MAPPING RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN VICTORIA

APPLYING A GENDER LENS TO DEVELOP PREVENTION AND DERADICALISATION APPROACHES

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BACKGROUND

There has been growing concern about the rise of the far-right in Australia, notably by ASIO in its recent annual reports. While the focus of violent extremism has overwhelmingly been Islamist terrorism and radicalisation, there is a need to widen the scope of what counts as ‘violent extremism’ in an era of alt-right and populist impulses, which largely hark back to ideas of national chauvinism and retuning society to traditional ideas of ‘order’, both publicly and privately. Significantly the relationship between acts of (terrorist) violence and gendered violence are gaining attention. Some recent perpetrators of terrorist violence have a past history of violence towards women or family violence. This has been the case in Victoria (notably the Bourke Street car attack in 2017), Sydney (Lindt Café siege in 2015) and in numerous cases internationally. Thus, the link between family violence, anti-women or anti-feminist sentiment, masculinity and broader extremism and radicalisation requires further investigation. This project responds to increasing right-wing extremism and anti-feminist sentiment in Victoria by mapping the social media activities of Victorian far-right extremists, including links with family violence, anti-feminist and other extremist sentiment.

AIMS

This project aims to map right-wing extremism in Victoria through the lens of gender. It begins from the premise that there is an underexplored connection between anti-feminist sentiment and far-right extremist sentiment. It does this by focusing on select Victorian-based online groups that have an anti-feminist and far-right profile. The project also works with stakeholders who work in the areas of gender and family violence, to gain insight into their practices and experiences.

MAIN FINDINGS

Our research found that far-right and anti-feminist sentiment is mutually reinforcing but differs depending on social media platform and wider context. Anti-feminism appears to be a ‘uniting ideology’ in far-right extremism. It brings together key themes that animate far-right ideology, such as hierarchy, order, power and a preference for ‘tradition’; it also becomes reinforcing when those who hold far-right views believe ‘the system’ works against them, and harbour a sense of ‘aggreiieved entitlement’ which is related to ideas of relative deprivation (that minorities and women benefit at their expense). The normalisation of extreme views of women and gender, aided by misinformation, is an issue frontline workers contend with. Violence is an issue that appears on the horizon.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

We suggest top-down and bottom-up approaches to counter violent extremism. Top-down approaches would include relating anti-gender violence as a public threat or associating it as a security issue, better monitoring of online social spaces and legislation that extends vilification to include gender. Bottom-up approaches are derived from our data collection findings and include the need to take a nuanced and careful approach to C/PVE measures that cover both anti-gender and far-right ideology. These include paying careful attention to trigger points, countering misinformation, providing alternative narratives and considering how far-right groups provide men with emotional support networks, with a view to providing better alternatives.
GLOSSARY

Anti-feminism
An oppositional position to feminism, which can be individual or part of a collective such as men’s or father’s rights groups, with the goal of protecting the power and privilege of men over women (Dupuis-Déri 2016, 23; Flood in Price-Robertson 2012; Nicholas & Agius 2018, 34).

Anti-gender
Movements and campaigns opposing issues relating to gender, particularly women’s and LGBTQIA+ rights and policies, usually manifesting in religious, right-wing and populist groups and movements (Darakchi 2019, 211; Kováts 2018, 2).

Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism (C/PVE)
Approaches to violent extremism that are located outside a security-driven framework. CVE approaches tend to focus on communities in the area of social work and education, whereas PVE measures involve addressing the drivers of marginalisation. The two approaches have been used interchangeably (Stephens et al 2019). The Victorian government, in alignment with the Commonwealth government, defines countering violent extremism (CVE) as, “the efforts...to prevent processes of radicalisation leading to violent extremism, including terrorism, and where possible to help individuals disengage from a preparedness to support or commit acts of violence to achieve political, social or ideological ends”. (Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention and Response Report 2, 2017, 18) We will refer to C/PVE to capture broad measures relating to preventing and countering violent extremism.

Extremism
A belief system which is predicated on the hostile action of an in-group toward a perceived out-group, which may or may not be violent or involve terrorist acts, and that hostile action must be unconditional and tied to the in-group’s definition of success or survival (Berger 2018, 44-45).

Family violence
“Encompasses domestic violence, intimate partner violence and sibling violence. Cases of child neglect, child abuse, child sexual abuse, sexual assault and rape may occur in the context of family violence; however, these forms of violence may also occur outside the context of the family, such as institutional abuse or stranger violence” (Long et al 2017).

Far-right or right-wing extremism
The definitions and terminology of far-right ideology or right-wing extremism varies, depending on context, country, type of organisation, aspects of ideology, and other factors. Broadly, far-right extremism embraces a range of themes, such as anti-immigration, traditional values, national chauvinism, and in recent populist manifestations, anti-establishment sentiment that characterises the radical right or alt-right (see Dean et al 2016). Throughout this report we will mostly refer to ‘the far-right’, ‘far-right extremism’ and, to a lesser extent, ‘right-wing extremism’, to capture the sentiment and groups we have examined.

Feminism
A social movement or idea dedicated to equality between the sexes, from the premise that there are injustices against women (McAfee 2018).

Gender
A social category assigned at or before birth based on visible sex characteristics. Historically and popularly considered to correlate to two biological sexes of either male or female, infants are assigned man or woman. These two categories then represent one of the most central social categories with various attributes traditionally tied to each. Almost all societies also operate with male and men as more powerful (Nicholas 2014).
Hegemonic masculinity
Masculine ideals (specific to localities) that serve as the model that men in that context strive for. ‘Hegemonic’ refers to the way that they have a kind of informal, cultural authority by being the implicit ideals that are understood by most members of that culture. Other men gain privilege by complicity with the hegemonic ideal, and all men, even if subordinated or marginalised by it, gain from the ‘patriarchal dividend’ received by being not women (Connell 1995).

Incel
Short for ‘involuntary celibate’, the incel community is a group found primarily online of men who believe they are owed sexual attention by women, an entitlement which is rooted in misogyny, racism and violence (Women and Gender Equality Canada 2019).

Intersectionality
An approach that centres the interactions between existing vulnerabilities to create layers of disempowerment (Crenshaw 1991, 1249), particularly regarding discrimination and inequalities based on gender, race and ethnicity, class, age, sexuality, and ability (Gill 2007, 149).

Manosphere
Refers to online anti-feminist groups that gather through blogs, forums and websites, often associated with the Men’s Rights Movement and similar communities, that argue that men are unfairly discriminated against and subjugated by women as a justification for misogynistic and male supremacist discourse (Futrelle 2020; Lyons 2017, 8; Nicholas & Agius 2018, 35).

Radicalisation
There is little to no consensus amongst the scholarly community on how radicalisation is best defined. However, governmental agencies in Australia define radicalisation, as a process through which someone “becomes extreme in their thinking and behaviour... during radicalisation a person’s ideology will become increasingly extreme” (Commonwealth Government 2020).

Social media
Networked communication platforms which involves creating a unique profile, connecting with other users, and producing or interacting with user-generated content (Ellison & Boyd 2013, 159).

Terrorism
Defined by ASIO as ‘politically motivated violence’, including acts or threats of violence that are intended to achieve a political outcome or influence government policy, lead to violence, attempt to overthrow a governmental system, or involve other acts defined as terrorism (Australian Security Intelligence Organisation [ASIO] 2019). The definition of terrorism varies widely between countries, organisations and government agencies and can be based on acts, intentions and results, impact on audience, motivations or criminal codes (Schmid and Jongman 2005).

