Warning messages to prevent illegal sharing of sexual images: Results of a randomised controlled experiment

Jeremy Prichard, Joel Scanlan, Tony Krone, Caroline Spiranovic, Paul Watters and Richard Wortley

The consensual sharing of digital sexual images is now a common form of sexual expression among adults (Mori et al. 2020) and adolescents (Madigan et al. 2018). Where these behaviours become exploitative and potentially illegal we find two overlapping constructs of cybercrime: image-based abuse (IBA) and child sexual abuse material (CSAM). IBA research is interested in the abuse of people of all ages—adults and minors—and findings demonstrate unambiguously that IBA occurs in both populations. A study of 4,274 Australians aged 16 to 49 years found that 20 percent had sexual or nude images taken of them without their consent, 11 percent reported that such images were distributed without their consent and nine percent had received a threat that such an image would be distributed (Powell, Henry & Flynn 2018). This same survey indicated that sharing self-images voluntarily (43%) and/or when pressured to do so (41%) were common experiences for young people aged 16–29 years (Henry, Flynn & Powell 2019: 10).
Similarly, self-report survey studies have indicated that 38 percent of Australian youths aged 13–15 years have sent an image of a sexual nature of themselves to others (Lee et al. 2015), six percent aged under 18 years have sent a sexual image of another person without that person’s consent (Crofts et al. 2015), and 15 percent of women aged 15–17 years have experienced IBA (Office of the e-Safety Commissioner 2017a).

IBA may also constitute CSAM where the person depicted in an image is, or appears to be, a minor. The IBA–CSAM overlap might occur where, for example, an 18-year-old adult photograph their 16-year-old sexual partner. However, the production and distribution of CSAM by offenders who are themselves minors is a rapidly expanding problem (see Dodge & Spencer 2018; Falligant, Alexander & Burkhart 2017; Lewis 2018; McNeish & Scott 2018). CSAM can be generated by minors in different contexts (see Office of the e-Safety Commissioner 2017a, 2017b). These include, but are not limited to, the filming of sexual assaults (eg Robinson 2006), non-consensual filming during consensual sex, covert image production (eg ‘upskirting’), and ‘selfies’ of solo sex acts, nudity or sexual posing (Wolak et al. 2018). Some self-generated material can be produced and consensually shared with one individual (eg a boyfriend) but then non-consensually shared with others. In other situations, minors can be coerced or blackmailed into supplying self-generated CSAM to another person.

Responding to these behaviours is a difficult task for government and non-government agencies. Determining the boundary between criminal and non-criminal behaviour is not always simple. Despite being sexual in nature, material generated or shared by minors might not constitute CSAM at law (Lee et al. 2013: 34–36). Nor indeed is such activity necessarily harmful (see Lee et al. 2015). There may also be an age-related bar to prosecution, such as instances where children under the age of criminal responsibility generate or share CSAM. These situations may require responses from health and welfare agencies and schools. Where an offence can be proven, there is a broad range of potential offending behaviour—from minor offences through to egregious acts of sexual cruelty—requiring nuanced justice system responses.

The generation or sharing of CSAM by minors can result in significant psychological distress for the young people depicted in the material and their families (Office of the e-Safety Commissioner 2017b; regarding adult IBA victims see Gassó, Mueller-Johnson & Gómez-Durán 2021). A compounding factor is that the material can be uploaded to open websites—‘revenge porn’ sites, Facebook, Snapchat, Reddit, Twitter, Tumblr and so forth (Belton & Hollis 2016; Office of the e-Safety Commissioner 2017a). On the open internet, minor-generated CSAM can be accessed by members of paedophilic subcultures, stimulating the CSAM market more broadly. By way of example, of 153 offenders investigated by the Australian Federal Police for CSAM offending, seven percent possessed CSAM images that were produced in a school setting (Krone et al. 2017: 46).

