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Parliament and regulators: how select committees can better hold regulators to account

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Government accountability Parliamentary scrutiny Regulation Government regulatory policy United Kingdom
Description

The UK’s new post-Brexit regulatory responsibilities and powers are not matched by adequate levels of parliamentary scrutiny – with almost a third of UK regulators not scrutinised by parliament since the 2019 general election.

This report says a focus on high-profile regulatory controversies – such as Ofgem’s role in the June 2021 collapse of 29 energy companies or the Environment Agency and Ofwat’s response to raw sewage spills – leads parliament to take an overly reactive approach to scrutiny.

As a result, a clear majority of regulators are almost never examined in a meaningful way by parliamentarians on vital issues such as their objectives, performance, and plans to mitigate future risks, with regulators often only called in front of parliament once a problem hits the front pages.

This report sets out how select committees can perform this important task more effectively, underpinned by a realistic assessment of parliament’s capacity, the support parliamentarians need and the tasks that only parliament can perform.

Recommendations in brief:

These interconnected recommendations that, taken together, would clarify where accountability sits, help parliament to focus its efforts where they are most needed while ensuring others do the rest, and support parliament to conduct its work more effectively. The key recommendations are as follows: 

  • The government should compile – and maintain – a public list of statutory regulators, summarising their functions and powers and the respective roles of parliament, ministers, departments and other organisations in overseeing each body. 
  • The House of Commons Liaison Committee should reintroduce a specific core task to examine the work of regulators for departmental select committees. 
  • The relevant Commons select committee should hold a general scrutiny session with each regulator at least once per parliament to review its remit, statutory objectives and powers, relationships with central government and parliament, and whether it is upholding the public interest. If it does not, the committee should explain why.
  • The House of Lords Industry and Regulators Committee should invite members of the relevant Commons select committee to participate in public evidence sessions and private deliberations when they hear from, or inquire into, specific regulators. 
  • A bicameral Regulatory Oversight Support Unit (ROSU) should be established in parliament to provide expert resource for both Commons and Lords committees. The unit would be made up of parliamentary staff and secondees. It would provide advice, training and practical support to enable parliamentary committees to scrutinise regulators more effectively. 
  • In preference to a new oversight body, the National Audit Office (NAO) should meet parliament’s expectations of greater regulatory oversight to the extent that its constitution allows. It should also work with parliamentarians to determine what reform of its remit, objectives, powers and resources would be required to meet their expectations fully.
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