Violence
The use of force or power intentionally against an individual, group, or oneself, which results in or is likely to result in harm (World Health Organisation 2002), which can manifest structurally, epistemically (through silencing), discursively, and symbolically (Nicholas & Agius 2018, 17).
Figure 1: Overall project aims

- Map activities
- Analyse how far-right & anti-gender sentiment is mutually reinforcing
- Stakeholder input & strategies for reform
A. PROJECT OVERVIEW

Overview and Background

This project aims to map right-wing extremism in Victoria through the lens of gender. It begins from the premise that there is an underexplored connection between anti-feminist sentiment and right-wing extremist sentiment. While many studies on the far-right have focused on hate speech and violence in the context of anti-immigrant and especially anti-Muslim sentiment (Lewis et al 2019), gender has been a neglected category of investigation. Indeed, some recent perpetrators of terrorist violence have a past history of violence towards women or family violence. This has been the case in Victoria (notably the Bourke Street car attack in 2017), Sydney (Lindt Café siege in 2015) and in numerous cases internationally (Smith, 2019; Johnston and True, 2019; Duriesmith, Ryan & Zimmerman, 2018; Baele, Brace & Coan, 2019; McCulloch et al 2019; Träbert 2017). Thus, the link between family violence, anti-women or anti-feminist sentiment, masculinity and broader extremism and radicalisation requires further investigation. Michael Flood, prominent Australian expert on masculinities, has argued that Australia has a long-established network of anti-feminist men’s groups, where men’s and father’s rights groups overlap; he describes this as an ‘anti-feminist backlash’ (see Flood in Price-Robertson, 2012). The impetus of ‘backlash’ discourses is usually the view that women and/or other minority groups (such as Indigenous people or migrants) exaggerate their oppression or have increased or disproportionate power, and are subordinating white, straight men (also seen as ‘reverse discrimination’ or ‘relative deprivation’) (Campion 2019a, 222; Nicholas & Agius 2018, 36; Gray & Nicholas 2018).

ASIO has been noting the rise of extreme right groups for some time, but in its 2018-19 annual report it signalled more clearly that “current extreme right-wing networks are better organised and more sophisticated than those of the past.” (ASIO, 2019, 4 and 20; see also Campion, 2019; Harris-Hogan, 2012, 2017; Fleming and Mondon 2018; Patel, 2019). Yet the relationship between far-right and anti-feminist or anti-gender sentiment and masculinity appears to be a missing link. To date, most of the connection between extremism and gender in relation to deradicalisation has been focused on the role that women can play in (Islamic) deradicalisation efforts, placing much responsibility on women to prevent or counter violent extremism while less attention is paid to “how gender might function in the dynamics of violent extremism and radicalisation.” (Pearson 2019, 96)

Narrowing down to the Victorian case, this research builds on past studies of social cohesion and violent extremism which noted the need for research on the gender dimension (Grossman et al 2016) and the role of ‘heroic’ and violent masculinity (Lewis et al 2017) in violent extremism. The project seeks to gain a clearer picture of these links at the state level in the online environment. Since the Reclaim Australia rallies in 2015, the far-right has grown predominantly online, using social media platforms like Facebook to form communities and spread messages to a large number of people; for example, the Nationalist Uprising page, which posted anti-Islam content and was run by a noted Australian far-right figure, had more than 100,000 followers (Wroe & Koslowski 2019). The livestreaming of the Christchurch attack of March 2019 by an Australian white supremacist who killed 51 people after posting his manifesto on social media platforms such as 8chan and Twitter has brought the connection between extremist ideology and violence to the fore (Nguyen 2019; Purtill 2019; Miller 2020). Cunneen and Russell (2020, 96) argue that social media platforms provide a real-time way of connecting over a “vision of moral unity”, and therefore can amplify and manufacture misogynist, racist and other extremist discourse.

Aims and Objectives

This project responds to increasing right-wing extremism and anti-feminist sentiment in Victoria by mapping the social media activities of Victorian far-right extremists, including links with family violence, anti-feminist and other extremist sentiment. A secondary aim is to determine how anti-feminist sentiment and far-right extremism are mutually reinforcing. We then use these findings to examine how existing prevention and deradicalisation strategies acknowledge or address gendered violence and masculinity. The research is informed by stakeholders who work with men who use violence, who have reflected on our findings and helped identify strategies for effective reform.

Scope and Gap

The project’s scope is focused on the Victorian case. There will, however, be connections at the national and international level, due to the nature of group interactions and social media engagement, limited in this study to Twitter and YouTube. We largely focus our cases in a post-2015 time frame, to update previous work conducted in this area under community and social cohesion projects funded by the State of Victoria (Grossman et al 2016; Lewis et al 2019). The scope of the project may also be restricted by changed rules around social media data collection, discussed below.
This section describes how social media data were collected and analysed in combination with stakeholder input. We report on the results of these activities in Section C. These findings inform our evaluation of existing approaches, described in Section D, followed by suggestions for effective reform and future activities.

The project involved four activities that were used to address our project aims. These included:

1. Social media data collection;
2. Qualitative content and textual analyses;
3. An evaluation of existing counter and de-radicalisation approaches; and
4. The development of strategies for effective reform.

Prior to data collection, ethics approval for the project was obtained from the Swinburne University Human Research Ethics Committee (Ref: 20191261-1655).

**Stakeholder surveys**

Stakeholders were engaged across all stages of the project to provide feedback, advise on relevant programs and strategies, and ensure the relevance of our subsequent policy implications. In addition to stakeholder workshops and individual consultations, we conducted an online survey. The purpose of the survey was twofold: to inform our social media search terms and to provide insight into the meaning of terms and the phenomenon under investigation. As such, the survey informed both our social media methods and the findings.

Surveys were undertaken with Victorian frontline workers who come in to contact with men who use family violence in order to gauge the extent to which they observed negative views about women and anti-feminist or other extremist sentiment. This was to corroborate the themes and sentiments we observed in social media data and consider how it makes its way into offline contexts and features among the specific population of men who use family violence. The survey was sent to various organisations who have contact with men who use family violence as part of their service, and their frontline workers asked to complete it. We cannot name the organisations for ethical reasons, and because the organisations requested anonymity. We had 18 respondents. The low number is likely due to the niche nature of this work, as well as the extent to which people providing services such as these are overworked and this was a voluntary additional task. The data was analysed quantitatively and thematically, and compared with the social media data.

**Social media data collection and analysis**

As social media has been shown to be a key site for the distribution and communication of both anti-feminist and extreme far-right ideas (Badalich 2019; Jones Trott Wright 2019; Ging 2019; Hutchinson et al 2013), the project looked to Twitter and YouTube to gain insight into the nature of and overlap between these. However, social media is diverse, with different audiences and degrees of privacy (for example, while Twitter and YouTube both allow for pseudonymous usernames, other platforms like Facebook require ‘real names’). Different affordances, which are “possibilities for action” (Evans et al. 2017, 36), are offered by various platforms, or in other words, different social media platforms allow their users to do different things (See Figure 2 Social media spectrum, below).

At one end of this spectrum is Twitter, which allows users to have global reach and engagement through brief 280-character messages which can include images, videos and URL links. Tweets are time stamped, and users can make their profiles public or private, can follow or block users as well as message privately. Users can reply to tweets, retweet messages, tag users and use hashtags. There were 330 million Twitter users in the first quarter of 2019 (Statista, 2019).

