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Abstract | Victim-survivors of domestic and family violence (DFV) are increasingly using closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems. To date, the impacts of CCTV systems on victim-survivors have been unclear. This paper presents the findings from a world-first study into how victim-survivors of DFV experience the use of CCTV systems. It draws on a national survey of 125 DFV support practitioners and 28 in-depth interviews (including with 9 victim-survivors). The findings demonstrate that CCTV can have beneficial impacts on the wellbeing of victim-survivors by providing a sense of safety and security but also carries risks, including that victim-survivors will become hypervigilant.

The impacts of CCTV on victim-survivors of domestic and family violence

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In Australia, closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems are increasingly being used by victim-survivors of domestic and family violence (DFV). DFV organisations facilitate CCTV deployment for victim-survivors to provide them with a sense of safety and security in their homes and in women's shelters and refuges (see Breckenridge, Walden & Flax 2014; Harkin 2020; Prenzler & Fardell 2016). However, to date, the broader impacts of CCTV on victim-survivors, both positive and negative, have been unclear. This paper attempts to address this research gap by presenting the results of an original empirical study of the consequences of using CCTV for victim-survivors of DFV. Drawing from a national survey of 125 DFV practitioners and 28 interviews with DFV stakeholders ($n=15$), victim-survivors ($n=9$) and private security workers ($n=4$), this paper provides insight into how CCTV systems can lead to feelings of hypervigilance among some victim-survivors but can also provide peace of mind and, in turn, safety.



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General impacts of CCTV

CCTV systems are widely used as a general situational crime prevention strategy (Jung & Wheeler 2023). Research in the United Kingdom found that CCTV use is associated with a 16 percent decrease in crime (Piza et al. 2019: 137). CCTV tends to work best as a crime prevention mechanism when deployed alongside other strategies, such as improved lighting, signage and increased police patrol (La Vigne et al. 2011; Piza, Caplan & Kennedy 2014). Police often gather CCTV footage from public spaces for evidentiary purposes in criminal investigations (Ashby 2017; Morgan & Dowling 2019), and it may be used to verify witness accounts, identify offenders or gather potential witnesses (Levesley & Martin 2005; Morgan & Coughlan 2018). In theory, and in principle, CCTV may also support the prevention and prosecution of DFV.

Victim-survivors of DFV and CCTV

To date, there has been no in-depth study of the use of CCTV by victim-survivors of DFV, examining its positive and negative impacts. In general, the use of technology to provide safety and security to victim-survivors has been labelled a 'double-edged sword' (Bennett Moses et al. 2022). Forms of abuse victim-survivors often encounter include harassment and stalking online and via technology. These have serious short- and long-term consequences (see Woodlock et al. 2020). However, technology may also assist some victim-survivors to respond to and to prevent DFV in its various forms. Several studies have examined the use of technology as a means of 'fighting fire with fire' (Al-Alosi 2020: 1) or 'stalking the stalkers' (Eterovic-Soric et al. 2017: 278). Such studies argue that 'innovative uses of technology' (Al-Alosi 2020: 1) can help protect victim-survivors and that there is a 'need for technologies which empower victims' (Eterovic-Soric et al. 2017: 284). Technology is said to offer a range of potential solutions, responses, aids or opportunities for addressing DFV and supporting the needs of victim-survivors. This paper explores this idea with respect to CCTV deployment and its impacts on victim-survivors.

CCTV has evolved from being a crime prevention tool found mostly in public or commercial settings to being used in private homes or residential locations of victim-survivors. Other technological innovations that are being used to capture DFV include the deployment of police body-worn cameras (BWCs; see Iliadis et al. 2024; Iliadis et al. 2023; Iliadis et al. 2022; Vakhitova et al. 2023). Like CCTV systems, police BWC technologies can document objective evidence in 'real time' (Iliadis et al. 2023), which can be used to substantiate legal proceedings. However, the risks associated with BWC use have also been charted, revealing the technical and practical constraints that impact how the footage is read and understood. BWC footage also carries the risk of being used to facilitate the criminalisation of 'non-ideal' women in cases where perpetrators of DFV alter their image while being recorded (Iliadis et al. 2023).

While 'innovative uses of technology' can empower and protect victim-survivors (Al-Alosi 2020: 1), technology-based responses need 'strong support from human-based resources' (Harkin & Merkel 2023: 662) who understand the causes, impacts and manifestations of DFV in order to mitigate potential adverse consequences for victim-survivors. In this respect, it is not clear whether and how CCTV could be beneficial for victim-survivors of DFV.