While we have good estimates of the prevalence of IBA, the amount of CSAM produced or shared by Australian minors is difficult to quantify. However, the scale of the problem is potentially very large. At the 2016 Census, the nation had approximately 880,000 people aged between 12 and 17 years (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016a). Teenaged Australians had a higher rate of internet access than any other age group in 2016–17 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016b). A range of factors have been identified that put young people at an increased risk of offending online. However, it is the opportunity to offend provided by modern technology—namely common access to digital cameras and the ease of uploading material to the internet—that is widely regarded as one of most salient factors (Quayle & Koukopoulos 2019; Wortley & Smallbone 2012).
Warning messages as a prevention strategy

While IBA and CSAM are inherently internet-based phenomena, it is critical to recognise the relevance of scientific research examining how people respond to messages in the real ‘offline’ world. This research, now many decades old, shows that ‘hard-copy’ messages can mitigate hazards in everyday life arising from motor vehicles, industrial machinery, poisons, pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs and so on.

Importantly, research has repeatedly demonstrated that the effectiveness of messages is greatly influenced by how they are designed. Table 1 lists design features that increase the likelihood of compliance.

**Table 1: Features of message-design that influence human decision-making**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>attract attention;</td>
<td>• Attract attention, ensure messages are easily seen and read</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are clear and concise;</td>
<td>• Clarity in language, clear and concise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impart explicit information about specific hazards, potential harms, and what to do to avoid harm;</td>
<td>• Explicit information about risks, potential harms, and prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are believable;</td>
<td>• Believability of the message, trustworthiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>come from a credible source;</td>
<td>• Credibility of the source, authority and expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>match the degree of danger to specific colours;</td>
<td>• Matching the severity of danger to specific colors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>match the degree of danger to alert symbols like ‘!’; and</td>
<td>• Matching the severity of danger to alert symbols like ‘!’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>match the degree of danger to signal words like ‘caution’ or ‘warning’.</td>
<td>• Matching the severity of danger to signal words like ‘caution’ or ‘warning’</td>
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See Haddad et al. 2020; Prichard et al. 2022

This evidence base has largely been ignored by crime prevention literature to date. Nonetheless, studies have demonstrated that messages can work to varying degrees. For instance, postal letters have been shown to be potentially useful in reducing insurance fraud (Blais & Bacher 2007) and tax evasion (Coleman 2007) and protecting victims of online fraud (Cross 2016).

Regarding online warning messages, several studies indicate that internet users are prepared to heed warnings about hazardous online behaviours related to: perpetrating cyber-attacks (Testa et al. 2017); piracy (Ullman & Silver 2018); exposure to malware (Haddad et al. 2020); online gambling (Caillon et al. 2021; Gainsbury et al. 2015); pro-anorexia websites (Martijn et al. 2009); and disclosing personal information (Carpenter et al. 2018). While more research is needed to understand what individual factors might increase or decrease the likelihood of compliance with online messages, it is relevant to note findings from Zaikina-Montgomery’s (2011) study. She found that warning messages could dissuade users from viewing legal pornography. However, an age difference was observed with respect to the warning that ‘police may be called’, which adolescent participants rated as less effective than did adult participants. One explanation offered for this result was that adolescents were more tech-savvy and consequently less inclined to believe that warning (Zaikina-Montgomery 2011: 228).
Messages to reduce the viewing of CSAM

Increasing attention has been given to automated online messages as a means of delivering information about CSAM in a targeted fashion to internet users who have just commenced offending or might be at risk of commencing offending (Prichard et al. 2019). Recommendations to investigate online messages have drawn on theoretical models found in health (Quayle & Koukopoulos 2019) and crime science (Wortley & Smallbone 2012).

Law enforcement agencies have trialled CSAM warnings. They are also used by internet companies (eg Google 2020; see further Prichard et al. 2022). To date the main focus has been on messages intended to dissuade users from viewing, accessing or downloading CSAM. We recently established that online messages can dissuade users from viewing material that eroticises adult–minor sex acts (Prichard et al. 2022). This experiment was a precursor to the study presented below, so the following details are relevant to note.

We subcontracted a commercial agency to design a men’s fitness website targeting young adult men which we refer to as ‘GetFit’. Like other ‘honeypot’ studies (eg Testa et al. 2017), we developed this website to covertly observe the behaviour of anonymous internet users. Among real advertisements, we included a fake advert for ‘barely legal’ pornography, which we used as a proxy for CSAM for legal and ethical reasons (see Prichard et al. 2022). Users who clicked on this advert were randomly allocated to either a control group, who received no message, or one of two experimental groups who received different types of warning messages. The messages purported to come from the administrators of the GetFit website. The messages were designed to incorporate the features presented in Table 1 (above). However, it is important to note that the messages in this initial study did not include any images or animation.

Nearly three-quarters of the control group (73%, n=100) attempted to enter the ‘barely legal’ website. In contrast, only 50 percent of the experimental groups who received a message about police monitoring (n=81) or criminal laws (n=99) entered the site. These differences were statistically significant and meaningful. The findings were interpreted as supporting situational crime prevention literature, which has argued:

- increasing the perceived risks associated with any offence will reduce the likelihood of the offending behaviour (Clarke 2017); and
- online CSAM warning messages will be effective because they can reach potential offenders at the moment they contemplate offending (Wortley & Smallbone 2012).
Testing online messages to prevent image sharing

The current study was conducted in collaboration with the Office of the eSafety Commissioner. The primary aim was to test whether automated messages can dissuade young men from uploading sexual images of women to pornographic websites. As outlined earlier, from a public policy perspective, we were particularly interested in the problem of image sharing by minors. However, as explained below, experimental research on minors was not feasible, and so our target sample primarily comprised males between 18 and 32 years old, some of whom may, for example, be considering uploading images of their underaged girlfriends. Nevertheless, we believe that lessons can be learned from this study more generally about the use of warning messages to prevent the sharing of CSAM by both adults and minors.

A secondary aim was to explore whether a message containing animated graphics would be more effective than a message containing static text alone. We hypothesised that the animated message would be more effective on the basis that congruent text and visuals have been found to enhance attention to and recall of warning messages (see, for example, Lochbuehler et al. 2018).

Design and procedure

We conducted a double-blind randomised controlled experiment with naïve participants who visited the GetFit website between 26 August 2019 and 30 March 2020. For this experiment we presented advertisements for a fake pornography website—referred to in this article as Swap My Babe (SMB)—which purported to offer users free access to pornography if they uploaded their own sexual image of a woman: ‘upload your sexiest real pic, free instant access’. These advertisements were designed by our commercial partner and simulated advertisements used by real pornography companies.

Users who clicked on the advert were allocated to control or experimental conditions. Allocation was made using Mersenne Twister, a randomisation algorithm. The control group did not receive an online message and therefore could proceed directly to the fake landing page of the SMB website. The landing page was also designed by our commercial partner and mimicked the landing pages of real pornography sites. It provided users with the option of ‘exiting’ (navigating to the previous GetFit page) or ‘entering’, which triggered a message after a five-second delay from SMB: ‘Sorry! We’re undergoing routine maintenance. Please check back shortly.’

Experimental groups were presented with one of two messages. The text presented in both messages stated: ‘It’s a crime to share sexual images of people who look under 18. Visit esafety.gov.au to find out more.’ Message A contained only static text, as depicted below in Figure 1. Message B combined the text with a nine-second 2D animation depicting a male character uploading a sexual image online and then being arrested.
Compliance with the evidence base on message design was achieved by ensuring our messages were clear, concise and believable; originated from a credible source; and contained an alert symbol (!) and a signal word (‘warning’; see Table 1). Our messages covered participants’ entire browser screen regardless of the type of device used. We also ensured that participants had to interact with the message in order to remove it (eg by clicking ‘exit’).

