The views expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the New Zealand Agency for International Development, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the New Zealand Government or any other party. Nor do these entities accept any liability for claims arising from the report’s content or reliance on it.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Community Policing Pilot Programme (CPPP) has been operating since September 2008 as a local project within the United Nations Police (UNPOL) component of the UN Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT). Initially planned for one year, at the time of review it had been running for 14 months and was extended until March 2010 in line with the UNMIT mandate. It is funded as part of the overall NZ Police deployment in UNMIT, constituting around NZ$4m out of NZAID’s approximate annual NZ$10m budget (2009/10).

The goal of CPPP is to support PNTL in developing a sustainable community policing model and philosophy, to assist in restoring community trust and confidence in police, and create an environment conducive to all aspects of community development’. The four components are:

- implementation of the community policing pilots in Becora and Suai
- capacity development of the PNTL Community Policing Unit
- support to the PNTL Police Academy for training on using community policing methodologies
- establishment of an M&E framework to assess and measure community policing management and the performance of the CPPP

METHODOLOGY

The purpose and objectives of this review are to:

1. assess the progress of the CPPP in relation to its stated goal (with sub questions structured according to four of the DAC criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability)
2. make recommendations regarding the future NZ involvement in support of community policing in Timor Leste

The scope of the review is the implementation of CPPP from September 2008 to November 2009 in relation to its stated goal and all four components. Beyond the scope of the review is:

- the impact of CPPP which cannot be reliably assessed in the short timeframe (14 months)
- wider UNMIT operations including community policing beyond the two pilot sub districts
- wider community policing initiatives of PNTL and other donors at the Academy

The review was undertaken by a team of four: three independent consultants (two from New Zealand and one from Timor Leste); and one UN staff member from the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO). Key stakeholders from GoTL, PNTL, UNMIT, New Zealand Embassy, NZAID, and NZ Police were consulted in New Zealand and Timor Leste along with other partners and community members. The main methods were document analysis and semi structured interviews, along with some observation. The team visited the pilot sub-districts of Suai and Becora.

There were several limitations to the review. The most important was the non availability of key stakeholders in PNTL who, for various reasons, could not find time to meet the team. Availability of Suco Chiefs was very limited and, in the PNTL Community Policing Units, only those officers on duty that day could be interviewed. The team has therefore been cautious in drawing conclusions.

FINDINGS

Relevance: CPPP has been relevant as an intervention in the broader justice sector and has played an important and useful role in the ongoing development of community policing in the PNTL. It also contributes to the higher level development objectives of the New Zealand Government in conflict prevention. Relevance, from the development perspective, focuses very much on partnership, in
recognition of the fact that few outcomes can be achieved without joint efforts. In CPPP there has been strong and beneficial emphasis on partnership with PNTL but less attention to the role of other partners. What CPPP has achieved has resulted, in part, from joint efforts with other actors working towards a similar goal. This is an area where NZ Police can develop their practice further in future.

**Effectiveness:** CPPP has been effective in that it has achieved much of what it set out to do. In so doing it has contributed to the effectiveness of PNTL in demonstrating practically that community policing is an appropriate and implementable concept. Working within UNMIT has been challenging and has led to some misunderstandings but the achievements of CPPP would not have been possible without the umbrella and support of UNPOL. Considerable capacity has been developed in PNTL with the main gains occurring fairly early in the project. Had this been picked up earlier, CPPP could potentially have been scaled up to include more sub districts. Factors limiting the effectiveness of capacity development were the short duration of NZ Police deployments, which resulted in a loss of momentum with each change, and an approach which lacked strategic direction. In the context of a rapidly changing environment, a stronger mechanism for monitoring and evaluation might have identified areas where incremental gains were small and enabled more dynamic approaches to be considered. Ownership by PNTL of the donor-oriented governance arrangements might have been increased had decision making been transferred into GoTL structures.

**Efficiency:** within the limitations of the data any assessment of efficiency is largely subjective. There is evidence of some efficiencies and some inefficiencies. Overall, efficiency is satisfactory.

**Sustainability:** as a pilot of only 14 months duration any claim to sustainability is spurious. Elements of CPPP have the potential to be sustainable, notably in the training modules if they continue to be used and in the attitude and behaviour change of individuals who have been mentored if they maintain them. More broadly CPPP is too small in scale and too short in duration to bring about sustainable change in such a complex security environment.

**CONCLUSIONS**

1. CPPP has made a strong contribution to community policing in Timor Leste. The comparative advantage of NZ Police has been in the practical operationalisation of community policing rather than in the introduction of a particular model. However, the successes of PNTL are not attributable solely to CPPP or NZ Police because PNTL have moved forward rapidly with their own agenda and other donors have become increasingly important over time.

2. CPPP adapted well to a rapidly changing environment and succeeded in building considerable capacity. An overall strategy for capacity development would have improved focus and helped mitigate the effect of the short (six month) deployment of most NZ Police officers.

3. The reach of CPPP across the country was very small, substantially to only two sub-districts and three more to a lesser degree out of a total of 64. Monitoring and review processes with greater local participation and independence might have resulted in a more dynamic set of objectives than was possible in the original design. Potential to scale up might have been tested.

4. Working within UNMIT has been appropriate and effective. It was also very challenging for both NZ Police and UNPOL. The way in which NZ Police sought to promote its own model of community policing has provided opportunities for learning about working in partnership.

6. Whilst CPPP has achieved a great deal, it was never clear exactly what, as a pilot, it was testing. If it was about whether a specific national contingent can take a specific aspect of policing and lead it
effectively, the answer is a qualified ‘yes’. If it was about demonstrating that community policing can be rolled out across Timor Leste, the answer is a qualified ‘no’.

RECOMMENDATION

CPPP should conclude in March 2010 as currently scheduled. The justifications for this recommendation are:

- it was designed with a limited duration and has broadly succeeded in what it intended to achieve
- to continue with the same approach in the same sub districts would see diminishing returns and scaling up to other sub districts would be more effective using a revised approach
- the operating environment, in terms of the capacity of the PNTL and the number and variety of donor interest in community policing, has changed considerably since inception
- the mandate of UNMIT, beyond 2010, is likely to be different as PNTL resumes responsibility and this would also require a different approach

OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Option 1: Withdraw from UNMIT completely

The choice to remain, or not, within the UNMIT mission is a political and policing decision and beyond the remit of the review. However, if a decision is made to withdraw, an appropriate exit strategy should be developed and implemented.

Option 2: Discontinue CPPP but remain within UNMIT

If NZ Police continued deployment within UNPOL, individual officers could still use the principles of community policing, where appropriate or possible, in whatever roles they were deployed into. Potentially new areas could be opened up in response to PNTL requests. UNPOL have recommended such a role and would therefore be likely to support it. Such resourcing, however, cannot easily be linked to outputs and therefore raises issues of accountability of development expenditure.

Option 3: Develop a bilateral programme

This option has been requested by GoTL and is strongly supported at the highest level in UNMIT. With positive experience of supporting implementation of community policing on the ground New Zealand has a potentially valuable role to play in supporting PNTL with the rollout of their own programme of community policing. However, the review team would only recommend this option if:

- there is a commitment to support policing in Timor Leste in the long term, in line with the long term and generational nature of the challenge
- NZ Police is able to deploy personnel on a minimum of one year contracts, preferably two, in order to address the significant limitations of short deployment
- there is a full design process which is undertaken jointly with PNTL so that a new project has greater PNTL ownership
THE MAIN REPORT

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

Timor Leste became a sovereign state in 2002 after 450 years of Portuguese colonial rule, 25 years of Indonesian occupation, and three years administration by the United Nations (UN). It is the least developed country in the Asia Pacific region and is ranked 162nd out of 182 countries globally in terms of human development. In common with other countries emerging from long periods of violent conflict, and with occasional serious incidents of violent conflict, the Government of Timor Leste (GoTL) faces an enormous challenge to provide stability and the capacity for delivery of core services.

PNTL IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFLICT

The Policia Nacional de Timor Leste (PNTL) was newly established in 1999 by the UN. It consisted of 2000 new recruits with no previous policing experience and 370 former Indonesian officers. The lack of expertise by the UN in the establishment of a police force within a new country, combined with a low level of existing institutional knowledge about policing within the Timorese population, meant that the new force possessed very low levels of capacity. In 2004, although capacity was still insufficiently developed to police the country effectively, substantive control was handed over to the PNTL.

Not long after control of PNTL had been handed over to GoTL, a number of special units were created in order to strengthen the police. This had the effect of politicising the new force and creating an element of competition with the new country’s military. A growing perception that the military was under the control of Easterners and the Police under the control of Westerners exacerbated the problem.

In April 2006 the country faced a political crisis which rapidly became a security crisis. The political crisis emerged when members of the armed forces, who petitioned the President to address complaints of discrimination, were dismissed. Their protests turned violent and the PNTL was called in to quell the protests. The inability of PNTL to control these protests, combined with factionalism within both the military and PNTL resulted in violence within the police. Over the next few months police control of Dili collapsed which the UN Commission of Inquiry traced to a blurring of the roles.

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1 Human Development Report – Rankings UNDP, 2009
and responsibilities of the police and military, the lack of a single chain of command and the lack of a national security policy to provide a framework for action of the country’s security forces in just such as crisis.  

The crisis demonstrated the overall weakness of the security sector. As violence between factions of both military and police escalated, and police force leadership collapsed, GoTL requested a UN policing mission ‘to maintain law and order.... and re-establish confidence among the people until the police has undergone reorganisation and restructuring so that it can act as an independent and professional law enforcement agency’.  

Although violence is currently greatly reduced, security remains fragile and there continue to be multiple fracture points within the various security agencies.

THE ROLE OF UNMIT

The mandate of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT) is to assist with rebuilding democratic institutions, foster good governance, support the process for elections, review defence and security needs, and coordinate economic development assistance to Timor-Leste. UNMIT has police, military and civilian components. UNMIT’s current mandate expires in February 2010. The Government of Timor-Leste has requested it remain in place until after the National elections slated for 2012.

UNMIT’s police component is made up of approximately 1500 police personnel from 40 contributing countries. Its mandate includes both capacity development, interim law enforcement and public security until PNTL is reconstituted. In May 2009, UNMIT and the Government of Timor-Leste agreed a process for the gradual resumption of primary policing responsibilities by PNTL. UNMIT will progressively hand over responsibility district by district based on joint assessments regarding the preparedness of the PNTL in each district and unit, in accordance with mutually agreed criteria. UN Police will maintain their presence in districts where PNTL have resumed responsibilities, in order to provide support and advice, and to monitor the PNTL, including in the area of human rights protection. To date, the districts of Lautem, Oecusse and Manatuto have been ‘handed over’ to PNTL. It is proposed that the level of UNPOL presence throughout Timor-Leste will continue to be slowly decreased in line with this transfer of responsibility.

THE COMMUNITY POLICING PILOT PROJECT (CPPP)

New Zealand’s contribution, following the 2006 crisis, was the deployment of 25 NZ Police Officers for a term of three months, as part of the Australian-led International Force. In September 2006 Ministers with Power to Act agreed that 25 NZ Police would participate in UNMIT for 12 months. This was extended in 2007, and again in 2008, by the Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee. The current approval is due to expire in March 2010.

In 2008 GoTL requested New Zealand provide capacity development support in the area of community policing. In that context the Community Policing Pilot Programme (CPPP) was designed within the wider framework of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT). CPPP has been operating since September 2008 as a local project within the United Nations Police

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6 Handing Back Responsibility to Timor Leste’s Police Asia Report No180, Crisis Group, 3 Dec 2009

(UNPOL) component of UNMIT. It was initially envisaged as a one year pilot and extended to March 2010 in line with the UNMIT mandate. Of the 25 officers deployed to the UNMIT mission, 10 are directly involved in the CPPP and the remainder are expected to display the principles and practices of community policing whilst undertaking their normal policing duties. NZ Police staff undertake six month deployments. Although there have been several requests for longer deployments it has not been possible for NZ Police to deploy all staff for twelve month rotations in the absence of a dedicated deployment pool.

There are two key positions for CPPP. The Community Policing Coordinator supports the PNTL Community Policing Commander and co-ordinates with NZAID and UNPOL in relation to community policing. The Community Policing Trainer assists the PNTL in the development of a community policing curriculum along with staff training and development.

CPPP fits within both past and proposed New Zealand Government development strategy for Timor Leste under the focus area of security and justice. It is funded as part of the overall NZ Police deployment in UNMIT, constituting around NZ$4m out of NZAID’s approximate annual NZ$10m budget (2009/10).

The goal of CPPP is to support PNTL in developing a sustainable community policing model and philosophy, to assist in restoring community trust and confidence in police, and create an environment conducive to all aspects of community development.

