?*, op. cit., p. 41.
181. Some reflections on maritime strategy and an oceans policy for New Zealand: presentation to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs Christchurch Branch, 14–14 June 2002. (<http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/reports/NZIIACh'chJun02.html>)
182. D. Dickens, op.cit.p.49.
183. Australia. *Defence 2000: our future defence force*. Canberra, Defence Publishing Service, October 2000, p. 47.
184. Australia. Royal Australian Navy, [Australian Maritime doctrine](#), p. 45.
185. S. Woodman, '[When it comes to flying, the Kiwis decide size does matter](#)', *The Canberra Times*, 17 May 2001.
186. M. Ware, loc. cit.

© Copyright Commonwealth of Australia 2004

Except to the extent of the uses permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means including information storage and retrieval systems, without the prior written consent of the Department of Parliamentary Services, other than by senators and members of the Australian Parliament in the course of their official duties.

This paper has been prepared to support the work of the Australian Parliament using information available at the time of production. The views expressed do not reflect an official position of the Information and Research Service, nor do they constitute professional legal opinion.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the valuable guidance and assistance provided by Dr John Reeve, Ms Adrienne Blunt, and Ms Morag Donaldson in the development and preparation of this paper.