**Authenticity and cybersecurity**

Several steps were taken to ensure that the messages appeared authentic even to tech-savvy participants. This was clearly important for perceived believability, without which the experiment could fail. But it was equally imperative for cybersecurity—that is, to reduce the risk of cyber attacks against the GetFit website.

The bottom of the messages contained a small logo for a fictitious software package called WebArmour. Curious users who clicked on this logo were directed to the fake landing page of WebArmour, which explained that the software was used by websites to increase cybersecurity by scanning, blocking or displaying warnings on outbound links.

As described in greater detail previously (Prichard et al. 2022), we also:

- used different servers in Australia and overseas to maintain GetFit, the SMB landing page, the SMB advertisements, and the WebArmour landing page; and
- ensured that GetFit and SMB were only accessible through SSL, using certificates issued by trusted third parties, as opposed to non-SSL sites, which lack any proof of authenticity.
**Recruitment**

The experiment aimed to achieve high ecological validity by covertly observing users’ behaviour without their knowledge. For legal and ethical reasons we could not recruit individuals under the age of 18 years. Social media advertising was used to attract English-speaking Australian men aged 18–22 years to the GetFit website, although internet users could take other routes to the website (e.g. organic searches). By targeting men only we both simplified the design brief for our commercial partner and increased the chance that the limited funds we spent on advertising would achieve a sufficient sample size (since men are more likely than women to use pornography; Rissel et al. 2017).

**Outcome measures**

Google Analytics provided metrics about the numbers of visitors to GetFit, their pathway to the site, and their behaviour at the site. We gathered the IP addresses of the participants who clicked on the SMB advert. No other information was gathered about the participants. With respect to our research questions, we measured whether participants attempted to ‘enter’ the SMB website landing page. With this information we created a dichotomous dependent variable, *desistance*.

We deleted repetitions of IP addresses through manual checking and excluded records identified as bots. These procedures mitigated the risk of double-counting and ensured that each IP address represented a real individual. Double-counting may have occurred if the same participant clicked on the SMB advert from different IP addresses (e.g. home and work). On the other hand, since one IP address can be used by multiple users, it is also feasible that we eliminated unique participants from the study.

**Ethics**

This research was approved by the University of Tasmania human research ethics committee (#H0012409). In accordance with international principles governing human research, despite the fact that the research involved covert observation, the study was conducted for the public benefit and it involved a low risk of causing distress to participants. We employed strategies to protect participants’ anonymity, including isolated secure storage of IP addresses (for further details, see Prichard et al. 2022). No illegal behaviour was observed. In designing the SMB advertisements and landing page, our commercial partner purchased non-pornographic images of certified adult models from a registered company. In all images the models appeared to be adults and appeared to consent to the photography, for example by taking the photograph themselves, or facing the camera.
Results

Metrics provided through Google Analytics indicate that during the seven months that the experiment was conducted GetFit was visited from 28,902 unique IP addresses. Most of these IP addresses probably related to single individuals, although we cannot discern how many visitors may have used more than one IP address (e.g., by visiting the site at work and later at home). Traffic to GetFit primarily originated through paid social media advertising (62%) and organic searches (i.e., via search engine queries; 33%). The remainder came from miscellaneous routes, such as shared links (5%).

As detailed below, of the many thousands of visitors to GetFit we recorded 528 clicks on the SMB advertisements from unique IP addresses after repeat entries and non-human agents (e.g., bots) were excluded. This number represents 1.83 percent of all GetFit visitors, which by industry standards is a good click-through rate for web-based display advertisements (e.g., Irvine 2020). The main weakness of our method is that the demographic profile of the participants is unknown. However, we can conclude with some confidence that the participants were likely to be Australian males aged between 18 and 32 years. This is for two main reasons. First, the social media advertisements targeted Australian men aged 18–22 years, which suggests that approximately 18,000 of the 28,902 visitors (62%) fitted this demographic profile. (We acknowledge, though, that some individuals may lie about their age when they create their social media accounts.)