The four components of CPPP are:

- implementation of the community policing pilots in Becora and Suai
- capacity development of the PNTL Community Policing Unit (CPU)
- support to the PNTL Police Academy for training on using community policing methodologies
- establishment of an M&E framework to assess and measure community policing management and the performance of the CPPP

### EVALUATION OBJECTIVES & METHODOLOGY

#### Purpose and Objectives

The purpose and objectives of this review are to:

1. assess the progress of the CPPP in relation to its stated goal (with sub questions structured according to four of the DAC criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability)
2. make recommendations regarding the future NZ involvement in support of community policing in Timor Leste

#### Scope

The scope of the review is the implementation of CPPP from September 2008 to November 2009 in relation to its stated goal and the four components. The Terms of Reference stated that the following were beyond the scope of review:

- the impact of CPPP because of the short timeframe (14 months)
- wider UNMIT operations including community policing beyond the two pilot sub districts
- wider community policing initiatives of PNTL and other donors at the Academy

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8 The DAC Principles for the Evaluation of Development Assistance, OECD Development Assistance Committee
These are important exclusions because they recognise both the impossibility of demonstrating impact in such a short period and the role of other stakeholders in ultimately contributing to impact. However, following completion of this review, the scope of the TOR was challenged retrospectively. Within NZ Police there were some who felt that, in not comparing outcomes with other sub-districts, this Review understated the achievements of the distinct NZ Police contribution. In fact, from an evaluation perspective, excluding wider UNMIT operations from the scope was wise because the additional cost of the human and time resources needed would not have been justifiable for an intervention of such short duration. Evidence of this, referenced fully later in this report, is data from the Perceptions Surveys which have been an important means of seeking to make comparisons. The questions look predominantly at aspects of policing which take a long time to influence and which therefore show little difference at this stage between NZ Police pilot sub-districts and other comparable control ones.

Methodology

The methodology for the review is elaborated in detail in the evaluation plan (Annex 3). The review was undertaken by a team of four: three independent consultants (two from New Zealand and one from Timor Leste); and one UN staff member from the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) from New York. Key stakeholders from NZAID and NZ Police were consulted in New Zealand. In Timor Leste GoTL, PNTL, UNMIT, the New Zealand Embassy, and NZ Police were consulted along with other key partners such as the Australian Federal Police and Asia Foundation. A small number of community members, including those of churches, were also consulted. The main methods were document analysis and semi structured interviews, along with a degree of observation. All interviews were prepared in line with the key evaluation questions and were analysed at the end of each day. Within the limitations, as described below, attempts were made to triangulate all information, especially issues relating to NZ Police’s distinctive contribution. The team visited the pilot sub-districts of Suai and Becora for one day each.

Limitations of the Review

There were several limitations to the review. The most important was the non availability of key stakeholders in PNTL during the fieldwork period. For various reasons, mainly understood to be the low priority afforded to this review in the face of more pressing demands on their time, it proved impossible to meet any senior personnel of the PNTL including the National Commander (Community Policing), or the National Directorate for Community Conflict Prevention (NDCCP).

After submission of the first draft of this Review, and concern within NZ Police that failure to interview key stakeholders invalidated the findings, a structured telephone interview was held, through a translator, with the National Commander (Community Policing). That interview proved very informative and helped strengthen several aspects of the report. It highlighted the value of CPPP support in establishing Community Boards and in developing the Academy curriculum. It also provided confirmation that NZ Police were often perceived to be pursuing their own objectives at the expense of engaging more strongly in capacity building of PNTL staff.

Obtaining the views of community stakeholders was also difficult. In Becora only one Suco Chief was available because it was a public holiday. In Suai no meeting could be arranged which, according to the PNTL members who tried to arrange it, was because the members of the Community Board had been called to too many meetings and did not understand their purpose. This was an important point which demonstrates limitations in CPPP in two aspects: engaging effectively with communities
for governance compared with implementation; and the lack of financial resources to provide the transportation and attendance allowances which are expected.

Finally, only the views of the PNTL Community Policing officers on duty that day in the sub-districts could be sought. Of around six officers in each location, only three in total were available to make substantive contributions, with the others either off duty or attending to other business. The team also sought to understand the perceptions of community policing among PNTL officers who were not engaged in it. This provided useful, mainly supportive, information but the numbers interviewed were small.

In the light of these significant limitations the Review team have taken care not to draw conclusions for which there is insufficient evidence. This results in a relatively large number of qualifications, such as ‘probably’ or ‘may’ throughout the report which was commented on after submission of the first draft. These have been reduced but the readers of this report are reminded that CPPP was designed and implemented for the very short duration of 14 months. All the findings presented are based on what the reviewers believe is sufficient evidence but the confidence with which these can be asserted is limited ultimately by insufficient triangulation. That said, the reviewers believe that everything in this report is an accurate reflection of the evidence and that the limitations do not distort the conclusions or recommendations.

EVALUATION FINDINGS

RELEVANCE

Community policing can play an important role in post-conflict situations in both rebuilding trust in Police institutions and in providing a link between the formal and informal justice sectors. This link can be especially important in post-conflict environments like Timor-Leste where the formal justice sector, or the parts of it that continue to exist, often have only limited capacity and are unable to effectively deal with all the cases that come before it. By supporting informal justice mechanisms, such as community-based mediation processes, community policing can effectively reduce the capacity load on the formal justice sector. These various roles are particularly important in Timor-Leste given that a survey conducted by the Asia Foundation in 2008 found that 75% of Timorese rely on traditional justice mechanisms to maintain security rather than the Police. Other research has also recently shown the importance of engaging with local norms in the Timor Leste context in improving the security environment and the rule of law within the country.

However, community policing alone cannot bring about these changes. Police reform, including the adoption and application of community policing techniques, is not a purely technical manner and to be sustainable necessarily involves working with agencies across the entire justice sector and

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beyond.\(^\text{12}\) As the Hughes Report noted “the activities of the national police and UNMIT police must be understood within the broader rule of law and security sector reform contexts.”\(^\text{13}\) Nonetheless, community policing can play an important role in this broader process of reform by helping create linkages between various parts of the broader justice sector, especially in terms of the formal justice sector and the community.

The CPPP has played a role in strengthening community policing in Timor-Leste since its inception 14 months ago. It needs to be noted, however, that PNTL did have a community policing section in Dili prior to the May 2006 crisis and so, though implementation may have been weak, the concept was not new. Given the prior existence of community policing in PNTL prior to the commencement of CPPP the main relevance of the New Zealand contribution has been in demonstrating how community policing can actually be implemented ‘on-the-ground’.

At a high level the CPPP is well aligned to the Timor-Leste policing environment as community policing is identified in the new organic law as constituting a key aspect of policing.\(^\text{14}\) The PNTL members interviewed as part of the review process all had a solid basic understanding of the principles of community policing. There was also widespread acceptance of the importance of community policing in the Timor-Leste context by PNTL who participated in the review although without being able to talk to high ranking members of PNTL it is difficult to know if this understanding extends across the ranks. While some concern was raised over the role of community policing in light of the shift towards the militarisation of the Police in the wake of the events of 2006, members of the PNTL did not see these two developments being in any way contradictory. Rather, community policing was identified as providing a way to mitigate conflict within the community before members of the various special sections of the PNTL would need to react. The new organic law also sees these two aspects of policing being complementary.\(^\text{15}\)

The broader international literature refers to the different forms of community policing utilised around the world and the PNTL approach – with its engagement with a more militarised form of policing – would tend to come under the typology of top-down policing methods with a stronger focus on criminality whereas the approach utilised by New Zealand Police, while also being top-down focused, would place a greater emphasis on problem-solving.\(^\text{16}\) These different styles and approaches to community policing may signal deeper incompatibilities between the New Zealand approach and that favoured by, and progressively being developed in Timor Leste. At the international level the shift away from community policing in South Africa in recent years can be seen as being an example of not how community policing did not fit South Africa but rather how Western-style community policing was not appropriate for the South African context.\(^\text{17}\) A similar process may be at work in Timor Leste. This may help us understand while the New Zealand approach has been useful in terms of providing ‘on-the-ground’ support but also may help us understand both the fact that NZ support has only supplied one of the a range of useful community policing inputs to PNTL and the decreased relevance of New Zealand’s support over time.


\(^{14}\) Decree-Law No. 9/2009 of 18 February Organic Law of the National Police of Timor Leste (PNTL)

\(^{15}\) Decree-Law No. 9/2009 of 18 February Organic Law of the National Police of Timor Leste (PNTL), Article 1, Section 2.


In its operation CPPP has both implicitly and explicitly provided support to initiatives in and around the development of the wider justice sector in Timor-Leste. Explicit support has been provided through the CPPP’s engagement and partnering with the Asia Foundation in Becora through the USAID-funded Conflict Mitigation through Community-oriented Policing programme. This programme, working in two subdistricts including Becora, to build community capacity to effectively engage with PNTL in the operationalisation of community policing approaches, complemented CPPP engagement with PNTL. Importantly, though it has not been noted in monitoring and reviews, it has shown the considerable amount of resourcing needed to bring about meaningful community participation. With Asia Foundation support it has been significantly more effective than in Suai where such support was not available.

Implicit support provided by the CPPP to the Timor-Leste justice sector occurred as a result of cases being settled in various community mediation forums in the roll-out of community policing in Suai and Becora. Being dealt with in these forums meant that these cases were diverted from entering the formal justice sector, which is chronically over-stretched with up to 5,000 separate cases pending before the courts. Whether crime was also prevented is difficult to establish. It is difficult to quantify the impact of these community policing initiatives on the justice sector as a whole though as the very nature of community policing, which is based on working with community to determine the community’s security needs and then working with them to meet these needs means that it is very difficult to gain data on the number of cases which did not enter the formal justice system because of the effective operation of community policing initiatives. Nonetheless, the linkages that CPPP has helped promote between the PNTL and community (and subsequently the linkages between the formal and informal justice sectors) ought to help reduce the load on the formal justice sector through the diversion of cases resulting from mediation in the informal justice sector.

However, while there were many positive aspects of the project, as demonstrated in the next section on effectiveness, there are a number of structural issues which limit its relevance. Although the design document and subsequent documentation refer to the CPPP as a pilot, there was no clear explication of logic which specified exactly what the project was piloting and what it might lead on to if successful. Community policing was not a new concept since it already existed in PNTL and, within UNPOL, officers have been attached to CPUs in other districts. However, during the course of the review it was evident that many officers of NZ Police are both promoting, and being seen to be promoting, the transfer of a uniquely New Zealand model. Given the entirely different historical, cultural, political and economic context in Timor Leste, there has been some strong resistance to this, especially in UNPOL.

CONCLUSION - RELEVANCE

CPPP has been relevant as an intervention in both the broader justice sector and has played an important and useful role in the ongoing development of community policing in the PNTL. It also contributes to the higher level development objectives of the New Zealand Government in conflict prevention. Relevance, from the development perspective, focuses very much on partnership, in recognition of the fact that few outcomes can be achieved without joint efforts. In CPPP there has been strong and beneficial emphasis on partnership with PNTL but less attention to the role of other partners. What CPPP has achieved has resulted, in part, from joint efforts with other actors working towards a similar goal. This is an area where NZ Police can develop their practice further in future.

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**EFFECTIVENESS**

This section seeks to answer the question of whether CPPP achieved what it set out to do. It begins by assessing progress against objectives and then looks in more detail at the effectiveness of working within UNMIT and the approach to capacity building. Also assessed as effectiveness issues are the governance arrangement, incorporation of NZAID’s cross-cutting issues, and the monitoring and evaluation framework.

**PROGRESS AGAINST OBJECTIVES**

**GOAL LEVEL**

The design of CPPP identified a goal and objectives. The goal of CPPP is to support PNLT in developing a sustainable community policing model and philosophy, to assist in restoring community trust and confidence in police, and create an environment conducive to all aspects of community development.

Although the goal is too high level against which to assess the progress of a pilot of only 14 months duration, it captures the spirit of the programme in a way that the objectives do not. If viewed as aspirational, in a context in which sustainability is difficult to define meaningfully for a country which is barely post-conflict, it is fair to conclude that CPPP has consistently focused on providing support for the goal. At the level of the two sub-districts it is not yet possible to conclude that CPPP has made a significant contribution to restoring community trust and confidence in PNLT.

A good initiative to try to measure the perceptions of communities towards the police was the baseline and follow up survey commissioned by NZAID and undertaken by Asia Foundation. However, demonstrating change has proven difficult for two reasons. First, because the results of the baseline were generally more positive than expected. The vast majority said that security had improved or stayed the same and two thirds said there were no serious problems. The proportion of police who said they were familiar with the concept of community policing ranged from 50-75%, and the vast majority believed that the relationship between police and citizens was good. This means that the starting point from which to measure change is already high.

Secondly, the repeat survey was done only eight months later, which is too short a period to expect attitudinal and behaviour change. Preliminary survey results, in fact, show insignificant change.