The developing evidence base on CCTV and DFV from Breckenridge, Walden and Flax (2014), Prenzler and Fardell (2016) and Harkin (2020) suggests that CCTV may have benefits. Harkin (2020) found that DFV practitioners view CCTV systems favourably because of their capacity to show evidence of DFV. A police officer in Harkin's (2020: 83) study reported that CCTV footage was used 'five or six times' to secure prosecutions against offenders within a single small-scale trial program. Breckenridge, Walden and Flax (2014: 57) similarly suggest that CCTV has the 'dual benefit of providing both a sense of security for clients ... as well as providing vital evidence for police'. Previous research also identified that CCTV systems have potential positive outcomes for victim-survivors' psychological and emotional wellbeing. Victim-survivors in Breckenridge, Walden and Flax's (2014: 57) evaluation of the Staying Home Leaving Violence program in New South Wales, for example, noted an increase in 'peace of mind' in their everyday life. This finding was echoed in Harkin's (2020) research, in which a case manager stated that CCTV systems can help victim-survivors 'commit to a brighter future'.

Limited research has been conducted about the risks of CCTV systems. Poor-quality footage and installation and limited knowledge of CCTV systems among both DFV practitioners and victim-survivors emerged as concerns in Harkin's (2020) study. Harkin also identified issues related to data storage, data ownership and the impact of legislative requirements on the use of CCTV. In one incident, a private security company installed a CCTV system for a victim-survivor but later refused to provide footage of an assault until the DFV organisation that facilitated the installation paid the company more money (Harkin 2020: 45–47). It should be noted that technology-based solutions to DFV always have a variety of 'practical, technical and strategic limitations' (Harkin & Merkel 2023: 662). These include a lack of standards and regulation and challenges in their deployment (ie whether they are 'user-friendly'; Harkin & Merkel 2023: 659).

Despite the limitations of research and data on this issue, Commonwealth and state governments are investing in CCTV systems as a response to DFV (Andrews 2017; Department of Social Services 2023; NSW Government 2023a). In Australia, CCTV systems are installed either by victim-survivors or with whole or partial funding from the DFV sector. The CCTV systems are then run and managed by the victim-survivor, who usually has control over the data gathered from the CCTV system. The Australian Government provides funding to state and territory jurisdictions and to selected organisations under the Keeping Women Safe in their Homes initiative (Department of Social Services 2023). New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory have ongoing programs that offer strategies, including the use of CCTV systems, to maximise victim-survivors' safety (Domestic Violence Crisis Service nd; NSW Government 2023b; State of Victoria 2023, 2019; Tasmanian Government 2021; Women's Safety Services SA 2023; YWCA Australia nd). In Queensland, the state government committed \$3 million in 2023 to trial the Keeping Women Safe from Violence grant program (Queensland Government 2023). The Western Australian Government has recently rolled out the Katanning Keeping Safe Project as part of the Keeping Women Safe in their Homes initiative (Department of Social Services 2023). Despite government efforts to support victim-survivors through the provision of CCTV systems, research into the factors that may either positively influence or undermine the successful implementation of these systems remains limited.

The present study


This study examined the use of CCTV technology to offer safety and security to victim-survivors of DFV. The study was guided by the following overarching research question: can CCTV systems support the safety and security needs of victim-survivors of DFV?

To answer this research question, our study combined qualitative and quantitative research methods. These included a national survey of DFV practitioners throughout Australia—to gather attitudinal data about their perceptions of victim-survivors' use of CCTV—and semi-structured interviews with DFV practitioners, victim-survivors and private security workers to gather in-depth data about the risks and benefits of CCTV use and the factors that impact its success. This study was approved by Deakin University's Human Research Ethics Committee (reference number: 2022-086).

The national survey

Survey recruitment was facilitated by the Women's Services Network, which represents 350 different organisations in Australia that provide services and support to victim-survivors of DFV. The survey had 125 responses from DFV practitioners across at least 19 different DFV support service agencies. In our sample, 117 respondents had direct experience of supervising victim-survivor clients who had used CCTV. Eight respondents had no experience with supervising CCTV use, and one said that they did not know. Every state and territory was represented in the final sample of survey respondents, but there was a notable skew of responses from New South Wales and Victoria, which together account for 64 percent of responses ($n=80$), as Figure 1 shows.

