Dropping the Autopilot:
Improving Australia’s Defence Diplomacy

What is the problem?

With Canberra’s instruments of international policy under strain, the military offers much potential as a foreign policy force multiplier. The Australian Department of Defence has 92 defence advisory staff in diplomatic missions, and about 560 other staff overseas, not counting troops on deployment. There has been recent movement away from an old-fashioned defence diplomacy based more on habit and individual initiative than on strategic or whole-of-government guidance. This movement needs to be consolidated and built upon. The nation needs to drop any remnants of its autopilot approach to defence diplomacy.

What should be done?

Defence diplomacy could be better integrated within international policy planning and implementation, including by:

- Clearer whole-of-government, interagency prioritisation of international policy goals through a regular foreign policy statement or new foreign affairs white paper
- Harmonisation of diplomatic objectives between the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of Defence
- Improved planning and communication between the two Departments, including through attaching DFAT liaison officers to Australian Defence Headquarters to match the seconding of Defence staff to DFAT
- Greater harmonising of defence diplomacy with international partners, and encouraging them to improve their own coordination of foreign affairs and military establishments
- Making experience working in or closely with other agencies a condition for promotion to senior levels in the Australian Defence Force and the Defence and Foreign Affairs bureaucracies
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Introduction

The Lowy Institute’s 2009 Blue Ribbon Panel Report, Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit warned that Australia did not have enough diplomatic missions or trained diplomats overseas to sustain the vital contacts with foreign governments that a middle power such as Australia needs to thrive securely in a competitive and globalised world. It added that almost every conceivable policy issue now had an international dimension, with 18 of 19 Commonwealth Government departments now having a dedicated international policy area. This paper will consider how one of those departments, Defence, can help remedy Australia’s diplomatic deficit.1

In the past decade, Australia has witnessed the greatest degree of overseas activity by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) since the Vietnam War. ADF engagement and operations take place in bilateral and multilateral settings, in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as in intervention operations. This pattern is unlikely to reverse soon. The tenor of documents such as the 2009 Defence White Paper, the 2008 National Security Statement and the recent Counter-Terrorism White Paper indicate the Australian Government’s assumption that this trend will continue or even increase.

Because it embodies the values of the profession of arms – shared by military colleagues across national boundaries – military-to-military engagement has the quality of being somewhat removed from the more transient aspects of politics and diplomacy. Soldiers speak a common professional language that strives to be apolitical. More broadly, defence diplomacy places a high premium on the reputations and informal networks of senior individuals. This can count for more than formal agreements and dialogues, especially in a crisis.

But the strength of defence diplomacy can involve a weakness. Over recent decades, there has been a perception – sometimes among foreign affairs officials – that Australian defence diplomacy has often functioned on autopilot, with some activities and their accompanying diplomatic messages being poorly coordinated with the wider foreign policy effort. This has begun to change in tangible ways in recent years. The challenge ahead is to build on that momentum, and here the onus is not all on the Defence establishment.

Naming priorities: the National Security Statement and the Defence White Paper

Australia’s 2008 National Security Statement1 was an effort to comprehensively identify challenges to the nation’s security and the necessary policy responses. Key within this national security approach was ‘an active foreign policy capable of identifying opportunities to promote our security and to otherwise prevent, reduce or delay the emergence of national security challenges’. The statement flagged regular foreign policy and national security statements at prime ministerial level as the strategic means by which the instruments of national security would be coordinated with Australia’s international policy. To date, no further such statements have been delivered.
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The National Security Statement pointed to a contribution from Defence to the nation’s diplomacy. This was reinforced in the 2009 Defence White Paper, Force 2030. The Defence White Paper itself is a pillar of Australia’s international policy – signifying how Australia views regional power balances and emerging threats. It also provides a tangible signal of Australia’s international posture to regional neighbours.

Force 2030 discusses the benefits of Defence’s international engagement efforts at length, and notes the potential contribution of the ADF to underpinning strategic stability in Asia Pacific through regional security cooperation. There is broad guidance on the relationships to which Defence most contributes, including multilateral forums with a major defence component, as well as countries where Australian forces are deployed or where security cooperation underpins the bilateral relationship. Force 2030 asserts that ‘Our defence relationships give Australia an important voice that underpins our credibility as a middle power’.

Broadly defined, defence diplomacy has four strands: diplomacy (narrowly defined), engagement and cooperation, relief and assistance, and the diplomatic component of intervention operations.