**OBJECTIVES LEVEL**

There were five stated objectives of the programme. These, along with an assessment of the extent of achievement against each objective, are shown in the following table:

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19 Baseline Survey of Community – Police perceptions 2008/2009 Asia Foundation
The Objectives of CPPP | Achievement
---|---
Design and progressively implement a framework for the sustainable management of a Community Policing Pilot Programme (CPPP), integrating a CP philosophy and key stakeholder engagement in Becora and Suai. | Achieved – pilot implemented as envisaged in Becora and Suai
Identify and secure the contribution of inputs required by PNTL, UNPOL, NZ Police, NZAID and other stakeholders needed to undertake the CPPP. | Achieved – all stakeholders contributed
Develop a monitoring and evaluation framework that will provide information on the effectiveness of the pilot implementation, as well as the long term impacts on communities of a PNTL community policing approach. | Partially achieved – there were monitoring activities but no overall framework
Develop and agree a long term strategic plan for community policing with key stakeholders. | Partially achieved
Support the Timorese National Police Training Academy to develop the capability and training resources needed to provide effective recruit and in-service training in community policing. | Mainly achieved

These objectives fall into two categories. The first three relate to the establishment and management of the pilot itself and, as such, constitute activities towards objectives rather than objectives towards the goal. The first two were therefore achieved early in the programme although it is premature to assess the extent to which the CP philosophy was integrated or the quality of key stakeholder engagement. The third, on monitoring and evaluation was partially achieved in that there have been a variety of monitoring activities but there is no overall framework for M&E. This is discussed later in this section.

The other two objectives were oriented to achievement of the goal. CPPP was successful in supporting the development of training resources, notably five community policing training modules, and in the delivery of some training. These have been greatly appreciated by PNTL. However, developing capability to provide effective recruit and in service training was over ambitious within the timeframe and not within the control of the pilot. Most of the training is delivered by PNTL through four to six day workshops which, in the pilot phase, have been led from a high level.

Support is also provided to the Academy by two long term Australian Federal Police (AFP) Community Policing Advisers under the Timor Leste Police Development Programme (TLPDP). NZ Police have therefore made a contribution to training but it would be impossible (and undesirable) to attribute success exclusively to CPPP. The effectiveness of the NZ Police Adviser based in the Academy was also constrained by poor handover processes between short term deployments which meant that it was difficult for them to know what had gone before and to continue from an appropriate point.

The objective of development and agreement of a strategic plan for community policing was partially achieved. Whilst NZ Police responded to a request for support by drafting a Community Policing Strategic Plan, agreement of any such plan is a political as well as a technical issue for PNTL and GoTL to determine. The process of such agreement would also likely take longer than the timeframe of CPPP.
The decision to operate within the framework and mandate of UNMIT was supported by all parties. The extent to which this served to support achievement of objectives is therefore an important consideration.

The design document states that ‘CPPP is based around a partnership involving PNTL, NZ Police and NZAID, supported by, and working within the UNMIT mandate’. Notably, UNMIT is not described as a partner and is not represented formally in the governance arrangements, other than by NZ Police who are deployed to UNPOL.

Within UNPOL, NZ Police have been subject to a degree of criticism for promoting the NZ model of CP as superior to that of other contingents. Community policing is practised throughout UNPOL through individual members of many contingents who are assigned to community policing and UNPOL are aware of the challenges of promoting a standard approach in this way. In part this criticism, which NZ Police readily acknowledge, may be an inevitable consequence of one national contingent being allocated a distinctive and attractive role in a context where other contingents are deployed generally. In part it may be attributed to enthusiastic displays of pride by members of NZ Police for what they believe is a world class model of community policing.

On both sides there are perceptions which easily create misunderstandings. Many of those interviewed in NZ Police expressed frustration at the way they experienced as overly bureaucratic processes within UNPOL. They were also critical of what they saw as a lack of capacity in some other contingents to undertake community policing in the way it is understood in New Zealand. Although relatively fewer UNPOL personnel were interviewed there were consistent comments that NZ Police worked in isolation and did not share its way of working with other contingents. These are perceptions – what people believe to be true - and therefore not for reviewers to question whether or not they are founded. What is important is the strength of the perceptions and this particular issue has been consistently controversial.

Some of these perceptions and misunderstandings arise from structural causes. Within UNPOL, for example, there is no common understanding of community policing, which is important given that there are more than 40 national contingents with varying experiences of, and skill sets in, community policing. Within CPPP the perceived superiority of NZ Police may also have structural roots in that the both the design and implementation are ambiguous about whether CPPP is a NZ Police pilot or an UNPOL pilot. Although NZ Police sought to obtain UNPOL support in writing, CPPP was defined within the UN system as a local project for which headquarter level formalised support is unnecessary and therefore not provided.

Since NZ Police, both in Wellington and locally, have been aware of such criticism since the beginning, consideration of ways to mitigate resentment might have improved relationships and, subsequently, effectiveness. Giving credit to the input of others, in this case UNPOL, might have helped. There may also be a broader issue about the extent to which NZ Police seek to take credit for achievements. The review team observed, for example, a tendency among those interviewed in NZ Police to appear to want to take credit for much of what was successful in community policing in Timor Leste. This, by default, appears to diminish the important role of other actors.

A theme of this review is that, whilst NZ Police and CPPP contributed to the success of community policing, success cannot and should not be attributed to them alone. Similarly, the success of CPPP

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20 It is understood that UNPOL officers sometimes attended meetings and that other stakeholders were also invited on an ‘as appropriate’ basis.
cannot and should not be attributed to NZ Police alone. The heavily bureaucratic systems of the UN have certainly been taxing to work within and may have slowed progress at times, particularly the negotiation and re-negotiation of NZ Police deployments, but CPPP could not have been a success without the support of UNPOL. Nor could training have been successfully conducted without facilitation support from the Asia Foundation in Becora and financial support from TLPDP across districts.

The design envisaged that the top level UNMIT support for CPPP would be formalised in a Memorandum of Agreement which would have spelled out the relative roles and responsibilities of the various actors. Although this did not happen it has probably not been a significant barrier to progress. In that the pilot could not have been implemented without the operational support of UNPOL, and that UN systems are challenging for all 42 contingents to work within, the issue for NZ Police has been, and will continue to be, to learn how to operate within them. The short deployment mitigates strongly against this learning as officers are only just beginning to understand what it takes to be effective when their deployment is over. Where there has been a longer deployment, at senior level, this has been appreciated.

Overall the review team believe that operating within the inevitable constraints of UNMIT has probably not limited effectiveness. It may be that UNMIT has actually enhanced effectiveness but, in the absence of a defined role beyond NZ Police, and the limitations of what has been monitored, there is no evidence, beyond the anecdotal, one way or another. The team were informed, for example, that ‘some’ UNPOL members from other contingents have heard about CPPP and sought to apply it themselves in their own areas. If this could be verified it would be an example of how CPPP might have achieved greater effectiveness by actively supporting such informal rollout.

### EFFECTIVENESS OF CAPACITY BUILDING

### COMMUNITY POLICING AND CAPACITY BUILDING

CPPP has made contributions in Suai, Becora, Oecusse, Emera, Metinaro and Viqueque. However, overwhelmingly, the focus and concentration of resources in CPPP has been on the practical implementation of community policing in the subdistricts of Suai and Becora and this is where effectiveness is most evident. In Suai there are a number of projects undertaken jointly by NZ Police and PNTL which, although the review team could not verify, are said to be appreciated by local communities. PNTL have also been successful in raising funds locally from a range of sources including the District Administration.

Compared with Becora, the approach in Suai is strongly project focused, which raises issues of appropriateness and sustainability. Although PNTL understand and value the purpose of community engagement, it is less clear that either PNTL or communities see ‘projects’ as the role of the police. In the absence of NZ Police support such an approach is unlikely to be continued by PNTL. It was apparent to the review team that the incoming contingent feel a degree of pressure to develop more projects so that they leave a heritage of the decade of NZ military and police presence in Covalima. To the extent that CPU staff are aware of this, and identify such projects as NZ Police’s rather than their own, the project approach potentially works against capacity building and ownership.

An implicit assumption of CPPP is that NZ Police officers are all skilled in community policing. However, although there is a component of pre-departure briefing on community policing, not all those deployed in community policing roles have such experience in New Zealand. In addition, it is
also clear that, whilst some individuals have understanding of and skills in capacity building, others do not and there is little guidance or supervision for those officers. The result is that, inadvertently, some activities may serve to undermine PNTL capacity rather than develop it.

The considerable capacity developed, most easily observable in Suai, appears to have been largely in the first deployment. PNTL officers were able to state exactly what they had learned from one particular NZ Police officer, and how it had helped them, in a way they could not easily do for the following two deployments. At this stage they state that ‘we know how to do it’ and their perceived need is only for logistics support (especially transport) which is currently not provided in as timely a way as previously and which they see as limiting their effectiveness. It was clear that PNTL are acute observers of NZ Police behaviours and make their own decisions about their value. At this stage there appears to be diminishing returns to continued support. This could potentially have been picked up through formal monitoring and it might have been possible to redeploy assets and resources to a different sub-district rather than continuing on a small scale in only 2 out of 64 sub-districts.

### STRATEGY AND METHOD

Capacity has certainly been developed through CPPP, both in individuals and teams and, at organisation level, through the production of training modules which continue to be in use. However, at sub-district level there has not been a strategic approach to developing it. The methods are predominantly on the job training, modelling, and mentoring provided by a Technical Adviser (TA) working with the CPU staff. This is colloquially known as ‘boots on the ground’ and is perceived by both NZ Police and other stakeholders to be their comparative advantage. It has certainly helped embed action on community policing by demonstrating what is possible in practice compared with what has been taught in theory.

Although CPPP is ostensibly about capacity building the design document reads as a blueprint for community policing without the specific context of Timor Leste. Certainly the design was produced in a very short space of time in order to be responsive to a particular situation but, given the membership of the design team, there might have been a basic institutional analysis. With no analysis of the capacity that already existed (at least in the document), nor any existing baseline data available against which progress could subsequently be measured, the design document gives the impression that community policing was an entirely new concept for which there was no existing capacity.

Capacity for community policing in PNTL may have been limited at the commencement of CPPP but it was not non-existent. All stakeholders interviewed for this review (who had a perspective over time) testified to the rapid development of capacity over the last year and the fact that PNTL now have a model which is very much their own. Even the curriculum, which is praised as a very valuable contribution, is said by the Head of the PNTL CPU to be “75% from New Zealand” indicating the recognition of, and ability to adapt to what is locally appropriate. This is testament to pre-existing capacity, even if concentrated at the top. Senior officials of PNTL had visited many countries to observe different approaches and have subsequently created an approach which is distinctly appropriate for Timor Leste. This reflects a core capability to ‘commit and engage’. The box below seeks to explain the importance of this.

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21 More recently there has been discussion of and movement towards redeployment of resources in Viqueque
The Core Capability to Commit and Engage

“Almost all discussion in development cooperation about the importance of ownership and motivation has to do with this core capability. It’s absence - or its fragility - dooms efforts at building broader capacity. Organisations must be able to choose, to empower and to create space for themselves. This is about the capability of a complex adaptive system – a living system – to be conscious and aware of its place in the world and to configure itself to develop its own motivation and commitment and then to act. And do this in time, over time and frequently, despite the opposition or resistance or non-cooperation of others. This is a condition that goes beyond conventional notions of own. It has a lot to do with attitude and self perception. This is the core capability that energises all the others.

Capacity, Change and Performance Synthesis European Centre for Development Policy Management, Study Report No 598, April 2008

As PNTL are increasingly demonstrating this capacity the approach of CPPP has begun to look rather static in comparison. In part this is a feature of a weak monitoring system which has not captured change outside CPPP and therefore reduced the potential to adapt. And in part it is a feature of the short deployment which results in a loss of momentum each time a new NZ Police officer tries to get up to speed.

This is not to suggest that there is adequate capacity in PNTL. Given the starting point after the liberation struggle and the collapse of PNTL in 2006, there is still a long way to go before capacity for community policing is adequate to provide a basic service across the country. Rather, the important point is that capacity is an endogenous and emergent process and the progress PNTL have made is commendable in the circumstances. Whether community policing will ultimately become a strength of PNTL is subject to many other political and security factors which will determine the extent to which the PNTL is militarised.

Implicit in the CPPP approach is the assumption that capacity is continuously developed. However, in the context of the six month NZ Police deployment this assumption, as noted above, is fundamentally flawed. Without prompting, the length of deployment was raised as a serious constraint by all stakeholders, without exception. It is long been internationally recognised that long term TA works much better than short term and the AFP, for example, deploy for two years in TLPDP. NZ Police officers themselves fully understand the limitations of short deployment and are frustrated by it. Not only does it compromise the formation of long term relationships, which are the basis of effective capacity building, it also creates unrealistic expectations among NZ Police officers about what they can, or should, try to achieve. As each new officer comes in, s/he is unaware of how much capacity the PNTL officers already have, receives little or no advice on what the next specific steps should be, and has no way of judging when ‘enough’ capacity has been developed. This is exacerbated by poor handover procedures and a degree of reinventing the wheel.