At the other end of the spectrum are media such as YouTube, which enables curated content on an author’s YouTube channel. Audiences can follow particular channels, engage with its audio-visual content and participate in contextualised discussions of the video contents and themes with other users. In this respect YouTube provides a space for engagement with a community of like-minded viewers. YouTube is driven by ‘recommender algorithms’. YouTube is owned by Google, and its algorithm is designed to get users to spend more time on its site. It has been found that its recommender algorithm suggests more extreme or inflammatory videos and content (Nicas, 2018; Lewis, 2018; Quinn, Blackall, Dodd 2020). Combined with ‘fake news’, this represents a serious channel of potential radicalisation and in some assessments, contributes to extremism (Tufekci, 2018; Berger 2018).
Discussions organised around hashtags
Comments not reliant on context
Shareability within platform
Text based, option to share A/V content
Can tag other users in posts/replies
Private messaging function

Discussions organised around specific content
Comments reliant on context (specific content)
‘Recommender algorithms’
Audio/visual content based
Dislike function
Users can follow/subscribe to channels
Curation-based (playlist function)

Overlap
Can share outside platform
Like function
Threaded replies
Anonymity/pseudonymity
User generated-content
User profiles
Followers/subscribers

Figure 2: Social media spectrum
Ethical restrictions on accessing social media data

We examined both Twitter and YouTube data to assess the social media activities of far-right extremists and their engagement with anti-feminist ideas. We faced three challenges in collecting social media data. The first was related to updated regulations by social media providers, which in some cases restricted the time frames of searches (Batrinca and Treleaven, 2015; Giachanou and Crestani, 2016). Second, the social media landscape is constantly changing in terms of access and searchability. A number of the groups we identified have either been banned from some sites or their presence has become defunct/removed/moved to other harder-to-access sites where membership is monitored. The prominent group Antipodean Resistance, for example, can be difficult to track because its Twitter account was closed in 2017 and its main recruiting platform was shut down by the host provider for violation of terms of service (nor would researchers be able to ‘join’ or access private groups such as those in Facebook, for ethical reasons). Anonymous forums such as 4chan and 8chan have deleted some alt-right and far-right forums, and Telstra banned access to 4chan, 8chan, as well as other platforms in March 2019 after the Christchurch mosque shootings. The third challenge concerned new ethics requirements around the collection of social media data and privacy (NHMRC 2018: 33). This meant that we were unable to identify individuals or groups and had to de-identify individuals who posted on social media as well as the specific social media video content we selected and analysed.

Sourcing social media data

To collect social media data, we used the social media monitoring tool, TalkWalker, which collects social media based on search criteria. The search criteria that we employed limited our search to Victoria, to particular social media types and to a specific time period (January 1 to March 31, 2020). We then sought to limit our search to particular key terms, derived from our literature review, a survey of industry stakeholders, and exploratory social media searches.

We also conducted a purposive search of YouTube videos. The YouTube channels of two Victorian-based anti-feminist groups and two far-right groups were selected for detailed review. The top five videos (based on number of views) from each of the selected YouTube channels were chosen for further analysis. These videos and the associated viewer comments spanned April 2013 to December 2019.
Qualitative content and textual analyses

Across the two social media data sources, all data that contained personal identifiers were replaced by a code prior to analysis. The videos analysed in YouTube were coded to avoid issues with identification, consent and privacy. The social media posts of users also cannot be used verbatim, because statements and comments can be easily searched online, revealing the identity of the user. Despite social media being in the public domain, consent for the use of openly available comments cannot be given by the user (NHMRC 2018: 16-22). As such, when we collated the comments gathered from social media, we reviewed the comments and classified them into broad groups or labels to indicate the type of sentiment or comment posted.

For both social media sources, we filtered the data to provide data only from those de-identified users who commented on both far-right (FR) and anti-feminist (AF) issues. The YouTube data stored in the Excel file was further analysed in Tableau, a data analysis and visualization tool, that shows various trends found in the YouTube data. The data on users who commented across the two topics, for both forms of social media data, then allowed an analysis of the overlaps between the two domains as well as the mutually reinforcing nature of the content of each, as we now turn to describe.
Informed by stakeholder input and survey results, we present the data findings based on emergent themes. Twitter and YouTube data give an insight into how far-right and anti-feminist views were portrayed on social media platforms, and in some places, where they overlap. We first provide an overview of the far-right and anti-feminist sentiment expressed in the various data sources, before we disaggregated the data findings by thematic content to show the connections and overlaps within and between specific platforms.

Far-right sentiment
The data collection showed a nuanced view of far-right sentiment. On Twitter, for instance, we observed strong resistance to far-right ideas and a good deal of pushback. At the same time, stakeholders’ survey responses indicated that men who use family violence often implicitly supported far-right ideas. Stakeholders noted that such men may not necessarily identify with specific far-right groups, but rather share broader agreement with far-right ideas that relate to anti-system views and traditional views of women, order and society. For stakeholders working with men who use violence, there was also recognition that their clients purposely avoided mentioning far-right connections or sentiment, either because there were issues with trust or that these men were aware that such views were considered problematic in the mainstream.

The ambiguous support for far-right ideas that we found on Twitter and in stakeholder feedback tallied with research that shows that the far-right movement in Australia is looser and less well formed compared to other countries, but nonetheless an ongoing concern (Peucker, Smith and Iqbal 2019; Hutchinson 2019; Campion 2019; Dean et al 2016). YouTube data, however, showed that there was overwhelming agreement with far-right sentiment in the data analysed. Our key finding here is that support for the far-right as a movement or for far-right ideas can be implicit, explicit or perhaps more covert.

Have the men that you work with expressed extremist right-wing views?

![Figure 3: Survey response: far-right views](image)
Figure 4: Wordcloud of most common terms from survey
Anti-left and racist sentiment

Anti-left sentiment was prominent among YouTube users and also featured in stakeholders’ survey responses (see Figures 5 and 6: word clouds of most common terms in FR and AF data). Anti-left sentiment was to be expected, as it lies at the opposite end of political polarisation. In the social media data, the left were seen as natural enemies who, in the context of far-right views, supported immigration, the inappropriate expansion of women’s rights, and the prioritisation of the rights of other minorities at the expense of nationalism and patriotism. Racism, particularly anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim sentiment, appeared regularly in the YouTube commentary.

Stakeholders also provided similar insights, albeit from a very different perspective. In the more open-ended questions, stakeholders listed One Nation, anti-feminist sites or ideas, as well as men expressing anti-left ideas (6% of survey respondents mentioned this) or disgruntlement or blame towards people of colour or immigrants (28% of survey respondents mentioned). The following representative quotation from one stakeholder response underlines the implicit anti-feminist and racist sentiment that they encountered in practice, but which was illustrative of what was found in more explicit forms, online:

“They may scoff, or get angry at the group facilitators who are doing an acknowledgement of country. They may speak about women as liars, or as men being the real victims, that feminism is going ‘too far’. Similar sentiments are said in racial terms. That really it is white men that are now oppressed.”

