Since its emergence in late 2019, coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has become a global pandemic that is impacting on human health and national economies. The World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 to be a ‘public health emergency of international concern’ on 30 January 2020. From January 2020 the Australian Government commenced the introduction of a range of policies and measures in response to the emergence of COVID-19, including international travel restrictions. Despite the imposition of international travel restrictions, on average over 41,000 travellers (excluding crew and transit passengers) entered Australia and over 56,000 departed Australia by air each month in the 2020–21 financial year.

In Australia, responsibility for human biosecurity generally is shared between the Australian Government and state and territory governments. On behalf of the Australian Government, the Department of Health (Health) is responsible for managing human biosecurity risks at the international border. Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment (DAWE) Biosecurity Officers (BOs) perform duties on behalf of Health at international airports, including working with Human Biosecurity Officers (HBOs) from state and territory health authorities to manage the risks associated with international air travellers. Other Australian Government entities involved in managing human biosecurity risks for international air travellers during the pandemic have included the Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs), including the Australian Border Force (ABF), and the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications.

The audit objective was to assess the effectiveness of the management of human biosecurity for international air travellers during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Key findings:

• Management of human biosecurity for international air travellers during COVID-19 by the Australian government has been largely effective.
• Human biosecurity operations for international air travel have been largely supported by good governance such as appropriate agreements and effective stakeholder communication. Arrangements under a 2017 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Health and DAWE to respond to a human biosecurity emergency were not agreed at the start of the pandemic. Mandatory training was not completed by all HBOs and BOs.
• The administration of routine human biosecurity measures has been partly effective during the pandemic. Roles and responsibilities for enhanced health screening were initially not clear, and roles and responsibilities for exit screening were not aligned with legislation. While the introduction of electronic traveller with illness checklists (eTICs) has improved the effectiveness of traveller screening, regulatory records maintained by DAWE are unreliable and cannot demonstrate that BOs have correctly administered routine human biosecurity measures.