Capacity development, as far as the review team could ascertain, does not feature in planning discussions among the whole UNPOL team at district level. The focus is very much on the ‘what’ of activities rather than the ‘how’ of the process. Without discussion on ‘how’, the effectiveness of capacity development is reduced. This point – that it is more important for NZ Police to build capacity in PNTL to do things rather than to do it themselves - was stressed by the Head of the PNTL. This is a limitation which extends to the whole UNPOL mission and it is widely acknowledged that few UNPOL officers have the skill or experience to be capacity builders rather than security enforcers. With resumption (PNTL resuming their powers of primary policing responsibilities from UNPOL) this is an issue under discussion.
Although some of these aspects were recognised during implementation of CPPP they were not explicitly addressed. The overall environment is very fast changing, and the PNTL officers have proven themselves to be fast learners on community policing, but CPPP was not as able to move with the times as might have been expected in a pilot which had potential to be experimental. Monitoring and review have largely recorded progress against objectives and recommendations have generally been specific and action oriented. For an operation that may be appropriate but for a capacity development pilot there should have been consideration of the issue of ‘for how long’ capacity development would continue to be piloted intensively in only 2 out of 64 subdistricts. In the meantime community policing was clearly moving ahead in many other districts without any support following the first round of training. Clearly capacity development is an ongoing process, and PNTL officers have a long way to go in their overall professional development, but it might have been more effective overall to trial scaling up to cover more sub districts. At the time of review the NZ Police inputs, almost one NZ Police Officer to two PNTL officers, seemed overly intensive especially in a context of high absenteeism. On the day of the visit of the review team to Becora there were equal numbers of NZ Police and PNTL on duty.

If a pilot is about testing whether something works or not, in order that it can be replicated, CPPP missed the opportunity to build on early successes and to scale up so that more PNTL officers benefit from support. Certainly this might have been challenging within UNPOL but there is little evidence that it was attempted. Rather than an innovative pilot, CPPP resembles an ‘old-style’ project in that, although it may have ‘proved’ that community policing can be effective if sufficient resources are invested, the gains are unsustainable once those resources are withdrawn. In theory CPPP could be rolled out but, in practice, NZ Police cannot support such rollout on scale and PNTL will need to rely on their own existing resources which are insufficient.

THE SUSTAINABILITY OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

An important aspect of effective capacity building is that, at individual level, the person in whom capacity is developed believes that they can continue to apply their new skills themselves. It was clear from the field visits that several PNTL officers who have worked with NZ Police have that belief which is very encouraging. One individual interviewed, in particular, was outstanding and has been held up by Timorese leadership as a model in the rollout of national PNTL CP trainings. Had there been a strategy for capacity development in CPPP, such individual potential might have been further developed as a more appropriate and sustainable resource than NZ Police officers on short term deployment. One of the most effective methods of capacity development is the sharing of positive experiences within country. A more dynamic CPPP might have moved away from its NZ Police orientation at an earlier stage and developed systems through which PNTL in other subdistricts could learn from the experience in the pilot areas.

The question of whether the capacity developed is sustainable is impossible to answer. What NZ Police officers have focused on is practical skill development and this is both important and a comparative advantage. However, the extent to which PNTL officers can use these skills is dependent on many factors. In the absence of NZ Police and UNPOL one critical factor would be transportation for getting out into communities. As important would be the attitude and support of senior district PNTL personnel and the ongoing support from the CP Unit in Dili. But motivation is likely to be a serious concern and the current high levels of absenteeism, which have multiple causes, will take time to address as part of the broader reform agenda.

The PNTL CPU Team Leader and staff in both Becora and Suai appear motivated and confident of their capacity to continue the work. They have readily adopted the concept of community policing
because, among other reasons, it is easy to understand and fits well with traditional justice systems especially in the rural areas where police are also members of the community. The baseline survey showed that a strong majority of PNTL in all districts said that they played a role in informal dispute resolution. All NZ Police interviewed said that, once the concept is explained and modelled, PNTL have demonstrated considerable skill in working with communities. Suai, however, is a rural area with few of the sort of crime or security problems that are measurably different as a result of community policing intervention.

In Becora, a sub-district of Dili, there is also evidence that PNTL capacity has been developed. Observers state that there is a reduction in the negative influence of martial arts groups and there are examples of defusing potentially high-conflict issues within the two internally displaced people’s (IDP) camps. But the tension and potential for new conflicts in Dili is much greater than in the rural areas so it is not surprising that the PNTL District Commander and other non-CPU officers in Becora were less confident of the whole PNTL ability to move towards community policing than in Suai. The work of Asia Foundation has been very important because considerable attention is given to developing the capacity of PNTL and community leaders jointly so that each can understand and enhance the role of the other. Both NZ Police and Asia Foundation have benefited from this partnership.

Under CPPP, therefore, a lot of capacity has been developed. Much of it has been in the demonstration of what is possible, which can be attributed to NZ Police. However, much of the capacity developed is a result of commitment and initiative of the PNTL officers as well as their skill in adapting what they have learned from a wholly different, peaceful, developed country, context. Among NZ Police there often appears to be a tendency to take credit for any positive change in community policing. Whilst this is sometimes justified, a more appropriate capacity development approach is to allow others to take credit and allow them to be seen as in the lead. Some NZ Police officers understand this very well but others would benefit from improved pre-deployment briefing procedures on principles of capacity development.

GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS

The design document specified a Steering Committee comprising three PNTL members, two NZ Police and NZAID with additional community members. The aim was to establish ‘strong’ PNTL ownership through 50% representation. However, this group was never well attended, especially by PNTL, and was later reconstituted as a Reference Group, in which the aim of providing overall guidance was dropped. This group has also experienced variable attendance.

Establishing steering committees for the purposes of specific bilateral projects has rarely been successful in global experience. As in CPPP, such project committees are donor led with poor participation from government counterparts. A more effective mechanism, which has ownership, is the use of the partner government’s own systems and mechanisms. During the course of the review, none of the GoTL members of the Steering Committee or Reference Group were available for interview which, in itself, may be an indication of the relative unimportance attached to a discrete project22. At national level, therefore, the pilot was and continues to be largely owned by NZ Police and NZAID. PNTL acknowledge its achievements but choose not to participate directly because they

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22 This observation was made by several stakeholders, mainly closely associated with CPPP and based on experience of trying to get greater engagement.
see it as someone else’s project over which they have little real influence. In response to a question about how CPPP would need to change if it continued, the Head of PNTL CPU observed that all donors need to work more closely with PNTL and coordinate their activities and resources fully with the Annual Action Plan.

At sub district level the Community Boards experienced similar challenges with ownership. In Suai the Board convened initially but then enthusiasm waned and recent meetings have not taken place. Neither the members nor PNTL appear convinced of the value of a board. In Becora the Asia Foundation established a Board for their own Conflict Mitigation through Community-oriented Policing programme, providing considerable training input, joint training and awareness raising, public consultation and allowances for income earning opportunities foregone during attendance. To make such a Board work requires considerable logistical support, which Asia Foundation were able to do through their local partners in Becora, and which CPPP, through its partnership with AF, was able to take advantage of. In Suai NZ Police, not having experience of community development, underestimated what was required to get such a board to function. In addition NZ Police were unable to provide a budget for travel, food and sometimes accommodation, as well as additional facilitation, which are considered by both PNTL and AF as essential for a functional Board.

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

The NZAID cross-cutting issues of gender, conflict prevention and human rights are not reflected explicitly in either the design of CPPP or in its review and monitoring activities. By its very nature, community policing aims to prevent the kind of conflict which may result in crime or disorder but prevention is a difficult concept to measure even in developed countries with sophisticated M&E systems. Human rights protection is also implicit rather than explicit in the community policing approach.

Nevertheless, it is surprising that some analysis of these was not evident in the design or in the two reviews which took place, all of which had an NZAID Adviser on the team who, in principle, is the guardian of NZAID’s policy commitments. Possible reasons for oversight are the absence of a design template and the challenge of negotiating a document across different government agencies with different values and mandates. Without a design template, which specifies what must be considered, addressed and included, important elements can be missed. Similarly, without a monitoring framework or specific terms of reference for internal reviews, the same issues are likely to continue to be missed. Even though the design was prepared in a short space of time it would have been possible, if a document required consideration of cross-cutting issues, to identify which were relevant and to develop and monitor them subsequently during implementation.

The most obvious example is gender, which is mandatory for NZAID, but which was notably absent in the design document and review reports. During the course of the review the team noted that there were female members in both PNTL and the NZ Police, which is positive. However, when any interviewees were asked about gender their responses indicated that it was not something that had been given special consideration, either in PNTL or in relation to communities. One NZ Police officer, when asked about whether he adopted a particular approach to the capacity development of female PNTL officers, said that he treated them no differently from the men. Yet, when asked about how the male PNTL officers treated their female colleagues, acknowledged that it was ‘very difficult’ for the women. Had there been a strategic approach to capacity development within CPPP, and
consideration of gender, it might have been possible to adopt strategies to advance equality. This, in turn, might have identified the need to work on gender as an issue affecting both men and women.

Following submission of the first draft of this report a number of comments were made, in response to perceived criticism, highlighting the particular challenges of the context of community policing in Timor Leste. These ‘particular challenges’ relate to an environment in which conflict continues to be present, either in occasional outbreaks of violence or in ever present tension below the surface. This is illustrative of the importance of addressing the cross-cutting issue of conflict prevention and mitigation. Had the design, or subsequent reviews, considered the effect of the conflict in Timor Leste, especially that on PNTL in 2006, specific measures might have been taken to ensure that the approach in CPPP was conflict sensitive. Whilst the practice of community policing itself has strong elements of crime and conflict prevention, CPPP itself comes across as ‘conflict-blind’ in relation to the country context.

**MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

The development of a monitoring and evaluation framework was one of the objectives of CPPP. However, no single, coherent, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework was created either at inception or during implementation. This has been attributed to the speed with which the project was designed at the particular time and in the particular circumstances. However, as the project was implemented, an M&E framework could have been developed to bring together data gathered from the project in a coherent and unified way. Not doing so has meant that important opportunities for learning have been missed.

This is not to say that no monitoring and evaluation has occurred during the operation of the project. Indeed, a number of different forms of monitoring have taken place in the course of the project. These include daily situation reports and weekly reporting by NZ Police, two community perception surveys undertaken by the Asia Foundation specifically for CPPP, and two reviews done jointly by NZ Police and NZAID. For the review team it was difficult to get a sense of what had been achieved overall because, although the data gathered through these various activities provides much useful information it is presented as a ‘bag’ of miscellaneous products. These range from the highly specific and anecdotal daily and weekly reports to valid research information aiming to show trends. To make sense of it, any interested stakeholder needs to sort it and interpret it rather than be able to look at one single framework document which explains the whole.

The surveys conducted by the Asia Foundation have provided a valuable set of baseline data. Although the second survey aimed to demonstrate impact, it is still too early to discern this so it constitutes one of what would need to be a series over a much longer period of time. Any impact on community policing, and ultimately on community perceptions of security, in the two target sites is also influenced by many factors other than CPPP.

Developing an overall framework would have required analysis of what information was required for which audiences. The design document certainly stated that a monthly report would be compiled by the pilot coordinator for the Steering Committee and Sponsors – PNTL, UNPOL, NZ Police and UNPOL. However, the Steering Committee never became functional and its replacement, the Reference Group, no longer had a role in oversight. This meant that ownership of CPPP rested largely with NZ Police and NZAID and the system for monitoring and reporting was oriented to their need.
As it stands, the daily and weekly reports are produced by and for NZ Police. Whilst they are copied to UNPOL, they are not designed with their requirements in mind and UNPOL do not use them. During the review a senior officer involved in community policing commented that there was insufficient communication which is, in part, explained by the absence of a framework for M&E. Had there been consultation about the particular needs of UNPOL as a Sponsor, this might have reduced the perception that NZ Police were acting alone rather than as a combined team.

The two reviews undertaken by NZ Police and NZAID in December 2008 and June 2009 contain a large amount of information. However, they are rather long and repeat a lot of what is in the design document or, in the case of the second review, what was already in the first. This limits their usefulness for external audiences who either, in the case of PNTL, do not have such a strongly written document orientation or, in the case of UNPOL, cannot digest them. They also mainly have an input-output orientation. Although there are a number of lessons identified in the reviews it is not necessarily clear to an external audience quite what those lessons were and what should be done about them. For the internal NZ Police audience the reviews led to action plans.

Information flow vertically, between NZ Police and NZAID in Dili and Wellington was regular and clearly met the needs of NZ Police. Although NZAID participated in the design and both reviews, the reports do not reflect NZAID’s interest in the pilot. It is surprising that there is nothing reflective, for example, on the institutional and capacity development elements and no mention of the cross-cutting issues, notably gender. Information flow horizontally, within UNPOL and between the various pilot sites in Becora and Suai was weaker or nonexistent. Even NZ Police officers in Becora and Suai did not know what the other was doing and there was no mechanism for formal learning across the two pilot sub districts. Given that the main purpose of a pilot is to test something, sharing of experiences and learning from them, both for NZ Police and PNTL could have been a valuable feature. The adequacy of information flows between PPP and PNTL could not be assessed.

The other area where an overall framework could have been helpful was for handover between contingents. All those officers interviewed found this inadequate and, in some cases, nonexistent. Clearly specific handover notes are needed for each role but an M&E framework would have clarified overall direction and progress towards more specific objectives. It might also, if consulted on more fully and updated regularly, have created a more dynamic environment by drawing attention to those areas where incremental progress was becoming minimal. The main example, as referred to previously, is Suai where more of the same was no longer adding significant value. Had this been identified, an alternative strategy could have been developed which might have enabled scale up.