An explanation for the often implicit nature of such in-person anti-left sentiment is that the survey respondents were in contact with men in professional capacities. In these circumstances, men were not in an affirming environment for anti-feminist and far-right sentiment. It is unlikely, for example, that a man would mention support for gun rights in court. The social media data, by contrast, shows a greater correlation between anti-feminist and other far-right ideas as in this space, and on YouTube in particular, men who hold far-right views are ‘preaching to the converted’. Where the stakeholders’ insights are relevant to this online space is that at times of disgruntlement – such as when engaging with the family court – men are accessing online material that has strong overlap with the extreme right content that exists in the ‘manosphere’ (Nicholas & Agius 2018). In light of social media features that usher users towards more radical content, and the misinformation and myths circulating in this space, attention is needed to curtail further radicalisation.
Anti-feminism

One of the main findings evident across the social media and stakeholder datasets was the prevalence and strength of anti-feminist sentiment, which was sometimes explicit and at other times implicit. On Twitter, for example, men tweeted more about anti-feminist terms (57%) than they did about far-right (43%) terms.

Figure 7 (word cloud for frequency of terms in far-right YouTube videos) shows how often feminism and anti-feminism occurred in far-right content that was not explicitly about feminism. In terms of what constituted anti-feminist sentiment, many of the YouTube comments relating to anti-feminism regarded feminists as ‘hypocritical’ – commenters responded to videos that showed feminists and put forward the view that feminism is inconsistent in its messaging and purpose. For instance, women’s equality equated to a decline in equality for men, or was regarded as an attempt to exert power over men. The label of ‘feminazi’ featured frequently.

A key insight provided by stakeholders that has impact for ‘countering’ anti-feminist and far-right ideas is that the men rarely described themselves as anti-feminist. This was also the case online. Rather, anti-feminism was implicit in their perception of a system that is anti-men. When asked to list the targets of men’s frustration, stakeholders listed these, in order of commonality, as (1) ex-partners or partners; (2) family court, child protection, legal system; (3) ‘The system’ or a ‘system against men’. The targets of men’s frustration were more specific in stakeholders’ accounts of their interactions with aggrieved men; again, likely framed and filtered by the nature of their service interactions. As a result, stakeholder responses indicate how men may not conceptualise their ideas as anti-feminist or extreme at all, which has implications for addressing them. However, online forums may offer such aggrieved men a platform where they can express their ideas in an unfiltered way (with terms such as ‘feminazi’).

Aggrievement (perception that ‘the system’ works against men)

What brought together both far-right sentiment and anti-feminist sentiment was a sense of aggrievement, or ‘aggrieved entitlement’ (Vito et al 2018). Common in both the online and stakeholders’ survey data was the idea that men commonly felt that the ‘system’ (courts, institutions) worked against men in favour of women. These ideas were strongest in the YouTube social media data, where anger against the system expressed in anti-feminist video comments often are of the view that women already benefit within society and have unequal power compared to men (see Figures 5, 6, 7: wordclouds of most common terms and phrases in radical right, anti-feminist videos respectively, and combined. These all feature ‘the system’ in some form prominently).
There are also complaints or comments in the YouTube data about the ‘system’ being against men and such commentary was associated with racist comments and in some cases, showed support for violence. For example, the main constellation of YouTube issues were users’ critical of feminism and the left. However, the perception that the ‘system’ works against them/men was derived only from far-right videos, but at the same time, anti-system views overlapped across anti-feminist views as well as anti-left or racist comments. These overlapping sentiments resonated with what our stakeholder survey told us: frontline workers who work with men who use family violence tend to perceive that ‘the system’ or institutions are working against them in favour of women or their partners. Similarly, in the Twitter data, men’s rights were one common widely-tweeted issue across both far-right and anti-feminist terms. But, it was often an issue which drew opposition rather than being embraced as a term by those in support of such ideas.

Taken together, our Twitter, YouTube and survey data revealed a constellation of terms and issues that were the common focus of online or service discussions. Visual representations of these terms are below for our survey and YouTube data, and are consistent with the themes described above.

The convergence of ideas around anti-left sentiment, feminism and systems that work against men carry overtones of men having to ‘respond’ to perceived inequities, at times through violence. The YouTube videos themselves often carry the narrative that men are victims (of feminism or ‘the system’) and there is a strategy of baiting women in these videos (for example, in public gatherings or marches) under the guise of ‘genuinely’ wanting to understand why feminism is unequal. Some of the videos analysed present these myths as positions that warrant ‘genuine’ inquiry and debate. When efforts were made to explain how inequality functions, women and those supporting feminist positions were described as inflexible, intolerant and wanting unequal power. Viewers were often invited to comment on such narratives or reflect on the ‘contrary’ messages of feminists.

Understanding how these narratives function is important in terms of thinking of measures beyond ‘countering myths’ – the style of engagement and rationalities at work will require careful reflection regarding effective counter-approaches. For example, to support claims that the system supports women at the expense of men, stakeholders suggested that some men draw on sources of information that tend to support their perceptions. Online misinformation, or the misinterpretation of evidence, is noted when organisations such as One in Three are mentioned by stakeholder clients. The One in Three campaign argues that family violence against men is under-represented, claiming that ‘one in three’ victims of sexual assault and family violence are men. Claims employ language of expertise and legitimate data, and explicitly criticize mainstream violence against women and family violence services (such as OurWatch and ANROWS) for their neglect of men as victims and women as perpetrators.

Violence and/or guns

Stakeholders in particular are concerned about an increased mention of gun rights in the conversations they have with men who use violence. While gun rights were discussed in the Twitter data, there was strong pushback against this. The YouTube data, by contrast, yielded varying results. In the overlap between far-right and anti-feminist ideas, mention of violence/guns made up 8% of the comments. Across all of the far-right YouTube video comments, 0.5% were pro-gun/weapon. While this is a very small number, the type of videos they were derived from were not necessarily on a topic that had direct affinity with guns or violence. The issues of gun rights, ownership and violence may be on the horizon, and ones certainly of relevance to countering violent extremism.
How are far-right and anti-feminist ideas mutually reinforcing?

While there is growing recognition of the connection between misogynistic sentiment, anti-feminist backlash and far-right views, it is important to consider the question of how such views are mutually reinforcing. What upholds far-right sentiment is a desire for tradition, order and at times, systemic change. Those on the far-right believe that progressive forces have ‘ruined’ society, and that multiculturalism and gender equality have come at the cost of white male privilege. At this juncture in time, when populist forces around the world are prominent and far-right ideas around immigration and border controls become part of mainstream politics and policy, the desire to take back control and return to either a different order or to abolish the current one to instigate a new system occupies much of the discourse of the contemporary far-right. The view of traditional power, nuclear families and the role of women in society are part of these ideas around order and tradition, as well as nationalism and a narrow reading of patriotic citizenship. There is also a significant degree of mistrust in mainstream government and politics, as well as institutions and expertise (Nicholas & Agius 2018).

Our Twitter and YouTube analyses identified two sets of connections between users who espoused far-right and anti-feminist sentiment. However, the source of the social media data shapes what kinds of issues and sentiment users are engaged with. As noted earlier, Twitter is a broad, decontextualized platform where users publicly broadcast short statements to a mass audience. As a result, the data sourced from Twitter were also decontextualized and typically appeared as standalone claims made by proponents or opponents rather than the contextual discussion of a community of peers who posted comments on YouTube videos.