Diplomacy: Formally, there is an accredited Defence presence in many of Australia’s embassies and high commissions. But the ADF also has its own long-established and often less formal links into militaries, governments, media, NGOs, business and other parts of civil society abroad. Military officers, like diplomats, build up networks over their time spent in conflict zones, other operational areas and elsewhere overseas. (Former Chief of Army Peter Leahy describes the benefits of such personal linkages in Australia’s relations with Papua New Guinea in Box 1.)

How is defence diplomacy done?

The International Policy Division (IP Div) within Australian Defence Headquarters coordinates the defence aspect of Australia’s international relations. Its staff coordinate detailed day-to-day engagement efforts with those of Joint Operations Command and the Army, Navy and Air Force – each of which has its own international engagement office. IP Div also develops bilateral and multilateral defence agreements and – not unlike a foreign ministry – oversees the network of defence adviser staff in Australia’s 91 overseas diplomatic missions. In late 2010, this comprised 92 personnel out of the approximately 650 non-operational Defence staff based overseas. To give some perspective, Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has about 500 staff overseas, and Australia has more than 4,000 troops deployed on operations.

Box 1 – Defence cooperation with Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea is one of several partner countries to Australia wherein the role of the military in domestic society and politics is considerably more prominent than in Australia. As a result, my friendship over nearly eight years with Commodore Peter Ilau, the Commander of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF), grew in importance beyond the mutual respect and friendship we...
enjoyed at the personal level. At that time, he was dealing with the simultaneous challenges of an extremely limited budget, difficulties with his own government officials and frequent pressure from Australian officials seeking to influence decisions.

Both Governments sought broadly mutual aims in changing the role and structure of a PNGDF that carried uncomfortable legacies from its formation after independence. Plans for downsizing were unpopular, and its employment in support of development assistance projects was often contentious in terms of priorities. However, drawing on our relationship developed during attendance at senior-level regional conferences and my visits to PNG, we were able to discuss issues in an informal and forthright manner. Mutual difficulties became matters of conversation rather than inflexible demands. As friends, we sought to understand each other’s position and modify our views where necessary, and were supported by our Defence Attachés who knew of the personal relationship. We were able to pass this information to our respective diplomatic officials and reach better outcomes.

These personal linkages are often formed over many years by officers who go on to be promoted to high rank in their respective militaries. The irreplaceable value of such connections based on trust and rapid, informal communication is borne out by events during difficult junctures during Australia’s relations with Indonesia (see Box 3).

Elsewhere, the early establishment of personal networks overseas, including as defence advisors or on exchange programs, helped several of the current most senior officers in the ADF to influence successful outcomes to some of Australia’s most sensitive pieces of security diplomacy. These have ranged from gaining operational access and basing rights for Australian forces during the 2003 Iraq war to securing a host-government invitation for Australia to deploy troops at the time of the 2006 crisis in East Timor. This underlines the particular importance of defence exchanges, whether staff college positions or integrated positions in foreign military units and headquarters.

Another important element of formal military diplomacy is defence-specific agreements – from treaties to memoranda of understanding and non-binding declarations. The ways in which such agreements can relate both to higher-level political diplomacy and operational cooperation is illustrated by the Australia-Japan experience. At the political level, a tightening of the strategic relationship between these two US allies has developed over the past decade. Milestones in this were the establishment of a foreign ministerial-level Trilateral Strategic Dialogue involving the United States and, in 2007, a prime ministerial bilateral security declaration, which foreshadowed, among other things, a ‘2+2’ defence and foreign ministers’ dialogue, a memorandum on defence cooperation and an agreement on logistics cooperation. On the ground, meanwhile, there developed unprecedented partnerships, notably with Australian military support to protect Japanese Self Defense Force reconstruction engineers in Iraq. More recently, if on a smaller scale, Australia has worked in a similar vein to support Singapore’s military commitment in Afghanistan. Partnership with both countries has been a success story for the coordination of
Australian defence diplomacy and wider international policy.

**Engagement and cooperation:** In addition to its obviously very deep engagement with the United States under the alliance, Defence works with a wide range of partner countries to improve communication, understanding and in certain cases capability on both sides in support of Australia’s international policy objectives. Examples in recent years have included training and education for Pakistani Army officers (including in counter-insurgency), and engagement with the navies of India, China, South Korea and Southeast Asian countries. These have strengthened existing diplomatic ties, although historically there have also been instances of military diplomacy leading the way in establishing formal interstate relations, as former naval officer and diplomat Mike Fogarty notes in Box 2.

