Now in its third year, the UTS:ACRI/BIDA Poll 2023 by the Australia-China Relations Institute and the Centre for Business Intelligence & Data Analytics at the University of Technology Sydney takes the Australian public’s pulse on prominent aspects of, and recent events pertinent to, the Australia-China relationship. Through so doing it hopes to build a better understanding of the relationship’s immediate past as well as the trends which may shape its future.

It examines how views have changed over the years since the inaugural 2021 poll. It also tracks opinions in relation to five demographic areas: age groups, state/territory of residence, education, geographical location (urban or rural) and which political party the respondent nominated as best placed to handle Australia’s China policy.

This year’s results reflect the view that the Australia-China relationship has made progress towards stabilisation, but aspirations for the future of the relationship continue to lie alongside apprehension and anxiety.

Four key themes appear to emerge from this year’s results:

The pragmatic thread in Australia-China relations endures but it continues to find itself under strain. The fundamental desire for a strong relationship with China remains despite persistently high levels of mistrust in Australia towards the Chinese government, ongoing and acute fears that Beijing poses a security threat to Australia, and majority support, although decreasing over the years, for a tougher government line towards the PRC. Moreover, Australians have expressed a clear preference for strengthening the bilateral relationship and continue to identify its benefits, particularly in tourism and higher education. There is a certain optimism, too, that the relationship will continue to improve, with responsibility for improvement lying with both nations, although many still believe the onus to make that happen remains with China.

The Albanese Labor government’s policy of ‘stabilising’ the relationship with Beijing appears to be aligned with public sentiments. The Australian Labor Party is gaining domestic political advantage from being seen as the better party to manage the relationship, and statecraft is perceived as preferable to megaphone diplomacy in terms of how the relationship is conducted in public. At the same time, there is no real groundswell of support for much movement in the relationship beyond stabilisation. The poll results revealed only lukewarm support for China’s membership of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), continued encouragement for Australian businesses and companies to diversify their trade, ongoing deep suspicion of Chinese foreign investment, and a belief that the Chinese company Landbridge should be compelled to sell the Port of Darwin back to the government.

Australians continue to approach the regional environment with a mixture of apprehension and ambivalence. Many see China as a threat, feel anxious about its intentions and military build-up, especially in the South China Sea, and believe war is possible within three years. At the same time, half of those polled believe a stable Australia-China relationship is a net positive for achieving what Foreign Minister Penny Wong has called a ‘regional strategic equilibrium’. The poll results also suggest Australians are still thinking about who carries the most influence in the region. Australians do worry, however, that the choice they have long wished to avert – that between its largest trading partner and its closest ally – may well be coming. Most believe that it will be Beijing that forces Australia’s hand, but an increasing proportion believe it will be Washington. Just over half of the respondents said that if America is engaged in a war with China over Taiwan, Australia will be there. But 49 percent advocate neutrality. It suggests that an Australian government could not count on blanket popular support in the event of making the decision to join a US-led war with China over Taiwan. And Australians are still thinking about the decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-United States) security partnership, with opinions divided as to whether the plan will help keep Australia secure from military threat from China - 44 percent agree and 33 percent disagree.

The residual fears and concerns about China continue to permeate public opinion. Such concerns took deeper root in the Australian psyche at the height of the downturn in bilateral relations from 2017-2022. These are clearly reflected in the poll findings which show ongoing reservations about Australian business ties with China – concerns that many respondents linked to China’s human rights record. There is anxiety, too, that the Australia-Chinese community could be mobilised to serve Beijing’s ends; that foreign interference remains a live issue. Many Australians believe that the Australian government should sanction those Chinese officials and entities involved in human rights abuses; that Chinese social media platforms such as TikTok and WeChat should be banned; and that Chinese ownership of Australian agricultural assets and residential real estate remain problematic. Some of those polled still judge Australia to be too economically reliant on China. However, most continue to believe that the relationship offers more economic opportunities than risks.