Most importantly, the development of a framework would have been the opportunity to review the success statement of CPPP and put some detail around it. As it stands, from design, the pilot would be deemed successful if the goal of supporting PNTL in successfully developing a sustainable community policing model and philosophy and to successfully pilot this in Becora and Suai’ was achieved. It is evident that the words were chosen carefully and the emphasis on supporting PNTL and developing a sustainable model is admirable. But, as objectives, these are not measurable. It is not clear, for example, what exactly is meant by ‘support’ or by ‘sustainable’ nor how we would know when they had been achieved. Discussion around these, between key stakeholders, might also have reduced some of the negative perceptions. During the review, for example, several stakeholders were resentful of the idea that NZ Police were promoting a ‘superior’ model and stated, in different ways, that ‘it’s not about the model’. Discussion of the issues might have clarified the fact that PNTL was clearly working to its own concept and that implementation of this was more the issue than development.
CONCLUSION – EFFECTIVENESS

CPPP has been effective in that it has achieved much of what it set out to do. In so doing it has contributed to the effectiveness of PNTL in demonstrating practically that community policing is an appropriate and implementable concept. Working within UNMIT has been challenging and has led to some misunderstandings but the achievements of CPPP would not have been possible without the umbrella and support of UNPOL. Considerable capacity has been developed in PNTL with the main gains occurring fairly early in the project. Had this been picked up in a stronger monitoring and evaluation system CPPP could potentially have been scaled up to include more sub districts. Factors limiting the effectiveness of capacity development were the short duration of NZ Police deployments and an approach which lacked strategic direction. In the context of a rapidly changing environment, a stronger mechanism for monitoring and evaluation might have identified areas where incremental gains were small and enabled more dynamic approaches to be considered. Ownership by PNTL of the donor-oriented governance arrangements might have been increased had decision making been transferred into GoTL structures.

EFFICIENCY

In terms of efficiency the CPPP has collaborated with two other police capacity building programmes: the Asia Foundation’s Conflict Mitigation through Community-oriented Policing programme and the Australian government funded Timor-Leste Police Development Programme (TLPDP). The collaboration with the Asia Foundation programme, which overlapped with the CPPP in the Becora sub-district, has rendered each intervention more efficient in its particular focus either on the community or PNTL side. The use of some aspects of the CPPP’s training manuals in the production of the Asia Foundation’s own training manuals, and the use of AF’s community forums by CPPP are testament to the positive overlap between the two.

Collaboration with TLPDP has occurred in the 4-6 day community policing training delivered by the Department of Community Policing from the Police Training Centre (PTC) where trainers from the TLPDP have participated in the training process alongside trainers from the CPPP in support of PNTL. This collaboration is only marginal though and is not a direct result of the two programmes formally deciding to collaborate and thus cannot be judged in terms of its success or not.

While CPPP was technically a part of the community policing section within UNPOL, various stakeholders within UNPOL felt that the NZ Police engagement with the rest of UNPOL and the CPU in particular, could have been strengthened. A key message obtained during the review process, and also discussed in the effectiveness section of this report, was that greater communication between CPPP and other parts of UNPOL about what the project itself constituted and what lessons were being learnt from its progressive development could have helped bring about greater sharing of resources and lessons learnt between the project and other parts of UNPOL involved in community policing initiatives. NZ Police maintaining a separate identity through CPPP is inefficient.

Given the lack of an M&E framework, to make any strong statement on counterfactuals such as whether or not CPPP may have benefitted from more dedicated resources being allocated from the NZ Police contingents in Timor-Leste is not possible. Any project, with enough resources, can be successful in bringing about short term change. The issue, however, lies in the sustainability of this change.
Where NZ Police were deployed as an UNPOL district commander, as in Suai, this almost certainly improved efficiency because the CP officers did not need to negotiate support for their role in supporting community policing. Successive New Zealand contingent commanders have also contributed greatly to efficiency in helping NZ Police officers and the other contingents within UNPOL understand each other. However, the role of such senior officers in agreeing deployments at each changeover has reduced their own potential efficiency for community policing more broadly.

The absence of a formal agreement for CPPP has reduced efficiency because the overall UNPOL CPU has operated with two very different mandates. Whilst the unit is intended to pursue both community and humanitarian policing, the result has sometimes appeared as competition rather than collaboration. In UNPOL publications, for example, the focus has tended to be on humanitarian initiatives. And, with CPPP being only in two sub-districts, the dominant model of community policing across UNPOL has not necessarily been aligned.

There is insufficient data for the review team to make any definitive assessment of whether or not the CPPP represented value for money. However, despite this, a number of less definitive conclusions can be drawn. CPPP has successfully contributed to the ongoing development of community policing within the PNTL. In this respect the funds provided for the operation of the CPPP have had a positive impact on community policing in Timor-Leste – although to what extent this was the most effective and efficient use of the resources allocated to the project is difficult for the team to conclude.

However, one area also discussed above which may help shed light on the cost effectiveness of the project is the roll-out of the project in Suai. It appears as if the major gains in community police capacity building in Suai happened during in the first deployment in that, once PNTL officers understood the concept and experienced the potential benefits, they were able to adapt their practice relatively easily. There were therefore decreasing returns to investment occurring in the subsequent two deployments. This would tend to suggest that some of the human resources utilised in this part of the project at least could have been usefully re-deployed elsewhere – possibly to another sub-district – and so the value for money of the ongoing deployment in Suai was not optimal.

**CONCLUSION-EFFICIENCY**

Within the limitations of the data any assessment of efficiency is largely subjective. There is evidence of some efficiencies and some inefficiencies. Overall, efficiency is satisfactory.

**SUSTAINABILITY**

The issue of sustainability in CPPP turns on the notion that there is no single specific model of community policing. Instead community policing is best understood as a range of values and principles which, when put into practice, constitute a specific approach to policing.23 CPPP, and the officers deployed within it, have helped provide advice and mentoring ‘on-the-ground’ to their PNTL counterparts which has helped model the types of behaviours that ought to flow on from these values and principles. In looking at the issue of sustainability, then, the review team focused on the ability of these PNTL counterparts to continue with these types of behaviour in the wake of CPPP’s withdrawal.

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The general consensus among stakeholders in Dili and Suai was that community policing is sustainable within the PNTL, at least in the two sub-districts where the pilot was trialled. Interviews with members of the PNTL CPUs working with NZ Police in Becora and Suai demonstrated that they had strong ownership of the concept of community policing and felt that they would be able to continue to operate successfully even if New Zealand support was withdrawn. The only area of possible concern involved the issue of resourcing. The withdrawal of resources provided through the project, such as motor vehicles, if the project was discontinued and UNPOL support was removed could impact on the ability of the PNTL CPUs to patrol as broadly as they have been able to under the auspices of the project. This is not specifically a CPPP issue as it applies to the withdrawal of any UNPOL resources in any district but it is a general issue of sustainability.

It appears that community policing has support at the highest levels as understood by the stated commitment within the new organic law that all PNTL members are seen as operating under the principles of community policing. However, the review team were unable to explore the likelihood of implementing and sustaining the law with senior members of the PNTL so no firm conclusions can be drawn. Similarly, it is also difficult to judge the extent to which CPPP impacted, positively or negatively, on senior management within the PNTL. All external stakeholders commented that, while community policing in PNTL has a strong champion in the figure of the head of the Department of Community Policing, these gains may be lost if there is inadequate succession planning. TLPDP advisers are providing support to develop mid-level officers in order to promote sustainability.

Nonetheless, this finding does point to the fact that sustainable change within an organisation such as the PNTL will require interventions at a range of levels and with a range of actors. This provides further support to the points made in the relevance section of this report on the political and military complexities of police capacity building in post-conflict environments. Sustainable change in policing in Timor-Leste will require interventions beyond the mere technical aspects.

One important area where sustainable change appears to have been made is in the area of training. There are at present three forms of training in community policing underway in the PNTL which have all been influenced by the CPPP, these are: general training for new recruits at the Police Training Centre (PTC) in Dili (which includes a 1-day section on community policing), a 4-6 day intensive course on community policing delivered in sub-districts and on-the-job training in the two CPPP pilot sub-districts of Becora and Suai.

The least sustainable aspect of CPPP, but most heavily influenced by CPPP, is the on-the-job training in the two pilot sub-districts. In contrast, the most sustainable is the general introduction to community policing delivered to all trainee police officers at the PTC as this is now a standard part of new recruit training. Promoting the principles of community policing in new recruits is generally thought to be effective because they are often keen to learn and to be successful in their chosen career. The remaining training, which is led by the Department of Community Policing within PNTL, has drawn substantially on the five New Zealand community policing training modules in the creation of the unit’s training programme in community policing for senior PNTL officers. This training, which is being modified by PNTL according to feedback during testing, has been delivered to over 350 officers in sub-districts around the country and continues to be rolled-out in other sub-districts. The limitation to sustainability, however, may be over-reliance on key individuals.

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TLPDP, in also providing community policing advisors to the Department of Community Policing within PNTL at PTC, has helped ‘back up’ CPPP by providing additional training support. In doing this TLPDP, especially in light of their stated ongoing commitment in the medium term to building police capacity in Timor-Leste, will play a critical role in supporting the positive changes made by CPPP.

CPPP has thus made some positive change in terms of promoting the use of community policing as an approach to policing by the PNTL. The key point of value that NZ Police were able to bring to PNTL was their ‘boots on the ground’ approach which enabled PNTL to learn how community policing principles can actually be put into practice in the Timor-Leste context. It is this application of community policing in practice, rather than the introduction of a New Zealand community policing model per se that was the true contribution of the project to community policing in Timor-Leste.

**CONCLUSION – SUSTAINABILITY**

As a pilot of only 14 months duration any claim to sustainability is probably spurious. Elements of CPPP have the potential to be sustainable: in the training modules, if they continue to be used; and in the attitude and behaviour change of individuals who have been trained and mentored, if they are able to maintain them. More broadly CPPP was too small and too short to bring about sustainable change in such a complex security environment.

**CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION**

**CONCLUSIONS**

1. **CPPP has made a strong contribution to community policing but the successes of PNTL are not attributable solely to CPPP or NZ Police**

NZ Police, through CPPP, have made a useful and important contribution to community policing in Timor Leste. At the same time, PNTL have moved forward with their own agenda on community policing and have clearly made significant positive progress. Other donors have also played an important role. Therefore, although CPPP has contributed to that outcome, the progress made by PNTL cannot, and should not, be attributed exclusively to CPPP.

2. **NZ Police comparative advantage is in the operationalisation of community policing**

Although much emphasis has been laid on the ‘superiority’ of the NZ model, it is not the model itself which makes the difference but rather the emphasis on practical implementation or ‘boots on the ground’. Timor Leste has its own model now, strongly influenced by NZ but also influenced by a range of approaches drawn from different countries, and there are various training and workshop interventions to roll it out. But there is always a gap between policy or strategy and actual implementation. Where CPPP has added value is in demonstrating that PNTL officers can be, and are, capable of being good community policing officers if they are provided the necessary support.

3. **As a pilot project CPPP had the potential to be more dynamic**

CPPP has achieved much of what it set out to achieve. But, the level of ambition – mainly 2 subdistricts out of 64 – has proved to be low and it would probably have been possible to achieve
the same early gains by scaling up to include more sub districts. The absence of an overall M&E framework has resulted in continuation of the same activities without critical reflection about progress and consideration of re-orientation. The environment within which CPPP has been situated has been rapidly changing but CPPP has not adapted to that as well as it might have.

4. CPPP has succeeded in building considerable capacity but has lacked an overall strategy and toolkit

The design of CPPP was very clear about the philosophy of community policing it was promoting. But, although it was ostensibly about building capacity in PNTL, there was no assessment of existing capacity, no objective or target set for building capacity, and no strategy for how it would be done. Some individual NZ Police officers have clearly excelled as capacity builders but others lack appropriate skills and would have benefited from a toolkit of methods which they could use to develop their own capacity to be more effective. The six month deployment is a serious constraint to officers developing the kind of relationships that are essential for capacity building.

5. Working within UNMIT has been challenging but appropriate

NZ Police have found it somewhat frustrating to implement community policing within the framework of UNMIT and through the cumbersome and slow systems of the UN. However, CPPP was designed within that context, in part because NZ had insufficient resources to implement a bilateral programme, and has succeeded in spite of challenges. There have been issues around the promotion by NZ Police of its own model which provide important lessons for NZ Police about working in partnership and sharing credit for success.

6. The answer to the ‘so what’ question is not clear

Whilst CPPP has achieved a great deal, it was never clear exactly what, as a pilot, it was testing. If it was about whether a specific national contingent can take a specific aspect of policing and lead it effectively, the answer is a qualified ‘yes’. If it was about demonstrating that community policing can be rolled out across Timor Leste, the answer is a qualified ‘no’. Too many projects, probably including CPPP, demonstrate success in a small area by deploying significantly more resources than could be sustained by the GoTL.

RECOMMENDATION

The recommendation of the review team is that CPPP should conclude in March 2010 as currently scheduled.