**Box 2: The sea door to Saigon**

*During the 1950s and 1960s Australia was pursuing a policy of forward defence in South East Asia in the context of the Cold War. Military diplomacy was instrumental in forging bilateral links and maintaining regional alliances. Royal Australian Navy (RAN) visits to South Vietnam often preceded efforts by the then External Affairs department to develop linkages and establish rapport with Vietnamese political leaders. HMAS ANZAC visited Saigon in October 1956 as part of a Navy-initiated effort to develop relationships with South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) countries. The ship hosted both Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and the Vietnamese National Secretary of Defence.*

The visit and associated events developed mutual confidence and respect between the two navies. Subsequent RAN ship visits by HMAS Tobruk in 1959 and the Chief of Naval Staff visit to Saigon in April 1961 preceded the opening of the Vietnamese embassy in Canberra by several months. The ship visits boosted Australia’s profile in the region and demonstrated an important Cold War commitment to the anti-Soviet SEATO. They also served to affirm Australia’s relationship with the United States by demonstrating shared regional interests.

Defence educational and training institutions play their part in engagement, including through tailored courses for foreign military personnel or teaching them alongside their Australian peers. Australian military officers also complete reciprocal training in institutions abroad, not only with traditional allies and partners but also increasingly with such powers as India, Pakistan and China. These educational engagement efforts serve to seed relationships with future military leaders in countries directly tied to Australia’s interests.

Another systemic form of cooperation is Defence’s role in building capacity in partner nations. Australia maintains several defence programs designed to assist small nations in its neighbourhood – the Pacific Patrol Boat program being one of the most enduring, if not one of the most effective. This involves funding the construction and maintenance of patrol boats to afford countries like Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands a basic maritime surveillance capability.

Although official engagement with foreign militaries can at times be controversial, such
formal training linkages can prove to be of value in times of crisis. Cooperation between Australian Special Forces and Indonesian KOPASSUS soldiers in the 1990s proved of much broader value during the 1999 crisis surrounding the independence of East Timor, as retired Australian Army Major General Jim Molan explains in Box 3.

Box 3: The dividends of engagement: East Timor 1999

Australia’s defence engagement during the 1990s aimed to build the closest relationship with the Indonesian military as morally possible. This was so Australia could best understand the Indonesian military and its then unique role in the Indonesian Government. The moral aspect was important because Indonesia’s was at the time effectively an illegitimate regime - ultimately rejected by the Indonesian people. The Australian military’s role in this engagement was often misunderstood by government departments and by the media - increasing friction for those who had to implement policy.

The fall of President Suharto, the coming of democracy and the East Timor situation were not foreseeable in 1993, when I was the Jakarta-based Army Attaché. Nevertheless, efforts to engage with Indonesia, invest resources into language training, and to provide military personnel support were essential for Australia to be able to react to the unpredictable.

Australia’s access in Indonesia through our military engagement gave us great understanding, strategic leverage with our allies and increased Australia’s overall strategic credibility. This military engagement also contributed to the later success of Australia’s intervention in East Timor in 1999, when as the Defence Attaché, my attaches and I were standing on Dili airfield alongside Indonesian military officers awaiting the first INTERFET troops on 20 September. Our access and insight into the Indonesian military allowed Australia’s Government to make Indonesia policy decisions with confidence.

Relief and assistance: Defence assets have exceptional direct utility in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In this way, Defence provides unique tools for international policy as well as a practical means for Australia to show support to regional partners. A prime example is the ADF’s role in providing relief, and then sustained advice and cooperation after the Boxing Day 2004 tsunami. In the years since then, ADF has frequently undertaken humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, including in 2009 to Samoa, Tonga, and Indonesia, and more recently in response to the catastrophic flooding in Pakistan in 2010. All this experience has left Australia and the ADF well placed to play a central role in multilateral meetings and activities, including under the ASEAN Regional Forum, to share knowledge with developing nations on disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. One by-product of such discussions is their contribution, however modest, in building communication, trust and dialogue among regional militaries.

Intervention operations: Defence’s role in military interventions or multi-agency state building activities is the most commonly understood way that the ADF contributes to Australia’s international policy. The
continuing ADF role in the Solomon Islands since the initial 2003 intervention is a case in point. This operation, in which the military initially played a central role, has matured as a DFAT-led strand of Australia’s international policy efforts in the South Pacific, with a strong policing and aid component as well. It is worth emphasising here that Foreign Affairs is not the only agency Defence works closely with in its ‘diplomatic’ role: policing and development assistance have in recent years become increasingly crucial tools in Canberra’s international policy kit. The relatively recent memoranda of understanding between Defence and the AFP, and with AusAID, are welcome examples of how agencies can lay foundations for coordinating their international engagement including during crises.