Second, our commercial partner advised that the organic traffic (33%) was probably mainly made up of the internet users we attracted to the GetFit website in the first experiment (Prichard et al. 2022). The number of visitors in that experiment was estimated to be 29,364. Over 90 percent of these arrived through our social media advertising campaign, in which we targeted Australian men aged 18–30 years. Taking into account that the first experiment started in November 2017—almost two years before the current experiment—we conclude that this ‘original’ cohort would now be aged between 20 and 32 years.

Desistance

The behaviour of the 528 participants who clicked on one of the SMB advertisements is presented in Figure 2. ‘Desistance’ refers to the proportion of participants who did not click ‘enter’ at the SMB landing page.

Our cell sizes were uneven due to the randomisation algorithm that we employed (a Mersenne Twister): 249 participants in the Message B group compared with 102 in the control. This algorithm ensured that the temporal allocation of a participant to an experimental group or control was independent of all prior allocations, ensuring no sequencing bias. However, the downside of this approach is that it does not guarantee an equal allocation of participants to any particular group. Future studies will use an approach that guarantees sequential randomness as well as equal allocation as far as possible. Of the 102 participants in the control group, 96 arrived at the SMB landing page. Six did not. How this occurred is not clear. This issue is considered further in the Discussion.
At the SMB landing page 61 members of the control group attempted to gain access to the SMB site by clicking ‘enter’. This means that the control desistance rate was 40 percent. The experimental groups had two opportunities for desistance. Their first opportunity was when they received a warning message which prevented them from advancing to the SMB site until they navigated away or confirmed their intention to visit the site. The second opportunity for desistance was—like the controls—at the SMB site. Of the 177 participants who viewed Message A, 98 continued to the SMB landing page and once there 76 clicked ‘enter’. In the Message B group (n=249), 117 continued to the landing page and 94 clicked ‘enter’.

Each of the experimental groups was compared with the control group. Fisher’s exact test (1-sided) was applied to determine the statistical significance of differences in the observed proportion of users from each group who did not click ‘enter’ (ie desistance) on the SMB landing page. (In contrast to chi-square, there is no statistical test value to report when conducting Fisher’s exact test.) For Message A and B groups, respective desistance rates were 57 percent and 62 percent. Individual comparisons found that the difference in desistance rates between the control group and Message A group (p=0.005, odds ratio (OR)=1.977 (95% confidence interval (CI)=1.205, 3.244)) and Message B group (p<0.001, OR=2.453 (95% CI=1.531, 3.931)) were statistically significant.

The effect sizes, as indicated by odds ratios, were small but either exceeded (Message B) or approached (Message A) the minimum threshold (ie OR=2.0) for a difference which is practically meaningful according to Ferguson’s (2009) guidelines for the social sciences. In other words, the magnitude of the difference in desistance rates for the control group compared with the two message groups was meaningful. A pairwise comparison of the difference in desistence rate between Message A and B was not significant (p=0.16) indicating the messages were equally effective.
Discussion

Our study has demonstrated that individuals can be dissuaded from sharing sexual images if they receive an online warning message concerning a potential breach of CSAM laws. We believe that our findings are robust because the participants did not know they were being observed, and by randomly assigning the participants to control or experimental conditions we controlled for selection bias and other factors.

Importantly, it is very likely that participants exhibited real-life behaviours. Every dimension of GetFit and SMB was professionally designed. In fact, the SMB advert was markedly more attractive to users than the advert we used in the original ‘barely legal’ experiment (Prichard et al. 2022). This is evidenced by the fact that the original advert took 16 months to recruit a sufficient sample size, whereas the SMB advert took seven. Whether this was due to the type of pornography SMB purported to offer or the appearance of the adverts is unclear. Either way, the overall ‘pitch’ was evidently realistic from the perspective of internet users. Other indications that none of the users suspected the true research purposes of the websites include the fact that no complaints were received from users via the ‘contact us’ email address at GetFit, and neither GetFit nor SMB were subject to system trespass (hacking) attempts.