First, Twitter data described how some users engaged in social media discussions that espoused each of these types of sentiment. In contrast, YouTube data provided insight into users who discussed issues that pertained to both far-right and anti-feminist ideas. The differences between these analyses is represented in the Venn diagram above (see Figure 8), where Twitter users’ posts touched on one circle or the other, but not both in the same post. YouTube users’ posts, by contrast, more often fell into the space depicted by the overlap in the two circles; although there were certainly times when users posted on one domain or the other. For the purpose of our analysis, however, we were most focused on the links between these two domains.

Figure 8: Overlapping topics on social media
Decontextualized engagement with both far-right and anti-feminist ideas

In the Twitter data, there were 298 tweets from authors who posted on both anti-feminist and far-right topics, however, most of these tweets came from individuals who were posting their disapproval of far-right wing and anti-feminist ideas. Of the 82 tweets that were in support of anti-feminist ideas and the far-right, tweets came equally from men (28), women (27) and unknown (27) users. Here, men tweeted more about anti-feminist topics (57%) than the far-right (43%) while women did the opposite, tweeting about the far-right (59%) more than about anti-feminism (41%).

Men and women who supported the far-right and anti-feminist ideas tweeted about different issues, as the following diagram illustrates. Women were far more interested in gun rights, whereas men tweeted equally about the encroachment of ‘feminazis’ who were curtailing their liberties as well as limitations imposed by the state, such as restricting their right to own guns. For both men and women, however, the curtailment of individual liberty was what brought together the two spheres of far-right and anti-feminist ideas. Indeed, men’s rights was a top concern of both men and women who supported these extreme positions, behind the impingement of the right to own guns and the overreach of ‘feminazis’ in restricting men’s rights.

While the Twitter data can provide insight into the overlap of the issues of interest to users posting about the far-right and anti-feminist ideas, they cannot tell us how these two sets of ideas come together. Rather, for that analysis, we draw on YouTube data which presents a much more nuanced account of the ways that social media users concurrently draw these two issues together when corresponding with other users who share their ideological stance. We refer to such users as forming loose communities of far-right and anti-feminist ideas.

Figure 9: Topics by (binary) gender of far-right and anti-feminist supportive tweets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Men’s Main Topics</th>
<th>Women’s Main Topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feminazi (29%)</td>
<td>Gun rights (52%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun rights (29%)</td>
<td>Feminazi (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s rights (18%)</td>
<td>Men’s rights (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Patriots (7%)</td>
<td>System against men (11%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While Twitter data provided us mixed results, we found greater consistency in terms of support for far-right and/or anti-feminist sentiment on YouTube. As described above, we analysed the top five most-viewed videos of two far-right and two anti-feminist groups based in Victoria. Of the two anti-feminist groups, the top five videos (coded AFC1-V1-5 and AFC2-V1-5) were anti-feminist or anti-gender in theme; of the two far-right groups, the top five videos (coded FRC1-V1-5 and FRC2-V1-5) were a mix of anti-feminist, anti-left and anti-Muslim themes. See Figure 10 above.

Across the overlapping comments from those posting on both far-right and anti-feminist videos, misogynistic anti-feminist comments outweigh all other categories. The second highest category was anti-left sentiment. Interestingly, anti-left and anti-system comments are to be found only in the far-right videos (except for one anti-feminist video that attracts an anti-left comment). There is a significant number of ‘unclear’ responses, which are comments that are either sarcastic, ironic or unrelated.

We also noted comments that contained more than one sentiment. Anti-feminist comments were also mentioned alongside references to violence or anti-system sentiment. There were fewer, but still notable combined comments that brought together racism and violence, anti-left and racist sentiment, anti-left and violence and anti-feminism and anti-left sentiment. Some of these combined comments are important to observe because they are indicative of reinforcing sentiments that move beyond one particular complaint or grievance.

Figure 10: YouTube overlapping comments between far-right and anti-feminist groups

Communities of far-right anti-feminists

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Given all of the above data on the overlaps and reinforcement between far-right and anti-feminism, in terms of ‘radicalisation’, it cannot be said to be happening in a conventionally understood way. There is an interesting interplay of abstracted ideas, personal experiences, contact with particular systems and access to certain information then influencing the individual level of domestic and interpersonal / intimate relationships. Some of the key insights from the survey data that complement the social media data is that anti-feminist and far-right sentiment can often be implicit, abstract, and rarely tied directly to traditional membership of organisations. Furthermore, the views that we may consider extremist or radical are considered ‘normal’ to many in this group. Stakeholders commented that traditional views of women and patriotic nationhood are not abnormal views to those who hold them.

Likewise, extremist views may not translate into acts of violence (Cherney et al 2018), or if they do, can manifest into ‘lone wolf’ attacks (McCulloch et al 2019). In particular, for considering counter radicalization strategies, many of the problems lie at the level of post-truth, fake news or misinformation, and the extent to which this feeds a nascent sense of disgruntlement. Despite the radicalizing effects of social media platforms, which can entrench black-and-white views as groups remain in their ‘bubbles’ or ‘echo chambers’, particularly when engaging in a community of like-minded users, there are a number of initiatives and methods that point to ways in which counter-narratives and complexity can work in certain contexts. The following section explores existing strategies for preventing violent extremism.

Conclusion: Radicalisation?

Figure 11: Combined sentiments in Youtube overlap comments

Combining sentiments in Youtube overlap comments
D. ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND DERADICALIZATION STRATEGIES

Strategies that address far-right and anti-gender extremism

The third activity of our project was to assess existing measures to counter or prevent violent extremism and deradicalization strategies. We approached C/PVE initiatives as a broad policy spectrum, because measures and programs vary significantly worldwide (Harris-Hogan et al 2016). CVE measures tend to link to community policing but focus on preventing radicalisation to violence based on ideological beliefs, and represent ‘soft power’ approaches to violent extremism (Lauland et al 2019, 3). A gender analysis is amenable to C/PVE efforts because it identifies gender dynamics and relations that underpin extremism. As True and Eddyono note, in order to prevent violent extremism, “then it is the social conditions that need to be investigated and changed to reduce the propensity for violence.” (2017, 3)

We selected prominent existing programs and strategies from Victorian, Australian and international contexts in order to assess if they addressed both gender and far-right factors in violent extremism. At a state and national level, our search criteria included the major C/PVE measures of government and other agencies. We included some pre-2015 measures to contextualise the framing of strategies, which were mostly focused on Islamist terrorist threats and radicalisation concerns, but also because these measures need to be viewed as part of a wider strategy to counter violent extremism.

In Victoria, we reviewed nine strategies and reports produced by the State Government, the Department of Premier and Cabinet and Victoria Police. As the national strategies and frameworks connect with the work of states, we examined five broad reports and reviews that related to C/PVE efforts, a majority of which were instigated in 2015.

