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How do platforms respond to user-reports of electoral process misinformation?

An experimental evaluation from the lead-up to Australia’s referendum
Publisher
Digital platforms Social media Digital communications Code of conduct Deepfakes Election campaigns Election results Referendum Political campaigns Disinformation and misinformation Australia
Description

This investigation set out to explore whether platforms remove electoral process misinformation when they are made aware of it via user-reporting. The researchers found, reported and monitored a small number of posts on TikTok (25), Facebook (24) and X (formerly Twitter) (50), that contained clear electoral process misinformation. This content largely centred around claims that Australian elections had been rigged, that ballots had or would be stolen, or that the Voice referendum vote was invalid or illegal. Electoral process misinformation stands to harm both the Yes and No campaigns.

According to each platform’s community guidelines, this type of content, once detected, should be:

  • TikTok: Removed.
  • Facebook: Demoted in prevalence.
  • X: Either removed or labelled.

However, the researchers found that none of the platforms are effectively enforcing their community guidelines, nor are they implementing meaningful responses based on their requirements under the Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation.

Publication Details
Access Rights Type:
open