The justifications for this recommendation are that:

- it was designed with a limited duration and has broadly succeeded in what it intended to achieve
- to continue with the same approach in the same sub districts would see diminishing returns and scaling up to other sub districts would be more effective using a substantially revised approach
- the operating environment has changed considerably since inception both in terms of the increased capacity of the PNTL and the increased donor interest in community policing
• the mandate of UNMIT, beyond 2010, is likely to be different as PNTL resumes primary policing responsibility which would also require a different approach

OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Although the review team recommends that CPPP should conclude in March 2010, this does not constitute a recommendation that NZ Police support to community policing should also conclude. On the contrary, there are historical and geopolitical reasons for maintaining support and security is perhaps the most important priority of the Timorese people. A professional security sector, in which police play a vital part, is also essential for effective governance. CPPP has shown that NZ Police have made, and could continue to make, a useful contribution to community policing in Timor Leste.

From the perspective of the review team there are broadly three options:

1. withdraw from UNMIT completely
2. remain within UNMIT but discontinue CPPP
3. develop a bilateral programme

Option 1: Withdraw from UNMIT completely

The choice to remain, or not, within the UNMIT mission is a political and policing decision and beyond the remit of the review. However, the review team believe that CPPP has achieved its purpose and should not be extended further in its current form. It therefore follows that total withdrawal would not compromise seriously the gains of CPPP to date.

If the decision was taken to withdraw the whole contingent after March 2010 it would be important to ensure an appropriate exit from the community policing component. In Suai and Becora the team believe that the concept of CP is sufficiently embedded and that those NZ Police working on community policing could withdraw. There would undoubtedly be a loss of momentum, and probably logistical difficulties, but these are long term challenges for Timor Leste to address over time. It would also be important to provide a comprehensive handover to UNPOL so that other contingent members could provide ongoing support if appropriate.

Option 2: Discontinue the pilot but remain within UNMIT

If NZ Police continued deployment within UNPOL, individual officers could still use the principles of community policing, where appropriate or possible, in whatever roles they were deployed into just as most of the contingent currently do. Potentially new areas could be opened up, such as Viqueque, but with a different approach designed and agreed with PNTL. UNPOL have recommended such a role and would therefore be likely to support it. There may also be additional learning opportunities for NZ Police in experiencing the resumption process.

Option 3: Develop a bilateral programme

This option has been requested by GoTL and is strongly supported at the highest level in UNMIT. With positive experience of supporting implementation of community policing on the ground NZ has a potentially valuable role to play in supporting PNTL with the rollout of their own programme of community policing.
However, the review team would only recommend this option if:

- there is a long term commitment by NZ to support policing in Timor Leste
- NZP is willing to deploy personnel on a minimum of one year contracts, preferably two
- there is a full design process which is undertaken jointly with PNTL

These aspects are crucial because, although Timor Leste faces many security challenges, it is no longer a country in crisis so a development approach is appropriate. The short term deployments of NZ Police, and the associated pressures and limitations that brings, are not appropriate in the long term if NZ Police is serious about building capacity.

Whilst PNTL is a complex organisation with many issues to resolve there is strong ownership of community policing and considerable existing capacity. In the future, therefore, NZ Police would need to play a role which is primarily supportive of the PNTL agenda and enables greater PNTL ownership than CPPP has. Although CPPP has intended to be supportive of PNTL’s agenda, its structure is one of a project under the management and direction of NZ Police. Officers would, in addition to being deployed longer term, need to be selected for their capacity building skills and provided with more guidance on how to go about it strategically. There are opportunities to learn from AFP in TLPDP as their approach to capacity building, supported by AusAID over the years, has become increasingly sophisticated.

It is beyond the remit of this review to identify what such a programme might look like and this should, as identified above, be done as a full design process, jointly with PNTL. However, the following considerations may be useful to inform a design:

**DEVELOP A MORE STRATEGIC APPROACH TO CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT**

Capacity development is much more than technical assistance (the individual police officer/adviser). Although capacity development often occurs in an emergent and unanticipated way, without a strategy defining what capacity is to be built at the levels of individual, organisation and system, and how that will be done, there is likely to be under-achievement in relation to potential. In addition a broader range of methods is essential. This might include in-country study visits to look at what has been achieved elsewhere and how (the pilot districts), short secondments of PNTL officers from new to established areas or vice versa, job swaps, PNTL to PNTL mentoring etc. These would all be low cost. Linkages could also be made to scholarships in NZ or regionally. Mentoring by NZP on an occasional basis from CP Units in NZ might also be an option which could address the deployment length issue.

**ASSESS THE POTENTIAL TO GET GREATER TRACTION ON THE REFORM AGENDA**

The AFP program TLPDP has greater influence and leverage of the reform agenda, by virtue of its long engagement and considerable resources, than a relatively small New Zealand project could aspire to. There are therefore benefits in designing an additional component of TLPDP which NZ Police could lead on. This would provide greater traction for reform and be in line with the commitment of both governments to donor harmonisation.

**DEPLOY A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DESIGN TEAM**

The design team may be better led by a development consultant who can facilitate the process, ensuring full engagement of PNTL, and produce a design document which meets the needs of all stakeholders, not least NZAID as the funder. Members of the team would be NZP, PNTL, a capacity development specialist and possibly a TLPDP CP Adviser. Whatever the composition of
the team, a good institutional analysis is critical in order to identify how NZ can be most effective within the reality of Timor Leste.
## ANNEX 1  LIST OF ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Asia Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPPP</td>
<td>Community Policing Pilot Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPU</td>
<td>Community Policing Unit (either PNTL or UNPOL depending on context)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoTL</td>
<td>Government of Timor Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZAID</td>
<td>New Zealand Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZ Police</td>
<td>New Zealand Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNTL</td>
<td>National Police of Timor Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPDVP</td>
<td>Pacific Prevention of Domestic Violence Programme (NZAID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Adviser</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLPDP</td>
<td>Timor Leste Police Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Timor Leste</td>
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<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
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Review of the Timor-Leste PNTL Community Policing Pilot Programme

For the past 12 months, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) has been working with the Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL) on a community policing pilot programme (CPPP). The CPPP was designed by New Zealand Police and the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID), in consultation with PNTL and UNMIT. The programme aims to support PNTL in successfully developing a sustainable community policing model and philosophy, to assist in the restoration of community trust and confidence in Police and help create an environment conducive to community development.

The review has been commissioned by NZAID and NZ Police to analyse the progress of the CPPP and to recommend improvements for future New Zealand support of the PNTL for community policing in Timor-Leste.

1 BACKGROUND

Timor-Leste context

- Timor-Leste became a sovereign state in 2002 after 450 years of Portuguese colonial rule, 25 years of Indonesian occupation, and three years under United Nations administration. The country is currently in transition from an emergency and reconstruction phase to a focus on longer term development.

- Timor-Leste is rated in the 2009 Human Development Report as the least developed country in the Asia-Pacific region, with a Human Development Index (HDI) of 162 out of 182 countries.

- Timor-Leste has very high levels of poverty. 50% of the population live below the basic needs poverty line of USD0.88/day. Poverty has increased significantly between 2001 and 2007, and is concentrated in rural areas.

- The current population of Timor-Leste is approximately one million people. At the projected population growth rate, this will double in 17 years, and quadruple by 2050.

- Assessments during late 2008 and early 2009 indicate that the security situation in Timor-Leste has improved significantly since the assassination attempts on key political leaders in February 2008. While currently calm, the security situation remains fragile.

- Timor-Leste has a high risk of recurring conflict. Risk factors include a history of conflict; low per capita income; political instability; and high rates of youth unemployment.

- Timor-Leste’s security forces and civilian oversight mechanisms are developing, but still need support to ensure gains made to date are well-embedded and sustainable.

- The Government of Timor-Leste is slowly developing its capacity for delivery of core services, and the development of Timor-Leste into a stable democracy. Despite this progress to date, government services still require considerable strengthening at all levels in all sectors, especially at regional and district levels.

New Zealand Government assistance to Timor-Leste

27 World Bank 2008
New Zealand has provided assistance to Timor-Leste since 1999 through a number of New Zealand Government agencies, including the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID), the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), and New Zealand Police. New Zealand now takes a whole of government approach to its involvement in Timor-Leste.

NZAID’s programme of official development assistance (ODA) to Timor-Leste is small compared with programmes of other donors and international NGOs. It must therefore be carefully focused. ODA expenditure in 2009/10 is expected to total NZ$10 million, of which NZ$4 million is allocated to the NZ Police deployment in UNMIT. To date, assistance has been distributed across a number of areas, with a focus on education, governance, and community development. A revised NZAID country strategy to guide New Zealand’s bilateral development assistance to Timor-Leste for the period from 2009 to 2015 is nearing completion. One of the two proposed focus areas - “enhanced peace and security for all” - identifies strengthening of the PNTL as a possible area for ongoing support.

**UNMIT support to PNTL and community policing**

In April 2006 Timor-Leste experienced a serious breakdown in internal security. Violence, including between and within the police and military, broke out around the country, forcing the Timorese government to call for international assistance. New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia and Portugal responded to Timor-Leste’s request by deploying police and military troops as the International Assistance Force.

In August 2006 the UN established the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). The mandate of UNMIT is to assist with rebuilding democratic institutions, foster good governance, support the process for elections, review defence and security needs, and coordinate economic development assistance to Timor-Leste. UNMIT has police, military and civilian components; but is strongly focused on policing, including the provision of support to the PNTL. UNMIT’s current mandate expires in February 2010. The Government of Timor-Leste has requested it remain in place until after the National elections slated for 2012.

UNMIT’s police component is made up of approximately 1500 police personnel from 40 contributing countries. Its mandate includes both interim law enforcement and public security until PNTL is reconstituted, and “to assist with the further training, mentoring, institutional development and strengthening of the PNTL with a view to enhancing its effectiveness including with respect to addressing the special needs of women.”

In May 2009, UNMIT and the Government of Timor-Leste agreed a process for the gradual resumption of primary policing responsibilities by PNTL. UNMIT will progressively hand over responsibility district by district based on joint assessments regarding the preparedness of the PNTL in each district and unit, in accordance with mutually agreed criteria. UN Police will maintain their presence in districts where PNTL have resumed responsibilities, in order to provide support and advice, and to monitor the PNTL, including in the area of human rights protection. To date, the districts of Lautem, Oecusse and Manatuto have been ‘handed over’ to PNTL. It is proposed that the level of UNPOL presence throughout Timor-Leste will continue to be slowly decreased in line with this transfer of responsibility.

**NZ Police deployments to UNMIT**

NZAID and NZ Police provided assistance with police training in Timor-Leste from 1999 to 2001, and since 2006 have supported the NZ Police deployments to UNMIT.

Following the 2006 crisis, the New Zealand Government authorised (June 2006) a deployment of up to 25 NZ Police Officers to Timor-Leste for a term of three months, as part of the Australian-led International Force. Following this deployment, in September 2006 Ministers with Power to Act agreed that 25 New Zealand Police staff would participate in UNMIT for 12 months, commencing from 10 October 2006. In September 2007 the Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee approved an extension of the previous approval, and again in September 2008. The current approval is due to expire in March 2010.
NZ Police, with NZAID support, have continued to provide 25 staff to the UNMIT mission. Of this number, 10 staff are directly involved in the CPPP. All other NZ Police personnel not directly involved in the pilot, are expected to display the principles and practices of community policing whilst undertaking their normal policing duties. All NZ Police staff deployed to UNMIT undergo specific community policing training during pre-deployment training to ensure consistency of practice before deploying to Timor-Leste.

NZ Police staff undertake six month deployments and generally rotate in April and October each year. In response to requests for longer deployments, the deployment has been partly staggered to facilitate better continuity in roles. Where practicable, up to three positions may deploy for twelve months. It is not possible for NZ Police to deploy all staff for twelve month rotations in the absence of a dedicated deployment pool.

The pilot maintains two key positions for the CPPP. These are:

**NZ Police Community Policing Coordinator:** This role supports the PNTL Community Policing Commander and acts as a programme co-ordinator, ensuring that the plan is implemented and the objectives achieved. The position holder also co-ordinates with NZAID and UNPOL in relation to community policing and assists PNTL in the development of strategic plan tasking and coordination processes, resource planning, the review process, communication strategies and end of pilot reporting. In addition, the NZ Police Community Policing Coordinator is required to identify appropriate community policing development opportunities and recommend to NZ Police Headquarters suggestions for future contingent deployments.

**NZ Police Community Policing Trainer:** This role assists the PNTL to further develop a community policing curriculum along with staff training and development.

### The Community Policing Pilot Programme (CPPP)

#### Background

To support the long-term professional development of the PNTL, the Timor-Leste Government signalled an interest in receiving capacity development support from key bilateral partners. This included a request from the Timor-Leste Secretary of State for Security for New Zealand assistance in the area of community policing. UNMIT has a community policing component within its operations. However, the structure of UNPOL, and the varied nature of the policing styles of the 40 participating forces, has made it extremely challenging to provide capacity development in the area of community policing for the PNTL in general, and the PNTL Community Policing Unit in particular. New Zealand has recognised expertise in community policing by the Government of Timor-Leste, and UNMIT leadership agreed that half the NZ Police personnel deployed to UNMIT could be involved in a community policing pilot programme.

The CPPP was designed using a participatory approach by NZ Police and NZAID in 2008 with the collaboration and agreement of the Timor-Leste Government, PNTL and UNMIT. Implementation began in October 2008. The CPPP is being implemented in partnership by PNTL, NZ Police and NZAID working within the UNMIT mandate and the wider framework of UNMIT operations and systems. NZ Police personnel involved in the CPPP operate within the UN institutional framework.