We found that while the focus of these measures is overwhelmingly concerned with extremist radicalisation and terrorist violence, there is only incidental mention of far-right extremism and no connection whatsoever with anti-gender extremism in both the Victorian and national strategies (see Tables 1 and 2).
## Victorian Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy Topic</th>
<th>Both gender and far-right?</th>
<th>If gender features, how?</th>
<th>Is far right extremism mentioned?</th>
<th>What sort of extremism?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protecting our Community: Attacking the Causes of Terrorism (Victorian Government, 2005, policy)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Terrorism: Radical terrorist ideologies, causes; Multi-faith &amp; multicultural emphasis; Prevention-focused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Framework to Strengthen Victoria’s Social Cohesion and the Resilience of its Communities (2015)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, briefly (alongside other forms)</td>
<td>Far-right, ISIS-inspired, Islamophobia, anti-Semitism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe and Strong. Victorian Government (2016, Strategy)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Gender equality (mostly in work, gendered violence) but not extremist sentiment</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria Police - Counter Terrorism Strategy 2018-21 Victoria Police (2018)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, (alongside other forms, but more frequently referenced)</td>
<td>Chief Commissioner notes rise of extreme right groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Victorian strategies
## National Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy Topic</th>
<th>Both gender and far-right?</th>
<th>If gender features, how?</th>
<th>Is far right extremism mentioned?</th>
<th>What sort of extremism?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Living Safe Together: Preventing Violent Extremism and Radicalisation in Australia. Attorney General’s Department (2015)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Specific mention of extremist nationalist groups, alongside other ideological extremist sentiments. Grants programme aimed at radicalisation at community level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of the Commonwealth’s Counter Terrorism machinery. Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian Government (2015)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Terrorist ideology mentioned in broad terms, Islamist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Strengthening our Resilience. Council of Australian Governments (2015)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, briefly (alongside other forms)</td>
<td>Religious extremism focus; far-right and left a ‘concern’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: National Strategies
We did, however, find international measures and strategies that brought together gender and far-right violent extremism. Even so, what was still missing in these strategies was an explicit link with far-right extremism and anti-feminist or anti-gender extremism.

The majority of C/PVE measures that have a gender focus largely address gender and violent extremism in the following ways:

- How women can help in deradicalization within their communities (Commonwealth Secretariat 2017) or in the context of counter-terrorism (UN Plan of Action 2016);
- How gender is important for understanding the dynamics of violent extremism, mostly in the context of terrorism abroad (OSCE 2019; UN Women 2017; UNDP & UN Women 2020);
- Concern about the recruitment of women to the causes of violent extremism (such as being agents for Islamic state, supporting ‘foreign fighters’ or groomed to serve terrorists abroad).

Thus, the majority of P/CVE strategies that do mention gender are limited to analysing the role of women in preventing violent extremism or calling on the need for greater inclusion of women and a gender perspective, which can lend insights into combatting terrorism. It should also be noted that studies that focus on a gender analysis of violent extremism are often in the context of terrorism abroad (see True and Eddyono 2017; Gordon and True, 2019; Pearson and Winterbotham 2017; UN Women 2017). These strategies rarely bring together in detail how far-right and anti-feminist sentiment fuels violent extremism. The document closest to combining both a gender and far-right focus was the OSCE’s (2019) Handbook, Understanding the Role of Gender in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism, which focuses on gender in violent extremism. While it recognises the importance of gender in the construction of ideas that animate extremist views – and notes the issue of incels and men’s rights movements – its focus is directed to the role that women play in promoting far-right sentiment or women who are involved in neo-Nazi or far-right organisations.

The connection between gender violence and far-right extremism is not wholly visible in CVE measures, or tends to be dealt with separately under initiatives for domestic or family violence or far-right or other types of extremism. Exit strategies in Europe, for example, are overwhelmingly concerned with gender and violent extremism primarily in counter-terrorism efforts in recent years with the rise of Islamic State, ‘jihadist brides’ and radicalisation. The EU and the UN note that women are targets of VE groups, and that sexual and gender-based violence forms part of the strategies that these groups use to recruit. “Therefore, for successful long-term prevention and to fulfil international obligations, deradicalisation efforts must commit to challenging ideologies that curtail women’s equality or jeopardise women’s security” (Brown 2019). Therefore, at the international level, gender appears in C/PVE measures and strategies but primarily in the context of the role women play or how violent extremism relies on gendered dynamics.

One of the most significant challenges in dealing with the intersection of far-right and anti-feminist sentiment and violent extremism is how under the radar and unacknowledged the connection is in current prevention strategies. C/PVE strategies are mostly focused on Islamist terrorism and radicalisation. Often, far-right extremism is mentioned broadly in discussions about ‘violent extremism’ or ‘extremist ideologies’, when the focus is predominantly on jihadist or Islamic extremism. The following section delves further into Victorian strategies, drawing in particular on the Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention reports as the most recent strategies on which to base future considerations in line with our findings.
Efforts to counter violent extremism in Victoria can be classified through three categories: primary prevention, secondary intervention and tertiary intervention. Primary prevention programs are focused on community resilience by educating about the risk of violent extremism. These programs are preventative in nature. They provide training to teachers, social workers, and mental health experts in order to equip them to identify and counter shifts towards violent extremism. Furthermore, primary prevention programs also enable positive cross-cultural relationships and interactions in communities and educational institutions (Harris-Hogan et al 2016: 12; Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention and Response Report 2, 2017). Examples of prevention programmes in Victoria have largely been in the category of building community resilience and focused on religious communities and youth, such as Aman: Youth for Peace-Building and Building Community Capacity in Nonviolent Leadership: An interfaith program for Young People (Lauland et al 2019, 68-69).

Secondary interventions target individuals in danger of becoming a member of a violent extremist group or potential promoters and supporters of a violent extremist cause. Measures include creating relationships between individuals and religious leaders as to create a pathway away from violent extremism through exploring challenges to identity and belief; provision of mental health and social support to address underlying issues of family violence, health problems and/or drug and alcohol abuse. It has been used in Norway’s Action Plan against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism with right-wing extremist youth, to a good degree of success. It involves conversations to reorient behaviour and alternatives for constructive change (Harris-Hogan et al 2016, 11). Examples of secondary intervention programmes include the Victorian Fixated threat assessment centre (VFTAC) (2018-Present), a multi-agency initiative that assesses high risk individuals and Community Reporting (2002-present) which offers community resources for reporting radicalisation.

In contrast, tertiary interventions are aimed at individuals who are already a part of violent extremist networks and thus have moved beyond the scope of secondary intervention (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016; Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention and Response Report 2, 2017). Tertiary intervention efforts encourage behavioural and psychological change in individuals that reject violent responses. These efforts aim to disengage such individuals from violent extremist networks and guide them away from the path of violent action and can often be costly and unsuccessful (Harris-Hogan 2016, 9). Examples include the Community Integration Support Program (CISP) (2010-Present), a prison-based terrorist disengagement program which has been expanded out to the community with a focus on individualised intervention.

According to Harris-Hogan et al., CVE projects funded between 2010-2014 at the federal level in Australia were overwhelmingly in the primary category, and had little or no connection to addressing radicalisation, rather they were concerned with community cohesion and ‘building
resilient communities’ (2016, 17). Tertiary and secondary level projects that would deal with those already radicalised or were radicalising toward violent extremism were in the minority of projects funded (2016, 16-17). It is therefore difficult to find comprehensive assessments of CVE projects and measures at the national level to see if they were viable or could be effectively evaluated. Broad targeting of Muslim communities also meant it was difficult to assess because evaluation was done so by geography or demographics rather than ideology/strength of extremism. Likewise in the European experience, top-down approaches can sometimes neglect bottom up delivery, so a greater role for practitioners and using their knowledge in broader prevention and countering strategies is needed. (Weinböck, 2019)