The warning messages in this experiment used colour and alert symbols appropriately, were simple and believable, did not disappear from participants’ screens until they navigated away, and appeared to come from a highly credible source (the Office of the eSafety Commissioner). Given these features, it is perhaps not surprising that animation did not significantly increase message effectiveness. The animation was redundant because other features of the message had already caught participants’ attention.

Of the many thousands of visitors to our men’s fitness website, GetFit, 528 chose to click on the professionally designed SMB advert, which offered users free pornography if they uploaded their own images of women. The warning significantly reduced the click-through rate to the SMB website. The plainest interpretation of this finding is that, consistent with situational crime prevention literature (Clarke 2017; Wortley & Smallbone 2012), the warnings influenced some but not all participants’ decision making by increasing their perception of the risks associated with the SMB website.

We believe that the results of our study can be generalised in two ways. First, although the messages used in the experiment specifically referred to the uploading of underage images, it is highly likely that they had a broader effect. While some of the participants may have been actually prepared to upload their own sexual image of a woman at the SMB website, others might have simply been curious about the pornography SMB purported to offer. For such individuals the warning message may have triggered generalised fears about the legality of the content at SMB. In other words, they may have wondered whether SMB contained CSAM. However, even where this was the case, the messages still demonstrated their crime prevention capacity by reducing the likelihood of distribution. This is because the messages diverted users away from a potentially criminogenic online environment—an online ‘situation’ where they could decide to share an image, regardless of their intentions prior to arriving at the SMB site. (In situational crime prevention terminology, the phenomenon whereby an intervention has an effect beyond its specific target is known as diffusion...
of benefits (eg Guerette & Bowers 2009).) Just the same, we might expect that specific warnings to prevent IBA among adult populations would be even more effective if the content of the message referred to the criminality of some IBA behaviours.

Second, despite the fact that our participants are likely to have been men aged 18–32 years, in our view the findings have implications for preventing the sharing of CSAM by minors—particularly those in the 15–17-year-old age bracket. This age group has demonstrated similar patterns of behaviour to adults with regards to IBA (eg Office of the e-Safety Commissioner 2017b; Powell, Henry & Flynn 2018). Additionally, since the wording of our messages was simple, we do not see any grounds for concerns about aged-based differences in literacy. Nor does there appear to be a sound reason to expect that the age-related differences observed by Zaikina-Montgomery (2011) might operate if our message was trialled with 15–17-year-olds. In Zaikina-Montgomery’s (2011) study, unlike the adult participants, adolescent participants appeared disinclined to believe a warning that police would be called after an attempt to access legal pornography. However, we see no reason for our message to stretch credulity in the minds of adolescents because our warning is a simple statement of fact: it is an offence in Australia to share sexual images of people who look under the age of 18 years.

Agencies developing messages specifically to target 15–17-year-olds would need to ensure that they adhered to the literature on message design. In our view, messages could be appropriate and beneficial for younger age groups, including those under the age of criminal responsibility—particularly if messages were used to assist children to increase their online safety and reduce the risks of victimisation. However, very little indeed is known about message design in this context and great care would be warranted.

In terms of the limitations of this study, as discussed the main drawback of our honeypot method is the lack of data it yields about our participants. However, as we have argued previously (Prichard et al. 2022), this limitation is a fair trade-off for the benefits we have identified above. Six participants in the control group did not arrive at the SMB landing page. Why this occurred is not clear. Slow connectivity or computer speed might have led to a delay of a few seconds, during which the participants lost interest and navigated away. We cannot discern whether similar factors affected any participants in the experimental groups. Future experiments using the honeypot method to test the effect of messages will need to identify whether additional data can be ethically collected about participants’ online behaviour while adequately protecting their anonymity.

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URLs correct as at December 2021


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