Introduction

On the morning of 5 July 2016, one day before the end of Ramadan, a suicide bomber named Nur Rohman blew himself up at the Solo police compound in Central Java. No one else was killed. Nur Rohman’s journey from anti-vice activist to would-be terrorist took place through the efforts of Bahrum Naim, an Indonesian with ISIS in Syria. The story of his radicalisation provides insights into how ISIS has been able to tap into old networks for new purposes.

Nur Rohman’s story is also an example of an anti-vice organisation crossing over from vigilantism -- attacking bars and nightclubs in the name of protecting Islamic values -- to terrorism. This has happened often enough in Indonesia to be a source of concern, especially when it is clear that an important factor in the process is the outsourcing of religious instruction by vigilante leaders to radical clerics. Where the vigilantes themselves are seen as ustadz (Islamic teachers), the crossover is much less likely to take place.

Nur Rohman’s ignominious death underscores the low capacity of Indonesian terrorists. Far from being glorified as a martyr, he was ridiculed even on radical social media. One person wrote, “Couldn’t even fast for 30 days, worse than an elementary school child.” At some point, the failure of one plot after another will push an enterprising extremist leader to try and fix the problem through more sophisticated training. It is clear than instruction via encrypted messaging sites does not produce the desired skills, and Indonesians in Syria have to be asking themselves about what options they can pursue for better results.