These measures have some degree of coherence and applicability when considering CVE measures to address anti-gender sentiment and far-right extremism. They can be repurposed and tailored to address underlying world views and to locate anti-gender sentiment as a problematic aspect of violent extremism (see section D below). The Victorian Government’s Expert Panel, while primarily focusing on terrorist extremism, suggests an individual-centric approach rather than a community-centric one, as the latter runs the risk of stigmatising religious communities as violent extremists (Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention and Response Report 2, 2017, 19). Sensitivity to the dynamics of specific forms of ideological extremism can be an important factor in widening this approach to addressing far-right and anti-gender extremism, as these views are often held by individual men. Extending on further points in the Expert Panel’s assessment, CVE efforts are also underpinned by a recognition that radicalisation and pathways to violent extremism are not linear but rather social and complex. For instance, perceptions of marginalisation, and grievances may push individuals to support or promote a violent extremist cause or organisation. Violent extremism is built on feelings of marginalisation and a search for an alternative identity; it links these two together to provide simple explanations for a complex world. This can prompt individuals to take action where they might feel disenfranchised so as to generate belonging and purpose through inculcating the group into their own social identity (Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention and Response Report 2, 2017, 22). This understanding of violent extremism and its relationship with social identity demands a CVE framework that is not just police-based or security-based but recognises the non-linear and multi-factor process of radicalisation leading to violent extremism. Our review of programs and strategies was informed by previous analysis of the overlap, logics and reinforcing themes that emerged during the course of our data collection. Our findings (Section C) correlate with many of these points and suggest a need for closer examination of the factors that align to drive far-right and anti-gender extremism.
E. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

From our data and review of existing measures, an effective C/PVE approach for far-right measures needs to address the connections with anti-feminist sentiment. This would involve action at the primary, secondary and tertiary prevention levels. Primary prevention would entail addressing wider community values and misinformation at the heart of many of the beliefs underpinning both far-right wing and anti-feminist ideas. Secondary prevention would entail targeting high-risk individuals who have used violence and are thus vulnerable to radicalisation by anti-feminist and extreme right ideas, at key trigger points that render them more vulnerable. Our data has allowed us to identify the common characteristics of such individuals, and the narratives that exacerbate vulnerability. Tertiary prevention would entail targeting those in the system explicitly identifying with or presenting extremist views and/or are members of online extremist groups, and offering them an alternative narrative and sense of belonging to counter that which they gain from this membership (Tomkinson et al 2020).

Continue to map the networks

Mapping the existing and constantly moving networks that unite far-right and anti-feminist groups will be an important ongoing task. Stakeholders were interested to understand how these networks and connections form, change, connect and operate. This is essential for not only tracking its growth but for identifying their reach and impact. As we can see from international examples, new groups emerge, or once covert groups become prominent, at different times and in different contexts. The way these groups attract people or speak to their specific grievances is important to understand. One example here is the Boogaloo Movement, which is a loose online far-right network that contains pro-gun, anti-government and militia groups but can differ on issues such as race (Evans and Wilson, 2020).

Perhaps one of the most foundational issues to grapple with when considering the connection between anti-gender sentiment and far-right violent extremism is how deeply our terminology conditions our possible responses to it. Much of the focus of C/PVE measures are largely associated with counter-terrorism efforts in relation to jihadist radicalisation. Measures dealing with gendered violence often focused on family violence at the domestic level, so this type of violence is separated conceptually from broader types of ideological extremism. This creates a ‘siloing’ effect, and perpetuates a divide between addressing violent extremism in relation to terrorism (seen as externally driven and located) and gendered violence as a community or private problem. Our data found that violent sentiment and extremist ideas were very common in Victorian anti-feminist online spaces and often precipitated by a personal sense of aggrievement from ‘domestic’ issues. Practitioners and feminist analyses have long argued that this divide is blurred and false (Pain, 2014; Smith 2019; Cartwright 2020; Gilmore 2019). We need to start seeing anti-gender sentiment as part of the fabric of violent extremism and extremist ideologies. Failure to address the connection between far-right and anti-gender extremism by police, policymakers, researchers and the public “undermines society’s ability to better understand, prevent and effectively respond” to violent attacks and mass casualties (McCulloch and Maher 2020). The Canadian government’s recent recognition of this – by defining incel violence as an act of ‘terrorism’ – goes some way towards bridging this connection, and should be followed in the Australian context.

Expand ‘gender’ focus to include masculinity in C/PVE

Our data found that there is a huge amount of anti-feminist sentiment among far-right extremists in Victoria, but our review of existing Victorian, Australian and international C/PVE practices found that gender is almost only mentioned in relation to women as facilitators or preventers of male radicalisation (see Section D, Table 1: Victorian Strategies and Table 2: National Strategies). A contextual gender analysis of far-right extremism is necessary for P/CVE measures because toxic masculinity can inspire violence against women (Jones et al 2019). Understanding, for instance, how ideas of ‘toxic masculinity’, ‘hyper masculinity’ and ‘heroic masculinity’ function in the ideas of the far-right can provide nuanced and targeted responses.

A key finding that should underpin strategies is the dual worldview we identified in the data that is common also to wider anti-feminist and far-right extremism globally (Nicholas & Agius 2018): that of a holding and revering traditional values on the one hand (e.g. patriarchal family structure, male dominance, protectionism over women and children, Madonna/whore ideas of women), and a sense on the other hand that the world has changed so much that white, heterosexual men are now victims of a system designed to subordinate them (Nicholas 2019). This, now increasingly common, backlash perspective is tied up in ideas of masculinity that justify violence and needs to be addressed at all levels of prevention and deradicalisation.
Address foundational worldviews and ‘aggrieved entitlement’

A key finding of our data was that anti-feminist sentiment and extremist far-right sentiment is based on the same underpinning worldviews, values and assumptions. As well as there being direct overlap with users in our social media data across these domains and topics, it was found that there is a great deal of overlap on some core issues (see figures 8, 10 and 11). These were notably related to misconceptions of feminism as ‘feminazis’, support for gun rights and advocacy of violence, and a sense of ‘aggrieved entitlement’ (Vito et al 2018). As in Träbert’s (2017, 274-6) work, anti-feminism seems to be a ‘uniting ideology’ in far-right extremism. Both involve hierarchies of power relations (in particular an idea of male victimhood due to feminism) and a preference for ‘traditional’ social and political relations. Thus, there is a need for primary and secondary prevention informed by understanding the key role of these worldviews in extremism. These can be divided into top down and bottom up approaches detailed below.

Top-down approaches

Men who hold extremist views on women often consider this to be ‘normal’. Top-down and bottom-up approaches can work in conjunction to challenge extremist views that have been ‘normalised’. Top-down measures can include broader legislative moves that can tackle wider societal impact. Tomkinson et al (2020) advocate securitising the incel moment, for example, as a ‘public threat’. While securitisation moves are at times inappropriate (they require extraordinary measures and ‘exceptional’ uses of state power), seeing misogyny as a ‘public threat’ may shift the normalisation and discourse around gendered violence in a different direction.

