In August 2023, the United States Studies Centre conducted a public opinion survey in Australia, the United States and Japan, to understand the public sentiment in each nation on a variety of issues one year out from the 2024 US presidential election.

Since the previous iteration of polling by the United States Studies Centre (USSC) in October 2022, uncertainty about Beijing’s intentions continued with growing tensions over Taiwan; Australia’s Defence Strategic Review delivered a bleak assessment of the nation’s military preparedness and shortened warning time before a major conflict; Australia and Japan committed to the greatest levels of investment in their respective defences since the Second World War; the US Congress increased its focus on the region with the formation of a new select committee on China; and the business community quietly embraced 'de-risking' in the face of new export control rules by Washington and increased political pressure on investors within China. The level of unease was only exacerbated by US political discord, with the 2022 US midterm elections delivering one of the tightest-ever House majorities by the Republican Party; the historic first-ever ousting of a US House Speaker; a criminal mugshot from a former president; two near encounters with congressional fiscal cliffs; and highly politicised investigations into the two leading candidates for the presidential election next year.

With just over a year remaining before the 2024 US presidential election, one might expect from these trends a deepening public pessimism about US alliances in Australia and Japan. Yet, USSC polling in 2023 reveals a strikingly positive picture about the future for cooperation and partnership between the United States and its allies.

Key findings:

• Negative views of Beijing persist across all three countries, but fewer Australians see war with China as likely.
• While US alliances remain important to all three publics, American and Australian publics are slightly less positive about them than last year.
• Australian, American and Japanese publics continue to favour robust responses to Chinese aggression.
• AUKUS is broadly supported by all three publics, particularly in Australia — even if Australians believe it will lock them into supporting the United States in a conflict.
• Despite a year of turmoil in Washington, views of US political dysfunction remain largely unchanged while the impact of the US 2024 election on Asian alliances may be less significant than anticipated.