Figure 1: Percentage of survey participants located in each Australian state or territory ($n=125$)



Interviews with DFV organisation representatives

To further unpack and understand the survey findings, follow-up interviews were conducted with 15 representatives of DFV organisations who had participated in the survey and had purchased and deployed CCTV systems. These interviews shed light on the impacts CCTV systems have had on victim-survivor clients. They also provided vital contextual information about the purchase, deployment and management of CCTV systems. DFV practitioners were located across all Australian states and territories except Tasmania. Practitioners predominantly resided in New South Wales ($n=4$) and Queensland ($n=4$), followed by Victoria ($n=3$). The other jurisdictions (SA, WA, ACT and NT) each had one participant ($n=1$).

Interviews with victim-survivors

Nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with victim-survivors to explore the nuances of how CCTV is integrated within their safety and security plans and to explore its impacts. Access to victim-survivors was negotiated through practitioners and organisations that identified suitable candidates for interview. This ensured that victim-survivors were not identified as being at risk of further violence. Victim-survivors must have had experience using CCTV to be eligible for interview. The interview questions explored what benefits were gained or risks were experienced as a result of having CCTV at their home; whether they would consider removing CCTV from their premises; and what logistical or practical issues (if any) were experienced from CCTV deployment. Victim-survivors were also asked how long they had been using CCTV for, whether its installation and costs were facilitated or covered by the DFV support sector and how they found the overall quality of the CCTV. Safe communication protocols were used before, during and after interviews, informing victim-survivors of their rights as participants. Risk mitigation strategies were also employed, including procedures to navigate discomfort: participants could elect to stop the interview, take a break, skip questions or redact parts of the interview. Participants were also provided with referrals to support services post-interview and reminded that they could engage with the DFV agency who had been supporting them. To recognise their participation in an interview, victim-survivors were remunerated with an honorarium.

Interviews with private security company representatives


DFV organisations identified four representatives of private security companies seen as providing quality CCTV and installation. These representatives were asked technical questions about the specifications of CCTV systems that are used, the installation procedures and the establishment of suitable data storage and access.

Results

Benefits of CCTV use reported by DFV practitioners and victim-survivors

The survey and interview data showed that CCTV deployment improves feelings of safety and security for victim-survivors. Among the DFV practitioners who had facilitated CCTV offerings for their clients, an overwhelming majority either 'somewhat agreed' or 'strongly agreed' that 'CCTV is a useful tool for victim-survivors of DFV to improve their safety and security' (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: DFV practitioners' views on whether CCTV is a useful tool to improve the safety and security of victim-survivors of DFV (%) (n=107)



Note: median='somewhat agree', IQR=1

DFV practitioners interviewed thought that CCTV provided 'peace of mind'. One stated:


I would say that the number one outcome from it is peace of mind, and my view is that that makes it absolutely 100 percent worth it. I think that ... the sense of safety that women we work with have at home after they get the CCTV, it's a profound impact. Even if the CCTV footage is never, ever used for evidence, it's so worth the cost of installing it ... I would say that probably 99 percent of our clients who have CCTV footage report a huge increase in how safe they feel in the home. (DFV practitioner 2)

Every victim-survivor interviewed reported that they experienced some extent of reassurance from the installation of CCTV; one commented:

It's just given me some peace of mind when I'm at work or when I'm not home or, yeah, just to be able to even sleep at night. (Victim-survivor 3)

Survey data showed that practitioners overwhelmingly agreed that CCTV is ‘likely’ or ‘very likely’ to ‘provide psychological “peace of mind” for the client’, as Figure 3 shows.

Figure 3: DFV practitioners’ ratings of the likelihood of CCTV providing ‘peace of mind’ for the victim-survivor client (%) (n=102)



Note: median='very likely', IQR=1

Notably, a victim-survivor participant identified that the benefits were not just confined to the victim-survivor; there were often positive flow-on effects for other family members, particularly children:

My daughter also has high anxiety and I do believe that she's a lot more safer and secure as well or feels it. (Victim-survivor 3)

CCTV was observed by practitioners to assist in easing victim-survivor fears about *potential* harm, as well as *actual* harm. This was explained by a DFV practitioner interviewed:

