Are we responsible for our beliefs? This is not - just - the question whether we can be culpably ignorant; if we can be morally responsible for our beliefs, then we might also be praiseworthy for some of them. Examining the extent to which we can be responsible for our beliefs promises to deepen our...

In this paper Janna Thompson concentrates on 'reconciliation' - its adequacy, meaning and requirements. But, because the possibility of reconciliation as acknowledgment and recompense for past wrongs depends on an idea of collective responsibility which, she uses the debate about apology to explain why citizens have a responsibility for making recompense for historical injustices committed...

Tom Campbell argues that, outside the confines of a fairly conservative common law methodology, "judicial activism" can be so wrong as to be treasonable. He argues that it is a breach of trust and an abuse of judicial power that undermines the foundations of constitutional democracy.

War is so obviously a bad thing that pacifism, which is defined by its hostility to war, would seem, on the face of it, to be a morally attractive position. Yet recent philosophical discussions of pacifism have tended to be unsympathetic, if not downright dismissive. In this paper Andrew Alexandra aims to demonstrate that pacifism...

Most theorists agree that a theory of justice ought to be practical. Janna Thompson argues that there is no theory of global justice that is both morally adequate and realistic. Those that are adequate as far as their moral content is concerned are unrealistic, and those that are realistic do not satisfy our moral intuitions...