This article looks at constitutional and contractual resolutions to central-local relations, looking to see in what ways each approach could benefit the power and autonomy of local councils. 

Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Andrew Butler recently released their draft constitution for New Zealand, which joins a rich body of work on the subject of constitutional reform. It is in the area of local government that the document departs from much of the literature and the current government’s thinking on this important sector.

In short, Palmer and Butler propose that local government’s place in New Zealand’s decision-making structure be reorganised along localist lines, as seen in many European democracies. In these countries local authorities have their own distinct place in the constitution that is independent from that of central government. Palmer and Butler call for decision-making power to be based on the principle of subsidiarity, where decisions are made at the lowest appropriate level.

As such, where government is concerned, local bodies would make local decisions, regional bodies would make regional decisions, and central bodies would be concerned with national-level decisions.

The proposed settings bear a close resemblance to the constitutional structure of the Netherlands and Switzerland, two countries whose governance arrangements are structured on a bottom-up rather than top-down basis (Krupp, 2016, pp.17-31).

Aside from Palmer and Butler’s proposed constitutional reforms the author suggests that contractual reforms such as those undertaken by the UK Government in Greater Manchester would fix the dysfunctional aspects of the relationship between central government and local authorities created by New Zealand structures. This relationship is characterised by poor lines of accountability and overlapping regulatory responsibilities.