So if there's been numerous times where she's been really fearful and concerned that something might be happening, sometimes the cameras are able to show that that's not actually happening, which is just as helpful really as if something is happening because, you know, domestic violence is about inciting fear and planting those seeds of fear. Sometimes nothing is happening and to have that peace of mind to know, 'Oh, that's just a cat out there' whereas without the cameras, she will very quickly become convinced he's lurking around out there. (DFV practitioner 7)

DFV practitioner 9 stated that the CCTV cameras can even encourage women to continue living at home and not feel that they need to leave to prioritise their safety:


Sometimes I feel like it is actually keeping women safer and emotionally safer and reducing homelessness because they're not leaving—more than it's actually doing [for] perpetrator accountability. (DFV practitioner 9)

Three victim-survivors observed some limitations of CCTV systems in withstanding environmental factors. However, overall, they thought that the potential benefits contribute invaluable to one's sense of safety:

Look, the cameras are invaluable for making you have that sense of safety. For allowing you to monitor what's going on outside of your property without you having to set foot outside your property. In that sense they are fantastic. They fall down with environmental factors, they fall down when there are power outages, they'll fall down if anyone can access your hard unit, your hard drive unit or if they can access your power box. So there are tremendous emotional advantages to them but you have to ensure that everything else is also accounted for. (Victim-survivor 1)

CCTV has been used to support action against perpetrators

When asked to rank the primary benefits of CCTV from the most important to least important, 43 practitioners ranked 'to collect evidence that could be used in police action or criminal proceedings' as the most important benefit ($n=92$), as Figure 4 shows.



The survey and interview data from victim-survivors and DFV practitioners showed that CCTV was helping victim-survivors to capture footage of perpetrators' threatening or illegal behaviour that could be used as evidence in legal proceedings. Nine support workers and three victim-survivors indicated that, in their experience, CCTV footage had formed part of a police investigation:


In my experience CCTV has been incredible in actually assisting victim-survivors and the police in charging these perpetrators with restraining order breaches, where if there was no CCTV there never would have been a charge ... When CCTV is involved and it's really black and white that the perpetrator was there, it can just completely 180 and completely empower the victim-survivor and assist police as well in their job because it makes it a lot easier on them to prosecute these perpetrators. (DFV practitioner 4)

A victim-survivor also described how the CCTV footage assisted her on one occasion to provide evidence to police of the perpetrator's threatening behaviour:

I was able to show footage of him trying to get to the house, to the front door and his agitated manner. So I was able to show that footage to a police officer and he said, 'Okay,' he says, 'I see what you're saying.' (Victim-survivor 1)

The value of CCTV in capturing evidence of the perpetrator's threatening behaviour towards the victim-survivor was noted in the survey. DFV practitioners overwhelmingly believed that CCTV was either 'likely' or 'very likely' to 'collect evidence that could be used in police action or legal proceedings (including capturing evidence of breach of intervention orders)', as Figure 5 shows.

Figure 5: DFV practitioners' ratings of the likelihood that CCTV footage will be used as evidence for police action or legal proceedings (%) (n=101)



Note: median='likely', IQR=1

DFV practitioners and victim-survivors gave examples of how CCTV footage had supported legal proceedings, including the prosecution of perpetrators of DFV:

I did see a lot of convictions that were based predominantly around the video footage because that was the main source of evidence of what was happening. In particular with stalking, with physical assaults, even with strangulations that have occurred and then filmed on those cameras, property damage, wilful damage, other forms of assaults and those kinds of things. So they have been really helpful in that sense. (DFV practitioner 5)

DFV practitioner 7 described CCTV footage as providing 'spectacular [evidence] when they do breach' and noted 'numerous times of the video footage being used as evidence in court'. Others described witnessing 'many situations where perpetrators have been imprisoned because there has been evidence provided' (DFV practitioner 1). DFV practitioners also highlighted how police recognise the importance of CCTV in facilitating evidence collection and charges for breaches of intervention orders:


I was actually at the police station the other week and they said that without footage they wouldn't breach. So I think it would improve responses from police. (DFV practitioner 2)

These reflections show how the benefits of CCTV extend beyond 'peace of mind' for victim-survivors. CCTV also captures evidence, which can provide further protection to victim-survivors where that evidence is used to facilitate legal proceedings and prosecutions.

The risk of hypervigilance for victim-survivors


The use of CCTV systems for victim-survivors has risks that must be kept in mind. Forty-four of the DFV practitioners who had experience supervising clients using CCTV ($n=108$) indicated that they had encountered negative impacts of CCTV deployment for victim-survivors (see Figure 6). The primary negative impact of concern is that CCTV systems can lead to feelings of hypervigilance among victim-survivors.

Figure 6: Proportion of DFV practitioners who had encountered instances where CCTV had a negative impact on a client (%) ($n=108$)



We asked the 44 survey respondents who had encountered negative consequences to victim-survivors from CCTV deployment to indicate the number of occasions on which they had seen such problems occur (see Figure 7). Fifteen respondents reported that they had witnessed these negative impacts on 'five or more' occasions, illustrating that CCTV can pose considerable risks for victim-survivors deploying these systems.

Figure 7: Number of times a DFV practitioner witnessed CCTV having a negative impact on victim-survivor clients (where applicable) ($n=44$)



The most common concern associated with the deployment of CCTV systems for victim-survivors was that it could lead to feelings of hypervigilance—that is, the presence of a CCTV system in a victim-survivor’s residential location could amplify their anxiety rather than alleviating it. Six out of nine victim-survivors interviewed indicated that, at least initially, they experienced heightened anxiety, rather than alleviated anxiety, because of the presence of CCTV. One victim-survivor said:

The cameras also make me incredibly hypervigilant, seriously hypervigilant. So you’ve got that sense of safety but you’ve also got that sense where you are constantly monitoring 24/7 for security threats ... I’m constantly monitoring it to make sure he doesn’t come back ... Every time I leave the house, I spend the first half an hour to an hour reviewing all of the footage that I missed while I wasn’t at home, every time I leave the house just in case something has happened while I’ve not been home. (Victim-survivor 1)


This victim-survivor describes how CCTV use can lead to regular or excessive monitoring of footage, which can exacerbate feelings of discomfort and heighten feelings of victimisation and harm. Numerous DFV practitioners stated in the survey that ‘the biggest negative impact on our clients has been mental health related, when clients become hyper fixated on CCTV cameras’ (anonymous survey comment). Practitioners noted that the cameras could ‘create paranoia for clients’; ‘the camera’s made her more hesitant to leave the property’; and ‘some survivors of domestic and family violence report an increase in anxiety, worry, stress, insomnia, hypervigilance and fears for their safety’ (anonymous survey comments).

False alarms and notifications sent by the CCTV were identified by DFV practitioners in the survey as a potential trigger for anxiety. A DFV practitioner suggested:

Some survivors disclosed that when their camera systems which were motion activated, activated at night causing them to wake and experience significant fears that the person using violence was at their home. Clients reported that cameras may be activated by birds, animals or their own family and notifications that cameras were activated would cause distress. (Anonymous survey comment)

Other DFV practitioners also raised the issue that notifications triggered by unexpected visitors or ‘unknown doorknockers’, such as gas meter readers, could be alarming and anxiety-provoking for victim-survivors (anonymous survey comment). When asked about how likely it is that CCTV could cause clients to experience ‘hypervigilance’ (for example, checking the camera footage excessively, thereby triggering further anxiety and/or distress), DFV practitioners identified that this was a clear risk of CCTV use (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: DFV practitioners' views on the likelihood of CCTV causing clients to experience hypervigilance (%) (n=102)



Note: median='not sure', IQR=2

On the other hand, DFV practitioners observed that not all their clients experienced hypervigilance. Practitioners explained that some victim-survivors had experienced hypervigilance to begin with but then eventually found the cameras helpful, and their anxiety lessened.

I remember initially feeling like they increased my anxiety and I found myself constantly checking my phone through the night, so there were some sleepless nights in the beginning. I think when you have left something like domestic violence, it's really easy to fall back into those kind of moments of heightened anxiety with something like this ... I did ease into it slowly. I remember the first night, I actually got three or four hours' sleep and then woke up and having that instant anxiety of, 'I haven't checked my phone in a while.' I think it took a while to get used to trusting that it will let me know. (Victim-survivor 4)

Another victim-survivor described the same trajectory of 'relaxing' into the system over time:

I have got a bit ambivalent over time because there are so many notifications where it's nothing of interest, but certainly I will periodically sit down and do a quick review of the footage. So I think this year, I've been a bit more relaxed about it, whereas if you asked me 12 months ago, I would have been definitely checking things more often, you know, checking everything was working fine, checking all the downloads and what it detected and everything and notifications, even checking it when we weren't at home. Whereas I think now he's less likely to do something. (Victim-survivor 5)

The likelihood of hypervigilance significantly impacting on certain users of CCTV is a real concern. This risk must be accounted for by support services and addressed with victim-survivor clients to enable strategies to be employed to mitigate and manage these negative impacts and feelings, where possible.

The risk of CCTV aggravating perpetrators

An additional problem that can emerge with the use of cameras is that the introduction of the system can aggravate perpetrators or become a flashpoint or target of abusive behaviour. It was reported that perpetrators could target the CCTV system, to damage it, in the course of enacting other abusive behaviours:

I've had clients before where we've given them CCTV and it's been physically ripped from the wall ... sometimes CCTV can aggravate perpetrators, if they're rocking up at the house and they're seeing this sort of stuff it can escalate their behaviour. (DFV practitioner 4)

There was a report that a perpetrator 'got quite angry that the cameras were there' (DFV practitioner 7) and several reports that perpetrators either 'smashed her hard drive to her CCTV a couple of times' (DFV practitioner 8) or 'did a run through of her house and didn't touch the kids' stuff but stole the DVR [digital video recorder]' (DFV practitioner 9). Private security workers similarly stated that perpetrators often 'take the hard drive' (Private security worker 3). Another private security worker recounted:


As far as the systems are concerned, I think we've had maybe half a dozen instances where they've broken into the properties and they've just physically stolen the hard drive for the system and they take it. (Private security worker 1)

In some instances, perpetrators hacked into the footage or modified the CCTV system to capture the footage themselves. One victim-survivor reported that her perpetrator modified her system to have the footage remotely broadcast and was able to watch the footage without her knowledge or consent:

So I was made aware of that when one of his work associates told me he was watching me at work on his phone which blew me away. Because it was like the tables had been turned, I couldn't, in the depth of my mind I just couldn't fathom why he'd want to be doing that ... It's just a couple of weeks ago I located a piece of hardware in my home which I then took to the police which was confirmed to be a piece of equipment which you add to wired cameras to attach wi-fi cameras to. So even though my current CCTV is wired a few years back he's made a purchase of something which had turned it into a wi-fi and he's again been monitoring me without my knowledge. (Victim-survivor 1)

Despite these prospects of cameras aggravating perpetrators, 46 practitioners were 'not sure' and 40 considered it 'unlikely' or 'very unlikely' that cameras would increase the likelihood of DFV perpetration ($n=102$), as Figure 9 shows.

Figure 9: DFV practitioners' views on the likelihood of perpetrators increasing DFV perpetration as a result of CCTV use by the victim-survivor (%) (n=102)




Note: median='not sure', IQR=1

Conclusion

This study builds upon indicative evidence provided by Breckenridge, Walden and Flax (2014), Prenzler and Fardell (2016) and Harkin (2020) that CCTV can improve the safety and security of victim-survivors of DFV. It shows that CCTV can produce beneficial outcomes for victim-survivors, such as peace of mind, safety and security. Other notable benefits include capturing evidence of a perpetrator's behaviour on CCTV footage, which can be used to support legal proceedings. However, the risks associated with CCTV use were also documented. These include the potential for CCTV systems to cause feelings of hypervigilance among victim-survivors and the possibility that CCTV systems will aggravate perpetrators or act as a site for further abuse. Consideration should also be given to developing training or guidance alongside engagement with DFV healing and recovery programs that can support clients who may experience CCTV-related hypervigilance or anxiety in addition to other forms of abuse. Ultimately, despite the identified risks, Figure 10 shows that most DFV practitioners expressed strong support for using CCTV as a response to DFV.

Figure 10: DFV practitioner support for CCTV as a response to DFV (%) (n=107)



Note: median='strongly agree', IQR=1

Considering the implications of the findings of this study for practice and policy, CCTV cannot be seen as a standalone solution to DFV that delivers safety and security to victim-survivors. However, with caution and with guidance from the DFV support sector, the use of CCTV systems can help to address victim-survivor safety and security concerns. Further, a one-size-fits-all approach will not work. The DFV sector needs to provide tailored support when deploying CCTV in victim-survivors' homes or residential locations. To achieve this, the DFV support and advocacy sector requires adequate funding and resources, as well as training and guidance, informed by an understanding of the risks of providing CCTV to victim-survivors, as this study has outlined.

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