Organisation

Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability

Report

Australia’s participation in the Pine Gap enterprise

Australian participation in the operation of Pine Gap is effectively complete, with access to all areas of the base except the US National Cryptographic Room. The senior Australian Defence officials who negotiated the original implementing agreement with the CIA sought and obtained access to all...
Report

The antennas of Pine Gap

Antennas are the most readily available and visible evidence of the existence, character, and size of signals intelligence facilities that operate or monitor space systems. Coupled with data on the timing of developments in US geosynchronous satellite programs, the timing of antenna installation now permits...
Report

Managing operations at Pine Gap

The management of operations at the Pine Gap facility has become increasingly complex as the functions of the station have expanded, the number of agencies involved has grown, and the demands of a wider range of ‘users’ or ‘customers’ for the provision of ‘actionable intelligence’...
Journal article

The Slovakian “Inspirasi” for Indonesian nuclear power: the “success” of a permanently failing organization

The most curious and telling episode in more than four decades of Indonesia’s nuclear power planning was the nuclear establishment’s promotion of the tiny European country of Slovakia as an “inspiration” and national industrial partner for a proposed Bangka Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).
Report

The SIGINT satellites of Pine Gap: conception, development and in orbit

Pine Gap’s initial and still principal importance to the United States lies in its role as a ground control and processing station for geosynchronous signals intelligence satellites. Nine geosynchronous SIGINT (signals intelligence) satellites have been operated by Pine Gap over the past 45 years. That...