As Australia prepares its 2026 National Defence Strategy, the nation must recognise that a window of strategic risk exists now and will do so into the early 2030s. 

This paper explores asymmetric methods of deterrence and asks whether they might be appropriate for Australia. These methods are organised under the term unconventional deterrence to differentiate them from traditional concepts of conventional and nuclear deterrence, which broadly conform to deterrence-by-punishment or deterrence-by-denial logic. 

Today’s technologies – along with the emergent realities of information and influence operations in a post-industrial information age – offer new asymmetries, new ways to create and apply both military and non-military elements of national power, and thus new mechanisms to deter beyond-peer adversaries from armed aggression.

This paper explores those options, offering the concept of unconventional deterrence as an organising principle for special operations, cyber and other specialised capabilities that might be rapidly fielded by Defence and other agencies, and could best be orchestrated through an empowered National Security Adviser reporting directly to the National Security Committee of Cabinet.