While you’re here… help us stay here.

Are you enjoying open access to policy and research published by a broad range of organisations? Please donate today so that we can continue to provide this service.


This report discusses the impact on journalists of the operation of section 35P of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act) concerning offences for the disclosure of information relating to a special intelligence operation (SIO).


The impact of section 35P on journalists is twofold:

A. It creates uncertainty as to what may be published about the activities of ASIO without fear of prosecution. The so-called chilling effect of that uncertainty is exacerbated because it also applies in relation to disclosures made to editors for the purpose of discussion before publication.

B. Journalists are prohibited from publishing anywhere at any time any information relating to an SIO, regardless of whether it has any, or any continuing, operational significance and even if it discloses reprehensible conduct by ASIO insiders.


The basic problem with section 35P is that it does not distinguish between journalists and others (outsiders) and ASIO insiders. The application in this manner of broad secrecy prohibitions to outsiders is not satisfactorily justified, including by precedents in Australia or elsewhere.

The SIO scheme is necessary and proportionate to the present threats to security. The statutory and administrative procedures in force are appropriate safeguards against abuse. A secrecy provision relating to the scheme is not inappropriate. However, section 35P is not justified. It does not contain adequate safeguards for protecting the rights of outsiders and is not proportionate to the threat of terrorism or the threat to national security.

Section 35P is arguably invalid on the basis that it infringes the constitutional protection of freedom of political communication. Section 35P is also arguably inconsistent with article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and so not in accordance with Australia’s international obligations.

Three basic flaws need to be addressed. The first is the absence of an express harm requirement for breach (of the basic offence) by a journalist or other third party. The second is that recklessness is the fault element in relation to the circumstance described in section 35P(2)(c)(ii) (that is, in relation to the latter harm requirement in the aggravated offence). The third is the prohibition of disclosure of information already in the public domain.


Section 35P should be redrafted to treat insiders and outsiders separately, with one part dealing with third parties and another part dealing with insiders. There should be a basic offence (penalty five years imprisonment) and an aggravated offence (penalty 10 years imprisonment) in relation to both insiders and outsiders.


The basic offence and the aggravated offences for insiders would be as per current section 35P.


The basic offence for outsiders would have the same elements as section 35P(1), but with the additional physical element that the disclosure of the information will endanger the health or safety of any person or prejudice the effective conduct of an SIO. Recklessness would be the default fault element in relation to this last physical element.

The aggravated offence for outsiders would have the same elements as section 35P(2) except that the fault element for (c)(ii) should be knowledge rather than recklessness (in other words, the fault element for the circumstance that the disclosure will endanger the health or safety of any person or prejudice the effective conduct of the operation should be specified to be knowledge).

There should be a defence of prior publication (not available to a member or ex-member of the intelligence and security services in respect of information available to them in that capacity).

Publication Details
Access Rights Type: