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What strategy should the United States use to deter China from using force against Taiwan? Some argue that deterrence requires convincing China that it would lose in a military contest, a strategy known as deterrence by denial. An alternative strategy, deterrence by punishment, attempts to convince China that even if it could win, the costs of trying would be so great that they would outweigh any possible gains.
Policy-makers should choose a strategy by analysing its costs and risks, balanced against the extent of the U.S. interests at stake. This policy brief concludes that the costs and risks of deterrence by denial are not justified on the basis of U.S. interests. Although there are many compelling reasons to prefer that Taiwan remain democratic and retain its affinity with the West, these outcomes are not so vital as to merit a strategy for which the immediate consequence of failure is high-end war with a nuclear-armed adversary.
A strategy of deterrence by punishment, by comparison, is pragmatic. It retains options for U.S. policy-makers even if it fails — it neither produces immediate war, nor precludes a subsequent decision to go to war either to defend against or to expel an aggressor. So too is there reason for measured optimism that deterrence by punishment will work. The United States has real leverage, and an increasingly resolute set of partners, with which to convince China that aggression will be enormously costly.