#### Goal

The goal of the CPPP is to support PNTL in developing a sustainable community policing model and philosophy, to assist in restoring community trust and confidence in Police and create an environment conducive to all aspects of community development. The pilots are active in Becora Sub-District in Dili and Suai Sub-District in Covalima.

#### Objectives
The objectives of the programme are to:

- Design and progressively implement a framework for the sustainable management of a Community Policing Pilot Programme (CPPP), integrating a community policing philosophy and key stakeholder engagement in Becora and Suai.
- Identify and secure the contribution of inputs required by PNTL, UNPOL, NZ Police, NZAID and other stakeholders needed to undertake the CPPP.
- Develop and agree a long term strategic plan for community policing with key stakeholders.
- Support the Timorese National Police Training Academy to develop the capability and training resources needed to provide effective recruit and in-service training in community policing.
- Develop a monitoring and evaluation framework that provides information on the effectiveness of the pilot programme implementation, as well as the long term impacts on communities of a PNTL community policing approach.

Components

The CPPP comprises four components:

1. Implementation of the community policing pilots. PNTL and NZ Police work in partnership to establish a model of effective community policing in Becora and Suai sub-districts.
2. Capacity development of the PNTL Community Policing Unit. NZ Police provide advice and support to key PNTL senior staff to strengthen community policing approaches throughout the PNTL.
3. Support to the PNTL Police Academy to provide training on using community policing methodologies.
4. Establishment of a monitoring and evaluation framework to assess and measure community policing management and the performance of the CPPP.

Methodology

The CPPP is based on international best practice models for delivering policing, predicated on the understanding that police should work with communities to ensure safer communities together, rather than imposing law and order. The programme has endeavoured to adapt these models to the context of Timor-Leste and the two pilot sub-districts. The community policing principles underpinning the design of the pilot are:

- Communities are the major focus point for policing
- Community policing increases safety and reduces crime
- Police are visible, accessible, and familiar to their community
- Police listen to, and work with, their community; jointly prioritising concerns and keeping the community informed and empowered
- Police provide opportunities for community participation in their work
- Problems are identified and responded to on a local level with area, district, and national support when required.
- Police engage other government, non-government, and community groups in problem solving and partnerships.
- Flexibility of response, and accountability for achieving outcomes identified as important by the local community, is emphasised.
- Community policing requires an integrated evidence-based approach
- Community policing is the responsibility of all police at all levels.
Other policing programmes

The CPPP is intended to link with and support other capacity development provided to PNTL, particularly the Australian Federal Police (AFP) managed Timor-Leste Police Development Programme (TLPDP). The TLPDP, which runs from 2008-2010 (with the possibility of further extension) is a capability development programme that aims to help establish:

- a PNTL that is robust enough to continue operating as a legitimate entity (within the law) when confronted by serious domestic crises; and
- a policing capability that has the governance, values and operational characteristics to support an increasingly strengthened rule of law in an emerging democracy.

The TLPDP and CPPP connect principally through collaboration in the Police Academy.

2 PURPOSE

The review has been commissioned by NZAID and NZ Police to analyse the progress of the CPPP in relation to its goal and to recommend improvements for future New Zealand support of the PNTL for community policing in Timor-Leste.

3 SCOPE

The review will assess the implementation of the CPPP from September 2008 – November 2010 in relation to its stated goal and all four components of the programme.

Asia Foundation Community Surveys

To enhance monitoring and evaluation, NZAID has contracted the Asia Foundation to conduct an independent survey, enabling outcomes in the pilot areas to be compared to those from other areas. The survey covers (a) perceptions of the respective roles of citizens and police, as recipients and providers of security and law enforcement; (b) the nature and source of insecurity and disorder; (c) current relations between police and local communities in selected areas; (d) citizens confidence in and satisfaction with the police; and (e) key issues that presently affect the quality of community-policing relations. Baseline data was collected in early 2009, but the results of follow-up research for comparative purposes will not be available until early 2010.

It is hoped that these survey results will be available to be considered as part of this review. However, feedback from communities in the Suai and Becora will also need to be obtained separately by the review team in addition to data that might be available through the Asia Foundation survey currently being undertaken.

Out of scope

The following aspects are beyond the scope of the review:

- The full impact of the CPPP. This cannot be reliably assessed in the short timeframe of the pilot.
- Wider UNMIT operations in Timor-Leste outside the Community Policing Pilot Programme. However, the consequences of working within the UNMIT framework will be considered as part of the review.
- Community policing initiatives outside those involving NZ Police at the PNTL training academy or undertaken in districts other than Suai and Becora.

4 KEY STAKEHOLDERS

The key stakeholders for the review include:

Located in Timor-Leste
Beneficiaries of the CPPP (i.e. members of the public, community leaders)
The Government of Timor-Leste (Secretary of State for Security, local government)
The Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL)
The United Nations Integrated Mission to Timor-Leste (UNMIT and UNPOL)
Members of the CPPP Working Group
NZ Embassy, including NZAID
NZ Police contingent

Located in New Zealand

NZAID
NZ Police, including previously deployed NZ Police to Timor-Leste
MFAT

5 OBJECTIVES AND REVIEW QUESTIONS

The following are objectives and review questions will need to be addressed in order to achieve the purpose of the review. While not exhaustive, they will inform the review plan and approach.

Objective 1: Assess the progress of the Community Policing Pilot Programme in relation to its stated goal

Relevance

1.1 What is the nature and degree of stakeholder buy-in to the CPPP?
1.2 In what ways does the CPPP support initiatives in and development of the wider justice sector?
1.3 To what extent has the CPPP been aligned and responsive to the Timor-Leste policing environment?
1.4 To what extent has the CPPP been aligned and responsive to the wider policy, institutional and socio-political context of Timor-Leste?

Efficiency

1.5 To what extent has the CPPP collaborated with other police capacity building programmes? How successful has this collaboration been?
1.6 Would the CPPP have benefitted from more dedicated resources being allocated from the NZ Police contingents in Timor-Leste? To what extent, if any, did the part of the contingents not deployed directly to the CPPP contribute to or detract from it?
1.7 Considering New Zealand’s input and contribution to strengthening community policing in Timor-Leste and the outcomes achieved to date, did the CPPP represent value for money? This will involve an assessment of whether the CPPP has achieved the best possible development outcomes relative to the total cost of managing and resourcing the pilot programme, and assessing whether these resources have been used effectively, economically and without waste.

Effectiveness

1.8 To what extent has the CPPP achieved its objectives? What factors have facilitated or hindered these being achieved?
1.9 To what extent has the CPPP addressed the cross-cutting issues of gender, conflict prevention, and human rights?
1.10 What unintended positive or negative outcomes have resulted from the CPPP?

Sustainability

1.11 What indicators are there that community policing practice has improved and the capacity of PNTL has increased in the pilot areas as a result of CPPP? If this is the case has it better placed the PNTL for resumption of powers?
1.12 Is the approach used in the CPPP sustainable in terms of resources, leadership, community support etc?

**Objective 2: Make recommendations regarding the future New Zealand involvement in support of community policing in Timor-Leste.**

2.1 From the results of the CPPP review, make recommendations about the nature and degree of any future New Zealand engagement for strengthening community policing in Timor-Leste.

2.2 How can any future New Zealand engagement best continue to support Timor-Leste ownership of community policing? How can future support be made sustainable?

**Wider learning**

It is anticipated that the review might highlight some preliminary lessons learned from the pilot programme to inform other international UN Policing operations. While not part of the formal scope of the review, any such lessons or learning should be annexed to the review report.

6 **STRUCTURE**

**Review team**

The review will be conducted by a team of up to four independent evaluators, one of whom will be appointed the team leader by NZ Police and NZAID. The skills and experience required by the review team include:

- Extensive knowledge of development theory and practice, including knowledge of the components of good governance and effective institutional strengthening.
- Extensive review skills and experience, including demonstrated ability to lead and provide quality design, implementation and reporting phases of an in-country review involving multiple stakeholders.
- Experience and knowledge of post-conflict development contexts, preferably Timor-Leste.
- A working knowledge of current policing practice and methodology, including best practice.
- Institutional knowledge of the United Nations, including peacekeeping missions, and the experience and position to represent UN policing interests and to communicate findings within the UN.
- A solid understanding of the Timor-Leste context, including the policing environment.
- Excellent communication skills, including cross-cultural communication and report writing.

**Review timing and arrangements**

The review team will conduct a 12-15 working day visit to Timor-Leste in December 2009. The team leader will lead the review and take responsibility for ensuring the timing and quality of process and outputs, including drawing together the final report. For the team leader, the review is expected to comprise up to 25 working days in total. The contributions of the other team members will include time in-country plus up to six days for providing input and feedback for the design and report writing phases of the review.

The team will be supported by representatives from NZAID and NZ Police who will act as information sources, but will not be involved in writing the report or making recommendations. The NZ Embassy staff in Dili will be available to facilitate focus groups as required and to facilitate contact between key identified stakeholders and the review team.

7 **METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH**

The review team will submit a draft methodology and implementation plan to NZAID and NZ Police for comment. This will be edited as necessary to obtain endorsement. The review plan should be appended to the report, and the main points of the review plan included in a methodology section.
The review will adhere to NZAID’s Evaluation Principles, and DAC Principles of Evaluation for Development Assistance (Annexes One and Two); which are based on impartiality, independence, credibility and usefulness.

In particular, the review will:

- Ensure that all key stakeholders have an opportunity to respond to all relevant review questions and that the views of all key stakeholders are incorporated into the findings of the review.
- Collect review data using a range of appropriate strategies including (but not restricted to) interviews; review of programme documentation (including reports from the two previous monitoring visits); focus groups, review of training modules and plans; and strategic documentation.
- Describe and assess how the CPPP has addressed the cross-cutting issues of gender, conflict prevention, and human rights. The review team will ensure that the review is conducted in a way that incorporates crosscutting issues. Details of how this will be done will be made explicit in the review plan.

Monitoring visits

An important aspect of the CPPP to date has been two programming monitoring visits that took place in December 2008 and June 2009. Reports and action plans from these visits as well as weekly reports will be available to the review team as a contribution to the methodological design of the review and the preparation of the final review report.

8 GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT

Overall responsibility to ensure that the review is designed, undertaken and completed as specified will lie jointly with NZAID and NZ Police.

Management of the review will be undertaken by Anna Mosley, Timor-Leste Programme Manager (NZAID) who will have the responsibility to:

- Ensure that the review is undertaken as agreed
- Prepare the draft terms of reference and manage feedback to prepare the final terms of reference
- Manage contracts for the review team
- Organise a briefing for the review team
- Manage and collate feedback from stakeholders on the draft review report and ensure that issues raised are addressed by the Steering Committee
- Liaise with the review team throughout

Governance of the review will be provided through a Steering Committee made up of Mikaela Nyman as chair (NZAID Team Leader), Anna Mosley (NZAID Timor-Leste Programme Manager), Jon White and Jacquelyn Goodwin (NZ Police: International Services Group), Sarah Wong (NZAID Manager Dili), and Cameron Cowan (NZAID SAEG Advisor). The Steering Committee responsibilities will be to:

- Sign off the final terms of reference
- Approve the review plan and methodology
- Consider the draft report and feedback received from other stakeholders, and identify any further required changes
- Approve the final report

The draft review report will be ‘peer reviewed’ by NZAID staff. Feedback may be sought from other selected stakeholders. Further work or revisions of the report may be required if it is considered that the report does not meet the requirements of the terms of reference, if there are factual errors, if the report is incomplete, or if it is not written to an acceptable standard.
Once approved by the Steering Committee, the final review report will be appraised and considered for public release by NZAID’s Evaluation and Research Committee (ERC).

9 OUTPUTS AND REPORTING

A timeline for outputs and payment milestones for the review is set out below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Completed at the latest by:</th>
<th>Payment milestone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Draft methodology and implementation plan to NZAID</td>
<td>December 8 2009</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary findings to NZAID</td>
<td>Dec 18 2009</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review team members provide agreed written contributions to team leader</td>
<td>Dec 22 2009</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft report to NZAID</td>
<td>Dec 24 2009</td>
<td>One third payment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steering Committee to provide comment on draft report to the review team. Further drafts may also be required.</td>
<td>January 18 2010</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final report to NZAID</td>
<td>January 29 2010</td>
<td>Two thirds payment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The review report will adhere to the standards set out in the NZAID Guidelines for Evaluation and Review Reports (Annex Three). It is expected that the report would be around 20 pages long (plus annexes). The report will be provided to NZAID electronically and as three hard copies.

10 REVIEW USE

The review findings will be used in the following ways:

1. **NZ Police and NZAID**

   Findings and recommendations will inform decisions regarding the nature of any proposed future New Zealand contribution to community policing in Timor-Leste. If New Zealand continues to support community policing in Timor-Leste, the review report will be useful as a baseline for future reviews. Learning from this review will also contribute to NZ Police international engagements now and in the future.

2. **PNTL**

   Review findings will provide learning toward informing the future strategic direction of the PNTL National Community Policing Unit and planning for future capacity development.