The boundary between intervention and engagement sometimes blurs in useful ways: for instance, Australia’s military role in Afghanistan includes mentoring and reconstruction as well as combat. This gives Australian forces opportunities to diversify their operational partnership with the United States and other NATO forces, as well as providing capacity-building to Afghan government and security forces.

**Defence on autopilot?**

It is clear that Defence has substantial resources, networks and experience to contribute to Australia’s international relations. What is not so certain is whether these are all consistently brought to bear for maximum effectiveness as part of a national diplomatic strategy. To be sure, Defence activities often have meshed with clear directions in Australian foreign policy in recent years – such as efforts to deepen security links with India, to reduce instability in Pakistan, or to forge a balanced relationship and minimise misperceptions with a rising China. And sometimes ambitious Defence efforts – such as naval engagement with India – can be impeded by political differences which military goodwill can do nothing to ameliorate. In the current Indian example, foreign policy differences over issues such as uranium exports seem to be giving pause to an otherwise promising security partnership.

But there is also the risk of over-investment in some military engagement activities and relationships simply because they advance under their own momentum, without full cognisance of whether they follow national priorities. This should be no surprise, given an absence of clear whole-of-government prioritisation of international policy objectives, the scale and diversity of Australia’s international Defence engagement and the many agendas at play, including the agendas of the three Services.

A relatively small military such as Australia’s cannot play substantively with every foreign partner. This calls for regular reappraisal of the priority and resources attached to different bilateral defence relationships. Such an approach will sometimes require difficult decisions, for instance about shifting staff from one country to another, winding back long-established defence activities with some partners and opening new levels of engagement with others. Some bilateral defence links, especially in Asia and with key NATO partners, might be assessed as core relationships, to be developed over the long
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term. Others might receive more or less emphasis depending on temporary operational partnerships (such as Australia and the Netherlands in Afghanistan) or defence industry considerations (which helped inform the decision to locate a defence attaché at the Australian embassy in Spain, a position reassigned from Rome in recent years).

Any such shifts in engagement investment will need to be carefully managed. When resources are limited, however, and ruthless trade-offs have to be made as to which external relationships need priority attention, it is in the national interest to identify and address any residual instances of ‘defence diplomacy on autopilot’. There are several ways this might be done, some of which build upon progress made in recent years.

Improving defence diplomacy

Strategic guidance on foreign policy:
Developing and articulating long-term international policy objectives poses obvious challenges. Critics might suggest that declaring too precise a long-term policy position could stymie the day-to-day work of diplomats, who need room for manoeuvre when domestic political opinion and external situations change. But it should be possible to distinguish strategic objectives from the tactical manoeuvring necessary to achieve long-term policy. National-level strategic objectives cannot be merely rhetoric, nor can they be overly specific. Even so, without common points of reference, it becomes hard or even impossible efficiently to pursue and coordinate diplomacy and engagement by multiple agencies across multiple tracks. The large and growing number of government agencies with a clear foreign and security policy dimension to their work makes it more necessary than ever for such objectives to be articulated at a national level. The broadened concept of security that has become widely accepted over the last two decades demands no less.

There are several ways this policy foundation could be provided. Foremost among these would be a foreign affairs white paper – the last one was in 2003, from a different government and in considerably different strategic and political circumstances. While useful, Defence White Papers are not designed to be the only declaratory source of foreign policy. Another, perhaps reinforcing, option would be to provide regular foreign policy statements at foreign ministerial or prime ministerial level. This idea was committed to in the Rudd Government’s 2008 National Security Statement, but does not appear to have been followed up thus far.

Clearer communication between DFAT and Defence: Defence diplomacy would be more effective, more often, if it were better understood and utilised by officials from other agencies, and part of Defence’s responsibility here is to ensure that DFAT and others have no excuse for not knowing precisely what its diplomatic potential really is. Defence needs to sustain and expand its efforts to raise awareness of the diplomatic tools and channels that the military can provide. Defence currently briefs all new heads of mission – ambassadors and high commissioners – before they go overseas. This could be extended to all Australian diplomats with foreign policy duties. In return, it would be useful to develop a system of regular DFAT advice to Defence on...
priorities for day-to-day diplomatic efforts – and not only through internal meetings at individual embassies. At the same time, Defence personnel – especially those posted overseas and those communicating with them from Australia – need to ensure that their reporting and policy perspectives on international issues are transparent to other agencies. This can be done through consistent use of the diplomatic cable network and minimising reliance on informal channels such as email.