It often takes extreme acts of violence – like that of the Christchurch attack – for action to be taken to deal with violent online content. According to Blackbourn, McGarrity and Roach (2019, 185) “Australia appears to be the only jurisdiction to have enacted legislation as a specific response to far right terrorism.” After the Christchurch attacks, Australia’s federal parliament enacted the Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Act 2019 (AGD 2019), which created two new offences under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). Internet service providers and content and hosting services must report and remove abhorrent violent content. However, it does not specifically address hate speech, focusing instead on violent and disturbing imagery (Cunneen & Russell 2020). Due to the absence of new counter-terror laws, what remains in the legislative toolbox for states depends on existing legislation, which can include murder offences, hate speech offences and laws against incitement (Blackbourn, McGarrity and Roach, 2019, 186-7). This suggests that Victoria’s current deliberations around extending the Vilification Act to include gender may be a significant move in addressing the intersections of vilification and hate speech. In fact, Victoria’s first successful prosecution of serious vilification case involved Blair Cottrell of the UPF, in 2019. Cottrell participated in a video that showed a mock beheading in front of Bendigo Council offices, was uploaded to the UPF Facebook page and later used to promote a rally against a proposed mosque construction in Bendigo. He was convicted of a serious religious vilification in the Victorian Magistrates Court, and his appeal was rejected in County Court (State of Victoria 2020). MP Fiona Patten introduced an ‘anti-vilification bill’ to Parliament in August 2019 that sought to extend protection to attributes other than race or religion, such as gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, and disability, and to allow the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission (VEOHRC) to request information to identify online ‘trolls’ who are engaging in hate speech or abuse (Elphick 2019). In September 2019, the Victorian Human Rights Commissioner added to calls for increased protections online from hate and abuse, stating that the current anti-vilification legislation is outdated regarding current use of online platforms (Towell & Preiss 2019).

Bottom-up approaches

Bottom-up measures can include a range of measures that can support top-down approaches and make critical interventions at the ground level. This can include training for frontline staff and engaging frontline staff who work with men who use violence and incorporating their strategies into broader frameworks, countering misinformation, and understanding men’s (emotional) support groups and behaviour change programs. These are detailed below in line with our findings.
Pay attention to key trigger points

Greater awareness of trigger points can allow for targeted prevention strategies. As identified by Lewis et al (2019; 2018) and stakeholders, key ‘reactionary moments’ or ‘trigger points’ can lend themselves to men accessing or using far-right sentiment. Trigger points can take a number of forms. They can be personal trigger points related to family, professional or social circumstances. They can also be ‘reactionary moments’ to external events and news. Mention of public figures, acts of violence, responses to societal tensions or policy changes can be included in these configurations. Trigger points can confront world views or affirm prejudices that are fuelled by misinformation. How these trigger points then connect up with broader sentiments to produce specific narratives remains one of the vital issues to observe, because this can help us to understand what drives these narratives, and therefore, how to offer alternative narratives.

Counter misinformation with evidence

Our data demonstrated that some of the same myths and misinformation re-appear across extreme right and anti-feminist online content. Some men seem to be getting their information and having their underlying anti-feminist myths reinforced from some key anti-feminist organisations or websites. Wider anti-diversity sentiment is less explicit but can often co-occur within the narratives of a system that is against the individual men. Family court was the most common term in our surveys unsurprisingly, but also very common in the YouTube and Twitter data. Thus we suggest prevention strategies be bolstered at the first point of contact that men have with ‘the system.’ This includes continued support of extant services such as Men’s Referral Service, contact which is mandated for all men with intervention orders in Vic and NSW, but also development of services for men who may be feeling disgruntled in family court proceedings. Stakeholders have told us that in order to confront myths and misinformation, evidence is needed. Here there is an opportunity for campaign work as well as collaboration between stakeholders, government and experts to develop materials that can tackle common myths that support extremist viewpoints. As far-right groups use alternative sources and evidence to support their claims, or use data selectively to bolster their positions out of context (such as the claims made by organisations such as One in Three), having evidence to show how that data is problematic can help deradicalisation efforts.

Secondary prevention: provide emotional support and community for vulnerable men

Masculinity has long been noted to socialise men into behaviours and lives that deprive them of emotional connection (Gilligan 1989). Understanding and replacing the emotional support that men get from far-right networks and groups is thus necessary. Previous studies have focused on social cohesion and community resilience in relation to racial, ethnic and religious exclusivism. But they also flagged the importance of subcultures and “the emotional needs that can be exploited by violent extremist groups that offer a narrative or redemption, thrill and purpose” (Grossman et al 2016, 7, emphasis added). While many P/CVE approaches mention the emotional triggers that drive foreign fighters or those susceptible to jihadist ideology and radicalisation (Lutz 2008), understanding how emotional triggers of, for example a sense of loss or loss of power or control after divorce, function in the far-right environment is important, especially how anti-gender ideas are engaged to provide support (such as promises to restore masculinity).

Much of what we found supports existing practice, then, such as the feminist-underpinned strategies of many men’s behaviour change programs in Australia (in particular, see No To Violence’s suite of tools that engage training and initiatives that embrace a gendered lens while being attentive to the emotional experiences of men). Specifically, these are mandated programs for men who have used violence but wider social and community building programs, such as men’s sheds (Wilson et al 2015), may be useful. Individual men’s sheds, for example, develop specific-issue health promotion activities. As this is focused on men’s health, wellbeing and connectedness, further sub-programs could be developed that do not collapse into anti-feminism and victimhood. Facilitators should be attuned to the trigger points outlined above and the misinformation we described in the findings. Furthermore, direction to sources of information and support for men needs to be focused on balanced views. Particularly at the specific trigger points of first contact with family court, and upon court decisions, a useful resource would be alternatives to online and in-real-life anti-feminist father’s ‘support’ groups. While court-mandated men’s behaviour change is indispensable, access to support groups that do not espouse an anti-gender equality viewpoint or present misconceptions about women and feminism can help avoid the proliferation of anti-feminist views. An alarming finding was that the dearth of informed and pro-feminist official support for men at these times of vulnerability to extremism meant that even professionals were directing them to organisations that disguise their extremist underpinnings with vague names such as ‘Dads in Distress.’ For example a response in our survey charted how:
“Dads in Distress [was] mentioned by a community health nurse colleague who specialises in men's health - he had heard this was a good place to refer men in trouble with family [court]”

This demonstrates that, as well as expanding these services, key staff need to be trained to know about them and refer patients and clients. These have worked in other contexts, such as anti-machismo groups in Mexico City (The Jakarta Post, 2020; Ramirez 2008) where this particular, local form of problematic masculinity was targeted.

**Careful alternative narrative construction**

Best-practice for men’s violence prevention often relies on accessing men ‘where they are’ (Flood 2019) and would seem to make sense here when explicit engagement with feminism may cause backlash. It serves to not alienate men at the start, and taps their own value systems as a foundation for change. However, Michael Flood argues that meeting men where they are has risks if it is not combined with critical reflection on privilege. Many men’s values ultimately need to be transformed to truly understand the context of inequality that underpins family violence. A good compromise here is to use ‘alternative’ narratives rather than ‘counter’ narratives. Feedback from stakeholders advise that positive, alternative narratives can do more work with regard to deradicalisation and changing or challenging behaviour. Counter narratives can alienate men; those who adopt far-right views are also highly likely to distrust narratives that directly reject their own worldview. As much as we see the importance of understanding the problem through a gendered lens, we have to be sensitive to what will work in terms of deradicalisation and countering violent extremism. Feedback from stakeholders and their experiences show how complex and nuanced these strategies need to be. Exit programmes that involve men, for example, who have disengaged from extremist groups or who used to use violence, can be effective because these alternative narratives speak from experiences that men will recognise and do indeed ‘meet them where they are’. This can also provide emotional support and understanding and place the onus on men to change their behaviour.


Victorian Government, Department of Prime and Cabinet. 2017. Expert Panel on...


MAPPING RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN VICTORIA

APPL YING A GENDER LENS TO DEVELOP PREVENTION AND DERADICALISATION APPROACHES