3. **United Nations**

   Outcomes of the review may provide learning that can be applied in UNMIT and/or transferred to other UN policing initiatives in similar contexts.

11 BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The following documents provide further background to the review. These will be provided to the review team at the initial briefing.

- The Community Policing Pilot Plan (PNTL, NZ Police, NZAID)
- Two monitoring visit reports (December 2008, June 2009), weekly programme reports and the Monitoring Review Two Action Plan
- Organic Law of the Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL), 18 February 2009
- UNMIT documents (Supplemental Agreements on Policing)
- Asia Foundation Baseline Survey of Community-Police Perceptions: Sub-districts of Suia, Same, Cristo Rei and Dom Aleixo (2008/2009)
- Other documentation as required
ANNEX 3 EVALUATION PLAN

EVALUATION PLAN FOR THE REVIEW OF CPPP 8 December 2009

Introduction

This document is an evaluation (review) plan for the Community Policing Pilot Project (CPPP) in Timor Leste. It is a working document, intended to outline the methodology for the purpose of approval by the review Steering Committee and for the use of the team. It will be updated and revised as necessary.

Evaluand

The Evaluand (object of the review), CPPP, is a pilot programme in which New Zealand Police and NZAID aim to support PNTL to develop a sustainable community policing model and philosophy. It commenced in September 2008 as a one year pilot within the framework and mandate of UNMIT and has been extended until March 2010 in line with that. In 2009/10 the NZAID programme allocation for Timor Leste in 2009/10 is in the region of $10m of which $4m is allocated for policing.

The goal of CPPP is to support PNTL in developing a sustainable community policing model and philosophy, to assist in restoring community trust and confidence in Police and create an environment conducive to all aspects of community development. The pilots are active in Becora Sub-District in Dili and Suai Sub-District in Covalima.

The objectives of CPPP are to:

- Design and progressively implement a framework for the sustainable management of a Community Policing Pilot Programme (CPPP), integrating a community policing philosophy and key stakeholder engagement in Becora and Suai.
- Identify and secure the contribution of inputs required by PNTL, UNPOL, NZ Police, NZAID and other stakeholders needed to undertake the CPPP.
- Develop and agree a long term strategic plan for community policing with key stakeholders.
- Support the Timorese National Police Training Academy to develop the capability and training resources needed to provide effective recruit and in-service training in community policing.
- Develop a monitoring and evaluation framework that provides information on the effectiveness of the pilot programme implementation, as well as the long term impacts on communities of a PNTL community policing approach.

Implementation of CPPP delivery has been in four components:

5. Implementation of the community policing pilots in Becora and Suai sub-districts
6. Capacity development of the PNTL Community Policing Unit
7. Support to the PNTL Police Academy
8. Establishment of a monitoring and evaluation framework

Purpose and Orientation of the Review

The TOR state that the review aims to fulfil two purposes:

- to assess the progress of the CPPP in relation to its goal
- to recommend improvements for future New Zealand support to the PNTL for community policing in Timor-Leste
Given that CPPP is a pilot of only 14 months duration, and that it is not yet complete, it is most appropriate to use the ‘Monitoring’ Form. This form is oriented to assessment of progress and to learning for the purpose of programme improvement.

The orientation of the review will also be guided by the approach of Evaluability Assessment (EA). EA is primarily used prior to an evaluation to determine whether or not a programme can be evaluated. This involves a review of the coherence and logic of the programme, clarification of the data available, and an assessment of the extent to which managers and stakeholders are likely to use evaluation findings given their interests and the timing of programme or policy decisions. It is considered an appropriate approach for this review because, should support to community policing be continued, evaluation information will be very important in determining its relevance and effectiveness in Timor Leste.

The type of EA questions the review team will draw on in the methodology are:

- what is the logic - the assumptions, mechanisms and expected outcomes - of CPPP
- what are the intentions and expectations of the various stakeholders and are they sufficiently engaged
- are the design, strategy, resources and implementation mechanisms appropriate for the intervention logic
- is the programme likely to achieve the goal for which it is set up in the real world environment
- is there information available to evaluate

**Client and Audiences**

The client is NZAID in partnership with NZPOL. The Primary audiences, and their interest in this evaluation, are described in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Audiences</th>
<th>What they would like to know from the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GoTL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNTL</td>
<td>What is distinctive about the NZ model compared with others?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is it the best model for Timor Leste?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NZAID</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZAID</td>
<td>Can CP be effective in the absence of reform?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is there a role for such a small contributor?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is it effective to stay in UNMIT?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NZPOL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZPOL HQ</td>
<td>How does CP fit in the UNMIT framework?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How can we demonstrate outcomes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are we building capacity that can be sustained?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is it worth continuing?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MFAT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ Embassy in Dili</td>
<td>How effective is it to work in UNMIT?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Would a bilateral approach be better?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNMIT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Is there potential to expand?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How can coordination be improved?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How can a transition to a bilateral programme be made?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Evaluation Focus**

The focus of the review is on the future. The ‘what next’ question is the most pressing for all stakeholders given that decisions need to be made soon about the future beyond the mandate of UNMIT. The decision about future development assistance to Timor Leste will be based on political and economic as well as a development priorities. This review primarily considers the development issues and aims to gather and assess
the best possible information, given the very short duration of implementation of CPPP, about its relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

**Key Evaluation Questions**

The review will address the two objectives posed in the TOR:

1. assess the progress of CPPP in relation to its stated goal
2. make recommendations regarding the future New Zealand involvement in support of community policing in Timor Leste

Under Q1 there are a number of sub questions which are posed in accordance with the DAC Evaluation Criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. The DAC criteria also include impact but this is beyond the scope of the review because of the limited duration of the pilot. Although the DAC criteria are a useful framework for analysis and potentially as a structure for the review report, for the purposes of the conduct of the review these have been re-formulated as Key Questions. Although it was not possible to consult all stakeholders about the key questions they would like to see answered in the review, these questions reflect the interests of most as far as the review team could ascertain.

The Key Questions emerging are:

1. Is there shared understanding of the purpose of CPPP among stakeholders?
   - what is the programme logic as defined by NZPOL
   - how is CPPP understood and accepted within UNMIT
   - how is it understood and accepted within PNTL

2. What progress has been made against the goal and objectives?
   - what capacity has been built in the PNTL
   - what elements have emerged as the most relevant
   - what progress has been made on a strategic plan for CP in PNTL

3. To what extent does the monitoring and evaluation framework demonstrate effectiveness?
   - what progress has been made on the M&E framework
   - what information do decision makers in PNTL and UNMIT need
   - how is information utilised

4. Is NZ support for CP appropriate in future?
   - is CPPP an appropriate model
   - what level and duration of NZPOL commitment is necessary for sustainability
   - what are the relative merits of continuing within UNMIT compared with a bilateral approach

**Data Management**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Question</th>
<th>Data Collection Instrument</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Is there shared understanding of the purpose of CPPP among stakeholders? | Document Review
| • what is the programme logic as defined by NZPOL | Design, review mission reports, UNMIT documents on community policing, other reports on policing issues in Timor Leste such as human rights
| • how is CPPP understood and accepted within UNMIT | Semi-structured Interviews
| • how is it understood and accepted within PNTL | Officials from MFAT and NZAID
| | Officials from NZPOL, UNMIT, and PNTL
| | Secretary of State Security

Independent Review of CPPP

Annexes
2. What progress has been made against the goal and objectives?
   - what capacity has been built in the PNTL
   - what elements have emerged as the most relevant
   - what progress has been made on a strategic plan for CP

   Other stakeholders eg AFP/TLPDP, Asia Foundation
   
   Document Review
   Review mission reports, PNTL documents
   Semi structured Interviews
   NZAID officials
   PNTL officers in CP Unit, Police Academy
   UNPOL officers in Dili, Becora and Suai
   NZPOL officers and former officers in NZ, Dili, Becora, Suai
   NDCCP
   Asia Foundation, Suco Council, community members, clergy
   Observation

3. To what extent does the monitoring and evaluation framework demonstrate effectiveness?
   - what progress has been made on the M&E framework
   - what information do decision makers in PNTL and UNMIT need
   - how are community perceptions captured and utilised

   Document Review
   Review mission reports
   Asia Foundation reports
   Semi structured interviews
   NZPOL officers in NZ, Dili and districts
   NZAID officials
   UNMIT/UNPOL officials
   Asia Foundation

4. Is NZ support for CP appropriate in future?
   - is CPPP an appropriate model
   - what level and duration of NZPOL commitment is necessary for sustainability
   - what are the relative merits of continuing within UNMIT compared with a bilateral approach

   Document Review and Interviews as above
   Team Analysis
   Feedback and consultation with whole of government partners in Dili - NZPOL, MFAT, NZAID and MD

Data Analysis

Preliminary analysis will be done by each team member familiarising themselves with available documents in accordance with their specific role on the team prior to the team convening.

During fieldwork data will be analysed daily through a process of reflection and progressive focusing at the end of the day. Initially data will be gathered widely but will then be systematically focused on those areas where information is hard to find or where evidence is mixed so that data collection narrows over time. After each interview rapid analysis will take place so that questions for the next are informed by what has been discovered previously. After fieldwork is complete the team will systematically analyse both fieldwork and documentary evidence in order to answer the key questions.

Team Composition

There are four team members:
Sue Emmott Team Leader and Capacity Development
Manuhuia Barcham Governance Specialist
Taimoor Khan DPKO Representative
Eduardo Soares Social Research Specialist

Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date (2009)</th>
<th>Where</th>
<th>Who</th>
<th>What</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov 30</td>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>Sue</td>
<td>Briefing in Wellington from NZAID and NZPOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sue &amp; Manu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 4</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Sue</td>
<td>Briefing from Ambassador &amp; NZAID. Meet Eduardo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sue, Taimoor, Eduardo</td>
<td>Initial briefing with NZPOL Contingent Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 7</td>
<td></td>
<td>Manu joins team</td>
<td>Full fieldwork begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 14</td>
<td></td>
<td>Taimoor departs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 16</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sue, Manu, Eduardo</td>
<td>Fieldwork concludes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Presentation and Aide Memoire to NZ Inc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 18-22</td>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>Sue, Manu</td>
<td>Data Analysis and Report Writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 24</td>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>Sue</td>
<td>Submission of First Draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid January</td>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>NZAID/NZPOL</td>
<td>Provide comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End Jan</td>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>Sue (Manu if necessary)</td>
<td>Finalise report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dissemination

Dissemination of the report will be determined by NZAID and NZPOL

Codes of Behaviour/Ethical Considerations

The review will be conducted in line with DAC Evaluation Quality Standards and NZAID Evaluation Policy. There are no specific ethical issues anticipated in this evaluation.
Annex 4  People Interviewed

In New Zealand
Anna Mosley  Development Programme Manager, NZAID
Cameron Cowan  Institutional Strengthening Adviser, NZAID
Mike Wright  Former Contingent Commander, NZPOL Dili
Jacquelyn Goodwin  Manager, ISP, NZPOL
Jon White  Asst Commissioner, NZPOL
Grant Nicholls  Asst Commissioner, NZPOL
Kevin Brennan  Former CP Programme Coordinator, Dili

In Timor Leste
Tim McIvor  NZ Ambassador
Sarah Wong  NZAID Manager
Ross Gilbert  Outgoing Covalima District Commander, NZPOL
Malcolm Drummond  Outgoing CP Team Leader, Suai, NZPOL
Jim Searle  Contingent Commander, NZPOL
Premalal Liyanarachi  Team Leader, CP and Humanitarian Unit, UNPOL
Kokila Siberia  CP and Humanitarian Unit, UNPOL
Fahim Abbasi  Dpty UNPOL Commissioner
Takahisa Kawakami  DSRSG, UNMIT
Luis Carillo  UNPOL Commissioner
Silas Everett  Country Director, Asia Foundation
Liam Chinn  Programme Manager, Asia Foundation
Mark Kay-Clough  District Commander, UNPOL Becora
Theo Gommins  NZPOL, Becora CP Unit
Kirsty Stewart  NZPOL, Becora CP Unit
David Hiroti  NZPOL, Becora CP Unit
PNLCP Unit members  Becora
3 Community Board Members  Becora
Miranda  UNPOL TL CP Unit, Becora
Cameron Sigley  Adviser PNTL Police Training Centre, NZPOL
Mal Nay  AFP, TLPDP
Ian Zimmer  CP Adviser, AFP, TLPDP
Daryl Meldrum  CP Adviser, AFP, TLPDP
Ivan Tarlton  Incoming District Commander, Covalima, NZPOL
Ivan Fulton  Incoming CP Adviser, Suai, NZPOL
Madre Guilhermina Marcal  Member of Community Board, Becora
David Kerby  CP Unit, Suai, UNPOL
Adelina de Sousa  District Commander, PNTL Becora
Antonino da Costa Fernandes  Dpty District Commander, PNTL Becora
Cecilia  CP Unit Team Leader, PNTL, Suai
Padre Jose, Madre Elsa  Church Leaders, Suai
Francisco Guterres  Secretary of State, Security, GoTL
Rosela Gementiza  Training Officer, UNPOL
Joao Belo (by telephone)  PNTL National Commander (Community Policing)