Better interdepartmental planning: Virtually all foreign policy challenges today require solutions crafted and executed by more than one agency. Systems of collaborative planning at the strategic level are now well established *within* Defence as well as, in more modest terms, at an interagency level all the way up to the National Security Committee of Cabinet. Regular collaborative meetings between senior officials also take place between some agencies, such as Defence and AusAID.

At an operational level, this spirit of collaboration has translated into, for example, Federal Police and AusAID liaison presences in Defence’s Headquarters Joint Operations Command. As mentioned earlier, the AFP and AusAID have also developed memoranda of understanding with Defence in order to reduce the need for inter-departmental planning from scratch in response to sudden crises overseas.13

There may be scope for a similar arrangement between DFAT and Defence. An adviser from Defence already serves within the Joint Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade – although the primary role here is provision of advice to the Defence Sub-Committee. The DFAT-Defence relationship could benefit, then, from the placement of a formal Defence liaison officer in DFAT, similar to the Army placement within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.14 Meanwhile, although some of the Defence Department’s international policy officials often have had diplomatic experience, it would useful to consider placing a DFAT liaison officer within the Australian Defence Headquarters, both as a communications channel and to improve collaborative planning in foreign policy initiatives.

Sharing the lead: The concept of distributed leadership involves establishing which agency offers the greatest potential to coordinate a particular policy action, and giving it the resources, authority and accountability it needs. At the national level, this would involve transferring execution of international policy endeavours from DFAT to another agency, were it better suited to deliver. Australia has increasing experience of this approach to international policy – for instance with AusAID taking the lead, and Defence in support, during recent cyclone relief in Papua New Guinea.

None of this need mean a diminution of the role of DFAT. In theory, this Department has the status, expertise and bureaucratic freedom of manoeuvre not only to interpret government-wide priorities in international policy but also to define and direct them. Questions remain, however, about whether DFAT has the resources across the board for both a leadership *and* execution role in an international policy and national security bureaucracy that in recent years has become heavily concentrated in an expanded Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.
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The restoration of DFAT’s policy planning unit is a promising start. What remains to be seen is whether DFAT is ready or equipped to play fully in the contest for bureaucratic influence within Canberra that a ‘first among equals’ role in international policy would require.

Make interagency experience the rule: The United States has made it compulsory for officials and military officers to gain interagency experience as a precondition for promotion to high rank. A purpose of this is so they can better understand the role and functions of other departments and agencies. In Australia, there is merit in the idea of likewise making experience working in, or closely with, other agencies a condition for promotion to senior levels in the ADF and the Defence and Foreign Affairs bureaucracies. In any event, the establishment of a National Security College at the Australian National University provides an obvious platform for a common educational foundation about working across the national security community, although it is only a partial solution.

Harmonising defence diplomacy with international partners: Just as it pays to coordinate international policy execution and planning among national agencies, there are similar large payoffs in harmonising multi-agency, defence-related diplomacy with partner nations – and indeed through multilateral arrangements – where interests sufficiently converge. This is possible at varying degrees of intimacy in cooperation. One of the key goals here is to encourage partners also to develop high levels of interagency coordination in their defence diplomacy. After all, helping partner nations break down their own interagency barriers and suspicions is in Canberra’s interests, since it helps empower friends to do more to help Australia. Conversely, Australia might learn from some partners’ own progress in this field.

Despite the greater size of its military and wider policy bureaucracy, the United States still holds lessons for Australia in coordinating defence and diplomacy. The forces controlled by US Pacific Command (PACOM) comprise not only massive combat power for force projection, but also an exceptionally capable and wide-ranging diplomatic instrument, useful for registering tangible signals of partnership, reassurance and of course deterrence. PACOM’s defence diplomacy, such as ship visits, training exercises, dialogues and disaster relief efforts, occurs in the context of strategic guidance documents such as the US National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review, and often in coordination with State Department efforts.

At a working level, meanwhile, the Theater Security Cooperation Program offers not only a framework to coordinate bilaterally and with third countries, but also a compelling example of how international policy can be coordinated effectively across government agencies. Like other Combatant Commands such as Central Command and the fledgling Africa Command, PACOM coordinates with the US State Department as well as other US agencies that play a role in security cooperation within the vast PACOM area of responsibility, which covers the entire Pacific and much of the Indian Ocean.

Australia’s experience with Japan in recent years demonstrates both the value of, and some
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of the challenges to, interagency coordination in building defence diplomacy with likeminded states. Japan has long been notorious for the stove-piped nature of its bureaucracy: coordination and communication between the foreign ministry and the former defence agency – only recently elevated to a ministry – was long minimal, although it is now improving. By advancing a genuinely political-military relationship, capped by a leaders’ declaration and a ‘2+2’ combined dialogue of foreign and defence ministers, Australia has contributed to a much-needed improvement in a vital partner’s own ability to move towards using its defence force for diplomatic ends, despite constitutional and domestic political limitations.

Closer to home, Australia’s relationship with New Zealand in pursuit of a stable and secure common neighbourhood provides a textbook opportunity for such collaboration. In tandem with close military partnership, great scope exists for their aid agencies to work collaboratively for common security-related development goals. Equally, there are circumstances where the AFP’s International Deployment Group and the New Zealand Defence Force may strive towards commonly articulated strategic objectives through harmonised operational or tactical-level actions.

A third close neighbour that offers Australia considerable potential in multi-agency defence diplomacy is France: the French authorities in New Caledonia, and the substantial French military forces and personnel of other agencies based there, constitute one of the more capable security partners for Australia in the South Pacific. The 2009 Australia-France Defence Cooperation Agreement brings the bilateral relationship to new levels, particularly by providing a legal framework for combined activities such as the multilateral Exercise Croix du Sud. Increasingly, real-life emergencies are demonstrating the benefits of such a close and effective entente.

Conclusion

Diplomacy through defence channels provides the Australian Government with powerful alternative mechanisms for achieving international policy outcomes in support of more conventional foreign service diplomacy. War is not the only means of international policy for which militaries are suited.

The effectiveness of defence diplomacy, however, is far from automatic. Credibility and mutual trust, built up through long-term and often informal engagement with forces from other nations, comprise a significant component. But another is the coordination of defence diplomacy with national foreign policy goals, other agencies and likeminded nations. This quality is not a given when defence diplomacy proceeds on autopilot, no matter how competently, impressively or sincerely it is executed. With little prospect on the horizon for a large augmentation of Australia’s diplomatic resources, and with security becoming a common thread across policy issues ranging from aid to climate change to terrorism to more traditional questions of war and peace, the need for good defence diplomacy has never been greater.
NOTES

1 This paper draws on the author’s discussions with a range of senior serving and former military officers and officials. Agencies and institutions consulted included the Department of Defence (including International Policy Division, the three Services and Joint Operations Command), the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, AusAID, the Australian Federal Police, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Asia-Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence. The author also acknowledges significant input to this paper from its editor, Lowy Institute international security program director Rory Medcalf, and from Lowy Institute military associate James Brown.


3 Ibid. p 8.


5 Ibid., p 43.

6 Ibid., p 93.

7 Allan Gyngell, Jillian Broadbent, William Maley, Brad Orgill, Peter Shergold and Ric Smith, *Australia’s diplomatic deficit: reinvesting in our instruments of international policy*. Sydney, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 18 March, 2009, p 36. Figures provided to the author by Attaché & Overseas Management, Department of Defence, October, 2010. The remainder of non-operational, overseas-based staff are in exchange or liaison positions, or undertaking professional training or education.

8 Peter Leahy, personal account provided to the author, 2009. Lieutenant General Leahy was Australia’s Chief of Army between 2002 and 2008.

9 Mike Fogarty, personal account provided to the author, 2009. Mike Fogarty was an Australian naval officer from 1967-70, prior to a twenty-eight year career in the foreign services, including in Hanoi and Singapore.

10 For example, the Defence International Training Centre in Victoria hosts foreign military soldiers and officers for training and education opportunities with the ADF and Australia, while the Royal Military College Duntroon trains selected officers from countries as diverse as Brunei, East Timor, and Tonga.


13 International Policy Division and Global Programs Division, *Defence - AusAID Partnership*; Department of Defence and Police, *Defence-AFP MOU on Interoperability*.

14 There is an important distinction, however, in the role and responsibility of a liaison officer and a secondee: the former provides representation, advice and coordination of communications between the host and sponsor organisations; the latter is effectively ‘lent’ to the host organisation to augment capacity and provide beneficial experience to the individual from the placement.
Indeed, the Commander of PACOM has on his personal staff a full-time senior diplomat on secondment as foreign policy adviser.


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